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Dosenrode, Søren

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World War 1
The Great War and its Impact

Edited by
Søren Dosenrode

AALBORG UNIVERSITY PRESS
World War 1
The Great War and its Impacts

Edited by Søren Dosenrode

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Introduction

Søren Dosenrode

The Great War belongs to modern world history’s most important periods, only rivaled by the Thirty Years’ War and its peace agreement in Westphalia in 1648. The Great War lasted – according to common history writing – from August 1914 until November 1918, but it arguably lasted until the implosion of the Soviet Empire in November 1989, with the 1920s and 1930s only being perceived as a fragile and unruly truce before war broke out again in 1939 (lasting until 1945), and the Cold War, with its proxy wars, broke out in 1947 (lasting until 1989).

The people fighting in the trenches of Flanders came from America, Africa, Asia, Oceania and Europe. Those who fell left their families and friends in their home countries in those continents, and those coming back were marked for life by their experiences. At the macro level, the results of the War impacted on the whole world: from the rise of Japan, the move of economic power from Europe to the United States of America, the construction of the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the transferal of German colonies to the victorious powers via the League of Nations, not to mention the Russian Revolution and the developments in inter alia Germany smoothing the path for World War 2 and the Cold War. As the analysis in the coming chapters will show, not only the twentieth century was marked by the War: the traces can be followed into the twenty-first century, too.

George F. Kennan described World War 1 as “The greatest seminal catastrophe of this century”, but the real understanding of the War first occurs in the German translation, which calls the War Urkatastrophe, as Sørensen (2005) reminds us. Urkatastrophe means the beginning, the mother of the catastrophes which were to come and which were to define the largest part of the twentieth century.

Winston Churchill wrote of the War (1938: 2):

“The Great War through which we have passed differed from all ancient wars in the immense power of the combatants and their fear-
ful agencies of destruction, and from all modern wars in the utter ruthlessness with which it was fought. All the horrors of all the ages were brought together, and not only armies but whole populations were thrust into the midst of them.”

One of several reasons why the War left such an impact was that it was not expected. Since the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), there had not been war in core-Europe. There had been crisis like the First Moroccan Crisis (Tangier Crisis) in 1905 and the Second Moroccan Crisis (Agadir Crisis) in 1911, and then the two Balkan Wars 1912 and 1913 respectively but not in Mainland Europe. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, war was not seen as a possibility, humankind had turned too civilized. Churchill captures this well when describing the British government, of which he was himself at times a member, during the ten years leading up to the War (1938: 13): “The British Government and the Parliament out of which it sprang, did not believe in the approach of a great war, and were determined to prevent it; but at the same time the sinister hypothesis [of a war] was continually present in their thoughts”.

As will be repeated over and over in this book, is it hard to overestimate the importance of World War 1 on our present day world. It is hardly necessary to note that interest in World War 1 is still very much alive, as has been manifested in a number of publications commemorating the centenary of the outbreak of the War: the centenary of the Battle of Passchendaele in 2017. A short survey on the internet in autumn 2018 (the centenary of the armistice on 11 November 1918) displayed a host of events in the form of parades, church services, concerts, and exhibitions especially in Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, showing that the memory and the importance of the Great War is still very much alive.

In this book, we will analyze the War itself and trace its impacts. This will be done using an interdisciplinary approach, which is the best way to get a broad understanding of the War, as the aim is to do a comprehensive ‘360 degree’ analysis of the impacts, finding them in culture, economy, politics, and technology.

The interdisciplinary approach is the hallmark of Aalborg University, and thus it has been obvious to find contributors there among scholars who are experts within the various fields covered and who also are used to the interdisciplinary approach. In this sense, one might describe this anthology as an Aalborg book.
The book is divided into three major parts. In the first one, the frame and raison d’être of the book is presented: the prelude, the course, and the end of the War are analyzed. In the second part, the book turns to analyzing the impact of the War; the War’s impact on literature, technology, economy, and foreign relations is concretely analyzed. The third part consists of one chapter integrating the previous analysis, tracing the impacts of World War I. Having this structure, the book aims at giving a comprehensive introduction to World War I.

**Acknowledgements**

We would like to extend thanks to the Head and Vice Head of the of the Department of Culture and Global Studies at Aalborg University – Marianne Rostgaard and Lise-Lotte Holmgreen – for the Department’s generous support which made the publication of this work possible. We are also grateful to Aalborg University Library which, as always, has been helpful and quick in obtaining necessary materials. Aalborg University Press (AUP) consented to publishing this book which we are very happy about, as the book is written in Aalborg’s interdisciplinary tradition and AUP is the natural place to publish it. Fruitful and constructive feedback was given by anonymous peer reviewers, as well as Professor Alan Sharp from Ulster University: thank you! Ashley Kim Stewart, MSc, undertook the task of language revision. Professor Li Xing yielded good collegial support and advice, and Christina Dosenrode, BA, helped her father overcome the peculiarities of references and layout.

**Dedication**

This book is dedicated to our children and our students in the utopian hope that they might learn something of the past’s mistakes, and avoid repeating them.

Søren Dosenrode
Hjermitslevgaard
November 11th, 2018
References


Endnotes

1 In spite of the Balkans not being part of core Europe, the area had been very much at the heart of pre-World War 1 European diplomacy since the two wars there – and would again cause deep embarrassment to the EU when, in the 1990s, it required the US’ and NATO’s assistance to sort out the post-Yugoslav problems.

2 Routledge re-issued fifteen volumes relating to World War 1 in 2014, some of which were first published as far back as the 1960s. Concerning Passchendaele, see for example, Paul Ham’s Passchendaele – The Battle that nearly lost the Allies the War, Chris McNab’s Passchendaele 1917 – The Third Battle of Ypres in Photographs, or Nick Lloyd’s Passchendaele – A New History. A number of publications will also arrive by November 2018.
Chapter 1

An age of security?

Søren Dosenrode

“The first world war was a watershed, not only in people’s lives, but also in politics and culture, even when a façade of normalcy was restored after the war.”

(Mosse 1986: 492)

A. J. P. Taylor introduces his famous book “From Sarajevo to Potsdam” (1966: 9) with the following description of Europe:

“In 1914 Europe was a single civilized community, more so even than at the height of the European Empire. A man could travel across the length and breadth of the Continent without a passport until he reached the frontiers of Russia and the Ottoman Empire. He could settle in a foreign country for work or leisure without legal formalities except, occasionally, some health requirements. Every currency was as good as gold, though this security rested ultimately on the skill of financiers in the City of London.”

And he goes on, stressing the similarities which prevailed.

A general war did not seem likely, and was unwanted. Norman Angell attempted to “prove” a European war’s impossibility in his pamphlet “The Great Illusion” from 1909 (and extended it into a book of the same name in 1912). In his analysis, he argues that the economic integration of the European countries had grown to such a degree that war between them would be entirely futile, thus making militarism obsolete. Norman Angell sums up his thesis in the following words (1913: ix):

“What are the fundamental motives that explain the present rivalry of armaments in Europe, notably the Anglo-German? Each nation
pleads the need for defence; but this implies that someone is likely to attack, and has therefore a presumed interest in so doing. What are the motives which each State thus fears its neighbors may obey?"

The motives, according to Angell (1913), are based on the idea that a nation has to follow a territorial expansionist policy to create the best situation for itself. And he goes on, (1913: x):

“The author challenges this whole doctrine. He attempts to show that it belongs to a stage of development out of which we have passed; that the commerce and industry of a people no longer depend upon the expansion of its political frontiers; that a nation’s political and economic frontiers do not now necessarily coincide; that military power is socially and economically futile, and can have no relation to the prosperity of the people exercising it; that it is impossible for one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another – to enrich itself by subjugating, or imposing its will by force on another; that, in short, war, even when victorious, can no longer achieve those aims for which peoples strive.”

In his famous novel “Die welt von Gestern” (The World of Yesterday) of 1947, Stefan Zweig described the previous two decades before the outbreak of World War 1 as an era of “security” where no one really believed in the possibility of a larger, general war. Yes, there had been smaller wars on the outskirts of Europe, but not in “core Europe”; man had become too civilized for that (Zweig 1947: 13):

“When I attempted to find a simple formula for the period in which I grew up, prior to the First World War I hope that I convey its fullness by calling it the Golden Age of Security. Everything in our almost thousand year-old Austrian monarchy seemed based on permanency, and the State itself was the chief guarantor of this stability. [...] In this vast empire [Austria-Hungary] everything stood firmly and immovably in its appointed place, and at its head was the aged emperor; and were he to die, one knew (or believed) another would come to take his place, and nothing would change in the well-regulated order. No one thought of wars, of revolutions, or revolts. All that was radical, all violence, seemed impossible in an age of reason.”

Norman Angell and others like him recognized that there is an old logic concerning “territorial expansion” and the “exercise of political force
against others”, although he finds it “futile”. The wish for peace prevails. This love for peace is also described by General Friedrich von Bernhardi, who wrote “Deutschland und die nächste Krieg” (Germany and the Next War) in 1912… and he dislikes it (1914: 9):

“The value of war for the political and moral development of mankind has been criticized by large sections of the modern civilized world in a way which threatens to weaken the defensive powers of States by undermining the warlike spirit of the people. Such ideas are widely disseminated in Germany, and whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal enthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history.”

Bernhardi himself adheres to the old territorial logic (1914: 11):²

“Under the many-sided influence of such views and aspirations [the wish for peace], we seem entirely to have forgotten the teaching which once the old German Empire received with “astonishment and indignation” from Frederick the Great, that “the rights of States can only be asserted by the living power”; that what was won in war can only be kept by war; and that we Germans, cramped as we are by political and geographical conditions, require the greatest efforts to hold and to increase what we have won. […]. We are accustomed to regard war as a curse, and refuse to recognize it as the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power.”

The texts just quoted describe the feeling of security which prevailed in the majority of the population in Europe, although not in the military elites and parts of the diplomacy. An arms race had been going on for years among the countries of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Social Darwinism inspired some politicians, officers, and groups of nationalists to pursue aggressive rearmament and to further nationalism. However, as late as the summer of 1914, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, had instructed his private secretary to make confidential enquiries in Berlin so as to explore the possibility of an Anglo-German rapprochement (Neilson 2014). No one wanted a general war (cf. Knudsen, Chapter 3, this book), and it could have been avoided.

MacMillan also describes the disbelief and shock which followed the outbreak of war in her important 2013 monograph (xxvii):
“The coming of war took most Europeans by surprise and their initial reaction was disbelief and shock. They had grown used to peace; the century since the end of the Napoleonic Wars had been the most peaceful one Europe had known since the Roman Empire. True, there had been wars, but these had been far-off colonial ones like the Zulu wars in southern Africa, on the periphery of Europe like the Crimean War, or short and decisive like the Franco-Prussian War”.3

It is exactly the disruption of the feeling of safety, progress, and wealth which made the outbreak and result of the War so paradigmatic in European – indeed, world – history.

The War shook Europe, leaving the continent crippled. G. M. Trevelyan describes the feeling on the evening of August 3, 1914, the day Great Britain went to war (in Johnson 1989: 177): “That night, as the lamps were being lit in the summer dusk, [sir Edward] Grey standing in the windows of his room in the Foreign Office overlooking St James’s Park, said to a friend: ‘The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime.’”

And, in a figurative sense, he was right. The outbreak of the Great War was a shock, and it meant the end not only of the Belle Époque and a fairly carefree optimism, but also of Europe’s role as the world’s dominating continent, and it marked the beginning of an era of conflicts, on the continent as well as outside, which would last until the end of the Cold War in 1989. The period from 1914 to 1989 is seen as one historic conflict event, only broken by periods of ceasefire, and still influencing our lives today more than 100 years later. In this sense, the Great War has proven to be just as important as the Thirty Years War, if not even more so.

The importance of World War 1 in shaping world affairs is unquestionable, and a large number of books have already been written. So, why another book on World War 1? We have three series of arguments:

First and foremost, as mentioned already, the Great War shaped today’s world, inter alia, politically and economically, so one cannot simply be “finished with it” and proceed. In Europe, particularly, but also in for example the Middle East, one has to return to it again and again in order to understand the world of today.4 Our book brings new contributions to the War’s influence on the softer elements of European culture beyond military history and politics, which leads us to our second argument:
Second, this book adds a broad interdisciplinary survey of cross-country impacts. As a quick look at the book’s chapters shows, this book takes a distinct interdisciplinary approach, bringing together experts from different disciplines, which makes it quite unique. This “360 degree” investigation will give the reader a comprehensive understanding of the War and its impact. We know that it is not possible to cover all aspects of the Great War but, by approaching it from a historical, political, psychological, literary (we consider literature the prism of culture), economic, and technological angle, we strive for an ambitious and broad survey of the War’s impact across a number of disciplines and across a number of states. This interdisciplinary approach stands out, as most recent books dealing with World War I and its impact tend to be monographs which concentrate on the impact of the War on a particular discipline. Thus, this makes our book a general reader for those seeking a broad interdisciplinary introduction, not only on the War, but also its cultural, economic, and technological impacts.

Third, this book goes beyond the Anglophone impact – but in English. The book provides the reader with the finer details of the War’s impact on continental European states. The country-specific chapters (Gemzøe’s on Denmark, Schlosser’s on Germany, and Jørgensen’s on France) expose the subject of the impact of the War in European societies other than the UK or the US, but in English; of course the impact on Anglo-Saxon literature is included, too (Sørensen’s chapter).

**Structure and contents of the book**

The first part of the book is focused on the War and the peace-conference and provides the overall frame. After this chapter, Valsiner asks how it was possible to make people go to war. Knudsen analyzes the events leading up to the War, Zank analyzes the course and development of the War, and Dosenrode looks into the peace treaties ending it.

In the second part, the book focuses on the impact of the War with a number of specialized contributions. The first four chapters (Schlosser, Jørgensen, Sørensen, and Gemzøe) focus on the War’s impact on literature, before turning to an analysis of the impact on economy (Olesen), technology (Skyggebjerg), and on the impacts outside Europe focusing on the spread of Communism to Asia, an often overlooked but crucial consequence (Xing).

In the final chapter, the long-term consequences are analyzed, both by
drawing on the findings of the previous chapters, but also extending them, asking which impacts of the War were the most important (Dosenrode). In detail, the contents looks like this:

Following this chapter, which sets the frame of the book, Jaan Valsiner writes in Chapter 2 that “War is willfully escalated violence built on the dynamic reciprocity of the warring side”. And he continues: “I will raise the question of the ways in which human beings – fascinated by the socially suggested representations of war – marched into the massacres on the battlefields of World War 1. The history of World War 1 is a particularly fitting arena for interdisciplinary collaboration – between history and psychology”. This is his focal point. He leans on Carl von Clausewitz, as well as especially cultural psychology, linking to the theory of social representations, which is especially fitting for linking with history.

Knud Knudsen discusses the reasons for the War in Chapter 3. His chapter is centered on the events of July 1914, demonstrating how the assassinations in Sarajevo were turned into the pretext for war. It is the basic idea of the chapter that some political and military leaders in Europe wanted a war in the Balkans, but also that no one got the war that they wanted. Further, it is argued that the political leaders in the capitals of Europe acted rationally, standing by their treaty obligations in an upcoming crisis, but also that they might have acted otherwise, that alternative options existed, and that they might have sought to restrain the crisis. This assertion is the basis for a final brief discussion of the structural ties that might have prevented the European leaders from acting in the interest of a peaceful solution for the 1914 July Crisis.

In Chapter 4, Wolfgang Zank gives an overview of the course of World War 1. The major political and military events are summarized. The conflict between Germany and the Western powers receives due attention, given the point that the Western Front, after the intervention of the United States, became the theater where Germany lost the War. But, in other areas, the War left much more long-lasting destructive impacts: Russia turned into a failed state where a rather small but disciplined and fanatical political force could seize power. This created a cleavage in world politics for some 70 years. Also, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary left multiple seeds of conflict, not least in Yugoslavia. And, in the Middle East, the disorder after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire can be said to be ongoing to this day. Also, the conquest of the German colonies in Africa and China had a lasting impact. The processes leading to these outcomes in Russia, Austria-Hungary, the Middle East, Africa, and China will therefore also be dealt with.
Chapter 5 is concerned with the end of the War, the negotiations among the Entente Powers, and their dictates to the losing powers. Søren Dosenrode starts out analyzing the war aims of the powers which were in conflict, as they guided the victorious powers. From the outset, especially France, Germany, and Russia wished to aim at securing their superiority. Next in the chapter, there is a brief section on the peace initiatives taken during the War, by the belligerent powers, by neutral ones, and by others. There were many initiatives but, as the main parties all hoped for victory, the prospects for peace were dim. The focus of this chapter is on the peace negotiations, or rather the negotiations among the Entente Powers which lead to the dictated peace. The very different approaches of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are presented, as are the considerations of the Imperial, and then republican German governments. After a survey of the peace treaties and their consequences, the chapter rounds off by discussing the consequences of the peace treaties.

Chapter 5 ends the first part of the book, which analyzes the War itself, why it broke out, why people were willing to sacrifice themselves, the course of the War, and how it was ended. The next part is focused on the implications of the War, starting out by looking at the impact the War had on culture and literature, followed by its impact on the world economy, on technological development, and on the world outside Europe.

Culture is a central concept, and in David Landes’ words (2000: 2), it makes “almost all the difference”. James Winders formulates the impact of World War 1 on culture like this (2001: 99): “It is difficult not to conclude that the Great War of 1914 to 1918 set in motion many of the violent forces and much of the cultural despair that beveled the remainder of the twentieth century. The War shattered the confident ideals of an entire generation, many of whom in their dissolutioned state would succumb to the lure of the apocalyptic politics of fascism”.

Using literature as a seismograph for societal developments is not new in itself; e.g. Donna Baker did it when analyzing the relations between Nazism and the petit bourgeois back in 1975. It has the advantage that a good author is able to capture the Zeitgeist, which a more typical positivist approach may not (cf. Niemeyer 1978). Phrased differently, the focus on literature is important because of its ability to absorb and amplify less tangible feelings and emotions, and if it succeeds in “hitting a nerve”, it will reach a big audience, thus contributing to both “framing” and characterizing a period. That, e.g. Barbusse, Hesse, and Jünger’s works are still published and read...
today is a rough indication of the War’s impact, and of course of their work’s literary qualities. These four chapters look into the impact of the War on literature in Germany, France, the Anglo-Saxon countries, and Denmark. By doing so (though not being able to include all states), we focus on the main antagonists – the powers – and also look at a representative sample of small, neutral states: Denmark.

World War 1 was an event which left its imprint on literature in all the European countries, and beyond. Obviously, the strongest traces are found in the literature of countries which participated in the War, but traces are also found in those of neutral ones. Not surprisingly, there are many parallels, e.g. the literature seeing the War as a possibility for reviving a country’s culture and soul, vs. those authors who opposed the destruction of people.

One of the large impacts felt until at least the 1960s was on the economy. Finn Olesen analyzes the economic impact of the War in Chapter 10. He states that, up until the outbreak of World War 1, expectations on economic matters were, in general, rather positive. At least the vision of Adam Smith – a macroeconomic outcome of harmony and optimality with economic growth and a significantly high level of wealth for the first time in modern history – seemed to be within reach for many of the European countries and the USA. However, the outbreak of the War, along with its consequences, dramatically changed this scenario – far from an economic environment of economic growth, the future was most likely to be one of troublesome economic – as well as political – turbulence. In his 1919 book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, the English economist John Maynard Keynes made an early prognosis on what could and should be expected to be the economic reality for the years to come, not only for Germany but also for the victorious countries. As history has shown, Keynes actually, unfortunately, was rather spot on with this prognosis. Somehow, the Versailles Treaty heralded the coming of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Furthermore, from then on, Great Britain was no longer the world’s most powerful Empire, economically or politically. Her position was overtaken by the USA which, to a large degree, had financed the expenditures of the war effort of both Great Britain and France.

It is occasionally claimed that World War 1 had a huge impact on development in science and technology, but is this so? Louise Karlskov Skyggebjerg analyses the impact of the Great War on everyday technologies with a special emphasis on transport and communication technology in Chapter 11. Skyggebjerg asks what impact the Great War had on everyday technology
in continental Europe. Many accounts of the connection between World War 1 and technology focus on the development of weapons and other technologies for military use, like tanks, machine guns, flamethrowers, poison gas, battleships, aircraft, and submarines. Others look into technologies invented during the War or which are claimed to have been boosted by wartime use, like sanitary napkins, tea bags, zips, stainless steel, radio technology, and wristwatches. The main aim of the chapter is, with a basis in empirical examples, to discuss the popular assumption that the general effect of war on technology is stimulation, an assumption which is criticized, among others, by the English historian of technology, David Edgerton. Thus, Skyggebjerg’s chapter looks into the question of if and how the Great War influenced the development and diffusion of mass communication (concretely of the civil use of radio in Denmark) and into how some “surplus” wartime technologies were transformed and used for civilian transport purposes after the war. The last analysis is based on two cases of technology transfer from the belligerent countries to Denmark after the War, the FF.49C seaplane formerly used by the German navy and the Mack truck used by the American army on the battlefields in France.

This book has a European angle in its conception. Still, one of the impacts of World War 1 is of such importance that it had to be included, even though it happened outside of Europe: in Asia, to be precise. The Russian Revolution and the emergence of the Soviet Union had a lasting impact on most, if not all, of the world. As Zank mentions in Chapter 5, Lenin declared war on the capitalist world by founding the Communist International. The Russian Revolution inspired and supported, inter alia, Mao Zedong in his fight for supremacy in China. Li Xing analyzes this relation, this lasting impact in Chapter 12, the impact of the war outside Europe – “The Expansion of Communism: The Chinese Revolution”.

Li Xing emphasizes the historical importance of the World War 1 in bringing about a fundamental transformation in China’s contemporary history – the victory of the Chinese Revolution. In other words, it explores China’s century-long “challenge-response” dynamism, i.e., how external factors helped to shape China’s internal transformations, and how generations of Chinese people had been struggling to respond to the external challenges and impact. The author sheds light on the historical background of the Chinese Revolution that was seen as a consequence of the Versailles Treaty in the aftermath of World War 1. The Chinese May Fourth Movement in 1919 was a milestone as a national outcry and response to the injustice of the Treaty. The Movement provided the soil for intellectual debate on the
role of Marxism, Leninism, and the Russian Revolution, and their relevance in the Chinese situation. One of the immediate outcomes was the rise of the Chinese communist socio-political force and its struggle in a century-long revolution. The chapter concludes that China’s socio-political and socio-cultural transformations coincided with the historical course of World War 1, and the effects of the War contributed to a radical change in the political situation in China and shaped the country’s developmental trajectory through the entire twentieth century.

In the last chapter, Chapter 13, Søren Dosenrode traces the impacts of the Great War. The basis for his analysis is the analysis in the previous chapters. His chapter follows the basic structure of this book’s second part, but is extended in scope. Concretely, the first section centers on the impacts of the War on culture and literature. This is followed by an analysis of the political impacts of the War both domestically (the spread and collapse of democracy, woman’s rights, the bureaucratization of the state) and in international relations, following a regional approach (Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the Americas). This leads to a section on the economic consequences of the War, including inflation, the shift of economic power away from Europe, and ends with its long-term consequences. The next section focuses on how World War 1 impacted science, technology, and medicine. In the concluding remarks, Dosenrode asks what the greatest impacts were. Using the criterion of focusing on the stability of the international system, he names three: the Russian Revolution, the instability of the international economic system, and the rise of Nazism. He then briefly comments on the usefulness of an interdisciplinary approach.
Reference list


Endnotes

1 John Maynard Keynes identified the same attitude in his 1919 book on the Versailles Treaty in which he describes the prewar time as conceived of as prosperous, stable, and good (p. 6): “But, most important of all, the [the middle or upper-class inhabitants of London] regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from this is aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable.”

2 In his 1986 book *The Rise of the Trading State*, Richard Rosecrance discusses the logic of commerce vs. conquest in depth.

3 But MacMillan (2013: xxix) also reminds us that: “The outbreak of war was a shock but it did not come out of a clear blue sky. The clouds had been gathering in the previous two decades and many Europeans were uneasily aware of that fact. […] On the other hand, they had, many of them, leaders and ordinary citizens alike, a confidence that they could deal with the threats of conflict.”

4 As enduring evidence of the interest in World War 1, Routledge re-issued fifteen volumes relating to World War 1 in 2014, some of which were first published as far back as the 1960s. This interest in World War 1 was naturally intensified by the centenary celebrations in 2014, and the same happens now at the centenary of the end of the War in 1918.


6 Geert Hofstede makes a very simple but useful distinction concerning culture, when dividing it into “Culture one” and “Culture two” (1991: 16). “Culture one” is culture in the classical meaning of the word; that is education, refinement, art etc. “Culture two” includes the activities in “Culture one” but is broader – very much broader – including everyday work and routines like greetings, eating, loving etc. Culture in this book is mainly concerned with “Culture one”.

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We will, so to speak, practice the latter without neglecting the former, getting a fuller picture of the epoch and its impacts.

Why Denmark? From a methodological point of view we could just as well have chosen, for example, Holland, Norway, Sweden, or Switzerland but, as this book originates in Denmark, it was natural to choose this country. Why not also include e.g. Russia? Two reasons: a) This book has a Western focus – some would say bias – and b) adding an additional chapter would tip the balance we try to maintain between the impacts on politics, psychology, economy, science and technology, and culture.
Chapter 2

Minds going to war: Psychology of patriotic carnage

Jaan Valsiner

War is a disaster. Yet – in contrast to all kinds of natural calamities such as earthquakes, floods, famines – war is a human-made disaster. Even if it may begin from occasional misunderstandings between social power holders, once it escalates, it becomes a framework for purposeful selective destruction – of values, value holders, and value creators.

It is human beings – as they keep taking on social roles or having those inherited by aristocratic or oligarchic lineages – who make war. They construct the tools (armament, fortifications) and socialize new generations into volunteering for war efforts, or at least accepting recruitment or conscription in obedient ways. Young men have been – over centuries – made proud of wearing their military uniforms and medals indicating their success in killing other human beings. Mothers of these men have been persuaded to accept the loss of the lives of their sons not as a cruelty against humanity, but with pride for their sons’ carrying out of his “patriotic duty”, while ending up as one of the so many crosses in the wide fields of war cemeteries.

War is a cultural product – similar to wedding ceremonies, weather forecasts, bull fights, and table manners. Yet it has its specificity – it is a cultural construction of acts of purposeful destruction. Not only are once created objects destroyed – this happens also by accident – but the purpose of human action is set to be that of demolishing – and doing it with full righteousness as if it were an act of a worthwhile cause. Everything human beings have carefully been building in peacetime becomes turned into a potential target for destruction (Lewin 1917). Human beings who have been brought up through their childhoods with the moral imperatives “thou shalt not kill!” and “thou shalt not steal” remarkably easily move to the mode
of the opposite: “you must kill!” (the “enemy”) and “you can loot” (the enemy’s property).

It is here where the need to consider psychology as a science in the service of making sense of wars comes to the social sciences. Movement from construction to purposeful destruction is a major psychological transformation – which happens in phases. A local friction between communities may escalate into temporary acts of violence, and de-escalate into ordinary peaceful co-existence between neighbors sometime later. It can be episodic – clubs of football fans travelling around Europe to confront their opponents in some peaceful town where the given football match is scheduled. Or the escalation of inter-state relations can lead to a war that can last short time, or not a short time – it can last even thirty, or hundred years. When peace is made again, the former enemies may move to a state of amiable acceptance of the histories of their socially-sanctioned cruelties towards one another. While some of the losers in the war are singled out as objects for final symbolic (and physical) destruction – peacetime trials and convictions of “war criminals” – the overwhelming majority of both the “winners” and “losers” in the just finished war go back to their peacetime constructive activities of sowing and harvesting crops, building up destroyed cities, opening restaurants and hotels, creating new consumer goods, and – in that myriad of peacetime activities – inventing new weapons for future wars to be fought. The technology of drones of the twenty-first century is developed for military purposes first, and may find its uses in everyday life later.

Psychology as science can relate with other sciences in their efforts to study wars. It is in the case of the phenomenon of massive participation in the war-to-peace (and peace-to-war) transitions where the interests of social psychology, history, and political sciences meet. No wars could be fought without the psychological readiness of ordinary persons to join in the act. Such readiness depends on mechanisms of internalization and externalization of social suggestions that psychology handles in the domain of the study of development of the dialogical self (Markova 2012; Valsiner 1987).

The feeling of the “patriotic glory” by decorated war veterans is a cultural resource for pride for the next generations – ready for new wars (Figure 1). Historical events and political processes fully depend on psychological conditions that are intuitively embedded in the social practices.
Figure 1 illustrates a powerful recent political effort to mobilize the personal family ties into the service of expansion of patriotic unity feelings around the issue of celebrating 70 years from the end of World War 2 in Europe. The history of a war won (or lost) matters – and is made to work for – the future. New generations, carrying the photographs of their deceased relatives who were in the war, join the promotion of the new vigilance of defense of their country in the future. Adding the notion of eternity (bessmertnyi, immortal) to the collective military unit (polk, a battalion) carries the affective personal links with one’s relatives forward to future readiness to devote the lives of the young (and their children) to the future political needs of the “fatherland”. Patriotism is promoted in all societies (Carretero 2011) and its function is set up ahead of time when it is needed to achieve concrete political goals. The nature of wars may change in history (Beck 2005; Leach 2000) yet these remain – as von Clausewitz (1908/1832) pointed out in the nineteenth century – a continuation of politics through military means (Roxborough 1994). The wars fought in the courts of law in any country, or between them, are peacetime continuations of the military acts on real battlefields.
Turning backward in time in the present book, I will raise the question of the ways in which human beings, fascinated by the socially suggested representations of war, marched into the massacres on the battlefields of World War I. The history of World War 1 is a particularly fitting arena for interdisciplinary collaboration between history and psychology. For historians, the making of the war – an escalation of the political oppositions at the pace at which these proceeded in 1914 – is a fitting target for analysis that still is far from having been captured (Neilson 2014). For sociologists, it is the transformation of the societal structures in Europe between 1848 and 1914 that could provide for serious insights into societal transformations in general. The complexities of World War 1 even led to the emergence of the scholarly field of the study of international relations (Lebow 2014). Yet the scholarly interpretations of the dramatic (and traumatic) social changes in Europe and the rest of the World as a consequence of the 1914-18 events remain as heterogeneous as the multifaceted phenomenon itself.

Psychology has been curiously peripheral in the discussions of World War 1. One needs to make sense of the rapid transformation of the “just plain folks” into soldiers who settle down in the trenches and keep shooting at “the enemy”. And even more than this, how could a war become glorified as “The Great War”? How can human beings accept the social suggestions to affectively frame an activity of devastation as if it had positive moral value? How have ordinary human beings, the sufferers of the wars and their collateral effects (famines, epidemics), managed to survive and resiliently re-build their prosperity – until the next war hits again?

In the reality of war (and peace), psychological issues are central. The waging of wars is older in human history than any psychological reflection. Von Clausewitz (1908/1832) outlined three types of reciprocities in the conditions of war:

1. War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds: as one side dictates the law on the other, and the other attempts precisely the same to the first, there arises a sort of reciprocal action which reaches its extreme.

2. War is always the shock of two hostile bodies in collision, not the action of a living power upon an inanimate mass. “As long as the enemy is not defeated, he may defeat me; then I shall be no longer my own master; he will dictate the law to me as I did to him” (Clausewitz 1908: 5).
3. The exertion of powers depends on the available resources and the strength of the will. As both warring sides depend on the will of the fighters, the enhancement of the fight is based on the reciprocity of acting against the other, getting similar feedback, and escalating the will to fight.

War is willfully escalated violence built on the dynamic reciprocity of the warring sides. It is not only built on the goal orientations of the opponents to launch into the destructive sequence of actions, and the socially-guided wills of the fighters to annihilate “the other”. It entails socially-guided escalation of all these features. Such social guidance is deeply interdependent with the environment: the fighter’s will is socially cultivated action orientation where no doubts are allowed to spoil the escalation of courage.

However, not all is immediately useful for historians peeping into the field of psychology for collaboration. Psychology in its traditional form – looking at individuals separated from their immediate life environments and attributing causality to the intra-psychological causes for actions – has little to offer history and sociology in the understanding of the human psyche at war. It is in the habit of asserting causality for the outcomes of some conduct to selected – but never provable – causal entities in the past. Trying to analyze Napoleon’s war crimes in terms of his difficult childhood or personality dispositions creates a social discourse that may be of interest to common gossip networks (“How interesting! All that Hitler did was due to his being sexually abused at age 3!”), but has no scientific value. What psychology has traditionally overlooked is precisely the willful escalation of goal orientations to destruction that is the psychological core of war.

Psychological phenomena are always co-determined by the person and the environment in an open-systemic arrangement (Valsiner 1987, 1998, 2007, 2014). The persons create their environments so that these environments guide them: a young man putting on a soldier’s uniform changes his relationship with the world; he starts acting like a soldier, and feeling like one. That feeling leads to further changes in the environment, escalating the feeling of being a warrior sometimes to the extreme. They may become conscientious killers, until the realities of being under attack by their opponents on the battlefield temper their bravado and lead to the main psychological feature that keeps wars going: fear (Bion 1997: 203-204, Grass 2007: 123-125; Sen’yavskaya 1999, 2006). By social guidance of the fighters towards courage, the military socialization system sets up constraints upon fear: once it is evoked, it is to be transformed to its opposite (non-fear) which
can allow irrational acts dangerous to one’s survival to emerge. Such acts are results of affective synthesis at the given moment. Later on, these acts may be depicted as “courageous” and given to others as examples of “courage.”

The depths of the human psyche are embedded in the social organization of purposeful conflict in the case of war. War is a theatrical act of destruction. It involves costumes (military uniforms), rituals (military parades), social order of a rigid kind (discipline) that at times is let out in moments of the reversal of order (looting). It is a profitable destruction, as most rich entrepreneurs benefitting from wars, or military industrial complexes in countries that produce war instruments, can testify.

Georg Simmel focused on the functional role of war (and peace) in resolving tensions within the social system:

“Conflict itself is the resolution of the tension between the contraries. That it eventuates in peace is only a single, specially obvious and evident, expression of the fact that it is a conjunction of elements, an opposition, which belongs with the combination under one higher conception. This conception is characterized by the common contrast between both forms of relationship and the mere reciprocal indifference between elements.” Simmel 1904: 490, added emphases)

The phenomena of conflict (and war) are wholes that are qualitatively different from the elements that they contain. They are organized in terms of Ganzheit, a whole of some abstract fluid form that is “in the air” of the given social situation. If – instead of a large tourist ship – an aircraft carrier were to dock in a little city like Aalborg, the whole affective atmosphere in the city would be changed. Nothing has happened, but the “feeling of war is suddenly in the air”.

Wars emerge as a result of the escalation of conflicts: legal, political, economic. They end as the conflicts are re-directed to other means of resolution. Rarely would an end to a war mean the end of a conflict; this might be possible only under conditions of complete annihilation of “the enemy”. A war – won by some and lost by others – leads to new conflicts (and, potentially, to new wars). Human beings create them, and suffer from them. If there is a need to show the inherent paradoxicality of the human mind, the movement of people through cycles of war and peace gives us dramatic examples of it. Yet, in this movement, human beings are resilient – which
is a major challenge to the science of psychology. So many human beings proudly marching onto a glorified arenas for collective suicide – be it at Austerlitz, Verdun, or Stalingrad – brings our scholarly efforts in psychology and history to share the same object of investigation.

**World War 1 as a psychological object (Gegenstand)**

The breaking out of World War 1 remains an enigma for political and social sciences (Neilson 2014; Lebow 2014). July 1914 passed, and the whole of Europe found itself at war. The whole societal organization at wartime is a complex social and psychological structure that becomes activated. It involves actors in different positions – soldiers on the front, others in the rear, civilians in the home places of the fighters involved in supplying the fight and taking care of the casualties. The whole social order changes to accommodate to wartime: economic activities concentrate on war provisions, hospitals become military hospitals, and religious institutions begin participating in the psychological preparation of the populace for the war and for the losses of the war. Ordinary “neighborhood watch” is turned into “spy watch”, and secret services earn their living by detecting and reporting anti-war sentiments expressed in public. The public has to face various shortages of food (Bonzon & Davis 1997) and energy, and adjust to the scarcity of otherwise available objects. Things of low value at peacetime: cigarettes, salt, become a valued currency for wartime exchange. Middlemen who gain profits from wartime scarcities become notable figures in everyday life (Robert 1997). Food scarcity leads to long queues in the cities as well as to dependence on the links of urban environments with their rural counterparts (Healy 2007). Yet life goes on, almost unchanged, except for caution in crossing the streets at time covered by sniper fire (Macek 2000).

World War 1 was also remarkable in the ease in which the best thinkers of Europe: philosophers, scientists, artists, rushed to take sides in the conflict (Bergson 1915; Wundt 1914). Counter-voices to the ideological alignment existed as well, yet the propagation of pacifism was under attack in all warring countries (Russell 1917). War’s first casualty is the mind, as its goal orientations are central for the social interests of the warring institutions. The panic reactions to the use of chemical warfare on both sides (Jones 2014) make the psychological sides of that war particularly dramatic. Understanding any war – and its aftermath – may require a special focus on the psychology of its survivors.
Cultural psychologies and the war: Linking with history

Two directions within contemporary cultural psychologies (Valsiner 2012a) can be brought together with history as possible domains for interdisciplinary scholarship. First of all, the theory of social representations (Moscovici 2001; Sammut, et al. 2015) is an explanatory framework that is ready for use in historical explanations. The meaning complex of social representation allows social psychologists to trace the link between macro-social and individual-personal levels of meaning construction. According to Serge Moscovici, the founder of the Social Representation Theory (SRT), the goal of use of this seemingly vague concept is clear:

“By taking as its centre communication and representations, it hopes to elucidate the links which unite human psychology with contemporary social and cultural conditions.... The reason for forming these representations is the desire to familiarize ourselves with the unfamiliar.” (Moscovici 2001: 150, added emphasis)

Since all moments in human lives are facing the unfamiliar – that of the next moment in time – social representations link what is familiar up to now with what is to come, but is not yet known. So, a statement “We’ll have breakfast tomorrow morning” links the familiar (“breakfast” of this morning, and mornings before) with the yet-to-happen tomorrow morning. However, if we modify the statement and claim “War will begin tomorrow”, the immediate experience of previous wars may be absent in the young generation that may volunteer to join the “Glorious War” (as World War 1 was labeled at its beginning). It is only through the schematized meaning war that the yet-unknown becomes “familiar”.

Representations are social in three concurrent ways (Moscovici 2001: 153):

1. They are impersonal (they are considered to belong to everyone). “This is a just war” is a generic statement promoted by a political institution for its goals, and assumed to be shared by all.

2. They are representations of the others – belong to other people – and through relating with the others become one’s own. A teenager admires his father’s war decorations and decides for himself that “this war is glorious”.

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3. They are – at the same time – personal (they are felt affectively to belong to the ego). The teenager may enlist out of his patriotic fervent in the “glorious war” without the parents’ knowledge or approval.

The unity of the three layers: social, inter-personal, and intra-personal in the case of social representations makes them into the center of social persuasion efforts. All war (and peace) propaganda entails operation with social representations in goal-directed manner. The tools, social representations, enter into social projects that move the participating actors towards their future goals (Bauer 2015; Bauer and Gaskell 1999, 2008). By analysis of the tactical use of such representations (e.g. Gibson 2015) one can trace the birthplaces of conscientious violence that is characteristic of wars.

Music is one of the most important cultural inventions of the human species, ranging from the simple sounds of a drum or violin to the sophisticated works of Stravinsky or Schönberg, which guides our affective lives. Music is included in most cultural rituals: including those of wars. The existence of military bands and the use of music in collective activity settings (choir singing, orchestra playing, or serenades by romantic young men in front of the fair ladies they are courting) allows the linking of social representation of the societal level with a personal commitment to the collective act. A religious hymn or a folk song in the mouths of a performing person carries forward the cultural history of the society while affectively directing the future of the performer (Dilthey 1927). There are examples of how attending an opera could give rise to a revolution.

The human mind is open for social direction through the feature that in SRT is called cognitive polyphasia (Jovchelovich & Priego-Hernandez 2015). In terms of simple description, that notion refers to the heterogeneity of human reasoning where different mutually opposite ideas may be endorsed by the person in different contexts without any feeling of contradiction. Such inconsistency constitutes the resource for innovation in meanings, through dialogical processes (Bauer 2015; Markova 2012). Any use of social representations by persons or institutions needs to be open to directed recursivity (Beckstead 2015; Veltri 2015); the social suggestions carried by such representations need to be re-combinable in ever new complex forms, yet all of them leading in particular directions. A particular goal orientation – dedication to a religious or patriotic cause – can be redundantly encoded into everyday practices, songs sung at local festivals, religious sermons, or neighborhood gossip. Participating persons are completely embedded in a symbolic social environment guiding them to feel and act in some direction.
Examples of enhanced patriotism at the beginnings of wars abound. SRT is eminently suitable for the study of human relations in history, providing a layer of analysis that is absent in historical and political science accounts.

“History is not simply a relevant topic for the study of social representations, but a critical one. It is critical because the ways in which history is constructed can have profound consequences for how politics are mobilized and how the identity of entire generations of peoples may be shaped. Those historical events and people widely regarded as important across all segments of society constitute important symbolic resources for mobilizing public opinion. They are difficult to ignore in public debate because they carry such widely shared emotional resonance and political legitimacy” (Liu and Sibley 2015: 279)

The second direction of cultural psychology of semiotic dynamics (Valsiner, 2014, 2015) inks with the SRT as it situates the social representations in a temporal scheme oriented towards the future (Figure 2). As applied (retrospectively) to historical events, it becomes possible to reconstruct the different possibilities for peacemaking in the middle of the ongoing war, and to demonstrate how these possibilities were not actualized at the time. Analysis of “war efforts” can be done looking at the intended future internalization of the public messages meant to be taken over and further escalated by individuals.

Figure 2. Guided emergence of a sign with feed-forward to the future
The function of signs is always future oriented, both in their immediate impact (turning the next immediate future into a new present) and their general orientation towards encountering similar situations in some indeterminate future moment. The emergence – construction – of the particular sign (S) is guided by the social representation system that sets up the whole social atmosphere in the given situation. Once the sign (S) has emerged – made by the person, it becomes one’s “own”. Its “birthplace”, a social suggestion based on social representation, is forgotten. Persons act on their own will in the direction suggested by the social representation. This can lead to the mistreatment of the enemy’s prisoners of war beyond the social norms agreed upon (Feltman 2010). Creativity in the invention of torture techniques and symbolic violence in wartimes has been known for centuries.

If sign use is future oriented, how can it be that the meaning-makers are constantly referencing the past: digging into one’s memory, trying to recall relevant life moments of the past? This question applies to the study of history: why are we taking interest in some wars (e.g., World War 1) rather than others (e.g., the Balkan Wars that preceded World War 1)? There are many to choose from, but only some are chosen. Such efforts – even if they seem to involve backward referencing – are actually forward referencing. The meaning-maker at the present accesses different traces of the signs of the past as s/he is moving towards the future. What looks as if it entails “looking back” at the given moment is actually “looking forward”, thanks to the accessibility of different trace signs from the past (see Figure 1 above). Within irreversible time one cannot reference “what was” without making it to be in the service of “what might come.” Explaining the intricacies of the making of World War 1 can give us knowledge to detect the emergence of World War 3 – even if a regional escalation of a conflict in some area in the world is not (yet) labeled that, at present. History, like cultural psychology, is a science that generalizes universal patterns of development (of societies, and of persons) from single systemic cases.

**General conclusion: Going beyond Wilhelm Dilthey’s failure**

What contemporary cultural psychology – in the form of SRT and the perspective on semiotic dynamics (CPSD) – can contribute to the interdisciplinary study of history is the generalizable analyses of single unique cases of societal or personal transformations. In this respect, this new synthesis allows us to transcend the dichotomy between “explanatory” and “under-
standing” sciences that Wilhelm Dilthey introduced in the 1880s (Dilthey 1883). Dilthey introduced his distinction between Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften towards the end of the “natural sciences war” (Valsiner 2012b) in the Germany of the nineteenth century – when the natural sciences side of the war was clearly winning and all the Naturphilosophie-linked scientific perspectives were being pushed out of the “real” sciences. It could be seen as a step to preserve the Geisteswissenschaften by allocating to them a qualitatively different role.

Yet there was a price to this rescue effort. As a result of this split, both history and psychology found themselves within the Geisteswissenschaften category, with the result being axiomatic denial of generalization goal of a science. Nothing can be more detrimental for science than accepting this axiom. The evidence in both history and psychology is unique – but follows general rules that science needs to recover. Understanding concrete phenomena – of history or of persons – was assumed to be that of understanding the particular case, rather than a road to a general theory of historical or psychological processes. This ideology against generalization was further fortified in the twentieth century by the dominance of post-modernist philosophes that denied generalizability in principle, and its necessity in practice. Combined with the general movement into the accumulative empiricism that governs all sciences – Natur or Geist in similar ways – the result is the defocusing from creation of general theories of either history of the human psyche.

In our twenty-first century, we can do better. Cultural psychology is a science of culture within persons that is of universalistic and developmental focus. Individual case studies serve as bases for generalization to models of human development through cultural means. The inductive generalization prevalence is changed to its abductive counterpart (Salvatore 2015). The focus of cultural psychologies is on the development of generalized knowledge about how social representations or signs work in the making and breaking of the most complex creations of human phenomena: art, literature, society, and – adding here the topic of this chapter – war and peace. Over a hundred years of intra-psychology war for “objectivity” – fought on the battlegrounds of “behavior” and (later) “cognition” – the focus once again turns to finding adequate general models of human complexity (Valsiner et al 2016). Possibly this example may be of use to history to develop into a universal science of temporally unique societal change processes. Interdisciplinary work can have outcomes that go far beyond the “normal science” in the old sense of Thomas Kuhn, and establish a new
sociodigm (Yurevich 2009) in which different sciences find concrete arenas for mutual collaboration – rather than being caught in rivalries.

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Endnotes

1 Individually marked soldiers’ graves were very much a legacy of World War 1.

2 “The mind must… first awaken the feeling of courage, and then be guided and supported by it, because in momentary emergencies the man is swayed more by his feelings than by his thoughts” (von Clausewitz, 1908: 51, added emphasis)

3 See Dwyer, 2009

4 Escalations of affective kind have been documented in battlefield histories in wars. During World War 2 around 400 Soviet soldiers have been reported to sacrifice themselves for the sake of covering up the path of enemy’s automatic rifle fire by their own bodies (Aleksander Matrosov and Aleksander Pankratov were the martyrs selected by Soviet propaganda for hero myth making about their suicidal acts)

5 On August 25, 1830 the crowd attending opera in Brussels – of Daniel Auber’s La Muette del Portici – after the duet “Sacred love for fatherland” moved out to the street in a crowd act that played a key role in Belgian independence.
Chapter 3

The origins of World War 1

Knud Knudsen

Historical accounts of World War 1 usually begin with the assassinations in Sarajevo in late June 1914 when Gavrilo Princip shot the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie. From the gunshots in Sarajevo, there seems to be an almost unbroken chain of events and decisions that led to the outbreak of war in August 1914; events and decisions that suggest that what began in Sarajevo inevitably had to lead to war. But it was not so. A general war in Europe was not the inevitable outcome of the killings in Sarajevo. On the contrary, it is the argument in this chapter that the assassinations in Sarajevo ended in war because some military and political leaders intentionally made them do that. It might be argued that the killings in Sarajevo were turned into a pretext for war. Some prominent politicians and military leaders in the capitals of Europe convinced the skeptical minds that war was advisable. It should be added that it is also the perception that no politician and no military leader in the summer of 1914 wanted a general European war. Those political and military leaders who wanted war did not get the war they went for; instead of the localized war in the Balkans they got something else: the general European war.

After the War, at the Peace Conference of 1919 in Paris, the victorious powers agreed that Germany was the guilty nation that had caused the War and it had to accept full responsibility. Somehow, the issue of guilt has obstructed, or at least impeded the discussion of the causes of war. In this chapter, it will be argued that the origins of war should be sought in national entanglements in the Balkans, and that the primary culprits were those Austrian and Serbian political and military leaders who escalated the local crisis into a general war.

The debate on the causes of World War 1 is one of the classic debates among historians. Books and articles on this topic have been produced in vast num-
bers. Why this massive interest? Two good reasons for the interest in the origins of the War might be suggested. The first is the notion that World War 1 marked a caesura in history, not only because of the enormous destruction caused by the War – including ten million dead soldiers – but also because the War set the scene for the catastrophes to come in the next three decades: how were such disastrous forces let loose, and why this deluge upon Europe? The second notion is the course of events 1914-18. No one had foreseen a war of such disastrous dimensions. How could trained politicians, diplomats, and generals miscalculate the consequences of their decisions? How could so many be so wrong?

Historians often distinguish between two categories of explanations for the causes of World War 1; the first is those related to the events of July 1914. During the July Crisis of 1914, politicians and military leaders made decisions with fatal implications. Why did they make these decisions? Maybe they were not fully informed of the circumstances, or they might not have been able to interpret the moves of the other sides. We may have a situation with both a lack of information and a lack of understanding. World War 1 might be depicted as the result of the unintended consequences of decisions made by politicians, diplomats, and generals.

The second category is the structural causes, explanations relating to the structures of European societies in the decades before 1914, such as the system of alliances, militarism and arms race, imperialist rivalries, nationalism, and national controversies. Considering for example the system of alliances, the argument was that, in Europe in the early twentieth century, a limited war involving only one of the great powers was not possible because all the great powers were woven into a complicated web of treaty obligations, with the implication that, as soon as one great power was involved, all would become involved.

Finally, we should not ignore those historians who argue that, in fact, Germany wanted a war and got the war that it wanted. I am referring to the Fischer school in the 1960s and 70s. According to the German historian Fritz Fischer, Germany planned the war, and Germany had expansionist aims in 1914, as it had again in 1939. The only thing that went wrong 1914-18 was that Germany lost the War. That was not according to the plan.
Historiography

The views of this chapter are in accordance with the ‘mainstream’ perception which Charles Emmerson refers to in the introduction to his book: 1913: The World before the Great War: “Historians do not now generally believe that war was inevitable from the moment that the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot in Sarajevo in June 1914”. (Emmerson 2013: xi) The notion of “inevitability” is deceptive, as also emphasized by Margaret MacMillan in her recent book The War That Ended Peace: “Very little in history is inevitable. Europe did not have to go to war in 1914; a general war could have been avoided up to the last moment on 4 August when the British finally decided to come in”. (MacMillan 2013: xxv)

On the other hand, it may be argued – as Christopher Clark does in The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 – that the killings at Sarajevo were not a mere pretext for war. According to Clark, such a view is a symptom of “the marginalization of the Serbian and thereby of the larger Balkan dimension of the story”, which already began during the July Crisis itself. Serbia, according to Clark, “is one of the blind spots in the historiography of the July Crisis.” (Clark 2012: xxvi) No doubt, Clark has a point in placing Serbia and the Eastern question at the center of the initial crisis.

The literature on the origins of World War 1 is extensive. James Joll’s introduction to the debates in The Origins of the First World War (1984) is still among the best. (Joll, 1984) Joll’s book is both an introduction to the literature and a well-informed discussion of the key issues. Shorter introductions to the debates on the causes of World War 1 have been published in rich numbers. (Martel 1987; Stevenson 1997)

The publication of documents on the origins of the War started when the Bolsheviks published documents from the archives of the Tsar to show the co-responsibility of Russia for the outbreak of war. Soon after, other European governments followed suit and published collections of documents. The new political leaders in Austria and Germany had nothing to hide; they just exposed the folly of the previous imperial regimes. As noted by Christopher Clark and others, the debate over the attribution of responsibility for the War has raged ever since: “the blame game” has never lost its appeal. (Clark 2012: 569; Emmerson 2013: x) The publication of documents encouraged research into the origins of the War and the general conclusion of these early studies was a revision of the views of 1919 that Germany was solely responsible; responsibility had to be shared by more. (Mombauer
According to the revisionist views, Germany had been exposed to unfair treatment by the Peace Conference in Paris.

Valuable treatments of the origins of war appeared in the 1920s and 1930s. Sidney Fay’s *The Origins of the World War* (1928) still counts among the classic books; so does Luigi Albertini’s *De Origini della Guerra del 1914* (1942-43) in three volumes, published in Italy during World War 2 and translated into English in the 1950s. Albertini was struck, as he wrote, by the disproportion between the intellectual and moral endowments of the decision-makers of 1914 and the gravity of the problems which they faced, “between their acts and the results thereof”. (Joll 1984: 7) Albertini’s book was primarily concerned with the diplomatic history of the origins of war, not least the July Crisis. 1400 pages were devoted to a detailed study of the course of events between 28 June and 12 August 1914.

Even more controversial was the book published a few years later by German historian Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (1961), followed by *Krieg der Illusionen* (1969). Fischer argued that Germany did desire the War and pointed to the annexationist aims of Germany in World War 1 as sketched in the so called *Septemberprogramm* of 1914. A controversial point in Fischer’s argument for German responsibility was his discussion of the war council of prominent German political and military leaders in 1912, allegedly planning for war. Fischer’s two books provoked a bitter debate among historians, in Germany in particular. (Moses 1975) A.J.P. Taylor’s *War by Timetable* (1969), on the role of mobilization and timetables, was another controversial interpretation in the 1960s.

The Fischer controversy stimulated a new phase of research in the origins of World War 1, and after a period focusing on Germany, historians now turned to studies of the foreign policies of other European great powers. According to Gordon Martel in his introduction to the historiography of the origins of World War 1, published in 1987, the Fischer debate provoked “an explosion of research” and these studies “stimulated fresh controversies far removed from the Fischer debate.” According to Martel, it was the most widespread assumption underlying the interpretations of the 1960s and 70s that the crisis of July “was the logical (if not necessarily the inevitable) culmination of deep-seated antagonisms and fundamental forces”. In the 1980s, the interest in the July Crisis itself had waned: “we seem to have reached the point where we know almost everything we are ever going to know about who said what to whom at what moment”. Those historians who concentrated on the events of July 1914, often did so – according to Martel
– to contest the argument that the War was the inevitable result of underlying causes. These historians resisted the suggestion that war was intrinsic to the nature of the European states system and societies. Instead, they argued that, had it not been for the peculiarities of the July Crisis, war might have been avoided. (Martel 2003: 8-9) Thus, the Fischer debate seemed to have inspired a common understanding of the need to incorporate structural causes, such as for example the impact of armaments or the alliance system, into interpretations of the origins of the War. To argue that structural causes might be in play should not be identified with structural determinism.

Approaching 2014, we witnessed a new wave of publications on World War I and the origins of the War. In contrast to the studies which followed in the wake of the Fischer debate, the literature on the origins of the War published in recent years has focused increasingly upon agency, decision-making, and decision-makers. Notwithstanding his own bold statement in the 1980s, Gordon Martel has published a book which investigates the decision-making processes in July 1914 in detail, and argues that at every step there were alternative options which might have avoided war. Presumably Christopher Clark, Margaret MacMillan, Sean McMeekin, and T. G. Otte – the authors of recent contributions to the ‘origins literature’ – would not subscribe to the perception that we already know everything that we need to know about who said what to whom in July 1914. Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (2012), Margaret MacMillan’s The War That Ended Peace (2013), Sean McMeekin’s July 1914: Countdown to war (2013), Gordon Martel’s The Month that Changed the World: July 1914 (2014), and T.G. Otte’s July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914 (2014) are important recent contributions. According to Otte, there is scope for a fresh examination of the sources and the July Crisis of 1914.

As emphasized in the introduction to Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers, his account is “saturated with agency”. In T. G. Otte’s July Crisis, the role of individual decision-makers is also placed at the heart of his analysis. The role of individuals in July 1914 was crucial, according to Otte: “By moving the actions of individual monarchs, politicians and generals into the foreground, by examining the ethos of the ruling élites with its emphasis on ‘honour’ and prestige, and by explaining the accelerating dynamic of the unfolding crisis”, he seeks to offer a reassessment of the July Crisis 1914. (Otte 2014: 522-23) According to Otte, the ruling elites of the European great powers were ill-suited to coping with the demands of the new age. Apparently, Otte’s conclusions support the views advanced by Albertini 75 years ago.
Subsequently, this focus on decision-makers has raised the question of who these decision-makers were, and opinions differ on that key issue. Whereas Margaret MacMillan subscribes to the traditional view, referring to “those few generals, crowned heads, diplomats or politicians” who made the decisions that in the end led to war, Christopher Clark takes a different stand; there were, in Clark’s opinion, “many voices in European foreign policy … Policy-making was not the prerogative of single sovereign individuals”. (Clark 2012: 168) In his concluding remarks on the structures of decision-making, Clark uses the term, “the fluidity of power” and claims that: “The chaotic interventions of monarchs, ambiguous relationships between civil and military, adversarial competition among key politicians in systems characterized by low levels of ministerial or cabinet solidarity, compounded by the agitations of a critical mass press against a background of intermittent crisis and heightened tension over security issues made this a period of unprecedented uncertainty in international relations.” (Clark 2012: 239) Clark argues that it was “this chaos of competing voices” that turned the July Crisis 1914 into “the most complex and opaque political crisis of modern times”. (Clark 2012: 160-79) As a general characterization of the structures of policy-making in the decades before 1914, Clark may be right. Still, it seems that the process of decision-making in the summer of 1914 was dominated by a narrow and limited gallery of prominent diplomats, politicians, and generals in the capitals of Europe. In Otte’s interpretation, the problems were located in the three continental monarchies of Eastern Europe: the crisis was “to no small degree the result of a crisis of governance in the three eastern monarchies … The degree of professional incompetence displayed at St Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna during July 1914 was striking. (Otte 2014: 512-13)”

The general historiographical trend in later years has, as already mentioned, been to dismiss ideas of the “inevitability” of war. In early 1914, “The future was still open”, according to Clark, and MacMillan’s views are concordant: even in the summer of 1914, generals and crowned heads, diplomats and politicians still “had the power and authority to say either yes or no. Yes or no to mobilizing the armies, yes or no to compromise, yes or no to carrying out the plans already drawn up by their militaries”. (Clark 2012: 363; MacMillan 2013: xxx)

Contemporary research also accepts the basic premise that Germany did not go for a European war. German leaders miscalculated the circumstances. The German leadership did not believe that the conflict would end in war, primarily based upon that “erroneous assumption that the Russians were
unlikely to intervene”. (Clark 2012: 417) However, both the Kaiser and the chancellor “believed that the Austrians were justified in taking action against Serbia”. Still, they wished to confine the conflict to the Balkans. (Clark 2012: 415-16) This is supported by Otte’s detailed examination of the diplomatic sources. In late July 1914, the diplomatic efforts of both German and British decision-makers went for a localization of the conflict. Germany did not want and did not prepare for a general war in the summer of 1914. (Otte 2012: 516-17) However, from 29 July, the conflict escalated, not least due to the aggressive acts of the Dual Monarchy – the ultimatum of 23 July and the declaration of war on Serbia five days later. The “war-party” was to be found in Vienna, in particular among some high-ranking officers and a few politicians.

Despite the focus on decision-makers, recent contributions do not altogether ignore the structural restraints upon the decision-makers in the summer of 1914. The “strange dialogue” between structures and individuals creeps into the historical accounts in various ways, for example in MacMillan’s discussion of the weight of “underlying causes” such as militarism, nationalism, arms race, and alliances, and, not least, the determining influence of history, in particular the experience of recurrent crises in the decade before 1914. History and the burden of distrust weighed heavily upon European decision-makers as 1914 approached and seemed to limit the options for those leaders who had to decide about war or diplomacy. “Yet while Europe’s leaders did not have to opt for war it was increasingly likely that they would”. (MacMillan 2013: 471) Besides being a well-informed and readable book, the ongoing discussion of the relations between structural causes, historical preconditions, and decision-making processes is one of the most thought-provoking and suggestive parts of MacMillan’s book. It is probably T. G. Otte who most emphatically rejects the theories of underlying structural causes. According to Otte, structures should rather be regarded as restraints, holding back the most belligerent war-mongers and promoting cautious measures. In this chapter, it might be of special interest to consider how these recent studies contribute to explaining the origins of World War 1. First, it might be appropriate to recapitulate the events of the July Crisis 1914 which led to war, and Sarajevo would be the place to start.

**The scene: The assassinations at Sarajevo 28 June 1914**

Sarajevo was the capital of Bosnia. Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina are one state in the Balkans, with a population of 3.8 million and a rather complex
political structure. In 1908, the Dual Monarchy (of Austria and Hungary) annexed Bosnia, and this illegal annexation of Bosnia caused anger and bitterness among nationalists in both Serbia and Bosnia. Therefore, the Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908 – the so called Bosnian crisis – was part of the problem in 1914, as nationalists in both Serbia and Bosnia wanted Bosnia to become part of Serbia. In 1914, the Bosnian crisis had not been forgotten.

Who was the young man who fired the shots in Sarajevo in 1914? His name was Gavrilo Princip. Was he a terrorist or a nationalist hero? I suppose that the answer depends upon the eyes which are doing the viewing. Gavrilo Princip was a young Bosnian Serb – a Bosnian of Serbian nationality – who was a member of a secret society called the Black Hand. The Black Hand was formed to overturn the Austrian annexation of Bosnia. When Gavrilo’s group was informed about the visit of Ferdinand and Sophie to Sarajevo, they planned to kill the noble guests. However, things did not go as planned, and the small group almost gave up; in fact, Gavrilo was on his way back when the car with the Archduke and his wife almost backed into him, and he fired the mortal shots. Were Gavrilo and his associates acting alone, independently, and on their own? No, the Black Hand was part of a web of clandestine groups that operated in Bosnia, maintaining contact with the Serbian intelligence service. Serbian officers supplied the Bosnian groups with arms and information as the planned attack upon the Austrians approached.

Who were the victims – Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie? Archduke Franz Ferdinand was the heir to the Austrian throne. Emperor Franz Joseph was a very old man, and Ferdinand was designated to become the next emperor of the Dual Monarchy. Austria and Hungary were two distinct constitutional entities. It was a multi-national empire comprising Czechs and Poles in the North and Croats and Serbs in the South, and besides these major ethnic groups, several minor ones: Ruthenes, Galicians, Rumanians, Slovaks, and others too. In Vienna, leading politicians (including ministers) feared that Slavic nationalities within the Dual Monarchy were attracted to their south Slavic brothers and sisters in Serbia.

The kingdom of Serbia was another player. It was a new kingdom, one of the independent national entities decided upon at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. After a coup in 1903, Serbia apparently entered a period of democratic government. Nevertheless, behind the parliamentarian surface, the military had a prominent position in Serbian politics in this period. As mentioned al-
ready, Serbian intelligence was not quite innocent in 1914; there is no doubt about Serbian complicity in the killings in Sarajevo – which thus might be depicted as a case of state-sponsored terrorism. Leading circles in Belgrade were intent upon detaching the Slavic parts of the Dual Monarchy and making them part of Serbia. The dream of a south Slavic state sounded attractive to Serbian nationalists.

As the backdrop to the dramatic events in the Balkans in the early twentieth century, we may point to the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire. The weakness of the Ottoman Empire was known all over Europe. The coup of the “young Turks” in 1908 – which served as the pretext for the Austrian annexation of Bosnia – did not solve the problems of the empire. In 1912-13, Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria engaged in the first and the second Balkan Wars in order to take possession of the European parts of the Ottoman Empire. When the conflict arose in 1914, some European politicians were inclined to regard this as a new phase of the unending “Balkan entanglements”, a Third Balkan War might possibly be in the making. Few, if any, were considering a European war.

The July Crisis of 1914

After the assassinations in Sarajevo, European politicians held their breath. What would happen next? In fact, nothing happened. Gavrilo and his associates were arrested. A sigh of relief, and then everyone could breathe again. After a day or two, Austrian newspapers engaged in serious controversies over the burial of Franz and Sophie. Could they be buried in the family burial-place of the Habsburgs – the ruling dynasty of the Dual Monarchy? Sophie was from a minor German noble family and was not entitled to be buried with the Habsburgs. Franz had married her for love, in spite of the protests of the senior Habsburgs. These seniors did not like him; nor did they like his wife.

However, behind the curtains, diplomats and politicians were in a flurry of activity. Vienna is the proper place to start. Leading politicians in Vienna were convinced that Serbia was behind the terrorist acts in Sarajevo. The problem was to document and prove the Serbian connection. In the eyes of the war-party in Vienna, the assassinations in Sarajevo provided the best possible pretext for a war against Serbia – in order to demolish all dreams of a south Slavic state; to make it clear, once and for all, to the Slavic peoples within the Dual Monarchy that they would remain inhabitants of the
monarchy – that is, of Hungary. The Slavic people would never be allowed to leave the monarchy to become part of Serbia. They might as well give up that dream. The leader of the Austrian war-party was Chief of Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf. It was a badly kept secret in Europe that Conrad was keen to crush Serbia, sooner better than later. Like Cato the Elder in the Roman senate in antique Rome, Conrad consistently urged his colleagues to solve the Serbian question once and for all. (McMeekin 2013: 24) “War, war, war” was Conrad’s standard advice to the emperor. While the position of Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold von Berchtold was vacillating and hesitant, Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza definitely “objected to any policy designed to engineer an immediate conflict.” (Clark 2012: 397) Later on, Berchtold switched views and seemed to be prepared “to use Sarajevo as a pretext for a ‘settlement of accounts’ with Serbia”. (McMeekin 2013: 61)

As the interrogations of Gavrilo and the other arrested young men went on, it became evident to the Austrians that Serbian intelligence was involved, although this was hard to prove. There was no smoking gun! This strengthened the position of the war-party in Vienna. Still, the Austrian Kaiser and his Prime Minister were not inclined to engage in initiatives that might result in war without consulting their German ally. It all depended on Germany. Why was German support so crucial? This was because Russia, as an ally of Serbia, might intervene.

The consultations in Berlin between the Austrians and the German leaders resulted in the so called “blank check” of 5-6 July: the Germans reassured the Austrians of their unconditional support for any measure the Austrians might deem appropriate and necessary. Armed with this “check”, the Austrians started talks about the response to Serbia. Discussions in Vienna were intense before reaching a final conclusion, and two weeks later a note was dispatched to Belgrade.

What happened in Berlin when the Austrians had left? Nothing! It is significant that the German Kaiser left the capital and went for his summer cruise. The Chief of Staff, von Moltke the Younger, left for a summer spa, and even Chancellor Bethmann Holweg left Berlin. They were obviously not preparing for a war involving German troops. If Bethmann were considering war – and he was – it was a localized war in the Balkans in order to settle the controversies between Austria and Serbia before any of the great powers could intervene.

The pattern which we observe in this case – the Germans confirming sup-
port for their ally – was repeated in St Petersburg when the Serbs enquired about the Russian stance. Russia’s support was crucial to Serbia, and the Russian Tsar and his ministers reassured the Serbs of Russian support. In the Russian government, there was a Slavic circle, among them the Russian ambassador to Belgrade, who spoke in favor of unconditional Russian support to Serbia in case of war, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov did his best not to appear weak. Thus, the pattern of Berlin was repeated in St Petersburg: the Russians were keen to prove that they were trustworthy and reliable allies. What happened in St Petersburg when the Serbs left the Russian capital? Two things, the authorities began to prepare for a state visit from France, and to speed up preliminary naval preparations in the Black Sea; operations which had been ongoing for some time (months). The difference between Berlin and St Petersburg is conspicuous. The Russian government did not consider war to be an unrealistic scenario.

How about the two Western powers – France and Great Britain? France and Russia had been allies since the early 1890s and the French visit in St Petersburg in the summer of 1914 had been planned for a long time. The killings in Sarajevo had not been a top story in the French newspapers. In Paris, a sex scandal attracted all the attention of the French papers. French President Poincaré and his top ministers visited the Tsar in the second half of July. For a week, the Tsar and the President and their ministers had talks on the international situation. After these talks, the Russians were confident and assured of France’s full support for any strong stand they might take on Vienna. (McMeekin 2013: 166) During the visit, there were parades and champagne parties, and apparently the Russian court was better informed than the French. During a dance at one of these parties, a young duchess, Grand Duchess Anastasia, did her best to make the French ambassador feel good by confiding the recent news to him that “there’s going to be war. There’ll be nothing left of Austria. You’re going to get back Alsace and Lorraine. Our armies will meet in Berlin. Germany will be destroyed”. Had it not been for a “stern gaze” from Tsar Nicholas, she would have carried on. A look from the Tsar, however, put an end to their confidential conversation. After all, the duchess was married to a potential commander in chief of the Russian armies. “I must constrain myself”, as she told the ambassador with a hint of conspiracy. “The Emperor has his eye on me.” (McMeekin 2013: 163) The duchess was well-informed, at least better informed than the French ambassador. There was no hint on the side of the French. The Russian alliance was crucial to French security, and the only French guarantee in case of a German assault. According to the Franco-Russian treaty, France was obliged to assist Russia in case of an assault by a third party
(Germany). Poincaré left Russia, warning the Austrian government that Russia had a friend in France.

Finally, how about the British government? In the early stages of the crisis, the British had hardly discovered that there was something going on in the Balkans. In Britain, all public and political interest was directed towards Ireland and the controversies of Irish Home Rule. Very late, the British government realized that something might come up in the Balkans which might be dangerous to Britain too. In fact, this happened when the government in Vienna skipped off the Ultimatum to the Serbian government. Having studied the text, British Foreign Minister Edward Grey declared that this would mean war in Europe.

The Austrian note of July 23 to Serbia was the result of talks in Vienna in continuation of the Austrian diplomatic visit to Berlin and the German “blank check” in early July. The Austrians decided upon a tough stance, including demands which were bound to be rejected by the Serbians: the Austrians demanded admittance into Serb territory to assist in the suppression of pan-Serb societies and to institute a joint judicial inquiry into the assassination plot (at Sarajevo) on Serbian soil, both of which challenged Serbian sovereignty. The Austro-Hungarian démarche – usually referred to as the “Ultimatum” – was in fact set up at a meeting on 14 July (the Strudelhof Meeting), but not delivered in Belgrade until immediately after the departure of the French delegation from St Petersburg. Due to bad communication at sea, the French leaders remained happily ignorant of the Ultimatum until their arrival in Paris.

At that time, it was evident to politicians and state leaders in Europe that “the Balkan entanglements” were serious business that might have grave consequences for the whole of Europe. The Serbian government was in severe doubt about how to respond – at the time no longer fully confident of Russian support. The reply was, according to Otte, “a clever concoction of acceptance and equivocation, evasion and rejection, and all dressed up in accommodating language”. (Otte 2014: 282) Once the response of the Serbian government was known, a short moment of relief spread, due to its conciliatory tone. However, assessments differed, and a negative reading of the Serbian reply could hardly escape the conclusion that, of the political demands, Belgrade accepted none in full. Under the circumstances, the war-party in Vienna got what they wanted: a pretext for war. Nothing but the unconditional acceptance of all demands would have satisfied the Austrians. On 25 July, the Habsburg Monarchy broke off relations with
Serbia. Three days later, on 28 July, Austria-Hungary ordered partial mobilization and the old emperor signed the declaration of war on Serbia. Two days before, Russia had begun pre-mobilization measures.

The same day, 28 July, the German Kaiser came forward with his abortive proposal for a “halt in Belgrade”. At this stage, however, the obstacles to a diplomatic settlement increased and the crisis escalated. Events now seemed to switch from the hands of politicians and diplomats to military preparations. Austria-Hungary began bombardment of Belgrade on 29 July. The Russian Tsar Nicholas authorized partial mobilization. On 29-30 July, German Chancellor Bethmann Holweg made a last attempt to restrain Austria-Hungary, as before with no success. On the other side, the French government made attempts to hold Russia back, with equally little success. On 30 July, Tsar Nicholas ordered general mobilization in Russia.

The course of events, not least the Russian mobilization, obviously came as a surprise to the Germans. When German intelligence discovered that Russian mobilization was heading not only southwards, but also towards Polish areas in the West – approaching German borders – the chancellor and the chief of staff acted in a hurry. Realizing that the prospects – or the risk – of a short and localized war between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia had failed, scenarios changed overnight. At this stage, it was the Schlieffen plan which should be implemented. The Schlieffen plan was the Germany plan for a war in which Germany was confronted with war on two fronts – by the Russians in the East and by the French in the West. The general idea of the Schlieffen plan was that Russia was the big and powerful enemy; but also an enemy which moved slowly because mobilization was a complicated and lengthy process. Therefore, the Schlieffen plan operated with a quick assault on France and a German rush for Paris; and having overcome the French armies, the German forces could be concentrated on the Eastern front to combat the mighty Russian army. The Schlieffen plan thus operated with a first assault in the West and the Belgians were first in line. Due to the Schlieffen plan, France would be engaged in war, and the march through Belgium was also risky business for the Germans, as Great Britain might thereby become involved.

Accordingly, the British stance was crucial to the Germans and German Ambassador to London, Karl Max von Lichnowsky, did his best to interpret the signs and signals of the British Foreign Minister, Sir Grey. To the best of his (Lichnowsky’s) knowledge, the British government had not yet – at the end of July – made up their minds. From London, he reported back to
the chancellor and the foreign ministry in Berlin that, in his interpretation, Britain would stay out, provided that Germany exerted a moderating pressure on the Dual Monarchy. After the outbreak of war, Lichnowsky was fired, accused of having misled Berlin – which he had not done. The crucial point, however, was that the government in London did not speak out in a clear voice – for the simple reason that it sought, as long as possible, to keep a free hand in order to reconcile the conflicting parties. We cannot know what Germany might have resolved, had they been informed in due time by the British government that Britain would intervene. We know – from Otte’s detailed examination of the correspondence between London and Berlin – that the focus of the two countries, Britain and Germany, differed: whereas Grey in London demanded that Berlin use its influence to moderate the views of her ally in Vienna, the focus in Germany was on Russia and Bethmann insisted that Britain restrain the moves of St Petersburg. In the final stages of the July Crisis, following the Austro-Hungarian démarche, Britain and Germany were the two parties seeking to reach a peaceful compromise by localizing the conflict. However, they did not agree upon how to reach that goal.

In early August 1914, the politicians were apparently no longer in charge; events were slipping out of the hands of the politicians and into the orbit of military planning. At that stage, it was the generals who resolved which measures were to be taken. This brief review of the July Crisis supports the conclusion that the inner circle of decision-makers was indeed limited, that few people made the crucial decisions, as was also repeatedly emphasized by Margaret MacMillan and Otte, and also that, until very late, a negotiated settlement was within reach.

The July Crisis 1914: Rational decisions and alternative options?

Looking back upon the events of July 1914, it seems reasonable to conclude that European politicians made decisions and took precautions which were substantially rational and consistent. It was consistent with German foreign policy to support their ally the Dual Monarchy, and no objections could be made against Russian support to Serbia. The alliance between France and Russia was a pillar of both French and Russian foreign policy; nothing therefore could be objected to in the French promise of support to Russia. In an upcoming crisis, it was rational policy to stand by and confirm existing treaty obligations.
At the same time, however, it may be asserted that all great powers might have resolved differently and acted otherwise. Germany was in a position to put pressure upon the Austrians. From the very start, the German leaders were aware that their support was crucial for the Austrians; and Russia could have persuaded the Serbians to hold back and to cooperate with the Austrians. The problem of the Serbians was that they were obviously involved in some kind of state-sponsored terrorism. France could have restrained the Russian government and made the Russians put pressure upon Serbia. All states acted rationally, and all could have acted differently. Rushing into war was not the only option but, in July 1914, none of the great powers acted in the interest of peace or compromise. They all pursued their own national interests, as emphasized by Konrad Jarausch. These politicians and diplomats were neither “sleepwalkers” nor “fatalists”, but decision-makers who did not really understand “the bloody consequences of the decisions they were about to make”. In Jarausch’s opinion they lacked “a sufficient sense of responsibility for the whole to be inclined to compromise”. (Jarausch 2015: 68)

Was Germany guiltier than any other state? It may be argued that the German “blank check” escalated the crisis – which it did – and that Germany delivered the declaration of war, thereby turning the conflict into a general European war. However, the Germans did not start it. The process was set in motion by the Serbs and the Austrians. Looking for the guilty party, the Dual Monarchy and Serbia were the two states which constituted the inner circle of the crisis, creating the crisis. In the next circle, we find that Germany and Russia are the two states which escalated the crisis. France and England were, more or less, drawn into a conflict which was of little concern to them.

When war broke out in August 1914, the great powers seemed to have forgotten that the conflict was about Bosnia and the rivalry between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia. They chose the war which the generals had planned, and that was a general war between the opposing alliances in Europe. After the War, the politicians were confronted with the difficult task of explaining and justifying why millions of young men had had to fight and die in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe.

**Structural preconditions**

At this point, we may return to the structural or the “underlying” causes.
Asserting that the European leaders might have resolved and acted in other ways may be too easy. The insistence on the crucial role of the decision-makers – whoever they might be – does not imply that structural preconditions can be ignored. The question is, how do we balance the two levels of explanation and discuss how to interpret the connections between structures and decision-making? How do structures work? Did “underlying causes” limit the range of options available to state leaders? To which extent were the options of the decision-makers in July 1914 restrained by structural ties? Such questions might be posed differently, as a matter of framing: Did social, political, or cultural structures frame the minds and expectations of decision-makers in definite ways, making alternative interpretations unlikely or irrational? To take just one example, it may be argued that the ethos of militarism made it increasingly difficult for political leaders to question the plans of the generals. German politicians might doubt and question the political wisdom of trespassing through Belgian lands, as stipulated in the Schlieffen plan, though such a route might be sound from a military point of view. This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of methodological questions, however important they might be. Structural ties worked in various ways. James Joll’s introduction still provides a sound basis for a review of such issues. A few comments on some of the most debated “underlying causes” – secret diplomacy and the system of alliances, militarism and arms race, nationalism and imperialist rivalries – will have to do here.

How important was the system of alliances and the polarization of Europe which it implied – on the one side the Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, on the other the Entente of France, Russia, and Great Britain? In 1918, before the War had ended, American President Wilson pointed to the secret diplomacy and the system of alliances as the basic reason for the War. Secret diplomacy was the evil and the curse of international relations, according to Wilson. The core of the argument was that the moment one great power became involved in war, the other great powers in Europe would be involved too. This view has been repeated in historical textbooks on European history in the twentieth century, for example by Harold James in *Europe Reborn: A History 1914-2000*. The major European powers “had locked themselves into a system of alliances that now entailed security commitments and preemptive strikes”. (James 2003: 49) No doubt, the alliance system and the treaties mattered; still, it was not the text or the paragraphs of the treaties that settled things in July 1914. Statesmen “seldom act on the basis of simple legal commitments”, as noted by Gordon Martel. (Martel 1987: 4) Rather, the alliances were important because they provided the basis for
military planning and conditioned expectations about the form a war eventually might take, “and who were likely to be friends and who enemies”. (Joll 1987: 66) MacMillan’s interpretation is similar: it was not the text that mattered. The system of alliances mattered, as diplomats and officers established practices within the framework of the alliances. “Inevitable expectations and understandings of mutual support accumulated within the two alliances as diplomats and the military grew accustomed to working with each other”. (MacMillan 2013: 497) Christopher Clark emphasizes the importance of the alliances too: “The polarization of Europe’s geopolitical system was a crucial precondition for the war that broke out in 1914”. A general European war was unthinkable without the system of alliances as it was formed after 1890. “The bifurcation into two alliance blocs did not cause the war; indeed it did as much to mute as to escalate conflict in the pre-war years. Yet without the two blocs, the war could not have broken out in the way it did. The bipolar system structured the environment in which the crucial decisions were made”. (Clark 2012: 123) No doubt, the system of alliances mattered, and yet we might wonder at – as noted by Otte – that however much the powers depended on their respective allies, there was little coordination of policy between any of them. (Otte 2014: 510)

Militarism and arms race – the making of standing armies of a size hitherto unknown in Europe – were factors at the structural level which have been discussed at length. I shall not go into the debates on the size of national armies. What is important is the changing role of the military in modern societies – with standing armies and military budgets that had no equivalent in pre-modern times – and a different ethos of militarism corresponding to the increasing weight and influence of the armies, not only as weapons of destruction in war but also as instruments of nation-building. (Sheehan 2007) In Prussia, at least, the ethos of militarism prevented politicians from objecting to the political wisdom of the Schlieffen Plan, for example, as mentioned above, in passing through Belgian territory which might invite Great Britain into the War. Again, MacMillan presents fine observations on militarism as not only a question of arms, but also as a matter of culture and cultural structures. (MacMillan 2013: 321-22) It was not the task of “the civilians” to question the plans of the military.

The connections between imperialist rivalries and war were not present in the same obvious ways. It was the Russian communist Lenin who in 1917 pointed to imperialism and imperial rivalries as the basic cause of the War: as Germany had entered the struggle for colonies late, she now claimed a redistribution of the colonies to get her share. Though imperialist am-
bitions were not among the immediate motives of the decision-makers in 1914, James Joll had a point, observing that earlier imperialist policies contributed to “the frame of mind” in which decisions were taken in 1914. (Joll 1984: 195) During the War, German General Erich Ludendorff seriously speculated about expanding German colonies.

Finally, the basic fact should not be forgotten that nationalism lay at the root of the Balkan entanglements. It seems to me that aggressive nationalism might be perceived as the crucial structural explanation of the War. Nationalism not only sparked the initial confrontation of the conflict but also turned the local conflict into a major international problem.

**The historical prelude: International crises in early twentieth century**

Leaving aside the fatal decisions of July 1914 and the structural causes, Christopher Clark and Margaret MacMillan seem to agree that the international crises in early twentieth century constituted an important part of the historical context. The recurrent conflicts and crises, starting at the turn of the century with the Fashoda crisis in 1898 and the Boer War of 1898-1902, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 and the Russian revolution of 1904-05, the first Morocco crisis of 1905 and the ensuing conference at Algeciras of 1906, the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908, the Italian assault on Libya in 1911, the second Morocco crisis (the Agadir Crisis) of 1911, and finally culminating in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, all served as the historical prelude to the general war to come. In both MacMillan’s *The War That Ended Peace,* and Clark’s *The Sleepwalkers,* the experiences and the lessons learnt by the decision-makers in the capitals of Europe are accorded an important role in the explanations of the origins of World War 1. Summarizing their views, we may conclude that the international crises between 1898 and 1913 prepared the way for the general war in 1914.

The international conflicts of these years might be approached in essentially two distinctly opposite ways: in the first, we depict the conflicts as individual crises successfully solved by international diplomacy; in the second, we regard them as a series of interrelated crises, each intensifying the level of international tension and contributing to a weakening of the confidence among political leaders and their belief in the value of international diplomacy. In the first, the conclusion is that diplomacy worked and military hostilities between the great powers were averted; in the second, we might
conclude that decision-makers were increasingly losing confidence in international diplomacy. Instead, some leaders were convinced that a military settlement might be inescapable and indeed preferable. MacMillan subscribes to the second view: these conflicts intensified the conflict-potential of Europe, and decision-makers increasingly lost confidence in the other, opposing powers. After the Balkan Wars, the pool of trust and goodwill was empty. In Clark’s argument, the Balkan Wars were crucial. The Balkan Wars upset the balance of power and influence among the great powers in a contested region of Europe. It was the Balkan entanglements that made the killings at Sarajevo so explosive.

Concluding remarks

Just as historians today do not subscribe to the idea of an inevitable route from the assassinations in Sarajevo in late June to the outbreak of war in early August 1914, so most historians also accept that the decisions of July 1914 have to be understood and explained in the broader context of European societies and the international system in early twentieth century; the question is how to disclose the mutual interdependence between structures and agency.

Assessing the structural causes, it can hardly be repudiated that nationalism was at the root of the conflict, and that the system of alliances mattered. The Balkan “entanglements” were rooted in national controversies: expansionist Serbian nationalism posed a threat to Austrian multi-nationalism. The Balkans and the Eastern question have to be placed at the center of the conflict – as Christopher Clark does – thereby turning the imperfections and the “backwardness” of the administrative and political apparatus of the three eastern monarchies into a major problem, which is also stressed by Otte.

Still, it can be argued that the killings at Sarajevo were turned into a pretext for war; it required the efforts of the war-parties in both Vienna and St Petersburg to convince the skeptics of the wisdom of military action. Having witnessed the atrocities of the two Balkan Wars of 1912-13, diplomats and political leaders might well have gone for a diplomatic settlement to the crisis of 1914. To explain why that did not happen, MacMillan evidently has a point, arguing that the recurrent crises between 1898 and 1913 had rendered compromise increasingly difficult. Diplomacy, having averted military confrontation between the European great powers up to 1913, did
not work in 1914. Yet, it was not so that the experience of these conflicts had obstructed all prospects for a peaceful settlement in 1914. Otte’s minute examination of the July Crisis bears witness to the intensity of diplomatic efforts in July 1914 and a diplomatic conclusion of the crisis was not out of reach – had it not been for the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum, the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia, and the general mobilization of the Russian army.

Unquestionably, recent studies of the decision-making process in the capitals of Europe in July 1914 document that something went wrong, at least according to schedule. These studies add important new insight into the worlds of the decision-makers, their thoughts and contemplations. Somehow, the conclusions of the recent studies on July 1914 support the views of Albertini’s classic book: that the decision-makers of 1914 were hardly equipped – “ill-coped” (Otte’s term) – to handle the serious crisis that confronted them in July 1914. Altogether, we are left with the impression that nothing in the decision-making processes of July 1914 suggests that either politicians or generals were considering seriously the consequences of four years’ destructive war; they were all victims of the “short war illusion”. (Joll 1984: 106) Furthermore, it seems reasonable to conclude that a basic problem was that decision-makers in July 1914 were willing to run risks, yet had only vague ideas of the weight, the nature, and the extent of these risks.
Reference list


Chapter 4

The course of World War 1
and its incomplete endings

Wolfgang Zank

The opening: Loading the odds heavily against the Central Powers

In the first two weeks of August 1914, seven of Germany’s eight armies concentrated along the French and Belgian borders. Colonel General Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff, followed the basic ideas of his predecessor, Alfred von Schlieffen, and based German strategy on the assumption that it might be possible to crush the French forces in one devastating blow at the beginning of the War, using Belgian territory for a massive enveloping maneuver. Thereafter, the majority of the German forces could be turned eastwards to confront Russia. Only this way did a German victory in a two-front war seem possible.

The Schlieffen Plan implied a monstrous violation of Belgian neutrality. Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg openly admitted in the Reichstag, the German diet, that Germany was violating international law; he promised indemnity for the period after the War. But, as he also said, someone who was as menaced as the Germans can only consider “how he is to hack his way through” (McMeekin 2013: 377). This reflected a perhaps dubious morality. But also, from the cool perspective of German interests, the Schlieffen Plan had obvious problems: it made the British entry into the War extremely likely. Indeed, still on 31 July, about three quarters of the British cabinet were determined not to be drawn into the War unless Britain was attacked. But on 2 August, when it was clear that the German army would march into Belgium, the proponents for a British entry, first and foremost Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, did not encounter noticeable resistance any more (Clark 2013). Actually, Moltke and other German
commanders were quite aware of the possibility of British intervention. They thought, however, that they could accept this risk because the British army was small.

Interestingly, both Schlieffen and Moltke saw the possibility – if not likelihood – that the war could become protracted and indecisive. As Schlieffen wrote in 1909, “The total battle as well as its parts, the separated as well as the contiguous battles, will be played out on fields and across areas that dwarf the theatres of earlier martial acts” (Strachan 2014: 44). This was quite an accurate prognosis. However, it did not make him or Moltke question the basics of the Schlieffen Plan.

The German offensive in the west began on 18 August, and for about three weeks it looked as if the Schlieffen Plan could work. The French army, the British Expeditionary Force, and Belgian troops were repeatedly driven back. By the beginning of September, the 1st Army on the German right wing stood some 35 kilometers from the center of Paris. Their lines, however, were overstretched, and the troops were exhausted. On 6 September, the Allies started a counter offensive at the river Marne, and three days later the 1st Army had to retreat. On the banks of river Aisne, the German troops dug in. Mobile warfare continued for some two months as both sides began a “race to the Channel”, endeavoring to come around the other’s flank. But, by the end of November, the whole Western Front was “frozen”; an uninterrupted line of trenches, barbed wire, and fortifications stretched from the Swiss border to the Channel. The Schlieffen Plan had failed.

After the War, there was some discussion in Germany about whether the High Command made a fatal mistake when it, under the impression of a Russian advance into Eastern Prussia, transferred troops from the west to the east; they were missing at the Marne. But they could not have made a profound difference anyhow. By 1914, troops on the defensive had a huge advantage; consequently any major offensive necessarily ground to a halt quite soon. The Schlieffen Plan was simply an impossibility.

At the other fronts, the situation did not seem to be much more favorable for the Central Powers. True, in Eastern Prussia in August the German 8th Army annihilated a Russian army at Tannenberg and badly mauled another one at the Mazurian Lakes in September. But in Galicia, the forces of Austria-Hungary, financially badly neglected in the years before the War, experienced a long row of catastrophes. And, against Serbia, the Austrian army made practically no progress at all. They could capture Belgrade on
2 December, but had to evacuate it again on 13 December. By the end of 1914, both Austrian fronts were in stalemate. Within four months, Austria-Hungary had lost 957,000 men, more than double the number of the pre-war size of the army (Strachan 2014). Germany could not expect much support from this ally.

The Central Powers seemed to gain a substantial reinforcement when the Ottoman Empire joined them. The Young Turkish leadership entertained ideas of pan-Islamic and pan-Turanic expansionism. Not least, the Turkophone areas under Russian rule attracted their attention. On 2 August 1914, Berlin and Istanbul signed an alliance, and three months later the Ottomans declared war. The Russian Black-Sea ports became cut off from the wider world, and Russia had to divert forces to the new front in the Caucasus. In Berlin many had rather wild ideas about raising the Muslim world in revolt against British and French colonialism, not least Emperor Wilhelm II. Sultan Mehmet V let indeed Sheikh ul-Islam, the highest-ranking cleric, declare *jihad* against the Entente powers. But this had next to no effect. In September 1915, a German mission reached Kabul; in January 1916 they signed a treaty in which, as the first European power, Germany recognized Afghanistan as a sovereign country. However, German hopes that Emir Habibollah would start an invasion of British India did not materialize; nor did ideas of creating an Indian government in exile in Kabul to start an insurgency (Opfer-Klinger 2014). In southern Persia in 1915, however, Wilhem Waßmuß, the “German Lawrence”, formerly Director of the German Vice-Consulate in Buschehr, was successful at instigating a tribal revolt against British domination. In 1916, the revolt spread to almost all the tribes in southern Persia. Only after the armistice with the Ottoman Empire in 1918 could the British restore control over the coastal regions (Loth 2014).

Far more important became a silent victory which the British navy won in the first days of the War: the establishment of a sea blockade against the Central Powers. It was a wide blockade between Scotland and Norway, out of reach for the German fleet. In 1914, the total steamer tonnage of the world was about 26 million tons. The Allies owned 59 percent; the British Empire alone 48 percent. Neutral countries accounted for 27 percent, and the Central Powers 15 percent (Germany 12 percent). The vessels of the Central Powers disappeared from the seas within the first days of the War. Sea-borne trade from then onwards was possible only through the neutral countries. During the first months, the blockade was restricted. Absolute contraband (military equipment and the like) on the way to Germany was to be confiscated, but the neutrals could still trade with conditional contraband
(most notably foodstuff). The British government endeavored to negotiate voluntary restrictions with the neutrals, but their basic rights were not yet questioned. But in March 1915, the British declared an unrestricted blockade: all flows of goods to the Central Powers had to be stopped (Hardach 1987).

The effects of the blockade are difficult to assess. Armament production was seemingly affected very little. But from 1916 onwards, the food supply for the civilian population deteriorated visibly. Calculating the excess mortality rates compared to pre-war years, the official British history of the blockade quantified the number of civilian deaths in Germany caused by the blockade at 772,736. As Hew Strachan put it, “Indirectly, at least, the blockade breached the principle of non-combatant immunity” (Strachan 2014: 209).

The Central Powers were thus gradually cut off from trade with the wider world. By contrast, the Western Allies had free access everywhere. This meant in particular to the gigantic industrial potential of the United States of America. Great Britain could also use the vast resources of its empire: raw materials and food stuff from all over the world, and soldiers from Canada, India, Africa, and Australia/New Zealand.

Britain’s naval dominance also implied that Germany was unable to send support to its colonies. Japan almost immediately seized the opportunity to attack Tsingtao on the Chinese Shantung Peninsula. By 7 November, the German garrison had to surrender. The Japanese leadership had no intention of passing it on to China. On the contrary, in January 1915 Tokyo presented a list of the so-called Twenty-One Demands. They ranged from extended direct control in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Southern Shantung to trading rights and privileges. On 14 August 1917, China declared war on Germany, with a view to participating at the Peace Conference (Strachan 2014). The aim was to get Shantung back. However, the Versailles Conference in 1919 decided otherwise, confirming Japanese ownership.

In 1914, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand took the German colonies on Pacific islands. In Africa, on 27 August 1914, British forces destroyed the German wireless station at Kamina in Togo. It had linked the other African stations with Nauen in Germany. Contact between the German colonies as cut. Conquering the bigger African colonies took a longer time, up to 1916 in Cameroon and November 1917 in the case of East Africa. The German garrison managed to move into Portuguese Mozambique and did not sur-
render before the armistice in 1918. This war was truly global in geographic
terms.

By November 1914, an assessment of the situation of the Central Powers
would not give much scope for optimism. The Schlieffen Plan had failed,
and Germany and Austria had to fight on two fronts with no possibility of
defeating France or Russia any time soon. Great Britain was practically
out of reach for the German forces. And for a drawn-out war, the possibil-
ities for the Allies were vastly superior in terms of industrial potential and
manpower. True, the German army occupied strongly fortified positions in
northern France and Belgium: to defeat it was to be a formidable challenge
for the Allies. But for a war of attrition, the odds were heavily in favor of
the Allies.

Of the German leaders, Erich von Falkenhayn, the new Chief of the General
Staff, seemed to have understood this for a moment. He argued for finding
a compromise with Russia (Strachan 2014). There was, however, no support
for this position, and Falkenhayn himself soon abandoned it. Instead, the
German leadership stuck to the war aims which Bethmann Hollweg had
formulated on 9 September 1914 (the Septemberprogramm). The program
was comparatively modest as to open annexations. In practice, however,
it would have given Germany hegemony over Europe (and a big colonial
empire in middle Africa). According to the program, France would be sub-
stantially weakened through reparation payments which would prevent
re-armament for 15 to 20 years; a commercial treaty would make France
economically dependent on Germany; and Germany would directly annex
the iron-ore region of Briey, and perhaps also border regions of military im-
portance. Belgium was to cede Liège and Verviers to Prussia, and some bor-
der territory to Luxemburg (which would be incorporated into Germany).
Belgium should be transformed into a vassal state, with German rights to
use the Belgian coast militarily. Also, the Netherlands should be brought
into a “close relationship” with Germany. An economic union with com-
mon tariffs should guarantee German economic domination over Central
Europe. Russia would be pressed back from the German border “and her
domination over the non-Russian vassal people be broken” (Fischer 1977:
93-5). Practically right to the end of the War, Germany’s leadership stuck
to this line.

It was Fritz Fischer who, in 1961 in his seminal Griff nach der Weltmacht,
published Bethmann Hollweg’s Septemberprogramm for the first time. His
claim that it was Germany which started the War, and that Germany did so
in order to realize these imperialist aims, has not been vindicated by historic research. But it is Fischer’s lasting merit to have brought these aims, formulated after the start of the War, to light. They strongly contributed to rendering a compromise peace very difficult, if not impossible.

Bethmann Hollweg spoke in public only vaguely about the “safety measures and guarantees” (Sicherungen und Garantien) which Germany needed. In the Septemberprogramm, the overall aim was formulated as “securing Germany towards West and East for the time imaginable” (Fischer 1977: 7, 93). This might have been a rhetorical smokescreen for imperialist ambitions (as Fischer had assumed). But in case Bethmann Hollweg meant it, we can see the Septemberprogramm as a classical example of a “security dilemma”: full security for one means submission for the others.

1915: Widening the ring, but no decision

In strategic terms, Germany had the advantage of the “inner line”: troops could be moved from one front to the other to create points of concentration and superiority. After the Western Front became immobile in November 1914, the German leadership used this possibility for the first time when it reduced the strength of the divisions in the West from four to three regiments, in order to create a strategic reserve which could be employed against Russia. In May 1915, a joint German-Austrian force broke through the Russian lines between Gorlice and Tarnow in Galicia. This was the beginning of a long retreat for the Russian army. In June the Central Powers took Lviv, in August they entered Warsaw, Grodno, and Brest-Litovsk, and in September Vilna. The Russian leadership resorted to the scorched earth tactic. Certain areas were “cleansed” of “unreliable” people, notably Germans and Jews. As an army commander told Chief of Staff Nikolay Yanushkevich: “The complete hostility of the entire Jewish population toward the Russian army is well established” (Strachan 2014: 144). There were indeed many Jews with pro-German sympathies. In Russia, Jews have become victims of numerous pogroms. By comparison, Germany appeared to be an orderly country under rule of law with no pogroms, and where Jews were, by comparison to their share of the population, strongly overrepresented in leading social positions (Nipperdey 1993).

In October 1915, German and Austrian forces crossed the Danube and marched into Serbia, soon assisted by the Bulgarian army which attacked the Serbian flank from the east. The Serbian troops had to retreat over the
mountains into Albania, with temperatures falling to minus 20 degrees. In relation to population size, Serbia suffered the most losses during the War. British and French troops landed in Salonika to open a new front, but this came too late to bring relief to the Serbian army. Entente ships brought the remaining Serbian troops first to Corfu and then to Salonika. Greece was still neutral, and using the territory of a neutral country was a severe breach of international law; but as David Lloyd George, Minister of Ammunitions, made clear, “there was no comparison between going through Greece and the German passage through Belgium” (Strachan 2014: 154).

In nearby Gallipoli, at the Dardanelles, the Allies had landed in April with the strategic aim of capturing the Ottoman capital and opening a passage to Russia. But the Ottoman forces provided a staunch defense. Mustafa Kemal, Lieutenant Colonel and commander of a division, became a national hero. In the trench warfare, the Allies lost many men to disease. And after German submarines had sunk two British warships, the Royal Navy withdrew their capital ships, leaving only smaller vessels with less powerful artillery to support the troops. In December and January, the Allied forces retreated from Gallipoli – yet another severe defeat for the Allied camp.

At the Western Front, Allied offensives brought no breakthroughs. All in all, 1915 was thus not a good year for the Allies. They could find some consolation in the fact that Italy had joined their camp in April. But, due to geography, the Italian army could not do much more than frontally assault the Austrian-Hungarian lines at the Isonzo River, with practically no results except long casualty lists.

The Central Powers had thus gained some important successes and conquered much territory. But they were still far away from victory.

**War crimes and genocide**

At the outbreak of the War, a substantial body of international law existed, formulating rules for warfare with a view to restricting its destructivity. Its main bodies were the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the London Declaration on war at sea (signed but not ratified). However, these conventions could not prevent numerous atrocities and the killing of civilians in practically all arenas.

Already during the war, the shooting of about 6,400 civilians in Belgium
and northern France by German troops was widely publicized, reactions to (usually imaginary) partisan attacks. Something similar happened during the Russian invasion of Eastern Prussia (1,500 to 6,000 victims). At the Eastern front and in the Balkans, the number of civilians killed was the highest. In Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania a culture of armed popular resistance existed. In these regions, real guerilla insurgencies began, reaching their peak in the insurrection in the Toplica district of southern Serbia, in February and March 1917. It was brutally repressed by Bulgarian troops, assisted by Austrian-Hungarian and German units. Twenty thousand people were killed, most of them innocent civilians (Neitzel 2014). Horrible as these waves of repression were, it should perhaps be emphasized that irregular guerilla warfare was also a breach of the conventions; only persons wearing a uniform had the status of legal combatants, and thus claim to humane treatment in case of captivity. Others did not. These rules were formulated precisely with a view to protecting the civilian population.

German Zeppelins bombarded Paris already from September 1914, and from January 1915 onwards British cities too. About 1,600 British civilians lost their lives. Allied air strikes on German cities cost some 800 civilians lives. A first big Allied air offensive against German towns in 1918 was stopped only by the armistice (Neitzel 2014).

The use of poison gas was widespread from 1915 onwards. This was not a war crime in the legal sense, given the point that no convention interdicted its use. Only in 1925 did the Geneva Convention formulate a ban on gas. In the Second World War, this ban was basically respected – at the front lines. From a strictly legal point of view, air strikes against the civilian population were also not war crimes, again, because there was no convention against it, neither in World War 1 nor in World War 2. They were, of course, breaches of the general “principle of non-combatant immunity”. But this principle did not carry much weight in either World War.

All these horrors were dwarfed, however, in comparison to what happened inside the Ottoman Empire. In January 1915, the Ottoman Third Army suffered a disastrous defeat at Sarikamish in the Caucasus. On their retreat, the troops committed brutal acts of “revenge” against the supposed traitors at their back, the Christian Armenians. This provoked an armed self-defense insurrection among the Armenians of Van. The advance of the Russian army saved about 300,000 Armenians. The Young Turk leadership in Istanbul convinced itself that the time was ripe to “solve the Armenian problem”. On 24 April, 650 Armenian politicians and leading intellectuals in Istanbul were arrested and
murdered. All over the country, similar atrocities were committed. In May 1915, in each Armenian town and village of the six vilayet (provinces) nearest to the Russian border, proclamations of evacuation were hung up. The procedures were the same all over, according to precise timelines: the people had two to three days to settle their affairs. The men, except the very old ones, were separated and brought out of town immediately. A few kilometers away, they were shot. The remaining population had to walk away, the official destination being Aleppo. On their way, Kurdish gangs, frequently – age-old enemies of the Armenians – or units of the Teşkilât-i Mahsusa, a special secret organization under direct command of War Minister Enver Pasha, attacked, robbed and murdered the evacuees. This happened without any interference from the accompanying gendarmes. Often it was the gendarmes themselves to open fire. Food and water was insufficient, diseases additionally killed many. After some months, the survivors arrived at Aleppo, where no preparations had been made for them (Chalion and Ternon 1983: 14-17). After the “ethnic cleansing” of the eastern vilayet, the operations were extended to other regions in Anatolia, though not to Istanbul and Smyrna. There “discreteness” could not be guaranteed.

The survivors of the marches were “resettled” along the Euphrates, usually in concentration camps. In October 1915, four teachers at the German Realschule in Aleppo wrote to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin: “How can we make our Armenian pupils read the story of Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, how can we teach them to conjugate and decline, when in the yards next to the school their compatriots are dying of hunger? When almost naked girls, women and children, some lying on the ground, others huddled among the dying or the waiting coffins, are breathing their last breath? … Of the 2,000 to 3,000 peasants, women and girls from Upper Armenia brought here in good health, only 40 or 50 skeletal figures remain” (Chalion and Ternon 1983: 68). Accounts of this kind, from missionaries, diplomats, nurses, and others, abound.

By February 1916, about 500,000 deportees were alive, distributed between Aleppo and Damascus or the Euphrates and Zor. About 300,000 had died during the “evacuation”. The Young Turk leadership was presumably surprised at the number of survivors. At any rate, in spring 1916, a systematic campaign began to murder the deportees in the concentration camps north of Aleppo. It culminated in the summer in the mass killings of the deportees in Zor and the Armenian workers at the building site of the Bagdadhahn. This wave cost presumably another 300,000 lives (Kévorkian 2011).
For some historians, the use of the word “genocide” is misleading. For instance, Hew Strachan wrote that the term might be correct for the scale of fatalities, but “in terms of causation the issue is more complex … The Ottoman Empire, a backward state, unable to supply and transport its own army in the field, was in no state to organize large-scale deportations”. He points at the cornered position of the Ottoman Empire, with the Western Allies at Gallipoli, Russian troops advancing in the Caucasus, and a British-Indian army moving northwards in Mesopotamia, and concludes, “Desperate situations begat desperate responses” (Strachan 2014: 111f). This reading of the events as an unfortunate evacuation accompanied by some crimes, can also be found among, for instance, some Turkish historians.

It is true that many of the fatalities were caused by the circumstances. And no one has ever found a written order by the Young Turk leadership to exterminate all Armenians. However, this does not say too much. There is, for instance, no written order by Hitler to start the Holocaust either. The most important instructions were given orally. And as to the “evacuation” of the Armenians, there exists, for instance, a report by the German ambassador in Istanbul, dated 30 June 1916, in which he informed Bethmann Hollweg about the Young Turkish organization Ittihad, the Committee of Union and Progress: “The Committee is demanding the extermination of the last remnants of the Armenians, and the government must yield. But the Committee is not only the organization of the government party in the capital. To every authority, from the vali to the kaimakam, is attached a member of the Committee to second and to watch him. The deportations of Armenians have resumed everywhere” (Chaliand and Ternon 1983: 54). There are several other diplomatic reports about an explicit genocidal intent.

Furthermore, shortly after the war, the massacres were investigated in court, on various occasions. The biggest trial was the one against the Young Turkish leadership in Istanbul from April to June 1919. The jury studied much written evidence and interrogated numerous witnesses. It established the important role of the Teşkilât-i Mahsusa and of the Committee of Union and Progress in organizing the massacres and concluded: “This shows that the murders were committed on the orders of and with the knowledge of Talaat, Jemal and Enver Beys” (Chaliand and Ternon 1983: 89), i.e. the leading Young Turkish triumvirate. They and other high-ranking officials were sentenced to death in absentia. In another trial Kemal Bey, the “Butcher of Yozgad” was sentenced to death and executed. However, when Mustafa Kemal (“Atatürk”) took power in 1922, he put a lid on the issue.
By this time, another trial had been finalized in Berlin, where Talaat Pasha, 1915 Minister of the Interior, had lived in exile. On 15 March 1921, he was shot dead by Soghomon Teiririan, an Armenian survivor. The process became quickly a trial of Talaat. Again, numerous witnesses were questioned. Among the documents studied were photocopies of cipher telegrams which Talaat had sent to Aleppo. Instead of destroying them, as he was ordered to, an Armenian, Aram Andonian, photocopied them and published them in Paris 1920. The court in Berlin had them assessed, and five of them could be authenticated. For instance, on 16 September 1915, Talaat sent a cable to Aleppo which read that the government, by the order of the Committee of Union and Progress, “has decided to destroy completely all the indicated persons living in Turkey .... No regard must be paid to either age or sex”. Or on 7 March 1916: “Collect the children of the indicated persons … Take them away on the pretext that they are to be looked after by the Deportations Committee, so as not to arouse suspicion. Destroy them and report” (Chaliand and Ternon 1983). The court in Berlin acquitted Teilirian.

Raymond Kévorkian draws attention to the Armenian workers on the construction sites of the Baghdadbahn. In 1916 they were murdered too. “The obstinacy with which the capital conducted these operations, against the advice of some military authorities … and in the face of all operational logic, illustrates, perhaps even better than the large-scale massacres perpetrated in Zor and Ras ul-Ayn, the desire of … the Young Turk leadership … to implacably carry through to the bitter end their plan to extirpate the Armenian Ottoman population” (Kévorkian 2011: 690). This was rather the opposite of what Strachan wrote: Due to the desolate infrastructure and administrative disorganization of the Ottoman state, a part of the Armenian population survived systematic genocide.

**Unrestricted U-boat warfare and the entry of the United States**

There is presumably no other single decision taken during the War which had such far-reaching consequences as the German one of 9 January 1917 to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. And none was based on such blatantly unrealistic assumptions.

At the beginning of the War, the German navy was blocked in the North Sea. During the first months, a few cruisers operated in distant waters un-
til they were all sunk. Their impact on Allied shipping was small. There was, however, the possibility of hurting Allied shipping by using submarines. But submarines were very vulnerable when they surfaced because they were slow and thinly plated. This made it difficult to use them and, at the same time, comply with international rules. According to these, a submarine, having encountered a ship, had to surface, stop, and search the ship, and establish whether it was an enemy ship or a neutral one carrying contraband. This became increasingly risky after the Allies began to arm freighters, often in a hidden way. The idea to declare an unrestricted submarine war and let a submarine torpedo ships from underwater and without warning gained ground among the German leadership. This was illegal, but so was the British decision to have a wide blockade for the wholesale control of the trade of several neutral countries; only a close, near-coast blockade of the harbors of the Central Powers would have been in compliance with international law (Erdmann 1980).

On February 1915, the German government declared unrestricted submarine war in the waters around the British Isles. Britain responded with the unrestricted blockade of the Central Powers (see above). The neutral countries protested against both. However, their sympathies were likely to glide towards the British side. For most neutrals, in particular for the United States, trade with the Allies was more important; the War had turned the Western Allies into very good customers for US products. And the gruesome character of the German blockade of Britain did not fail to cost Germany sympathies. This was in particular the case after a German submarine sunk the British passenger liner Lusitania on 7 May 1915, with 1257 passengers and 700 crew on board. One hundred and twenty American citizens lost their lives. In September, the German leadership backed down: no submarine warfare on the British West coast, and in the North Sea only according to the rules (surfacing, warning, and checking).

General-Lieutenant Erich von Falkenhayn, the Chief of the General Staff, brought the subject back on to the agenda at the end of 1915. In his view, German successes in the east could not decide the War; Germany had to win in the west. Therefore, he was preparing a big offensive at Verdun (to start in February 1916). But it could hardly bring victory alone; it had to be complemented with unrestricted submarine warfare. Bethmann Hollweg was strictly against it and argued, in case it would not bring victory, it implied finis Germaniae. As a kind of compromise, in February 1916 the German navy was ordered to begin an “intensified” (verschärften) submarine warfare, not fully unrestricted, which, however, again produced gruesome
results. In March, the French liner *Sussex* was sunk, with 80 passengers killed or injured. On 20 April, US President Woodrow Wilson sent an extraordinarily sharp note to Berlin, stating that a declaration of war would become unavoidable if the sinking without warning continued. Bethmann Hollweg was able to convince the Kaiser to cancel the *verschärften* submarine warfare (Herzfeld 1968).

In the meantime, Falkenhayn’s offensive at Verdun had failed. He wrote later that his intention had been a war of attrition, weakening the French army much more than the German one. But this was a construction he began to use from mid-March onwards. His original orders aimed at a breakthrough. This failed, and fighting continued until December with very limited gains of ground. With 337,000 casualties, the German army had suffered practically as much attrition as the French one, 377,000 (Strachan 2014).

On 1 July, the British army, supported by French troops, opened the offensive at the Somme. Also in this case, breakthrough failed, and General Douglas Haig, the British Commander in Chief, then also used the term “attrition” as justification. Fighting continued to November. The German front withstood the pressure. But the German High Command was seriously concerned about the vast quantities of material which the Allies could deploy. Just in the preliminary bombardment, the British fired 1.5 million shells (Strachan 2014).

At sea, the big naval battle at Jutland (31 May/1 June) had only confirmed the superior British position. Admiral Reinhard Scheer, the Commander of the German High Sea Fleet, had hoped to lead his fleet against weaker British forces. Instead, he clashed with the complete Grand Fleet and had to do his utmost to break off contact and rush back to Wilhemshaven. Meanwhile, the British blockade had become more effective. The list of goods classified as contraband became longer, and the neutrals had to accept quantitative restrictions on their imports and increased surveillance. Within a few months, German food imports from Scandinavia fell by half (Erdmann 1980).

In the east, the Russian army had regained strength and launched a major offensive against Austrian-Hungarian forces. This made Romania enter the War on the Allied side. This blow cost Falkenhayn his post. On 29 August, Paul von Hindenburg became his successor, with Erich Ludendorff as First Quartermaster General being the real “strongman” in the new High Command.
As had become obvious by the end of 1916, a German land victory in the west was impossible. The logical conclusion would have been to seek a compromise peace, at least in the west. But this meant that Germany had to drop all ideas about substantially weakening France or gaining control over Belgium. Johann Heinrich Count von Bernstorff, the ambassador in Washington, informed the German leadership explicitly that the US regarded a full reconstruction of Belgian independence as an essential part of any political solution (Fischer 1977). But the leading circles in Berlin were not prepared to give up the war aims in the west. Instead, they cultivated illusions.

Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, Chief of the Admiral Staff, declared that a resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare would crack Britain within five months. Scheer and Navy Minister Eduard von Capelle agreed. In their calculations, they worked with powerful multipliers: submarine warfare would not only destroy Allied shipping space, it would also drive insurance rates for the ships and freight rates and wages for sailors upwards because shipping would be so much more risky. The argument that, at least for the US, deliveries to Britain would become a war effort and thus not subject to the usual commercial calculations failed to make an impression. Furthermore, von Capelle and others quantified the risk of American troops arriving in Europe at zero, because the submarines would prevent it (Erdmann 1980: 131-132). As matter of fact, not one single ship transporting US troops to Europe was sunk.

By the end of 1916, the united military leadership, including Hindenburg and Ludendorff, pressed for submarine war. So did representatives of the bigger commercial interest groups (Fischer 1977: 247) and, in the Reichstag, so did Conservatives and the Catholic Zentrum party. On 9 January 1917 at the Crown Council in Pless, the decision was made.

Bernstorff delivered the declaration on unrestricted submarine warfare on 31 January. The US broke off diplomatic relations a few days later. On 2 April, Wilson, with the support of the entire cabinet behind it, presented a declaration of war to the congress. Germany was doomed. Not immediately, however, because the US had first to mobilize and train an expeditionary force.

The decision for unrestricted submarine warfare can be seen as the implicit recognition of the German leadership that the War could not be won.
Only playing *vabanque*, based on illusionary assumptions, seemed to offer a possibility. The material superiority of the Allies had become overwhelming, and the blockade showed its deadly effect. Morale among the German and Austro-Hungarian troops, and not the least at the home front, was visibly declining, mostly under the impact of hunger. True, Germany, had successes at raising war production through the *Hindenburg Programm* of September 1916, and with the Law on Patriotic Auxiliary Work Efforts (*Gesetz über den Vaterländischen Hilfsdienst*) of 5 December 1916, aimed at mobilizing more of a labor force. But this was far from sufficient to balance the resources of the Western Allies. And, of course, Britain and France also started programs to increase war production. It was the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau who first used the term ‘Total War’, referring the need for France to mobilize all of her resources (Strachan 2014: 253).

The concept of “Total War” came to cover over dynamics which made World War 1 like no other before. Highly industrialized countries unleashed forces of destruction on an unprecedented scale. And if the population at large had to be fully mobilized to drive industrial war output as high as possible, then the enemy could see the civilian population as a “legitimate” target; there were, so to speak, no civilians any more. Furthermore, as not least the events in Germany and Austria-Hungary in the autumn of 1918 showed, the morale at the home front could become a factor of primary importance. Preventing “subversive” activities of any kind, real or imaginary, could be seen as measures of indispensable self-defense. Many could qualify as “subversives”, for example socialists or anarchists. Given the widespread thinking at the time in biological-racial terms, from a militarist perspective, Jews could even appear as “born” subversives.

It was thus by 1917 unavoidable that this War had unleashed forces of destruction which were bound to be felt many years after its end. Then, particularly in this year, a chain of events occurred which worked as a multiplier of destruction and instability on a global scale.

**The Russian Revolution and the emergence of the Brest-Litovsk line**

In February 1917, Petrograd became the scene of a growing wave of strikes and demonstrations, originally for social demands and more bread. By 25 February, banners with political demands such as “Down with the War” and “Down with the Tsarist Government” appeared, and so did red flags. On the
26th, a Sunday, the troops were ordered to open fire, killing or wounding hundreds of people. But on the following morning, the Volinskii regiment mutinied. Soon, other units followed. The same night, the Tsarist government resigned. Liberal Duma politicians formed a committee and contacted the military High Command: only if Tsar Nicholas resigned could order be maintained and the War continued. Most army leaders had come to the same conclusion. On 3 March, Tsarism came to an end (Smith 2006: 114f).

Meanwhile, the Duma Committee had appointed a provisional government under Prince Georgy E. Lvov. However, its authority was shaky. Workers and soldiers had elected soviets – councils – in factories and army units, and sent 1,200 representatives to a common Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. The provisional government invited the soviet to participate, but only the lawyer Aleksandr Kerensky accepted, whereas the left-wing majority in the Executive Committee (EC) of the Petrograd Soviet – mainly Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries (SR) – refused. ‘Dual Power’ was established, with the provisional government having the formal power, whereas the Soviet EC often had more real power through its influence over garrisons, transport workers, and the population at large (Smith 2006: 116).

The biggest mistake of the provisional government was the decision to continue the war. Six Mensheviks and SR entered the government in May with the intention of accelerating the coming of peace. Instead, they became implicated in the preparation of a new offensive, energetically pushed for by War Minister Kerensky. The offensive, in July, turned into a fiasco; the Russian army began to fall apart.

By that time, the countryside was already tormented by a peasant revolution. The peasants were outraged about the state grain monopoly, by which the government tried to force them to sell their products at fixed low prices. Furthermore, beliefs were widespread that the land ought to be distributed from the nobility, state, or church to those who tilled it. The government was divided over the issue (the liberal Kadets insisted on full compensation for the land owners), and declared this an issue to be decided by the coming Constituent Assembly. The peasants began to take matters into their own hands. After harvest, often instigated by returning soldiers, they increasingly occupied the gentry’s land, and confiscated equipment and livestock, distributing them outright. The government introduced martial law in several districts, but did not control sufficient troops to suppress the movement (Smith 2006: 127f). In many factories, soviets established workers’ control,
a praxis of supervising the management, not necessarily demanding socialization.

The economy disintegrated. Gross factory output fell by 36 percent in 1917; half a million workers were laid off. Disorganization spread in the transport system and prevented grain and industrial supplies from coming to the towns. The government printed money in order to pay its bills, thus creating inflation. In Petrograd, real wages fell by half in the second half of the year. War weariness became endemic.

Among the non-Russian people, nationalism gained ground, though unevenly across the regions. Initially, most nationalists demanded only cultural rights such as the use of the native language in schools, or political autonomy in a Russian federation. The provisional government, also divided on this issue, was reluctant to concede substantial autonomy. In September, Kerensky, now Prime Minister, endorsed self-determination, “but only on such principles as the Constituent Assembly shall determine” (Smith 2006: 131). By then, nationalist politicians had already substantially stepped up their demands.

Russia turned into a failed state. Under such conditions, fanaticized and disciplined minorities got their chance. Particularly when led by a charismatic personality. The importance of dramatic actors in history has often been debated controversially. But in this case, it looks like indeed one person had tremendous influence, because he was endowed with charismatic legitimacy at the top of a strictly top-down organization, which in turn achieved unrestricted power in a huge failed state. When Vladimir I. Ulyanov, called Lenin, arrived in Petrograd on 3 April 1917, the Bolshevik leadership was divided and remarkably moderate: it agreed with qualified support for the provisional government, said yes to the military defense of Russian territory, and was open for negotiations with the Mensheviks with a view to reunification. Lenin changed this drastically: he was implacable in opposition to the government and the War, wanted no talk of union with the Mensheviks. Under his leadership, the Bolsheviks incessantly campaigned for bringing down the government, ending the War, distributing the land to the peasants, bringing in workers’ control, and giving all power to the soviets. These slogans gained increasingly traction. Previously, the Bolsheviks were a tiny minority, with hardly 20,000 active members in March 1917 (Koenen 2005: 119). But over the year, they gained a popular basis – in particular in Petrograd and Moscow – the most important locations.
By September, Lenin pressed for an armed insurrection. The majority of the leaders were unenthusiastic. When Lenin managed to persuade a majority in the Central Committee to prepare for an insurrection, Grigory Y. Zinoviev and Lev B. Kamenev were strictly opposed, and even published the decision (Smith 2006: 134). The government was thus warned well in advance. But, in its own capital, it could not muster the few loyal troops necessary to prevent the insurrection – an action by a few thousands which had truly global consequences.

Revolutionary emigrants had informed the German authorities in March 1915 about Lenin and his position that a Russian defeat would be desirable. The Bolsheviks received German money (Koenen 2005: 92-97). In April 1917, with permission of the German authorities, Lenin went by train from Switzerland through Germany on his way to Petrograd. As we have seen above, Germany had not been very successful at supporting Jihad in Oriental lands. But in the case of the Bolshevik fundamentalists, it was a full success. This was arguably the most destructive act of German imperialism.

Immediately after the seizure of power, the Bolshevik regime offered an armistice and peace negotiations on the basis of no annexations or contributions and self-determination of the nations, accompanied by decrees endorsing workers’ control in the factories and land distribution in the countryside. A Peace Treaty was signed in Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918. The Bolsheviks had to accept that Russia gave up sovereignty over a third of its 1914-population: Finland, the Baltic provinces, Poland, and Ukraine, and cede Ardahan, Kars, and Batum to Turkey. According to a supplementary treaty on 27 August, Russia also had to recognize the independence of Georgia.

Brest-Litovsk has often been seen as indicative of the megalomania of German imperialism, because in the territories which became separated from Russia, pro-German governments were in place, partly directly installed by German troops. The developments were, however, very different in the various territories.

The disintegration of Russian state power released national energies, for a long time massively suppressed under the previous-Tsarist system, which had not allowed for the expression of non-Russian otherness or autonomy. Only Finland retained a few autonomous rights – and these were ever further restricted. However, the great German and Austrian advances in
1915 worked as a catalyst for Russia’s territorial decomposition, because non-Russian nationalists saw the possibility for throwing off Russian oppression with the help of foreign troops. This indeed happened, but in many different forms.

Already in November 1916, the Central Powers proclaimed a new Kingdom of Poland. Not least the hope for Polish soldiers had motivated this move. In Lithuania, occupied in 1915, the German military administration endorsed a conference in Vilna, composed of two representatives of all parties and districts, which in June 1917 elected a council (Taryba) as a kind of provisional government. In December, the Taryba proclaimed independence according to ethnographic borders, not the much wider historical ones. A second, more precise, declaration underlined independence both from Russia and Poland. After the Taryba had accepted close connections to Germany in political, military, and financial fields, Emperor Wilhelm II confirmed Lithuania’s independence officially on 23 March 1918. In what later became Latvia and Estonia, the German authorities negotiated only with the Baltic German nobility, which had the support of conservative Estonians and Latvians. Elections on the basis of general estates generated a common council (Landesrat), which decided to ask for a monarchic state under German protection. Bourgeois and popular nationalists contacted the Western Allies; an Estonian committee gained their de-facto recognition as official national representation in May 1918 (Rauch 1990: 48-57).

In the case of Finland, however, the road to independence was mainly an internal process. Under Tsarism, the country had retained some autonomy with a parliament, since 1906 elected on the basis of universal suffrage. The elections of October 1917 brought a bourgeois majority, and President Peter Evind Svinhuvud championed for full independence. But the Social Democrats refused to accept the result of the elections. They organized Red troops which cooperated with the remaining Russian forces, and in November they proclaimed a general strike. On 6 December, the parliament declared independence. Lenin formally recognized it. This did not prevent Russian support for the Red side. In January, full-fledged civil war broke out; the Red side occupied Helsinki. The government evacuated to Vaasa and organized White troops in the northern provinces. Germany assisted them with weapons and, in March 1918, with troops. In May, the civil war ended in a White victory.

In March 1918, Svinhuvud signed treaties in Berlin which established close ties with Germany. Finland was not supposed to make alliances with foreign
powers or offer them bases, whereas the German navy could require them. A commercial treaty guaranteed German products access to Finland free from tariffs, whereas Germany could impose tariffs. On 9 October 1918, the parliament elected a German prince as king (Fischer 1977: 449-454).

In Ukraine on 4 March 1917, a Rada (Ukrainian for soviet) established itself as provisional regional government. Bourgeois politicians dominated, but the political left supported it. The Rada was a corporatist institution with representatives of the major social and cultural institutions. Mychailo Hruševskyi, historian and main representative of the Ukrainian national cultural revival, became chairman (Hildermeier 1989: 211). In June, the Rada proclaimed: “Long Live Autonomous Ukraine in a Federated Russia!” (Smith 2006: 131). In January 1918, a declaration of full independence followed. However, the new country was immediately threatened by Bolshevik troops. The Rada sent a formal request for support to Germany, whereafter German and Austrian troops drove the Bolshevik forces out of the country. However, German hopes for grain deliveries did not materialize; the Rada could not stabilize the situation. Consequently, in April, the Germans replaced the Rada with the Cossack Hetman and former Tsarist General Pavlo Skoropadski. This was a massive interference in Ukrainian affairs. However, as Peter Lieb pointed out, “archival evidence does not support the claim that … [Germany] sought long-term annexation or the creation of a new ‘super’ empire under direct rule”; here Fischer and his supporters had over-interpreted the material (Lieb 2012: 630, 641n11).

As Bethmann Hollweg had formulated in the Septemberprogramm of 1914, Russia’s domination over the non-Russian vassal people ought to be broken. Brest-Litovsk seemed to assure this. The big German advances in 1918 had been possible only because Russia had disintegrated, the “vassal people” themselves wanting to go. In the case of Ukraine and Georgia, the Bolsheviks could reverse this in 1919 and 1922 respectively, by military force. However, from Poland to Finland in the interwar period, the borders were very similar to the Brest-Litovsk line. Stalin could wipe it out, leaving only Finland in conditional – and Poland in formal – independence. But, in 1990, the Brest-Litovsk line appeared again in the Baltic countries and Poland. At the time of writing (2018), the turn of Georgia, Moldava, and Ukraine towards EU association in 2014 seems to have re-established the line in its full length. It looks as if it would be quite wrong to see the Brest-Litovsk line mainly as a product of German imperialism.
The collapse of the Central Powers

Russia’s collapse made it possible for the German High Command to move 44 divisions from the Eastern to the Western Front between 1 November 1917 and 21 March 1918 (Strachan 2014: 283). For the first time since 1914, the German army became superior on the western theater – for some weeks. On 21 March 1918, the German army struck at the British positions astride the Somme, after a bombardment of only five hours. For the first time, the Western Front was properly broken, the War turned mobile again, and the German troops approached the important railway junction of Amiens. For some time, a kind of panic spread through the British lines of command. But the German army did not have sufficient transport to bring up supplies and artillery fast enough, and it lacked the cavalry to exploit advances. On 5 April, the offensive ended. After gains of some 60 kilometers.

The German High Command ordered four more offensives, which basically repeated the pattern: achieving a breakthrough, then some advances, and again a standstill. By July 1918, German military power had reached the maximum of its geographical extension, stretching from positions near Paris to Rostov in Russia. But the offensives in the west had cost some 800,000 German casualties. And German morale had suffered a crushing blow: the victorious end of the War, seemingly so near in spring, had receded again into a distant future. In the meantime, fresh American troops had arrived in big numbers at the Western Front, 25 divisions by July (Strachan 2014: 283-292, 303).

By 18 July 1918, the initiative on the Western Front passed to the Allies who, in a series of limited offensives, drove the German army back. At the same time, Germany’s allies collapsed. Bulgaria was the first one. A mixed Allied army, also containing Greek troops, broke through the Bulgarian positions at the Salonika Front on 18 September. Already on 29 September, one third of the Bulgarian troops were prisoners. This was the day that Bulgaria signed an armistice. The Allies now had free passage to the Danube, and the railway connection between Germany and the Ottoman Empire was broken (Herzfeld 1968: 342).

In Palestine and Mesopotamia, British forces had taken Bagdad on 11 March 1917 and Jerusalem on 9 December. Thereafter, the British had to withdraw many troops to the Western Front, but in September 1918 they could resume the offensive, supported by an Arab insurrection army. By an effective combination of tanks and cavalry operating in the Ottoman rear and cutting
the Hejaz railroad, the British troops paralyzed the Ottoman forces. By 31 October 1918, they entered Damascus, having taken 75,000 prisoners. In Mesopotamia, British troops could enter Mosul with its rich oil fields after an arrangement with the remnants of the Ottoman 6th army. On 30 October, the Ottoman government also signed an armistice (Herzfeld 1968: 340-3).

By this time, Austria-Hungary was also in a state of advanced decomposition. On 16 October 1918, Emperor Charles offered a new federal constitution for the Austrian part; in Hungary the ruling nobility still refused any such reform. It was too late anyhow. Four days later, US President Wilson, who had already committed himself to the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, declared he would not negotiate peace with Austria-Hungary as a whole. The Italian army began an offensive at the Piave Front on 23 October, and achieved a breakthrough at Vittorio Veneto five days later. The Austro-Hungarian troops went home. Revolution grasped Budapest and Vienna on 31 October. Austria signed an armistice on 3 November; Hungary did so on the 13th (Strachan 2014: 318).

In the German High Command, Colonel General Erich Ludendorff, the “strongman” since August 1916, declared himself to still be optimistic on 24 September. But two days later, he demanded briskly that the government should seek an armistice. Instantly (Mai 1987: 150). On 3 October, a new government was formed under Prince Max of Baden, a known advocate of a compromise peace. This government had a broad base, and included Social Democrats for the first time. The next day, Berlin sent a proposal for armistice to US President Wilson. An exchange of diplomatic notes followed, where Wilson repeatedly raised the demands. By 23 October, it was clear that he demanded military submission. The military High Command turned 180 degrees and claimed a continuation of the War – without showing any solution for how this could successfully be done. In order to stabilize an increasingly fragile internal situation, but also to accommodate Wilson, the constitution was changed on 28 October. Germany became a parliamentarian monarchy; the chancellor became dependent on a parliamentary majority. Most parties had demanded this for decades.

At the end of October, the High Sea Command ordered preparations for an operation towards the Channel. But, on 29 October, the sailors began a mutiny. Within a few days, the mutiny had spread to the cities of Northern Germany. The army leadership informed Emperor William II that he could not count on loyal troops to crush the rebellion; the soldiers just wanted peace. On 9 November 1918, Wilhelm went into exile in the Netherlands.
The same day, Prince Max of Baden transferred the chancellorship to the Social Democrat leader Friedrich Ebert who formed a left-parties-only government. In addition, all over Germany, *Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte* (i.e. soviets) were formed. For a short while, Germany seemed to slide in a Russian direction.

On 5 November, US Secretary Robert Lansing communicated that Germany could expect a peace based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points. This implied the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and some territory in the east because an independent Poland ought to have direct access to the sea. Overall, however, the Fourteen Points gave the impression of a reasonable and equilibrated solution. Germany accepted and signed the armistice on 11 November. The terms made her defenseless, while the blockade continued (Erdmann 1980: 231-3).

In December 1918, the *Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte* accepted the Social Democratic proposal of election to a National Assembly. It took place in January 1919. The Social Democrats, the Catholic *Zentrum*, and the left-wing liberal *Deutsche Demokratische Partei*, i.e. parties which had demanded a parliamentary constitution with equal franchise for decades, gained more than three quarters of the votes (Boldt 1980: 359). The Assembly convened in Weimar and finalized a new republican constitution in August 1919. After all, Germany was different from Russia.

**A war not really ending**

On 11 November 1918, World War 1 ended in the west. The weapons became silent and, after some months, a formal peace treaty was concluded. The War ended in the Balkans too. The break-up of Austria-Hungary created many tensions, and Hungary even had to go through the horrors of a Communist revolution and a White counterrevolution. But also here formal peace treaties were concluded which produced a basically stable situation.

But the situation was quite different in Russia. In November 1918, the civil war was still raging. And when Germany signed the armistice, the Bolsheviks cancelled the Brest-Litovsk peace, invaded Ukraine and intended the same with the Baltic states. The Russian civil war lasted until 1921/2. But because World War 1 had turned Russia into a failed state, it rendered the Bolshevik dictatorship – which had the openly declared intention to spread armed revolution – possible. In 1919, they formed the Communist
International in order to create an instrument for this purpose. This was a declaration of war against everyone else. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks also regarded large sections of their own population as enemies. They declared all somewhat richer farmers to be potentially counterrevolutionary kulaks, a group which they never defined exactly. But the Bolsheviks also regarded smaller peasants with a very suspicious eye. As Lenin put it, “day by day, hour by hour small scale production is engendering capitalism” (Conquest 1986: 22). Stalin “solved” this problem by deporting the kulaks and forcing the other peasants into state-controlled collective farms. This fatally disorganized agricultural production which, in combination with merciless forced procurements, caused millions of deaths, possibly as many as fourteen million (Conquest 1986: 305). In short, this was war against huge sections of their own population.

Also in the Near East, World War 1 did not really end for many years to come. The Ottoman Empire had to sign the humiliating peace of Sèvres (June 1920) and give up all non-Turkish areas; Italy acquired the Dodecanese, Greece, the whole of Thrakia and all islands in the Aegean Sea. Greece could also formally occupy Izmir for five years. Turkish sovereignty was restricted in many ways. However, a national movement appeared in Anatolia under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, later called “Atatürk”: father of the Turks. The Greek government tried to expand its hold on territories in Little Asia, occupied Bursa, and in 1922 even tried to occupy Ankara. Devastatingly beaten at the river Sakarya (August-September 1922), the Greek army fled to Izmir, from which the British navy evacuated the troops (and many of the Greek-speaking inhabitants of the area) to Greece. In July 1923, the Peace Treaty of Lausanne recognized Turkey’s full sovereignty and returned some territory, including Izmir. A huge population transfer was part of the agreement; Turks in Greece had to move to Turkey, Greeks in Turkey to Greece. Three thousand years of Greek history in Asia Minor ended.

In Syria in November 1918, the Arab insurgents under Prince Faysal had installed an Arab government in Damascus. They claimed full independence for a Greater Syria, including Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Hijaz (Rogan 2009: 157). Regarding the void after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, they would have presumably prevailed, if it was not for foreign intervention. And Britain had promised a united Arab kingdom for Arab support against the Ottomans. But back in 1915 France, Great Britain and Russia had divided the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence. By 1918, Russia was out of the picture. Consequently, in 1920, France and Britain implemented their deal in the form of a mandate by the League of Nations.
And back in 1917, British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour had declared that His Majesty’s Government would support a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine, without, however, prejudicing “civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” (Rogan 2009: 154). He left open how this could possibly be done. Taken together, these schemes and contradictory promises appeared as if designed to produce long-lasting instability and conflicts.
Reference list


A war to end all wars?
The peace conference 1919-1920

Søren Dosenrode

Introduction

On 11 November 1918, an armistice entered into force and the Great War, “[a] war to end all wars” (Wells 1914), “[the] greatest seminal catastrophe of this century” (Kennan 1979: 3), “[the] European civil war” (Keynes 1919: 3) was over. It was now time to design the peace, but which kind would it be?

This chapter starts out analyzing the war aims of the main belligerent powers, before it touches briefly on some of the more important peace initiatives taken through throughout the War, and then focuses on the peace negotiations and some of their impacts.

War aims

To understand the war aims of the fighting parties is a precondition for understanding the peace treaties signed between 1919 and 1920, ending World War I.

Soon after war broke out in summer 1914, German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg presented his Septemberprogramm, stating Germany’s war aims (quoted in Fischer 1967: 103i):

“The general aim of the war is security for the German Reich in west and east for all imaginable time. For this purpose France must be so weakened as to make her revival as a great power impossi-
ble for all time. Russia must be thrust back as far as possible from Germany’s eastern frontier and her domination over the non-Russian vassal peoples broken”.

The *Septemberprogramm* was written during the German army’s initial victorious sweep through neutral Belgium and Northern France. Although it had a very political aim – to secure Germany against France and Russia – it was also the plan to ensure German (economic) hegemony over Central Europe (*Mitteleuropa*), quoted in Fischer (1967: 104):

“4. We must create a central European economic association through common customs treaties, to include France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway. This association will not have any common constitutional supreme authority and all its members will be normally equal, but in practice will be under German leadership and must stabilise Germany’s economic dominance over Mitteleuropa.”

These war aims remained in until the end of 1916, when Bethmann Hollweg (but not the military leaders), had come to the conclusion that Germany could not win the war in the West.4

The British, French, and Russian leaderships – and later also the American one – also expected to win the War, and had war aims. Starting out, France and Russia gave each other a free hand after the expected victory in the West and in the East respectively, while Britain was kept a bit outside. France’s overall aim was security, and she obviously wanted the Alsace-Lorraine back. Not only had they lost in the humiliating peace after the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), they were also important industrial centers with natural resources, important for France’s future economic revival. Added to this, France wanted to annex the Saarland and perhaps Luxemburg, and occupy or dominate the Rhineland. This should have been a part of a French dominated customs union aiming at keeping Germany “down” (Soutou 2017; Kennedy 2014). Russia was more modest, “only” wanting the Prussian and part of Poland. As the United Kingdom had entered the War due to the violation of Belgium’s neutrality, it was not a surprise that a restauration of Belgium was the top-priority (Kennedy 2014). However, especially after Lloyd George took over as prime minister after Asquith in 1916, British demands also hardened (Soutou 2017: 7):
“From a fundamental geopolitical perspective, Britain felt that it would be impossible to stop the Reich from uniting the European “heartland”, Mitteleuropa, including Austria, Poland and Romania. The British felt that it was essential, however, to control the sea front and keep Germany from gaining ocean access – and thus to chase it out of Belgium, Africa and the Middle East.”

These war aims were fulfilled with the peace treaty, when it came about. Both in Africa and in the Middle East, the United Kingdom was able to expand (cf. Chapter 13 for a full discussion).

The United States was not a part of the negotiations and the secret treaties made between Britain, France, and Russia in the early years of the War. On 8 January 1918 (around nine months after the US had entered the War), President Woodrow Wilson announced his plan for peace and a new world order, his Fourteen Points, which had a great effect on both the Entente Powers and the Central Powers (Wilson 2).

The first five of the Fourteen Points, as well as the last one, were of a diplomatic nature. The rest – Points 6 through 13 – handled territorial matters. The “diplomatic points” are all liberal in nature and very much inspired by Immanuel Kant’s essay “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch“. Wilson wanted to set the frame for a world of peace. The Fourteen Points included demands for a cessation to secret negotiations and agreements in diplomacy, freedom for navigation upon the sea, a removal of economic barriers to promote free trade, disarmament, and an impartial adjustment of all colonial claims where the interests of the populations living in the colonies should have the same weight as that of the colonial powers. The last point was a suggestion for the creation of the League of Nations as an organization to secure peace, working to advance collective security and disarmament. When looking at the territorial provisions, this runs like a Leitmotif through it, that as a rule, territorial questions should be solved according to nationality. Wilson wanted to create peace, justice, and democracy in the international realm, just as they were present domestically, in the USA. He also stated that he wanted a just and fair peace with Germany (Wilson 2):

“We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program [the Fourteen Points] that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not
wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world, – the new world in which we now live, – instead of a place of mastery.”

However, these thoughts were not shared by the other Entente Powers, especially not by France. In their essence, the war aims of all the participating great powers – with those of the US as a possible exception – was to win the War and to prevent the adversary from ever being able to get into a position to wage war again. Of course, such aims did not promote a negotiated peace “without winners” as long as the fighting parties still believed victory was possible.

Soutou (2017) rightly remarks that the war aims respectively the conditions for peace of Britain, France and the USA were hardened after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Germany and Soviet Russia in March 1918. Germany had expected the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to be a bargaining chip in the coming negotiations with Britain, France, and the USA, and thus made the conditions harsh. This harshness boomeranged, convincing Britain, France, and especially the USA of Germany’s imperialistic and raw nature, thus in them calling for harder peace terms.

**Peace plans**

All the belligerent parties thought they would win the War partly or as a whole. Still, there were a large number of peace proposals during the War, resulting in hesitant exchanges which mostly came from the Central Powers, the USA, and civilians outside the government, and not that many from Britain, France, or Russia.

Germany began her opening towards France and Russia already at the end of 1914. These were promoted by Germany’s feelings about her military strength, on the one hand, and on the other hand the deadlock on especially the Western Front. Added to this was the German chancellor’s feeling that time was not on Germany’s side (Kennedy 2014). Later on, in 1918, other German proposals were launched. Fischer comments (1967) that these proposals served two aims: to end the War in Germany’s favor, or if they
failed, to be able to blame the Entente Powers for the continuing war. All the attempts were futile. The same was the case when Woodrow Wilson tried to intervene. In 1916, Wilson considered a post-war international security organization as a means to get peace negotiations started before conflicts escalated (Kennedy 2014); before 1917, Wilson tried to make the fighting states state their peace terms; and, in January 1917, Wilson addressed the US Senate and demanded “a peace without victory” (Wilson 1).

Socialist groupings, believing in the idea of international solidarity amongst labor parties, made several attempts to launch peace processes. An early one was the meeting of 37 people from 12 states who assembled in Zimmerwald, Switzerland in September 1915 (Henke-Bockschatz 2014). In the resulting manifesto, they demanded a peace without annexations, without reparations, and founded on the right to self-determination of the peoples.

Kennedy (2014) analyzes and discusses an extensive range of peace initiatives from the period 1914-1918, and he concludes that the peace proposals failed due to two basic reasons: a) the costs of “defeat”, understood as “not victory” were too high. The powers involved in the War all felt that their survival as great powers and/or their governmental systems were at stake should they not be victorious. And, b) the expectation of victory. Great Britain, Germany, France, and the US, and – to a much lesser degree, Austria-Hungary – felt they that they had a fair chance of winning the War, a conviction which was maintained until early 1918 (Kennedy 2014; Henke-Bockschatz 2014). To this, one should add that the huge losses of life, the sacrifices, would make a negotiated peace hard to legitimize towards the populations. On such a basis, a negotiated peace, a “peace without victory” becomes close to impossible.

Only two peace treaties were concluded before the end of the War; the Central Powers’ peace with Soviet Russia (cf. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 1918) and the one with Romania (cf. Treaty of Bucharest, 1918), and these treaties were dictated, not negotiated.6

Armistice

By the end of September, the alliance of the Central Powers had begun to crumble7 when Bulgaria asked for an armistice on 29 September, followed by the Ottoman Empire on 30 October and Austria-Hungary on 3 November. A truce was signed with Germany, to be effective from 11 November 1918 at 11.00 A.M.
Of the Central Powers, Germany was militarily and economically the strongest, and its enemies occupied no part of its territory. Already in July 1917, the German Parliament had passed a peace resolution, calling for a peace of understanding and lasting reconciliation amongst the peoples (Henke-Bockschatz 2014). As the government was not tied into following the Parliament, this did not have external consequences, but it did indicate that the people were not wholeheartedly in favor of the War. In Germany, strikes and riots broke out, and after yet another unsuccessful offensive in July, and the successful Allied offensive in August 1918 (the “black day” of 8 August), the German High Command asked the government to sue for peace (Groener 1957). By October, a new, more democratic government had been formed, supported by the Parliament, and it asked for peace, based on Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points plan (Henke-Bockschatz 2014). The domestic situation in Germany deteriorated further and led to a revolution in November 1918, resulting in the end of the Empire and the birth of the Republic.

The conditions for an armistice imposed on Germany and her allies were made in such a way as to make a renewed fight impossible (Henke-Bockschatz 2014): occupied territories were to be left immediately (including Alsace-Lorraine); the left bank of the Rhine was to be vacated (and to be occupied by the Entente Powers); the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest were to be annulled; and large numbers of U-boats, airplanes, guns, ammunition, etc. were to be handed over. According to MacMillan, the Allies made at least one mistake: they did not hold a victory parade, e.g. in Berlin: a parade which would have made it obvious to the German population that they had lost the War, and thus prevented the widespread myth that the army had not been defeated militarily (2001).

In his memoirs, General Groener, the German quartermaster general (Chief of the general staff, second-in-command of the German army) writes about the High Command of the German Army’s analysis of the Entente Powers conditions for armistice (1957: 466, my translation):

“...In plain words, we wrote the government that the Army’s High Command, after what had happened at home which had taken away the support of the army, we did not have the possibility of declining the conditions for an armistice, nor the power to get better conditions through the use of arms. The government bore the consequence and accepted the conditions”.

98
The armistice ended four years of bloodshed among the great powers, but many smaller wars would continue or soon break out.

**Dictating peace**

The objectives of the peace conference can be summarized in the three words (MacMillan 2001: 162): “Punishment, payment, prevention”. As mentioned before, one result of the Franco-Prussian War was that France had to cede Alsace and Lorraine to the new German Empire. The prominent French statesman Léon Gambetta pleaded for the reclamation of the lost territories from the very day they were lost until his death in 1882, and said, “Always think about it, never talk about it”, which turned a national mantra. Now it was payback time! As mentioned above, Germany had become a democratic republic just before the armistice, but Taylor (1965) notes that the Entente Powers did not really believe in Germany having purged her guilt by getting rid of the emperor and having introduced a very democratic constitution. Besides, one should not forget the hatred of the populations of the Entente Powers towards the Germans, and one wanted Germany to pay the costs of the War. The consequence was (Taylor 1965: 68) that “the Germans were treated harshly. The settlement was imposed on them virtually without negotiation, certainly without verbal negotiation – a unique case in modern times”. However, the lack of negotiations was not a sign of strength, but rather one of weakness. According to Sharp (2010), the position of the Entente Powers was fragile, and a direct confrontation could have undermined it. Harold James commented nearly 40 years after Taylor that “Versailles and the Paris treaties have come to represent (in the popular mind) the most striking example of a pointless vindictive peace settlement” (2003: 73), but he added that, because of the costs and suffering of the War, “any settlement would be a disillusion”. It should be added that this was not the intention Woodrow Wilson had arrived with, but “peace without winners” did not go down very well with his colleagues, so he used many of his skills to try to establish a new world order with the League of Nations as its focal point (MacMillan 2001).

How did the peace settlement come about? The Supreme War Council met in Paris on 12 January 1919. It consisted of the heads of government and the foreign ministers of France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They decided to include their Japanese counterparts, and then lead the conference. They formed the Council of Ten (Sondhaus 2011; Watson 2008). Beside this council, there were to be plenary sessions where all the victorious states were represented according to their size and contribution
to the war effort. The first session was on 18 January. It was opened by French President Poincaré, who reminded the participants that they were assembled to redo the evil done by Germany in 1871 and to prevent it from happening again (Sondhaus 2011).

The Paris peace conference lasted from 18 January 1919 until 21 January 1920, but the most important part of it terminated with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, that is the peace treaty with Germany on 18 January 1919. After that, both Wilson and Lloyd George left Paris, leaving Clemenceau in charge, together with their deputies.

According to Sondhaus (2011), it took less than a month for the Council of Ten to agree on the main features on the treaty with Germany, and MacMillan (2001) emphasizes that – apart from the question of reparations – a basic agreement was reached fairly soon. After that, the concrete formulations were left to sub-committees, while the Council concentrated on Wilson’s proposal of a League of Nations. Later on, the Japanese members of the Council of Ten withdrew when matters not related to Japan were discussed, and the Council of Ten did not convene after 25 March. From then on, only Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Wilson, and Orlando met, as the Council of Four. This council was further reduced when the Italian Prime Minister Orlando left in protest, not having being able to secure even larger territorial expansions for Italy (James 2003).

John Maynard Keynes, as quoted at length in Chapter 10, clearly saw the French attitude as a dictate from a position of strength, to prevent a new war (1919: 15). Keynes described the renowned characteristics of the French Prime Minister and Minister of War George Clemenceau’s approach to negotiating with Germany (1919: 16):

“His principles for the peace can be expressed simply. In the first place, he was a foremost believer in the view of German psychology that the Germans understands and can understand nothing but intimidation, that he is without generosity or remorse in negotiations, that there is no advantage he will not take of you, and no extent to which he will not demean himself, that he is without honor, pride, or mercy. Therefore you must never negotiate with a German or conciliate him; you must dictate to him. On no other terms will he respect you, or will you prevent him from cheating you.”

On the other hand, the United States and the United Kingdom were more
inclined to secure a less harsh peace to avoid the pretext for revenge and a new war. However, the French line prevailed in the negotiations\textsuperscript{16} (MacMillan 2001).

The Versailles Treaty between the victorious powers and Germany was the blueprint for the treaties with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{17} It included 440 articles, divided into 15 parts, of which only the most important will be looked into here\textsuperscript{18}:

Part I created the Covenant of the League of Nations, a novelty in international affairs suggested by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points. Part II stipulated Germany’s new boundaries, the territories Germany had to cede (Belgium got Eupen-Malmedy, Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France, several eastern districts were given to the resurrected Poland, Memel came to Lithuania, and parts of North Schleswig came back to Denmark after a referendum in Schleswig). Part III of the treaty stipulated the return of Belgium and Luxemburg as sovereign states, the return of the occupied parts of northern France, a demilitarized zone in the Rhineland, and the separation of the Saarland from Germany for 15 years. Part IV stripped Germany of all its colonies, which were put under “mandate” of the League of Nations, but administrated by old colonial powers. In other words, a colonial aggrandizement. The Part V concerned the limitations of Germany’s armed forces, which were reduced dramatically (it contained very detailed rulings including the prohibition of possessing certain kinds of weapons, as well as the demand for the dissolution of the general staff which was seen as the epitome of German militarism). Part VIII began with Article 231, in which Germany and her allies had to accept responsibility for the losses and damages of the Allies “as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies” (the so called “War Guilt Clause”\textsuperscript{19}). It established Germany’s liability for reparations, and Part IX imposed other financial obligations upon Germany (without specifying the exact terms).

When the treaty was presented to the German delegation, the German foreign minister, Count Ulrich von Brockdorf-Rantzau, protested strongly, claiming that the terms would mean the death by hunger of millions of Germans, but without success. The German government also protested strongly, especially against the “War Guilt Clause”. In a cabinet meeting, Brockdorf-Rantzau suggested rejecting the terms. In the end, both the Chancellor, Philipp Scheidemann, and Brockdorff-Rantzau resigned. Gustav Bauer and Herman Müller succeeded them, and decided to accept
the terms to avoid a further radicalization in Germany (cf. Sondhaus 2011; Groener 1957).

When the peace terms became known, General Groener ordered the German general commands to investigate the mood of the German population concerning a resumption of the war. The answers were negative (apart from one), “worse than expected” Groener noted (1957: 497). After further analysis of the situation, his conclusion was that Germany had to accept the peace terms (Groener 1957). General field marshal von Hindenburg, commander of the German army, came to the same conclusion, but considered a defeat with honor as an alternative; that is, a last battle (Groener 1957). In the end, the army supported the government and there was no military revolt.

President Wilson adhered to the principle of the people’s right to self determination but, to save the ideal of a new world order and especially the League of Nations, he made a large number of compromises, *inter alia* self-determination was not applied to the colonies, and it had to be relaxed when it contrasted with the desire to reduce and Hungary to small powers, as well as in relation to the Polish Corridor where the population was primarily German. In Central Europe, the Austria-Hungarian Empire was split into three new states: Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and it had had to cede land to Italy, Romania, Poland, and Serbia (which was later to become Yugoslavia). Bulgaria had to cede territory to Greece, Serbia, and Romania. Concretely, this resulted in a situation where there were, for example, large Hungarian and Bulgarian minorities in neighboring states, and where there was an immediate and lasting desire for changing the borders.

Russia, although not a Central Power, also lost territory. Concretely, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland came into being, and Romania was extended by Bessarabia and Bukovina (and Transylvania from Hungary). For a short period, Ukraine and Georgia were also independent before the Soviet Union occupied them.

The Soviet Union did not participate at the peace conference, and the other states watched with anxiety what happened there. So, if one looks at a map, a “*cordon sanitaire*” had been created; separating Central and Western Europe from the “infected” Soviet Union by a string of states: Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland, and strengthening Romania and Greece (Gilchrist 1995, Howard 2002).
The Ottoman Empire was split up, too. The first peace treaty (the Treaty of Sèvres, 1920) was signed by the Ottoman Empire. It included an independent state of Armenia, autonomy for the Kurds, the renunciation of all non Turkish territory, and the Empire’s cession to the Allied administration. Cession of land to Greece, including Smyrna (today Izmir), a British Mandate for Palestine and Iraq, and the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon. The terms and the presence of Greek troops in Anatolia fueled nationalist feelings and helped General Mustapha Kemal Ataturk to gain power, dispose of the Sultan and his government, and wage a war against the Allied forces situated in parts of Turkey (1919-1923). A new peace treaty was negotiated in Lausanne, and signed in 1923. The Treaty of Lausanne left Turkey in control of Anatolia and the Straits, as well as a small piece of territory in Europe (Howard 2002). In connection with the Lausanne treaty, the Lausanne Peace Treaty VI or the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations was signed (Lausanne Convention). The background was the Ottoman Empire’s – and later the Turkish government’s – mass-prosecutions of Greek Orthodox Turks during the War and in its aftermath, (paralleled with the genocides against Armenian and Syrian Christians, cf. Chapter 4 in this book). Approximately 1.5 million Greek Orthodox Turks were expelled from Turkey, and approximately half a million Greek Muslims from Greece. Thus, the new Turkish Republic was recognized internationally, but its conduct strained its relationship with Greece.

It is obvious that the peace agreement was not an ideal fundament for a new peace in Europe. It was harsh to the Central Powers, but it is worth remembering that it was less brutal than the peace Germany and the other Central Powers imposed on Soviet Russia in the Brest-Litovsk peace agreement (Brest-Litovsk), and on Romania (Bucharest 1918). When Germany tried to negotiate her terms, Clemenceau urged Lloyd George and Wilson not to give in, and Wilson, returning from a trip to Belgium where he had seen the destruction caused by the German attack and later occupation, agreed (Sondhaus 2011). Still, it is worth remembering that Germany remained a power in Europe. Economically, the peace treaty did not endanger Germany’s potential as the second largest economy (cf. Henke-Bockschatz 2014). Sharp has a good point when concluding that (2010: 214), “under these circumstances, […] the peacemakers did well to create any settlement at all”. And Margaret MacMillan is very much in the same line when stating (2001: 493), “if they could have done better, they certainly could have done much worse”.

103
Reparations…

The negotiations on reparations to be paid by Germany and her allies turned out to be one of the most difficult topics during the peace conference. Difficult for the victorious powers (MacMillan 2001): France, the United Kingdom, and the US had very different interests. The United States did not want anything for itself, but insisted that the loans given to France and the United Kingdom should be paid back. France and the United Kingdom needed reparations to pay back their debt to the US, as well as to pay for rebuilding their respective countries. Both countries had expenses for pensions to be paid to war-invalids and widows etc., and France had huge areas to rebuild after four years of fighting and occupation (cf. James 2003). These desires were all launched on the platform of the uncertain question of how much Germany could pay without her economy collapsing. In the end, France, the United Kingdom, and the US gave up agreeing on a figure for the size of the reparations to be paid (MacMillan 2001). Thus, the peace treaties were not specific on the reparations to be paid, but Article 231 (the War Guilt Clause) laid down the legal basis for reparations, as it established Germany and her allies’ responsibility for “for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies”²⁷.

Following this, Article 233, *inter alia*, stated that:

“The amount of the above damage for which compensation is to be made by Germany shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, to be called the Reparation Commission and constituted in the form and with the powers set forth hereunder and in Annexes II to VII inclusive hereto”.²⁸

By 1920, France and the United Kingdom had agreed upon on how to share the payments (52% and 28% respectively), and by 1921 they had agreed on the sum of the reparation payments: 132 billion gold marks (MacMillan 2001).

According to Sharp (2014), much of this was “‘phony money’ – window dressing to mollify Allied public opinion. Of the three series of bonds Germany was to issue, over £4 billion were C bonds, which no one believed would be paid. Its real debt, under the A and B bonds, was therefore about £2.5 billion, well within British and American estimates of its capacity to pay”.

104
Peace and security at last?

The peace treaties did not bring the security which was longed for, and France was worried about her security, especially after the US and the United Kingdom declined to guarantee it as Clemenceau had requested. Thus, she insisted on a full reparation payment and of Germany living up to every word of the treaty. As Germany could not pay in 1923, France and Belgium occupied the Ruhr area in Germany, resulting in civilian unrest there. The US and the United Kingdom put pressure on France, and a compromise regarding the payments was found. As new statesmen came into power in Britain, France, and Germany, tensions relaxed and, in 1925, the Locarno Pact was signed, guaranteeing France and Belgium’s borders to Germany, and also the borders in the East (Locarno Pact). The treaty was signed by Germany, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Germany was admitted into the League of Nations in 1926, and the Locarno Treaty was followed up by the Kellogg–Briand Pact (or Pact of Paris) of 1928, where the signatory power renounced the use of war as an instrument for solving conflicts (Kellogg–Briand Pact).

On paper, these initiatives and treaties gave France the security she strived for. Unfortunately, the principle of pacta sunt servanda works best amongst democratic states, and Europe was already on its way into an era where democracy was not en vogue (see below), and the peace treaty was de facto annulled as the 1930s progressed.

Consequences

The peace treaty was hard on the losing Central Powers, as described and had many consequences. Nevertheless, it did end the general war, the Great War, at least for a while. However, a large number of bigger and smaller conflicts broke out, partly because of the peace treaties, e.g. the wars between Soviet Russia and Poland and between Greece and Turkey. Gatrell (2010: 558) phrases it aptly:

“Four uninterrupted years of mass bloodshed in the chief theaters of war did not make the postwar world a more peaceful place. Revolutions, civil wars, wars of independence, ethnic conflicts, and anticolonial uprisings occurred around the globe. Churchill observed that ‘the war of the giants has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have begun’.”
The War brought down three imperial families, which had shaped European history (the Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov dynasties). The German and Russian empires had to cede territory, but survived. Not so the Austrian-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires, which were cut into pieces. As a result, new states emerged in Central and Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

The new states should, according to Wilson’s Fourteen Points, have been created in accordance with the nationalities involved, the “self determination of the peoples”, to make new nation states. As mentioned previously, this idealistic approach clashed with “realistic” political considerations, leaving Europe with dozens of national minorities cut off from their perceived home states. The breaking up of empires also hurt national pride, when land perceived as one state’s “historic territory” was ceded to another country, like in the case of today’s Burgenland in Austria which, seen with Hungarian eyes, was historically Hungarian, and so forth.

Losing territory and ethnic kinsmen, having a bad economy (and having to pay reparations), and being blamed for the bloodshed (the War Guilt Clause), stirred nationalistic feelings and sowed the seeds for a desire for revenge. In Germany, the legend of being “stabbed in the back” grew. According to that, the armed forces had not lost on the battlefield, but had been “stabbed in the back” by an alliance of Jews and socialists at home.

Therefore, there is a line between the results of the Peace Conference in Paris and the rise of fascism in Italy of Nazism in Germany, etc. and the outbreak of World War 1. However, it is not “causal” such that World War 2 was inevitable. World War 1 did not “create” Hitler and Mussolini, but it did create the frame (hurt national pride, revanchism, economic crisis, etc.) which they could use and abuse (cf. Chapter 13). The peace treaties did not create a lasting peace.
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Endnotes

1 H.G. Wells coined the Phrase in an article published in The Daily News on August 14, 1914 titled ‘The War That Will End War. However, it is mostly associated with pres. Woodrow Wilson and his approach to peace after World War 1.

2 The Entente Powers were, inter alia, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Central Powers included Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire.

3 Fritz Fischer’s thesis, that Germany had planned and wanted the War, has been widely discussed cf. Knudsen, Chapter 3 in this book, or Neilson (2014).

4 In his seminal but controversial book Germany’s Aims in the First World War, Fischer places the responsibility of the outbreak of World War 1 solely on Imperial Germany, based on, inter alia, the war aims mentioned above. See also Chapters 3 and 4.

5 It was exactly this kind of secret deal President Wilson wanted to prevent, and it is worth noting that the United States of America did not join the alliance of Britain, France, and Russia but remained an “associate”, giving Wilson the freedom to act without needing the consent of the other three countries, if he felt he needed to.

6 When the German High Command had decided that an armistice was needed, the next step was to appeal to Woodrow Wilson, based on his Fourteen Points and the “peace without winners” statement, rather than to e.g. Clemenceau who was expected to be less favorable towards Germany. That was the argument for introducing democratic reforms and to dispose of the chancellor in favor of Prince Max of Baden, a liberal. Max of Baden insisted on including the Social Democrats in the government – Philipp Scheidemann and Gustav Bauer (cf. Beckett 2013: 544).

7 See also Zank, Chapter 4 in this book.

8 In his memoires, General Groener, a conservative, gives a vivid and detailed account of the collapse of Imperial Germany as seen from the very top of the German military establishment.
9 “In dürren Worte wurde darin der Reichsregierung mitgeteilt, dass die O. H. L., nachdem die Ereignisse in der Heimat dem Heer die Rückensicherung genommen habe, nicht mehr über die Möglichkeit verfüge, die Waffenstillstandsfordernungen abzulehnen oder mit der Waffe eine Verbesserung der Lage zu erzwingen. Die Regierung zog die Folgerungen und nahm die Bedingungen an.”

10 Fink summarizes the aims of the three major, victorious powers aptly (2010: 543): “France, one of the war’s main battlefields, aimed at a permanently reducing German power and creating substitutes in Eastern Europe for its lost Russian ally; Britain, with its principal naval and colonial goals already achieved, now sought to guard its economic interests, revive the European balance of power, and protect its shaken empire. The United States, which had entered the fighting in the last year, had the most grandiose design of them all, to create a stable world of democratic governments, limited armament, and open markets”.

11 Reparations were an enduring theme during the conference. France and Belgium especially, both having suffered tremendously under German occupation, were hard on this issue. As MacMillan notes, Lloyd George was pleased that the final amount for reparation was not mentioned in the treaties; it was left to further negotiations (2001: 201) (see further below).

12 From France, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau; from Italy, Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando, from the United Kingdom, Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and from the United States, President Woodrow Wilson. They were joined by the Former Prime Minister of Japan, Kinmochi Saionji.

13 January 18th marked the anniversary of the 1871 proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles – so the conference, oddly, opened on a Saturday in order to mark the defeat of the German Empire.

14 There was still the Council of Five, the foreign ministers plus the Japanese representative who actually drafted many of the territorial clauses and much of the Austrian treaty, though they passed the hot potatoes to the Four.
John Maynard Keynes participated in the British delegation, and resigned in protest at the treaties’ harshness. See Olesen, Chapter 10; Nicolson discusses Keynes’ frustrations (1964: 350).

Nicolson (a British junior diplomat who participated as member of the British delegation) refers to the text of the Versailles Treaty, describing it as punitive (1964: 359). He also describes how Lloyd George unsuccessfully tried to soften it (1964: 358).

The treaties were named after the locations where they were signed: the one with Germany was called the Versailles Treaty (signed 28 June 1919), with Austria was the Saint-Germain-en-Laye Treaty (19 September 1919), Bulgaria’s was the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (27 November 1919), Hungary’s the Treaty of Trianon (4 June 1920), and that of the Ottoman Empire the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920). The latter was later renegotiated and ended with the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923).

The peace treaties from 1919 have been discussed and analyzed by dozens of scholars. John Maynard Keynes’ The Economic Consequences of the Peace from 1919 is still very readable. For good, contemporary analysis see, for example, MacMillan (2001), Sharp (2010), or Sondhaus (2011), and chapter 13 of this book.

The full text of the Versailles Treaty: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/versailles_menu.asp

The Polish Corridor was a territory connecting the restored Poland with the Baltic Sea. It cut East Prussia off from the rest of Germany.

Approximately 30 million people belonged to minorities after the peace settlements (MacMillan 2001: 486).

E.g. Hungary lost 72% of its country and 64% of its population (Sondhaus 2011: 463).

This division of the spoils in the Middle East had been roughly agreed on in the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 (cf. Chapter 13)

25 See also James 2003: 75-76.

26 The Field Marshal, the Earl Wavell, is supposed to have said of the Paris Peace Conference, “After the ‘war to end war’, they seem to have been in Paris at making the ‘peace to end peace’.”

27 Article 231 was really a sop to Allied opinion – in theory it justified a claim against Germany for ALL allied costs, but Article 232 limited the categories that could be claimed – including, of course, the controversial pensions and allowances.

28 “While most of the 440 clauses of the Treaty of Versailles have long been forgotten, the handful dealing with reparations stand, in what is still the received view, as evidence of a vindictive, shortsighted and poisonous document” (MacMillan 2001: 181).

29 Signatories included France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Later on, more states joined.

30 See also Chapter 13 for a general discussion of the War’s consequences.

31 Among others: 1917-1921, the Ukrainian War of Independence; 1918-1920, the Lithuanian Wars of Independence; 1918-1920, the Estonian War of Independence; 1919-1920, revolutions and interventions in Hungary; 1918-1919, the Austro-Slovene conflict in Carinthia; the Polish-Czech war for Teschen Silesia, 1919-1920; and the Czechoslovakia-Hungary War.

32 It is estimated that more than one million Russians fled the revolution to find shelter, mainly in France and Germany (James 2003: 76-77).

33 The background and the serious consequences Middle East are analyzed in Chapter 13.

34 E.g. Hungary.

35 The *de facto* importance of the reparations as a cause of Germany’s economic crisis is contested. According to Bresciani-Turroni 1931: 94-95, the reparations “only” amounted to 1/3 of the German deficit.
and the inflation would have come anyway. See Chapter 13 of this book for an analysis.

36 Originally, Italy was allied with the Central Powers, but shifted to the Entente Powers when she was promised territorial gains. As Italy did not have all of her territorial wishes fulfilled, Orlando left the peace conference in protest, and a feeling of having been cheated for the fruits of victory prevailed in Italy, stirring nationalist sentiments, and paving the way for Mussolini.

37 Margaret MacMillan (2001: 493-494) defends the Versailles Treaty, admitting its shortcomings. She also states that “Hitler did not wage war because of the Treaty of Versailles, although he found its existence a godsend for his propaganda”. In this author’s opinion, she misses the point, because World War 1 and the Treaty of Versailles paved the way for nationalism and Nazism.
Chapter 6

The impact of World War 1 on German literature: Ernst Jünger, Herman Hesse, and Georg Trakl

Jan T. Schlosser

Introduction

World War 1 resulted in a military, political, economic, social, and mental breakdown for many Germans. In 1918, a socialist revolution failed in Germany when the Social Democrats cooperated with the former army of the Kaiser. German democracy was strained by this cooperation and by the hard and demoralizing Treaty of Versailles, later also by the inflation and the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Most Germans were obviously not aware of the fact that Germany had suffered a total defeat in 1918. The Dolchstoßlegende, saying that the German army was not beaten on the battlefield, prevented a realistic estimation of the German defeat.

World War 1 is essential in German society and literature in the 1920s. The 1920s in Germany were definitely not the “Roaring Twenties”. The century was dominated by poverty and an insecurity that is a vital contrast to the enthusiasm of August 1914. In literature, the 1920s were a fruitful period with various experimental forms and efforts to find modes of expression in accordance with the time. Literary texts with a pacifistic (for instance the poems of the Dada founder Hugo Ball) or very realistic attitude were only found in a few cases – like Erich Maria Remarque’s novel *Im Westen nicht Neues/All Quiet on the Western Front* (1929) – able to oust military books like Ernst Jünger’s war diary *In Stahlgewittern/Storm of Steel* (1920). In Günter Grass’ novel *Mein Jahrhundert/My Century* (1999), every single year in the twen-
tieth century was described in 100 short stories. The war years 1914-1918 consist exclusively of a fictive dialogue between Jünger and Remarque. No other authors got as much space in Grass’ novel as Jünger and Remarque. The pacifists like Remarque or Georg Trakl – Trakl committed suicide in 1914 – are representatives of a generation destroyed by World War 1 and its absurdity. On the other hand, Jünger identifies himself with the war generation. This chapter focuses on three authors (Ernst Jünger, Hermann Hesse, and Georg Trakl) who deal with World War 1 in the context of modernity and intellectual aristocratism.

The breakdown of the German Kaisereich in 1918 resulted in a variety of culture and in new themes. German literature after World War 1 is dominated by crisis-thinking. Hermann Broch focused on the decline of the bourgeois society in 1918 in the novel Die Schlafwandler/The Sleepwalkers (1930/1932). Gottfried Benn had already written about the decline of reality during World War 1. German philosopher Oswald Spengler diagnosed the transformation of cultures into civilization. His book Der Untergang des Abendlandes/The Decline of the West (1918/1922) became a slogan for the crisis after World War 1. Spengler positioned himself beyond everyday political rhetoric.

Ernst Jünger was on the Western Front in the period 1914-1918. He volunteered for the German army because he thought World War 1 would be suitable as a field of the male love of adventure. Already in the fall of 1913, the 18 year old school boy had shown a love of adventure. He escaped his boring schooldays and volunteered for the Foreign Legion in Northern Africa, but his father took him back to Germany. In World War 1, Jünger became a lieutenant and was wounded and decorated several times.

Jünger was not the only one who had war fever. The majority of German intellectuals looked positively on World War 1 in 1914. Even the humanist Thomas Mann, the playwright Gerhart Hauptmann, the Austrian aristocrat Hugo von Hofmannsthal, and the sculptor Ernst Barlach saw the War as a potential purification. Thomas Mann maintained that the War was a struggle between German culture and French civilization. Thomas Mann’s patriotism from 1914 was revised in his speech Von deutscher Republik/The German Republic in 1922. In Der Zauberberg/The Magic Mountain (1924) Mann holds on to the traditional novel, but also writes a parody on this genre. The novel takes place just before World War 1 in a sanatorium in the Alps. In The Magic Mountain, Mann’s national conservatism is replaced with humanism, represented by the character Settembrini. Political radical-
ism, represented by the character Naphta, is rejected. The main character, Hans Castorp, is unable to return to bourgeois society.

The majority of German intellectuals claimed that the bourgeois society was characterized by materialism and shallowness. Even the expressionists were enthusiastic about World War 1. The War seemed to be a possibility for revitalizing culture.

In Heinrich Mann’s novel Der Untertan/The Patrioteer (1914/1918), it is demonstrated that the main character, Diederich Heßling, already possesses the extreme nationalistic, pre-fascistic, and orthodox mental condition (“germanische Herrenkultur”) that later would be essential for the Nazi consolidation of power in 1933.

Storm of Steel established Jünger’s name in antidemocratic, extremely nationalistic intellectual and political circles in Germany in the 1920s. Das Abenteuerliche Herz/The Adventurous Heart (1929) is the first text in which Ernst Jünger moves away from World War 1 as his primary subject. In The Adventurous Heart, it becomes clear that Jünger does not want a political career, but wishes to establish his intellectual credentials as an author. After his sympathies for Nazism in the first part of the 1920s, he turns his back on this political movement because he disagrees with Hitler, who since 1925 aims at the legal assumption of power in Germany through participation in elections. Jünger does not wish to act politically on the terms of the hated democracy. In 1933, Hitler’s government tried to win Jünger as an intellectual front figure in the Third Reich, but he rejected all offers and moved from the political center of Berlin into the German provinces. He was still able to publish in the Third Reich, although the second version of The Adventurous Heart (1938) and the novel Auf den Marmorklippen/On the Marble Cliffs (1939) contained several critical reflections about Germany during the Nazi Regime.

Hermann Hesse was a war volunteer too, but became a pacifist during the War. Hesse is for democracy and the German republic but like Jünger, also characterized by intellectual aristocratism and spiritual mysticism. Hesse maintains that the world disintegrates due to modern technology. In Der Steppenwolf/Steppenwolf (1927), the main character Harry Haller suffers from an identity conflict between the assimilated bourgeois part of his personality and the social and cultural critic part of his personality. Haller overcomes his depression and antisocial attitude by optimistic grim humor.

Like Jünger in The Adventurous Heart, Hesse also focuses on the inner,
mental life in his 1931 short story *Die Morgenlandfahrt/Journey to the East* (Schlosser 2009). The search for the metaphysical meaning of life is the central link between Jünger and Hesse. But Hesse is against the radicalization of the crisis-thinking around 1930, and refuses all ideologies. Mental maturity is essential for Hesse.

**Ernst Jünger**

In German literary history, Jünger is an example of an author who was stigmatized as a man glorifying war, a nationalist, and a pioneer of Nazism. Until the publication of Karl Heinz Bohrer’s *Die Ästhetik des Schreckens* (1978), the research on Jünger was overexposed by interpretations of ideological, rather than philological, character. Jünger’s conservative defenders distinguished between his early texts – for example *Storm of Steel* – and later works to demonstrate progress from the glorification of World War 1 to aesthetic implications. Martin Meyer’s voluminous monograph, *Ernst Jünger* (1990), contextualized his publications and placed Jünger in the European literary history of the nineteenth and twentieth century. On the other hand, Jünger’s critics looked at the early texts about World War 1 and classified them as representative of his whole authorship. An example of this is Horst Seferens’ book *Leute von übermorgen und von vorgestern* (1998). Seferens argues that ideology is the central idea of Jünger’s aesthetic program. This position also includes ideological readings of Jünger in the 1970s and a closer reading of his nationalistic articles from the 1920s. The articles were published in a well-arranged edition a few years after Jünger’s death in February 1998.

Today, Jünger is part of the “canon” of modernity (Dietka 2011: 61). Jünger’s interest in modernity and his strategies to overcome it are worth noting. He moves from enthusiastic affirmation of modern technology in his World War 1 publications to proper skepticism in the late 1930s, during and in particular after World War 2. The leitmotif in his long-standing authorship is non-conformism. In every single period of his literary production he declines to meet demands from the outside world. Jünger is a solitary figure in German culture in the twentieth century.

*Storm of Steel* has often been read as an ideological text, as a radical violation of humanistic ideals. *Storm of Steel* is the text with which Jünger achieved his status as a controversial figure in German literature.
In 2013, the annotated edition of *Storm of Steel* was published. The new edition makes it possible to compare the seven different versions (1920, 1922, 1924, 1934, 1935, 1961, 1978) of the text. The purpose is to date when the different stigmatizations of Jünger can be proved in his war diary. All versions are characterized by a radical reduction of World War 1 to a scene for Jünger’s own act of war, instead of the War seen as a whole.

In the 1920 edition, Jünger wishes to describe World War 1 as it was, and not as it could have been. Already in the first chapter about the mobilization in August 1914, he mentions death on the battle field as “No finer death in all the world than” (Jünger 2004: 5). Jünger’s official purpose, written in his preface, is not heroism but the glorification of war. He describes several battles, praises the heroic death, and the sense of duty.

An important aspect of Jünger’s glorification of war is its confrontation with killed soldiers. The precise observation of the mangled bodies of dead soldiers includes a very subjective view, namely an aesthetic view of the dead soldiers (Jünger 2013). The pleasure of looking at the soldier’s wounds, their death struggle, and the final rot of flesh breaks with humanism and ethical conventions like the inviolability of the grave. With such descriptions, Jünger becomes an exponent of a violation of the values of the Age of Enlightenment. His purpose with the precise description of rotten flesh is to strengthen himself against the War.

World War 1 was the first war dominated by modern technology. Even men turned into material in Jünger’s book (Jünger 2013). With that, a direct line of communication was established between a view of the human being during World War 1 and the Nazi ideology. The description of the soldier as a self-sacrificing and brave war hero, is a central link to Nazism. A ‘new man’ is born during World War 1. Jünger defines this man as a warrior who controls modern technology. In the first edition of *Storm of Steel*, he outlined how the warrior does not accept destruction of French villages and the suffering of the civilian population. Jünger also mentions that it is meaningless to send soldiers into a fight that cannot be won (Jünger 2013).

The first edition of Jünger’s book not only focuses on the glorification of war, but contains different considerations about the War as well. In the preface, there is mention that the war is grey and that the battlefield is a desert of madness (Jünger 2013). Trench warfare results in disillusion and does not promote heroism. Jünger is also a lonely and freezing soldier who is longing for something human in the trench (Jünger 2013: 34).
Even though Jünger is praising the English soldiers and mentioning such things as weekdays in the war, disillusion, and friendship with the civilian population, the stigmatization of Jünger as a man who glorifies war is proved in the first edition of his war book.

The War should not be forgotten: that is the purpose of Jünger’s 1924 edition. He is proud of World War I. Future generations must be ruthless and ready to die for Germany. The warrior of the future is portrayed as a German prototype and is very suitable for war, seen from a Nazi point of view. A so far unknown brutality will dominate the future. His prognosis is that there will be another war in Europe (Jünger 2013). Nationalistic passion is more important in the 1924 edition. The French are characterized as an enemy race (Jünger 2013). Jünger still pays respect to the English soldiers. His political object is the nationalistic and imperialistic state, but in his war diary he does not consider giving up democracy in favor of Nazism – as he does in other articles published in right winged papers in the 1920s.

In 1924, Jünger begins to focus more on nature (Jünger 2013). His interest in plants and animals is more obvious than in the 1920 edition. Looking at nature promotes Jünger’s fighting spirit (Jünger 2013). Nature and war seem to be competitive. Reading literature and studying beetles seems to contrast with the warrior who lives in eternal war.

The focus on nature is even more evident in the 1934 edition. Nature is no longer important for Jünger’s fighting spirit. Nature is now an aesthetic phenomenon. The soldier Jünger likes to look at nature (Jünger 2013). The pleasure of plants and animals is an expression of Jünger’s mental change. The self-reflective and contemplative soldier is of importance in the 1934 edition (Jünger 2013). Jünger is critical towards the heroic status of the War when he brings up subjects like the mercilessness of war and the soldier’s fear. The former focus on nationalism and on the sense of duty is deleted.

In 1934, the stigmatization of Jünger as a man glorifying war, a nationalist, and an ideological pioneer of Nazism changes. The Nietzschean and social Darwinistic perspectives are replaced by a criticism of civilization that is centered on stoicism and escapism. These are Jünger’s answers to political change in Germany during the 1930s. Some additions demonstrate that war results in the destruction of culture in France and Belgium (Jünger 2013). Jünger admits that he and other volunteers were not welcomed with enthusiasm by the German soldiers on the Western Front in 1914 (Jünger 2013). The technological war creates the illusion of hope that the individual
can settle the war. Comments on the mercilessness of the war have to be read in this context.

In the 1961 and the 1978 editions, there are very few substantial changes that move the focus from the battles to more reflective considerations, while nature is given a higher priority and the remaining nationalist words are deleted. A German defeat in World War 1 seems to be possible in 1918 now, and the sense of the War is discussed again (Jünger 2013). Pity for dead enemies is a subject now. Jünger writes about his sorrow for killing a very young English soldier, about his thoughts of him in the following decades, and about a state that claims warlike behavior from young men (Jünger 2013). In 1961, Jünger deletes paragraphs from the 1920 edition glorifying death on the battle field.

Hermann Hesse

The interpretations of Hesse’s point of view during World War 1 are very different. Usually, he is classified as a pacifist and the novel Demian (written in 1917 and published in 1919) – for instance in the postscript of the 1974 edition – as a text belonging to “anti-war tracts and novels” (Hesse 1974: 142). Research has failed to appreciate Demian as a text which deals with a variant of intellectual aristocratism which is part of a larger context in German literature about World War 1. Schwilk emphasizes Hesse’s ambiguous relations to the War, his patriotism, and his opinion that man has to follow his archaic instincts (Schwilk 2012). In the summer of 1914, he did not act as a pacifist and was ready to defend Germany (Schwilk 2012). Hesse saw the War as a possibility for revitalizing culture (Schwilk 2012). He volunteered for the task in August 1914, but was refused because of his age and myopia. From November 1915, he participated in civil active service. In September 1914, Hesse demonstrated the anti-British attitude of German nationalism (Hesse 1973). Already in November 1914, his doubts about German nationalism and the brutal invasion of Belgium became obvious, when he accentuated his international attitude (Hesse 1973). Also in November 1914, Hesse admitted his love of European culture in preference to patriotism, and was denounced as a traitor to Germany. An interesting point is that Hesse’s rejection of nationalism did not include a rejection of World War 1. In December 1914, Hesse claimed that the War would not destroy culture (Hesse 1973). In February 1915, Hesse praised the German philosopher Max Scheler (Hesse 1973). In Scheler’s book Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg (1915), the War is described as the culmi-
nation of the activities of the German state. In Scheler’s opinion, World War 1 seems to be a possibility for developing life. Hesse advocates a European spirit, a supranational humanity, and is pro a cooperation between nations in 1915 (Hesse 1973). However, Hesse underlined Germany’s right to defend its position as a world power in December 1915. He emphasized that the Germans also have a right to express national feelings, because German culture has contributed so much to European culture (Hesse 1973). In June 1917, Hesse announced that he was not politicized by World War 1. The War has reinforced the contrast between the outside and inside world. Hesse’s main interest is the inside world (Hesse 1973).

Hesse’s most important work, written during World War 1, is the novel *Demian* (1919). The main topic is the young Emil Sinclair’s struggle for mental maturity in the period before and during World War 1. The motto of the text – “I wanted only to try to live in accord with the promptings which came from my true self” (Hesse 1974: XIII) – focuses on the philosophy of life and its “natural” life expansion. Hesse discusses whether humanity can still be expressed in a narrative form when millions of people are killed in a technological war. He emphasizes the unique character of every human being as a creature of nature. Every human being carries the spirit of life. This spirit includes archaic behavior as well.

Like Jünger, Hesse criticizes the boring bourgeois – and dying – society before World War 1. It may be a “good” world of peace and security, but Sinclair is also attracted by a “bad” world of evil that includes the idea of patricide, the elimination of the bourgeois society, and the longing for “life and adventure” (Hesse 1974: 60). Sinclair’s friend Max Demian has a self-determined life and is a “law unto himself” (Hesse 1974: 42). For a short while, Sinclair lives a self-destructive Dionysian life with alcohol and cynicism. At last, he abandons the excessive life in favor of a forceful interest in developing spiritual aristocratism, characterized by “purity and nobility” (Hesse 1974: 67).

The main purpose of intellectual aristocratism is not a revitalization of the outside world, but of the inner world in every human being. The mental world is outlined as the “real” world in *Demian*; to achieve self-knowledge and mental maturity, defined as “another mode of vision” (Hesse 1974: 122). However, it is of importance to recognize that humanity has not developed in the pre-war society yet. *Demian* positions an actually not very well-defined humanity in the future. Contemplative observation of nature is a central part of intellectual aristocratism: “The observation of such configura-
tions. The surrender to Nature’s irrational, strangely confused formations produces in us a feeling of inner harmony with the force responsible for these phenomena” (Hesse 1974: 88). According to Hesse, it is the same divinity which determines nature and human beings.

Collective ideologies are refused. According to *Demian*, World War 1 is no a possibility for improving the “old” world. This world – here Hesse agrees with the other intellectuals in the German speaking world – must be destroyed in the War, but new political constellations of power after the War are of no interest. Only mental maturity is: be yourself because you are unique. Heroism has no part in mental maturity, but belongs in the outside world, the “surface” (Hesse 1974: 140): “The most primitive, even the wildest feelings were not directed at the enemy; their bloody task was merely an irradiation of the soul, of the soul divided within itself, which filled them with the lust to rage and kill, annihilate and die so that they might be born anew” (Hesse 1974: 140). Mental maturity only belongs to the “underneath” (Hesse 1974: 140). Jünger and Hesse both look at World War 1 as a rupture in world history. Modern technology becomes a “stahlgewittergleich” (Decker 2007: 61), a destruction of human life on the battlefields. Hesse’s objective, to understand the outside rupture mentally caused by World War 1, is also Jünger’s literary project.

The Hesse research focuses on the C.G. Jung context, and not on World War 1 in *Demian*. The text should be read as a story dealing with the experiences of central relevance for the whole generation which was sent into the War in August 1914.

Schwikl reads *Demian* as a story of becoming a human being during a war of extermination. Mental brilliance originates in spiritual independence (Schwikl 2012). Although Sinclair fights on the Western Front, he actually fights an inner struggle (Schwikl 2012). Freedman analyses the text as a symbol for the World War 1 period. Sinclair is the hero of the revitalization of mankind and humanity. Radical destruction can result in renewal and in a better world (Freedman 2013). A central topic in *Demian* is the fall of the old Europe, but the text presents an offer of new metaphysical meaning and identification (Singh 2006). Toprak interprets the text as the representation of an atmosphere that ends in the War. He reads *Demian* as a text that advocates World War 1, because it will generate a new and better world. The problem is Hesse’s new indistinct humanism (Toprak 2013).

The pessimism towards culture that Hesse formulated in the novel *Peter
Camenzind (1904) is replaced by finding meaning in culture in Demian (Frenzel 1991). Camenzind moved from the countryside to the city and returned to nature. Sinclair’s solution is not the simple life in nature, but a confession to culture. Demian is the confession of a wounded soldier. Demian shows Sinclair the way back to himself. Demian’s mother is the archaic ideal of maternity (Frenzel 1991).

Demian conduced to Hesse’s worldwide reputation as a representative of individualism and non-conformism. Demian became a figure of identification in several époques, for instance in Germany after World War 1, when soldiers returning from the battlefields thought the text was written by an author belonging to their own generation, and in the American hippie era too (Limberg 2005). Hesse published Demian under the pseudonym of Emil Sinclair for more than fifteen editions. The genre of the publication was displaced from fiction to non-fiction. As a non-fiction text, Demian pretended to be an “authentic” war report written by a soldier, like Jünger’s Storm of Steel. Actually, Demian is not as far from Jünger as the research asserts (Singh 2006). In 1920, Hesse had to reveal his authorship. Hesse was a moralist in the context of World War 1. He requested moderation from nationalism. Hesse is interested in reconciliation between an excessive and a tranquil life, and he is always searching for a metaphysical meaning of life.

Hesse was attacked by the Nazis and the exile authors in the Nazi period, but he insisted on his mental independence and refused all ideological instrumentalizations (Limberg 2005). The impact of Hesse is particularly obvious after World War 1 and World War 2 (Limberg 2005).

His pacifism made him a cult figure in the US during the Vietnam War (Schwilck 2012). Several traces of Hesse’s texts can be found in novels written by the American Beat Generation (Esselborn-Krumbiegel 2013). The American rock band “Steppenwolf” was named after Hesse’s novel. While Hesse found many readers in the conservative society of Western Germany in the 1950s, the 1970s was a period of intensive Hesse reception in Western Germany too. He became interesting for the growing ecological movement (the political party Die Grünen was founded in Western Germany in 1980) as an author practicing spiritual opposition (Singh 2006).

Around the millennium, Hesse was still a representative of contemporary subculture in German novels, like in Ralf Rothmann’s Stier (1991) and Markus Werner’s Am Hang (2004). In the first mentioned novel, Demian is the mental companion on an LSD trip; in the second novel, Hesse’s
home for many years, Montagnola in Switzerland, is a place of humanism (Esselborn-Krumbiegel, 2013). The research in German literature often rejected the relevance of Hesse’s literature, and blamed him both for believing in an obsolete romanticism and for writing beyond modernity (Singh 2006; Limberg 2005). In fact, Hesse is the leading figure of escapism in the modern consumer society and a representative of a magic world order (Esselborn-Krumbiegel 2013). Young readers in China, Korea, and Japan understand Hesse as a writer of their own culture and of their own generation, as he writes about the always-current conflict between individual autonomy and conformism in society (Limberg 2005). Hesse represents an aristocratic humanism that is not part of the outside world, but develops inside the human being. The strategy of this aristocratic humanism is to protect oneself from a frightening modernity. The modernist looked at Hesse as an author of integrity, but also as an intellectual looking back, instead of looking forward.

Today, Hermann Hesse is the most read German author from the twentieth century. Twenty-five million Hesse-books have been sold in the German speaking countries, 125 million in the whole world (Schwilk 2012). Hesse answered 35,000 letters from his readers, and for young readers Hesse is a representative of moral integrity and humanism (Limberg 2005). Hesse’s enormous impact of our time is bound up with an antiauthoritarian attitude and maximal individualism (Schwilk 2012).

**Georg Trakl**

Georg Trakl’s last poem *Grodek* was written at the front, after he had to nurse almost 100 very badly wounded soldiers, all alone without any assistance from doctors, for two days in an Eastern Front field hospital near Grodek in Galicia in September 1914 (Lichtenberger 1971). “He found intolerable the facts of the human suffering – the physical squalor, the cries of the wounded. Within sight of the camp, the army command punished partisan peasants by hanging them, leaving their decaying bodies on display, as warnings, in the trees” (Tapscott 2011: XI). Trakl’s attempted suicide by shooting himself failed. His cause of death was an overdose of cocaine in the psychiatry hospital of Cracow in November 1914.

“On the basis of ‘Grodek’ alone, Trakl has achieved a place among the poets of World War I” (Lichtenberger 1971: 128). Stephen Tapscott’s new 2011 translation of Trakl’s poems from German to English proves that Trakl’s po-
tery has an important impact in our time, not only in the German speaking countries, but from a global perspective. His gloomy lyric poetry under the impression of World War 1 also shocks today, namely based on a “self reflexive melancholy” (Tapscott 2011: VIII). But the “traumatic events on the Eastern Front in WWI” (Tapscott 2011: XV) and their tragic consequences for Trakl’s life, seem to be of importance for his reputation as well. Indeed, Tapscott’s edition of Trakl’s poems attempts to emphasize the “continuity of his development” (Tapscott 2011: XV). From this point of view, Trakl’s poem *Grodek* manifests itself as a logical consequence of modernity, modern warfare, and modern inhumanity, and not as the author’s individual tragedy.

Trakl describes the apocalypse and is longing for humanity. He takes note of the decline of a well-ordered world. His reaction is resignation. Jünger’s is rebellion. Trakl is a representative for an aesthetic view of World War 1. Even on the battlefield, he finds aesthetic. The horror is revealed in aesthetic.

Trakl’s main impact on our time is that his poems go very far beyond the historical context in which they were written. His position in German literary history is paradigmatic because his poems consider aesthetic tendencies that essentially conduced to establish modernity in the beginning of the twentieth century (Cellbrot 2003). His poems are characteristic of the way of looking at history. Many currents support his view on history as a period of decadence (Cellbrot 2003). The impact of Trakl in our time was documented in 2014 with the publication of Gunnar Decker’s illustrated work *Georg Trakl*. Photos and texts in Decker’s book show an author associated with an era of decadence and death (Decker 2014). Decker expounds Trakl as an extreme individualist who rejected all sorts of collectivism. With the author Trakl, German expressionism becomes fervent (Decker 2014). Decker positions the battle of Grodek as the basis of a new era of the mechanical destruction of human beings (Decker 2014):
Grodek

In the evening the autumnal woods resound
With deadly arms, [as do] the golden plains
And blue lakes, over which the sun
Darkly [gloomily] revolves; the night embraces
Dying warriors, the wild lamenting
Of their broken mouths.
Yet quietly in the [low] pasture there gather
Red clouds, in which a wrathful god lives,
The spilt blood, moonlike coolness;
All streets run into black decay.
Under golden branches of night and stars
The sister’s shadow hovers through the silent grove
To greet the spirits of the heroes, the bleeding heads;
And softly in the reeds the dark flutes of autumn resound.
Oh prouder morning! You brazen altars,
Today the hot flame of the spirit is fed by an immense pain,
The unborn grandchildren. (*Lindenberger 1971: 129*)

In 1973, Ernst Jünger’s younger brother Friedrich Georg Jünger pointed out that putrefaction can no longer be passed over after World War 1. The War includes a rupture, not only with humanity, but obviously with warfare compared with wars in the nineteenth century. Friedrich Georg Jünger makes
clear that Grodek shows the reality of World War 1, with dead and dying soldiers. According to Friedrich Georg Jünger, Trakl enquires about the substance of war and comes to the conclusion of not distinguishing between friends and enemies. They are dying together in Grodek (Jünger 1973: 12). Trakl worries that the next generations might be essentially influenced by the war fever of World War 1. They will never be born into a life dominated by humanity. The hope that World War 1 might result in the mental change of mankind might be articulated in Grodek (Doppler 2001: 80) – but it seems to be as vague as Hesse’s uncertain humanism. Trakl’s perception of reality is characterized by a combination of subjects in new contexts. War and nature are the main subjects in Grodek. They are entwined. The quiet nature contrasts with the noisy and lethal weapon in an apocalyptic dimension. The concrete historical occurrence indicated in the title of the poem is relative, because the impressions of nature create a distance that urges the reader to reflect (Doppler 2001: 79-80). It is a landscape of outrage, death, and wailing. The soldiers are no patriotic heroes (Doppler 2001: 79).

The “evening” and the “autumnal woods” indicate both death on the battlefield of World War 1 and the decline of an era. Even nature is dominated by the War and the apocalypse of the new era, when the woods echo with deadly weapons. The thematic focus in the poem is the crying of the “dying warriors”. With “All streets run into black decay”, Trakl emphasizes his criticism of modernity. Modernity leads to death and decline. Later in Grodek, nature still contains the values of the declined era: “And softly in the reeds the dark flutes of autumn resound”. Trakl’s aesthetic view of the War rests on nature.

**Conclusion**

The majority of the German and Austrian intellectuals looked positively at World War 1 in 1914. The War was seen as a potential purification and as a possibility for revitalizing culture. This chapter examined three authors who published during and about World War 1 in the context of modernity and intellectual aristocratism. The impact and reception of their work in our time and its culture were also examined.

The war diary Storm of Steel established Ernst Jünger in antidemocratic, extremely nationalistic intellectual and political circles in Germany in the 1920s. According to the 1924 version, future generations must be ruthless and ready to die for Germany. The self-reflective and contemplative soldier
is of importance in the 1934 edition. However, *Storm of Steel* means a glorification of war and a radical violation of humanistic ideals. All versions are characterized by a radical reduction of World War 1 to a scene for Jünger’s own act of war, instead of the War seen as a whole. In every period of his authorship, the nonconformist Jünger declines to meet demands from the outside world. Hermann Hesse’s novel *Demian* and Georg Trakl’s poem *Grodek* seem to represent pacifism at first sight, but they include remarkable consistencies and differences with Jünger’s text with regard to intellectual aristocratism and mental maturity.

Like Jünger in *The Adventurous Heart*, Hesse focuses on the inner mental life. Hesse agrees with Jünger that radical destruction might result in renewal. The spirit of life includes archaic behavior. Hesse’s rejection of nationalism does not include a rejection of World War 1. But Hesse is against collective ideologies and political radicalization. To him, European culture and supranational humanity are both important. Mental maturity – the inside world – is essential. He represents an aristocratic humanism that develops inside the human being. The strategy of this aristocratic humanism is to protect oneself from modernity. *Demian* was a figure for identification in several eras, despite the fact that the text formulates a very uncertain humanism in the future. With *Demian*, Hesse became a worldwide representative of individualism and non-conformism.

Trakl is more pessimistic than Jünger and Hesse. He focuses on the decline of the old world and gives up physical and mental life. In remarkable contrast to Jünger and Hesse, there is now future mental aristocratism for the next generations in Trakl’s poem. The possibility to revitalize culture after World War 1 manifests itself in Ernst Jünger’s and Hermann Hesse’s authorship, but not in Georg Trakl’s.
Reference list

Chapter 7

The impact of World War 1 on Anglophone literature

Bent Sørensen

Introduction

World War 1 gave rise to a number of phenomena of lasting interest to historians and scholars of literature and culture in the Anglophone World. Prior to the Great War, English literature already had a long tradition of reflecting on wars and their impact on soldiers in the frontline, as well as the civilians on the home front (roughly speaking as part of the spine of the logic of empire), but with the brutal witness-based poetry of the trenches of World War 1 the awareness of the psychological effects of war and of trauma discourses and behaviours became foregrounded in new ways. In this chapter the aim is look at transmissions of the cultural iconicity (see Sørensen & Nielsen, 2015) of World War 1 over the century that has now almost fully lapsed since the War unfolded. By cultural iconicity is understood the mechanism involved in memorialization through images; both physical, tangible images such as photographs and moving filmic images and pictorial art, and mental images such as those embedded in literary and non-fictional texts and other forms of concrete memorial storages such as testimonials, memoirs, trauma narratives and other medical records. All such images, the theses of cultural imagology run, are stored in and simultaneously have an impact on what could be termed the iconosphere, here understood as the sum total of images that a literate public has access to at a given point in time. The iconosphere thus resembles the totality of operationalized historical, literary and cultural knowledge of a given culture at a given point in time (by ‘operationalized’ is here meant easily accessible via the media and other current transmission mechanisms of the given epoch. See Johnson 2005). The iconosphere is, thus, by nature historically contingent, but also changeable and malleable in a rather ‘sluggish’ manner, i.e. relatively resistant to change in mentalities
and ideological priorities of the specific populace. World War 1 is arguably still an active portion of the global (or here the Anglophone portion of the) iconosphere of the second decade of the twenty-first century, but not in the same manner as it was in the Interwar decades of the 1920s and 30s, or the post-World War 2 decades (World War 2 having inevitably revitalized the images of World War 1...). Examples will be given of re-entries into the iconosphere of specific texts and images related to World War 1.

Specific interest is given in the second part of the chapter to the generational discourse that World War 1 occasioned in English and American cultural and literary history. Here the emphasis is overwhelmingly on the long, and by nature increasingly tenuous, lines drawn by the trauma of World War 1 in the iconosphere. The term “the Lost Generation” was coined as a way of discoursing about the national and personal trauma of losing upwards of one million UK citizens to military or civilian deaths directly attributable to the Great War. The generational metaphor is of particular interest as a reservoir of cultural memory of the losses connected with the War, as generation follows generation, both in biological terms and in terms of cultural heritage and literary tradition. While the US lost relatively few soldiers in combat (ca. 117.000), the aftermath of the Great War was of great cultural significance there, as the Lost Generation identity position became widely disseminated to apply to many groups that had not directly been involved in the War. In fact, the Lost Generation became only the first of a number of American literary generations whose auto-image incorporated absence and negation in its label. It is, in other words, the main thesis of the second part of the chapter to follow, that it is also possible to trace the effect of World War 1 through the cultural and literary generational constructs of the entire 20th C. in an American context. Thus the legacy of the War plays itself out in several arenas, of which the chapter engages with the following: The preoccupation with World War 1 in a) popular culture and the media as a watershed event of continuing iconographic value to new generations; b) songs that continue to be performed, recorded and to matter for contemporary culture; and finally c) fictional texts that ‘produce’ and ‘perform’ generationality, and which thematically deal with feelings of repeated loss of life, identity and trauma transmission. To spell this out even more, the corpus of this article consists of texts that originated in World War 1 and still have imagological resonances in the iconosphere (poems and song lyrics), and texts that are part of the trauma transmission chain that started with the Lost Generation of the 1920s. The article cannot possibly refer to all Anglophone texts that ever referenced World War 1, and it deliberately chooses to look at texts
that have entered into the current iconosphere in surprising ways as part of a cultural transmission of memorialization or trauma.

**Cultural Memory**

As we currently move through the centenary years of World War 1, our cultural memory of the long bygone events is being constantly jogged and revitalized by new generations of social and cultural actors, producing new texts about the Great War, or restaging old ones in new settings and media. These new forms of memorialization form a natural starting point for a discussion of the continued relevance of World War 1 in the twenty-first century in the English-speaking World, as they are perhaps indicative of what forms memorialization will take in the immediate and long-term future. Such a discussion is particularly poignant in a period where the very last survivors of World War 1 have recently died, definitively precluding the possibility of new living memory transmissions of the War experience. Historians and archivists may still be able to retrieve new testimonial material but no more living voices can be recorded which insert the World War 1 experience into a contemporary cultural setting. This leaves us with traditional archival knowledge, remediation technologies and – of particular interest here – fictionalizations of the War as access lines to cultural knowledge about the impact of the War and the development of the mental images future generations will store about it in the iconosphere. The imagological method is unique in allowing us indirect access to cultural texts cached in the iconosphere that may contain surprising traces of World War 1 despite on the surface appearing to have no connection to the Great War. This is the purpose of tracing generationality through the hundred years since the War generated the first literary generation-construct, the Lost Generation.

**YouTube and the Iconosphere**

YouTube has arguably become the major platform for cultural dissemination via video and video/audio formats in the second decade of the twenty-first century. With the seamless integration of YouTube and other social media platforms, it has become easy to share manifestations of cultural memory among users of these platforms, and the generational profiles of social media users ensure that people born in any decade of the twentieth century have easy access to an unprecedented selection of documents that carry individual, collective and cultural memory manifestations.
World War 1 is specifically memorialized on YouTube via the channel the Great War which follows the events of the War week by week, exactly a century after they happened. Currently 133 ‘episodes’ are available for viewing on this platform, and in 2017 episodes routinely reached 80,000 views within the first week of upload, with an expectancy of reaching at least 150,000 views after 6 weeks. Videos from the first ‘season’ of the series, covering the year of 1914, also hover around 150,000 views, with especially popular episodes (the first instalment and episodes following particularly significant battles) reaching ten times that amount. Clearly these are significant numbers of views, indicating in their own right a level of interest or fascination with the Great War that is perhaps surprising given the conventional wisdom of our postmodern age being one of cultural acceleration and diminished individual and collective mediatized attention span. A closer look at the format of the videos, however, creates nuances in the picture we may have formed of this state of cultural memorialization. Each video is held carefully under the ten-minute mark, features a digest version of a narrative presented in talking head style, and copious use of archival footage and still photography. Every episode also features extensive use of map animation showing troop movements during battles and strategic concerns of the combatant parties. The format is thus adapted to a profile of users/viewers which prefers short format texts and a serialization that allows for ‘binge’ watching of episodes at times convenient to the individual needs and lifestyle of the user. Further, the simplification of information in the programming, allows for the episodes to be used didactically in school systems even in countries that are not predominantly Anglophone.

The Canadian Memorialization of the War: Cohen and McCrae

Yet this is not the only way in which World War 1 is re-entering the current iconosphere via YouTube as dissemination platform. A striking example of how other routes of transmission of cultural memory may open unexpectedly occurred in November 2016. In the immediate aftermath of the death of Canadian cultural icon, singer-songwriter and poet, Leonard Cohen, numerous cultural texts memorializing his life and cultural impact were produced or re-surfaced from archives. His multimediatized obituary, if one likes, was disseminated in multiple instalments and types of features far beyond the traditional genre of newspaper and radio/TV obituary texts. One of the most popular cultural documents that circulated very widely in November 2016 consisted in a reading Cohen had done the year prior to his death of the most
iconic Canadian World War 1 testimonial poem, namely John McCrae’s *In Flanders Fields* (1915). In Canada, World War 1 has traditionally been memorialized on 11 November, which of course is the day of the armistice ending active hostilities in 1918, under the name of Remembrance Day. With this day occurring so closely to Cohen’s own death (on 7 November 2016, but not announced by his estate until 9 November), the coupling of the two events became particularly poignant, increasing the impact on the iconsphere of the dissemination of Cohen’s reading of the poem. Multiple news outlets throughout the World created pieces that incorporated embedded video links to the various YouTube uploads of Cohen’s reading, and the electronic versions of these articles were obviously extremely sharable via social media, creating an unexpected viral spread of McCrae’s already quite iconic poem which is traditionally taught and recited in primary school in Canada and other Anglophone countries. The first recording of Cohen’s reading of the poem marked the centenary of its composition and took place in 2015, and the original upload of the audio/video-montage quickly soared well above 500,000 views after Cohen’s death, despite its original obscurity on Legion Magazine’s YouTube channel. A later live recording of a very frail and ill Cohen reciting the poem from memory was also circulated by news media, but this less iconographically striking video has only reached a little over 28,000 views. Still the fact that a century-old poem whose relevance to young readers/listeners may long have seemed dubious can once more impact upon the iconsphere is significant. Further reasons behind this impact, beyond the sensationalism and pathos of Cohen’s death, can briefly be offered.

Cohen had personal reasons for taking an interest in the poem, as his father served in the Canadian expeditionary force during World War 1, so Cohen already used the poem to revitalize his father’s living memory every year on Remembrance Day in what amounted to a private ceremony. Further, Cohen’s public performance career contained multiple songs with war, or perhaps more accurately anti-war, narratives, both of his own composing and performances of other writers’ songs, notably *The Partisan*, a song about the French Resistance during World War 1 (recorded by Cohen in 1971). These songs, regardless of the conflict they originally sprang out of and memorialized, served as an essential part of Cohen’s image as a counter-cultural, oppositional figure which his audience could rally around in symbolic fashion. Cohen thus played an active role, both during his writing and performance life, and posthumously through the continuous dissemination of cultural texts such as the recording of *In Flanders Fields*, in the memorialization and manifestation of the continuing relevance of World
War 1 as an ideational backdrop for sentiments about death and loss in war – and potentially the transcendence of these negative structures through art and memory.

Lieutenant Colonel McCrae’s poem itself warrants a brief analysis. Its most poignant feature (and one that doubtlessly resonates with a contemporary audience already preoccupied with stages of death and undead beings) is that it is spoken by the dead soldiers themselves, although it is at first unclear whether the speakers’ collective ‘we’ are the fallen or simply those doomed to fall, given the imbecilic strategies of warfare employed in World War 1, where soldiers watched futile attacks kill multitudes of their fellow combatants, leaving them with a certain knowledge that they themselves were next. The line (highlighted in the Cohen video – it simply appears on the screen when spoken, unlike any of the other lines of the poem, and it even features a word printed in red, a colour otherwise reserved for the poppies that are the symbolic illustration of the dead and wounded, bleeding soldiers remaining in the fields of slaughter) in question, giving away the speakers’ position, runs in all its simplicity: “We are the dead”. The impact of this line is of course increased by the fact that McCrae did not survive the War. Along with the work of Wilfred Owen, who also perished in the very last months of the War, McCrae’s poetry has been given an extra lease of line due to the tragic circumstance of its apparent prediction of his own demise. The poem’s ghostly tone is further underscored by the dead speakers’ threat to return to haunt the living if they do not pick up the “torch” and carry on the “quarrel” with “the foe”. In a manner of speaking this particular poem embodies the cultural function of memory and trauma of combat to haunt the survivors, sometimes through several generations. McCrae’s poem is also the reason for “Poppy Day” being the popular denomination for Armistice Day in Great Britain, due to the poem’s reference to poppies growing over the buried dead. The continuing success and iconic presence of Poppy Day, esp. in Britain is to a very large extent operative in keeping World War 1 alive in the iconosphere in the Anglophone World, what with the poppy having become an established synecdoche for World War 1 as such.

Hopefully it is apparent to attentive readers that the imagological analysis above is not exclusively a reading of Leonard Cohen, but simultaneously a reading of Cohen as a receptacle of memorialization of the Great War and a text that is co-contemporaneous with World War 1. Only through such diachronic cultural studies perspectives can we continue to access the War and its legacy.
Commonwealth Experiences: Ireland and Australia

As a further historical context one can offer the fact that every nation of the Commonwealth that sent soldiers to fight alongside the British in World War 1 has a particular iconographic aftermath to the events and the sacrifices borne by their troops. Irish, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand forces were often placed at the forefront of the heated interactions between Allied and Central Powers frontlines, and a remnant of this bitterness can be detected in the cultural texts that particularly effectively commemorate the participation of these nations in World War 1. *In Flanders Field* is a bitter text, but maintains at its closure that the sacrifice is necessary for the survival of the nation and its populace, thus echoing, perhaps somewhat unconvincingly, the prevalent rhetoric surrounding the incipient war years, suggesting that the War was being fought to keep the World safe for democracy or similar types of legitimating *illusio* in Bourdieu’s parlance (See Bourdieu, 1984:56). Thus it echoes the most famous British pro-World War 1 poem, Rupert Brooke’s pathos-laden *The Soldier* (first published in the magazine *New Numbers* in January, 1915) in which the speaker claims “a corner of some foreign field” as “forever England” by virtue of his blood sacrifice and death. Here the imperial discourse is quite naked and unabashed, the words “England” and “English” occurring no less than six times in the poem’s 14 lines, and the poem suggesting that colonization of the “foreign” is a worthwhile endeavour to die for, and in fact one that one is morally obligated to perform as a thank you for the “thoughts”, “sights and sounds”, “dreams”, and “laughter” that England has already supplied the titular soldier with.

Other nations have provided their iconospheres with bleaker, more critical texts about the logic and economy of empire in which the ‘colonial’ soldiers’ lives are shown to have been eminently dispensable for the greater glory of Britain. In Ireland the year of 1916 is of specific cultural significance due to the centenary of the Easter Uprising, marked last year by many academic and popular cultural events. In a song entitled The Foggy Dew, whose lyrics were composed after the end of World War 1 by Canon Charles O’Neill to fit the tune of *The Moorlough Shore*, an air from the late nineteenth century (for variations in lyrics and in-depth context, consult O’Boyle, 1973), the speaker imagines watching Irish lads in 1914 who have enlisted to fight in the War for the British, and he muses with remarkable foresight on what awaits these young men on their way to “their lonely graves [...] by Suvla’s waves or the fringe of the great North Sea”. He further suggests that they would have been better off not heeding the *illusio* of empire for the War:
“‘Twas England bade our wild geese go, that ‘small nations might be free’”,
and instead to have fought at home for true freedom, i.e. independence of
the self-same empire they were soon to die for: “‘Twas far better to die
‘neath an Irish sky, than at Suvla or Sud el Bar”. The song thus suggests
that it is better not to die in the corner of some foreign field (referencing
specifically the Gallipoli campaign), but does not reject the value of na-
tional martyrdom wholeheartedly – as long as one dies for the right nation!
This song has had an intense afterlife as a parable that transcends its initial
World War 1 setting, featuring recordings and performances in various cul-
tural contexts, including those of the immediate Irish nation-building era of
the early 1920s; the troubles era of the 1970s, during which the song was
memorably recorded by The Dubliners; and the post-ceasefire era of the
late 1990s, leading up to the Good Friday Agreement, during which Sinéad
O’Connor recorded the song with The Chieftains. Thus the images of young
Irish sacrificial lambs led to slaughter for the British Empire, or more po-
etically expressed the freedom-seeking “wild geese” of mercenaries, have
survived in the iconosphere, carrying on the critique embedded in the orig-
inal version of the lament.

For Australia the great loss of innocence with regards to the motives of
empire is also associated with World War 1, and more specifically the same
events at Gallipoli, where Commonwealth soldiers were used as cannon
fodder in the first waves of attack on the Turkish lines. Immortalized in the
song *And The Band Played Waltzing Matilda* by Eric Bogle in 1971 (a time
where pacifism was a dominant mode among young members of the global
counter-culture, not least due to the disaster of the Vietnam War (cf. Cohen’s
recording that same year of *The Traitor*)), the gruesome description of the
meaningless loss of human life in this campaign is coupled with innocent
national pride through the citation of the unofficial Australian national an-
them *Waltzing Matilda* (which underlines the carefree nature of Australians
and has an anti-war sentiment embedded in some versions of its lyrics as
well). In several ways Bogle’s lyrics are unusually sophisticated for an an-
ti-war anthem. Not only is the description of battle lucid and graphic, and
its aftermath is described in a cynical tone (“Well we buried ours and the
Turks buried theirs/Then it started all over again”) indicative of how trauma
narratives often appear, but the song also bitterly describes the altered post
festum narrative of the battle that the logic of nation-building dictates, in
a description of the annual April parades commemorating the campaign.
The lines eloquently formulate the question of the usefulness of the War
in generational terms: “I see my old comrades, how proudly they march/
Renewing their dreams of past glories/I see the old men all tired, stiff and
worn/Those weary old heroes of a forgotten war/And the young people ask
“What are they marching for?”/And I ask myself the same question…” Past
glories are extolled by the nation state, and in the process the sacrifices of
the men involved are elided from the history, except for the fact that the
younger generation see through the rhetoric and acknowledge the futility of
the War. On the question of remembrance (of the “forgotten war”) the lyrics
are slightly ambiguous, as the purpose of the song obviously is exactly to
remember the War – not for its glory, but for its effect of reminding us that
never again should we follow blindly the pied piper of nationalism into a
war that is not ours.

The first part of the chapter has thus examined cultural texts that thematize
the Great War in a transnational Anglophone perspective, offering up read-
ings of how the War was conceptualized by Canadian, Australian and Irish
voices co-contemporaneous with World War 1, as well as the later and still
vivid representation of this history in the intervening century. These chains
of memorialization are diachronic in the sense that they bring the past in
contact with our own present through the medium of the iconosphere where
the traces are stored and revitalized in surprising ways.

**Generationality as cultural memory: The US Trauma Transmission**

Having examined a number of cultural texts that inscribe World War 1 in
the iconosphere of specific nation states, esp. those of the dependent corners
of the former British Empire, the second half of this chapter turns to the me-
morialization of World War 1 in an American context. Here the focus will
be on generational texts and the transmission of trauma from one generation
to the next, not coincidentally aligned with the movement from one war to
another. American literary history had not been narrated explicitly in terms
of generations until the 1920s when the concept of the Lost Generation was
constructed. The first occurrence of the construct can be pinpointed quite
accurately to Ernest Hemingway’s debut novel from 1926, The Sun Also
Rises, which contains two epigraphs which both thematically reference the
transmission of time and the potential of loss as well as continuity (the latter
is indicated by the epigraph quote from Ecclesiastes which the title phrase
also cites). It is however the other epigraph that performs the generational
naming speech act. In it Hemingway cites his literary mentor, Gertrude
Stein, for saying “You are all a lost generation”. In Hemingway’s later book,
A Moveable Feast, which is a revisionist memoir of his life in Paris in the
1920s, he tells a fuller version of how the phrase came into existence. Stein claimed to have overheard a mechanic at her garage yelling the phrase at another, younger, worker whose skills he was dissatisfied with. Stein then picked up the phrase in conversation with Hemingway, and specifically coupled the mechanic’s state of lostness and confusion with the war experience that left many men of Hemingway’s generation crippled physically and/or mentally. It is also in this trauma and war-related context that Hemingway’s epigraphic use of the phrase must be read.

His protagonist in *The Sun Also Rises*, Jake Barnes, has been physically emasculated by his war experiences, having suffered a grievous wound while serving as a volunteer airman in the Italian air force. He refers to it obliquely on numerous occasions, including the levity that the situation could well have occasioned, if it was not so tragic. Barnes states that he received the wound flying on a “joke front” and that the injury is akin to having had your joystick damaged. He even makes a self-deprecating but nonetheless chauvinistic mockery of the gravity with which his Italian commanding officer receives the news and tries to soothe Barnes with patriotic claptrap. Barnes is having none of the officer’s fake bravado on his behalf, and after the War has ended he tries to make the best of life as a disabled person. While the exact nature of the injury is never revealed it is clear that it makes Barnes impotent in the traditional sense of the word, although there is some indication that he is not beyond all forms of sexual satisfaction. All this is revealed through his desperately co-dependent relationship with the novel’s female protagonist, Brett, who is however also depicted as a ruthless femme fatale who is enthralled by her own needs for instant gratification. She enjoys seducing men, and subsequently have Barnes rescue her from the sordid consequences of her affairs. At the end of the novel Barnes finally seems to break free of this unhealthy circle of betrayals and rescues, and leaves Brett to her own devices after one final trip to Madrid to bail her out of a failed relationship. Thus, the novel deals with a number of ways in which its characters can said to be lost: Barnes is lost in a World that favours masculine pursuits and expressions, none of which he is ultimately able to fully participate in: bull fighting, boxing, fishing and cycling being the most prominently mentioned in the novel. He negotiates a precarious, secondary masculinity as an observer and as a writer about all these pursuits, depicting himself as a hard-working journalist. Instead of the original primary masculinity he is barred from enjoying and participating in, he substitutes a more cynical form of surrogate masculinity where he lets money play the role of potency. In particular, the novel associates France and French culture with prostitution and corruption. As long as one can decode what
the price of a transaction is, one will always be able to do well in France is the message Barnes sends. It is remarkable that a nation that has come out victorious in the War is seen as having lost its more primal values, but in the novel it is clearly a pattern that dogs all the victorious nations of World War 1, including the joke warriors of Italy, and the soft, almost homosexual masculinities of the US.

Lost Generation

On a more general level, this was exactly the inscription that Hemingway intended to add onto Stein’s original label of “Lost Generation”. Where she seems to indicate, echoing her perceptive garage mechanic, that the young men of the generation that came home from the War damaged were ‘lost’ in the sense of having lost their way or sense of direction, both physically and spiritually (the French word “perdue” carrying the religious overtone of ‘perdition’), Hemingway reads the lostness in a more brutally literal sense: His characters have lost their balls, or at least their sexual prowess. The other characters in the novel, who are not as literally wounded as Barnes, are all soft and queer in some way as well: Cohen, whose Jewishness is described as a weakness as well, is a boxer – but he lacks the knock-out punch. Romero, who is a strapping young bullfighter whose tight green pants leave nothing to the imagination of either Brett or the reader, ends up emasculated by her rapaciousness, and loses his touch with the bulls. Mike, Brett’s actual husband, is bankrupt and not man enough to face his debts and debtors. Even Bill, Jake’s only true American friend, is found wanting in his skills as a fisherman and a conversationalist (he is also the only character to openly mention the phenomenon of homosexuality). Thus, queerness is associated with the loss of the Lost Generation in Hemingway’s treatment of the phenomenon. As mentioned earlier he returns to the scene of his writer’s life in Paris at the time in his 1964 memoir, A Moveable Feast, and in that bitter retrospective volume he viciously mocks Stein for her homosexuality and his closest friend and rival, F. Scott Fitzgerald for his anxiety over the size of his penis. It would seem that among the many things that were lost in the War for Hemingway was all human decency, that is to say whatever moral compass he might have had before his own war experiences as an ambulance driver on the Italian (joke) front.

The tradition of thematizing traumatic loss and absence of values in generational writings that Hemingway founded with The Sun Also Rises continues in several ways in generational work by American fiction writers. F. Scott
Fitzgerald, who is the other important male writer of the Lost Generation, thematized trauma and loss of moral compass in somewhat different terms. Where Hemingway tended to rage against the World at large and take his frustrations out on his female characters, Fitzgerald’s characters were no less misogynistic, but tended to turn their rage inward as a destructive form of self-loathing. Fitzgerald’s debut novel, *The Great Gatsby*, which appeared the year before Hemingway’s debut and caused great jealousy in Hemingway, makes little overt reference to the War at all, but features a set of characters that are equally as damaged as those in Hemingway’s novel. The novel is set in the US, and concerns social and sexual ambition, rather than physical wounds and psychological compensation for them. Gatsby, whose story is lovingly told through the naïve narrator Nick, is gradually revealed to be an impostor who has used criminal means to gain a great fortune which he however is busy jeopardising and eventually squandering to impress his former sweetheart Daisy who in the meantime has married a fascist member of the old, moneyed East Coast autocracy. Daisy is an ambitious social climber who is willing to take any amount of abuse to maintain her status, and she is in fact quite happy to raise her daughter in the same manner. Gatsby is however blind to Daisy’s fatal character flaws and willing to go to any lengths to win her back and protect her from her own vacuity and ambitions. When he takes the blame for a vehicular manslaughter Daisy commits while drunk, he sets himself up for a rapid loss of all he has worked meticulously to attain, and Gatsby dies stupidly at the hands of the accident victim’s husband in a misguided act of attempted revenge. Nick is left to muse over what the story of the “Great” Gatsby might mean, but does not really have the mental acuity to offer much beyond blind loyalty to the image of Gatsby he has formed for himself (being in need of a hero and a moral compass that his own father was unwilling or able to supply) The novel ends with a famous passage in which Nick pleads for us all to toil on like boats desperately attempting to sail against the wind, and most critics and casual readers have failed to recognize the rather obvious irony in this plea – after all that is exactly what brought about Gatsby’s utter demise; the inability to face up to the reality principle.

In this novel the loss is twofold: a loss of moral direction, and a loss of energy and purpose in the face of life in general. Of course, *The Great Gatsby* does not directly lay the blame for these losses at the feet of the Great War in the unambiguous manner that Hemingway’s novel does, but nonetheless these feelings of anomie and shiftlessness are often described as core elements of a diagnosis of combat fatigue, or what in more modern terms is termed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, in Fitzgerald’s last
completed novel, *Tender Is the Night*, a failed attempt at surpassing his earlier masterpiece, he creates a character, Dick Diver, who is both a psychoanalyst and a victim of war trauma. Diver is however also, and perhaps chiefly a victim of hubris in connection with his relationships with women, having breached all codes of ethics in the psychoanalytic profession and married a client of his who eventually ends up dragging him down into suicidal depression himself. Nicole, Diver’s patient/wife is a traumatized incest victim, whom Diver fancies himself capable of saving – a pattern which repeats itself when Diver becomes disenchanted with Nicole and starts an affair with a much younger woman, Rosemary, for whom he commits a cover-up of a crime (exactly repeating the plot of *The Great Gatsby*). Eventually Diver ends up betrayed and abandoned by both women, and despite his saviour syndrome he is unable to save himself from alcoholism and inability to work as an analyst. Much of Diver’s need to function as a saviour can be traced back to his experiences in World War 1 that left him prone to self-doubts and addictions (alcohol).

Thus the core texts by core members of the American Lost Generation share common features. They depict a crisis of masculinity, directly traceable back to the War and its onslaught on the manhood of its participants. The fear of death, but equally of cowardice, evinced by these characters, could and should have been assuaged by the females that have ‘kept the home fires burning’ while the men fought the war, but the women commit the ultimate betrayal by denying their men the comfort they long for. Instead, the women are either too gender ambiguous as in the case of the predator Brett in *The Sun Also Rises*, or too weak and needy as the neurotic and narcissistic female characters in the two Gatsby novels. This pattern in generational novels by male authors to pin the cause for loss of masculinity and freedom on female characters continues for almost the whole remainder of the twentieth century in the US, and this could perhaps be argued to be one of the biggest unnoticed trauma chains/consequences of World War 1 in American culture.

Part of the reason why this reading possibility for Lost Generation novels has gone largely unnoticed is of course the presence of much more overt novelistic commentary on the Great War, to some extent authored by the same individuals as those discussed above. Hemingway is naturally the best example of a generational writer who also practised the art of the war novel. He in fact wrote two of his best known novels about wars he personally participated in: *A Farewell to Arms* (1929) about a World War 1 ambulance driver who is wounded on the Italian front (as was Jake Barnes); and *For
Whom the Bell Tolls (1940) about the Spanish Civil War. It is A Farewell to Arms that warrants a brief commentary here. The novel was in fact Hemingway’s first bestseller, and it therefore had a more immediate impact on the iconospheric afterlife of World War 1 than his debut novel had at the time. The iconic afterlife of A Farewell to Arms has also been furthered by numerous adaptations, first for the stage, and later for both film and TV. Its plot, however, is largely a variation on the tragic story of how war and love get conflated in a traumatized male psyche (Frederic Henry, the wounded ambulance drivers falls in love with his nurse at the hospital where he is a convalescent) that we already were told in The Sun Also Rises (as the two novels are both autobiographically occasioned, this similarity is not entirely surprising). In A Farewell to Arms the female protagonist, Catherine, offers potential salvation for the wounded and traumatized hero (much as Brett did, albeit under different circumstances, for Jake Barnes), who is unjustly persecuted for treasonous and cowardly behaviour at the front. After multiple escapes and much hardship, the couple effectuates a successful escape to Switzerland, but in a melodramatic turn of events, Henry loses both his lover and his child during the birth of the latter. Female consolation is thus again shown to be utterly inadequate as salve for a war wound.

The Beats and Onward

We now return to the general thread of intergenerational trauma transmission. The later literary generations in the US all share features with the Lost Generation in their labelling practice. The adjectives without fail have the same duality of absence and presence that ‘lost’ carries in it. The ‘50s Generation of the Beats, the ‘80s Blank Generation, and finally the 1990s Generation X show elements of transgenerational trauma transmission as well, in connection with their representations of beleaguered masculinity. Looking first at the label ambiguities and the acts of naming involved it is clear that ‘Beat’ at first glance looks more upbeat than ‘Lost’, perhaps to the uninitiated suggesting a rhythmic element to the characters’ lives as well as the authors’ prose. While this to a certain extent is true, it should also be noted that Jack Kerouac, the author who is the ‘father’ of the Beat Generation in the same way that Hemingway is of the Lost Generation, insisted on the duality of the ‘Beat’ label (see also Mortenson, 2011 for a general introduction to Beat poetics and ethos). For Kerouac, those who were ‘Beat’, were so in the sense of being downtrodden and worn-out elements at the bottom of society in terms of social class and status. Kerouac borrowed this sense of the word ‘beat’ from the street slang of black and white hipsters
of his acquaintance, frequenting the dives of Times Square in New York City in the late 1940s. Many of these characters were ‘Beat’ in the sense that they were addicts and criminals, discarded by society because of their lack of willingness to contribute to the economy and conform to the materiality of the American Dream, for instance by serving in the recently concluded World War 2. In subsequent versions of his narrative of naming his generation, Kerouac added a religion dimension to the label ‘Beat’ by suggesting that a member of the generation could also become ‘beat’ by being ‘beatific’ in the sense of being a radiant saint-like role model for his peers. This added layer of significance grew in Kerouac’s understanding of the label’s implications as he reverted to his childhood Catholicism after flirting with Buddhist beliefs in his most famous novels On the Road and Dharma Bums which established him as a generational spokesperson.

The two final generational labels are ‘empty’ in a slightly different way than the first two, in the sense that ‘Blank’ directly indicates the absence – the space before the word ‘Generation’ is literally left blank – yet, at the same time it is NOT blank, exactly because the word ‘Blank’ literally is there. The label ‘X’ is particularly rich in connotations, but let it suffice here to say that ‘X’ indicates, among other things, the unknown entity, the value that one has to solve the equation to come up with, and the marking on a map of the spot where treasure lies buried. These dualities again encompass the absence/presence duality, involving a promise of fulfilment if one does the required work. The suggestion behind this brief sketch of the label evolution in American literary generations is that in some ways the emptiness of the original loss of the post-World War 1 generation continues to haunt the later generations. “I once was lost, but now I am found”, as the lyrics to the popular gospel song Amazing Grace goes, indicating the hope of young men (the protagonists in American generational novels are almost invariably male, as are the authors writing such novels) of redemption of the original loss. And where does the loss stem from? It is a mixture of original sin (which as we know was first perpetrated by woman in the Garden of Eden, when the primordial fruit of knowledge was shared), and traumatic loss of innocence provided by the experience of the slaughter of war (which echoes the first murder scene in the Bible, the killing of Abel by his brother Cain). This is not to suggest that all generational novels in the last three literary generations are all war or trauma narratives, however the traumatic loss of masculinity is there as an unbroken chain, transmitted from Hemingway and Fitzgerald’s post-World War 1 fictions. The last part of this chapter briefly examines the transmutations of the themes of trauma and loss in the later American generational fictions.
In Kerouac’s *On the Road*, the two male protagonists drive thousands of miles across the American continent, from east to west and back again, before finally plunging south, into Mexico, in their quest for an elusive redemption or tranquillity, which in the novel is labelled with frustrating lack of concreteness as “IT”. This “IT” is related to jazz music, to the African-American race and its culture, and to an immediacy of life that for Kerouac is associated with Spengler’s idea of the Fellaheen, the poor uneducated people of the land, which in Kerouac’s case becomes synonymous with being ‘Beat’. The quest continues unsuccessfully to the novel’s very end where the two protagonists part ways. One goes on in his search for ‘kicks’ (another synonym for “IT”), the other goes home to his mother’s house to attempt to heal his wounds and the sickness his travels have inflicted on him. The latter is Sal Paradise, Kerouac’s alter ego in the novel, who is the more reflective of the two, and who has understood that “IT” should not be equated exclusively with sexual pleasure and loud music and drugs, but can only truly be attained through contemplation and peace of mind (for a further discussion of the quest in Kerouac’s *On the Road*, consult Sørensen, 2013b). This ‘cure’ for restlessness and a feeling of emptiness and that “everything was dead” resembles the strategies Hemingway’s Barnes attempted in the battle of overcoming his trauma, and in fact there are two scenes in Kerouac’s *On the Road* that directly reference Hemingway (naming him as a stylist) or offer up a direct pastiche of the plot of *The Sun Also Rises*. One could therefore argue that the trauma travels intertextually into the next generation of seekers in the quest novels of the Beat and later generations.

In Douglas Coupland’s novel *Generation X*, we again meet two main protagonists, both male, who seek a form of sanctuary from the trauma of their contemporary culture and the burdensome legacy of the previous, far more privileged, generation (in this case the post-World War 1 Baby Boomers). Again it is sanctuary that these young males seek, and in a striking parallel to Kerouac’s novel, it is south of the border, down Mexico way, they hope to find the particular locus of their peace of mind. The protagonists’ utopian project in *Generation X* is to found a hotel, where one pays not with money but with stories to stay. Along the way, the protagonists try to come to terms with the loss of material and emotional capital, as they all opt out of careers and marriages/nuclear families in favour of elective affinities in peer groups. The trauma narrative is less obvious in *Generation X*, since this generation has not been called upon to serve in any war, unlike the Lost and the Beat, but it is nonetheless present, as evidenced by Dag, one of the protagonists, who has a deep-rooted fear of the nuclear holocaust, having been a young child at the height of the Cold War (for a deeper discussion of
nostalgia for the past in Coupland, see Greenberg, 2013). Thus even three generations removed from World War 1, young American males experience an intergenerationally transmitted war trauma (by proxy, in the case of the X’ers) which render them insecure in their roles in society, family relations and expressions of their own sexuality.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, the present chapter has been an attempt at reading a wide variety of cultural texts, ranging from documentary films, via various types of personal and communal memorializations of war (mainly poems and songs), to generational fictions. These cultural texts have been discussed in an imagological perspective to determine the continuing presence of World War 1 in the iconosphere even a full century after the events of that war. It has been established that images of the War continue to be recharged with new significance for every new, passing generation – often aided in their presence by transmission by iconic contemporary figures whose own memorialization is on-going (as in the example with Leonard Cohen and *In Flanders Fields*). Further, the first half of the chapter demonstrated some of the global legacies of the British involvement in World War 1, with particular attention to the critical, or even postcolonial figurations of the Great War in twentieth century and contemporary popular culture in Canada, Ireland and Australia. The second half of the chapter was not as directly focused on the imagological afterlife of the War, but rather on the trauma chains World War 1 initiated in the form of a crisis of masculinity in American culture, or as imagology would have it, the auto-images of Americanness. It was shown how the transmission of such sexualized traumas as represented in Hemingway and Fitzgerald’s novels travelled obliquely to the post-World War 1 period in the writings of Beat Generation author Jack Kerouac, and could be traced in novels as late as 1991’s *Generation X* by Douglas Coupland.

World War 1 is thus still with us in both positive and negative images. The images of heroism that the immediate contemporaries of the War years longed to impose on the war effort and the societal order it created in its aftermath have not fared well over time, whereas the anti-imperialist images produced in the 1920s and onwards have grown in strength, not least by becoming intertwined imagologically with positive auto-images of independence in the Commonwealth countries, but also negative auto-images of faltering masculinity in strands of American culture.
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Endnotes

1 For full text, consult Bogle (2016).

2 Repetition, indicating a Sisyphean feeling of futility. See also Carruth (1995).

3 For a discussion of trauma transmission, consult Sørensen (2013a)
Chapter 8

The impact of World War 1 on French literature: Literary traces of the war experience – formal challenges in French literature

Steen Bille Jørgensen

Given the central role of France in World War 1, as well politically, strategically, and geographically, the War itself left multiple and profound traces at all levels of the nation. Not only were the landscapes around Verdun formed by the battles, but memorial monuments bear witness to traces of the war experience in French culture. In France, the commemoration of this event has played an important role in the official history, with the early decorations of war heroes and military parades marking the armistice every year on 11 November. As a historian, Pierre Nora has worked on cultural memory and created the notion of *lieux de mémoire* to emphasize the relation between history and ways of representing the past. According to this perspective, history is dependent on storytelling, and it is hardly surprising that an abundant literature on different aspects of *La Grande Guerre* (The Great War) has marked the literary history of the twentieth century. “La Grande guerre a nourri la littérature durant un siècle”¹. These words are Laurence Campa’s, which she develops further:

“comprise comme une rupture inaugurale. C’est pourquoi elle s’inscrit dans la mémoire contemporaine, ainsi que dans les récits de transmission et de filiation, qui forment un courant majeur du roman contemporain (pensons aux Champs d’honneur de Jean Rouaud)”².
However, the question remains: how we should distinguish and understand the specific ways in which writers deal with the war experience, and more generally the theme of World War 1? One first observation could be that narratives allow human beings to create order vis-à-vis reality and the lived experience. From this perspective, the French attach a quite particular attention to the force of literature. This is probably the reason why P. Nora, following a philosopher like Paul Ricœur who examines and compares historical and literary discourses, emphasizes the importance of – more or less ritual – revitalizing of national collective memory. Still, when it comes to the variety of literary expressions, we must take into account a more critical attitude towards “official national commemoration”. In many ways, the literary – “written” – and individually based relationships to the past can be seen as the contribution of French culture to a larger cultural history with its nuanced approach to the relationship between collective memory and individual experience as such.

If it is fair to say that the beginning and the end of the War can be fixed to the period 1914-1918, it is more complicated to delimit both the individual and the collective memory. Publishing his inventory of testimonies or témoignages, Norton Cru equally established that a chronology 1915-1928 of firsthand – or immediate – renderings of the war experience could not move beyond the end of the twenties, one of his own criteria being the veracity of the soldiers’ writings, their quality as memoirs. However, in French literary history, the traces of the collective national experience can be detected in fictional – or increasingly, mediated – writings, less patriotic than the early ones and more critical in storytelling, competing even with the official nationalistic versions. Beyond official celebration of heroism, Antoine Compagnon points out this aspect of writing on the war:

“Toute écriture de la guerre, y compris la composition d’une anthologie, passe par une descente aux enfers, impose une épreuve expiatoire, entraîne la rencontre de nos fantômes, et l’on ne revient pas indemne d’une telle expiation” (Compagnon, Préface, p. 7)

In his recent anthology *La Grande Guerre des écrivains* (2014), in his attempt to sketch the history of literature on World War 1, Compagnon distinguishes three phases of literary writing. Taking our point of departure in the early writings and its canonized writers like Apollinaire, Barbusse and, later Céline (but also Aragon), the more intricate part becomes the increasingly formalist novels in contemporary literature and how to deal with the distance in time and poetics based on documents, rewriting, and intertex-
tuality. Writers of our time do not have firsthand experience, but have gathered knowledge and information in many different ways. As we shall see through a series of works published from the late eighties and onwards, it is crucial to take into account the combination of stylization and critical intention. The emotions that are very often the point of departure for the writing are, evidently, related to losses and suffering very much present at the level of the family. Still, it remains open how the writer goes about persuading the reader to cease the more collective ideological aspects of the personal experience. Paradoxically, this becomes a question of aesthetics and literary form, and this kind of “oblique approach” does have a privileged status in the French context.

Writing the war

It is quite intriguing to think that one of the first writers to publish on World War I was the poet Guillaume Apollinaire. Much along the lines of futurist euphoria related to progress, technology, and even warfare, his poem *La Petite auto / The Little Car* – expressing uncertainty – is also a poem about new horizons. The “narrator” of this trip in an automobile is thoroughly dated (although it probably took place a month earlier): “Le 31 du mois d’Août 1914” is the first line of the poem, where we hear about a trip from Deauville to Paris, much like the one Apollinaire actually made when he heard that the War had been declared, and he decided to join the army: “Nous dîmes adieu à toute une époque” (Apollinaire 1965: 207).

Even before his actual participation in warfare, Apollinaire is aware of its enormous consequences that contrast with the word “small” we find in the title, and the subject seems ready to let destiny rule. Heroically, he imagines the “hauteurs inimaginables”, where the human fights against another human. Formally, the poem corresponds to the ideal of *Esprit Nouveau*, the words and stances forming the graphic image of a car floating between two uncertain lines or borders. This image, marking a pause in the text, might suggest a future that is blocked and the idea of an exploded tire could simultaneously suggest the positive renewal and the uncertain future.

Later, in his *Poèmes à Lou* from 1915, Apollinaire writes love letters to Louise. These poems express the intensity of both the war and his feelings: “Ô mon ciel, ô mon beau ciel gemmé de cannonades / Le ciel faisait la roue comme un phénix qui flambe / Paon lunaire rouant Ainsi-soit-il” (Apollinaire 1965: 433). The image of the lightning from grenades is very powerful. The war experience and the love story seem to coincide, and the
writing transgresses the distance between the situations of the trenches and the loved one nourishing his imagination at a time when he had not yet been at the front line and felt the imminent threat to his life. If Apollinaire’s aesthetic and existential ideal is one of intensity, his view of the War would change once he moved to the front line of battle and discovered the atrocities of the War. The impact or legacy of his work would indeed represent a more positive battle for humanist values.

Like Apollinaire predicted, the War would change the world, and in France the literary norms would also be profoundly affected. Very radical artistic positions, like Proust’s and Duchamp’s, would make 1913 a magical year and point to the absurdities of Dada and the surrealist avant-gardism. However, between 1915 and 1918, four novels on World War I received the prestigious Goncourt-prize. The second of these titles was Henry Barbusse’s *Le Feu – Journal d’une escouade*,¹⁴ which became a kind of model for writing on the War.¹⁵ Writing on the War and using the term *Journal* as a sub-title, readers would expect to find a relatively authentic narrative of the war experience.

In general, the genre of the *témoignage*, or “testimony”, played an important role and allowed the ordinary soldier a space for reflection and communication of the horrors, but also the trust among fellow beings which is expressed by the term *escouade*, which means “squad”. In *Le Feu*, Barbusse not only uses surnames for all of his fellow soldiers, he also renders the language used in the trenches and creates a kind of model for the writing of the War. In this way, he gives an impression of authenticity regarding the relation between the narrator and his fellow beings. Nevertheless, in his commentaries on *Le Feu*, Jean Norton Cru questions its veracity, questioning the descriptions of the trenches after combat, and criticizing the composition of narrative as opposed to the rendering of “lived experience”. Critics have written much about the book as a sort of “fictionalized journal”. In fact, it is hard to say when you met the true story of the War, and even the ones who experienced the trenches need to construct the narrative.¹⁶ It becomes crucial to understand the importance of genre conventions and narrative strategies as ways of rendering the traumatic experience, both at an individual and a collective level.

The war experience varied according to the point of view and the actual position of the writer. This becomes clear to reader of *La Grande guerre des écrivains*, an anthology published in 2014 by Antoine Compagnon. Of course we find letters from the trenches written, for example, by Norton.
Cru and Céline, but we also find female authors like Colette and Yourcenar who did not, of course, participate in the battles. The impact on the ones left behind by the men was immediate, as we can see in Colette’s *La Fin de Chéri* (1926). Yourcenar’s journal writing, published in *Le Labyrinthe du monde* (1988), reflects on the front domestique (Compagnon 2014: 625).

Yet another writer who wrote about the War, without having participated in warfare, was Romain Rolland. From his retreat or exile in Switzerland, he would – as an intellectual – try to persuade his contemporaries of the absurdities of war by way of rhetorical means, when he published his *Au-dessus de la mêlée* in 1915\(^{17}\), based on 16 articles published in the *Journal de Genève* from 2 September 1914 to 2 August 1915. As a writer constantly aiming at a universal perspective and with a remarkable sense of the other (Lüsebrink 2016:149), he would receive the Nobel Prize for Literature. Although the prize is a recognition of his work in general, he received it right after having published this pamphlet in favor of peace. However, this kind of pacifist pamphlet against hatred and violence above national interests was not appreciated by the French.

**The novel, above all**

Considering the more clearly fictional narratives based on the war experience, Compagnon talks about a certain distance necessary for the writer who would rethink the war experience (Compagnon 2014: 22). In the first half of the thirties, we find novels by Montherlant and Drieux La Rochelle, but the most widely read, translated – and controversial – would be Céline’s *Voyage au bout de la nuit*. As a novel on the ancient combatant, it would be followed in 1944 by Louis Aragon’s *Aurélien*, which resumed the communist writer’s cycle *Le Monde reel*. Both of these novels are considered to be stylistic masterpieces, and both narratives develop a plot line based on the young man returning from war and trying to find his position in life, in spite of the writers’ different ideological positions. Still, let’s first take a closer look at *Voyage au bout de la nuit*, and then compare it to *Aurélien*.

It is interesting to consider that Céline himself did not believe that he could write as well about the War as Barbusse did in *Le Feu*. However, this novel remains a classic often quoted by other writers, even beyond World War 1 and Céline’s anti-Semitic pamphlets written between 1937 and 1941. In a sort of *Prologue*, the plot of the War is launched with the following sentence: “*Ca a débuté comme ça*”\(^{18}\). The reader meets the narrator without knowing
his name, and at the end of the chapter we read, “On était faits comme des rats”19. In the following approximately forty pages, fear of death, humiliation, and the imagined – but never actually present – enemy is presented, but at the same time mediated in a sarcastic-ironic tone. The claustrophobic experience of obedience and, more or less abstract, threats makes the reader understand that every human can be a coward and that Bardamu’s volunteering was based on a naïve idea of the War.

Regarding the structure of the novel, the protagonist’s experience of the War is presented in the first fifty pages of this linear, chronological narrative. However, the apparently authentic representation of the War is clearly literary. This artistic intention is even more thoroughly signaled in three preceding small texts: “Voyager, c’est bien utile ça fait travailler l’esprit”20, and on the following page: “Ah on remet le voyage en route”21. The reader is already immersed in the narrative development related to the allegorical title before he meets the protagonist who will carry the plot and take him both to Africa and the US, before we return to the poor banlieues in Paris and ends with Bardamu’s reflections on Robinson’s death.

In 1936, Céline would publish Mort à credit and create a kind of general narrative frame for the story on the Parisian Doctor Bardamu. However, both the tone and the structure are radically different from his first novel. In the opening, we meet the disillusioned Bardamu working as doctor after World War 1, as was the case in Voyage. However, in an extensive flashback, the narrative develops a kind of negative Bildungsroman that ends with the young protagonist who decides to volunteer and go to war. None of his family life, sentimental relations, or professional life promise any kind of future. At some point, he finds a position with the inventor and impostor Courtial, whom he respects and follows until this relatively positive role model commits suicide. Not even his uncle – the most positive figure – taking care of him at the end of the novel is able to persuade him not to go to war. The protagonist’s perception of the world determines the cynical view of humanity and its grotesque features. Humans appear to be controlled by their most simple needs, and only the phantasmagoric figure of the inventor or pseudo-scientist might have been some kind of a role model. However, the medical framing and the representation should be read as a diagnosis of the disease-struck humankind. The only aspect of Céline’s writing that inspires some kind of hope is the rage or the energy on the level of style. Somehow, we have to make friends with the dark sides of existence to be able to read his books and perhaps even find dreams and hope again, once we are through with reading.
If we now turn to Louis Aragon’s *Aurélien*, the whole setting is quite different. Aurélien Leurtillois has returned from war, and lives on his heritage in Paris. Nothing really pushes him to work or otherwise define a project in life, unlike his friend Barbentane, who has a brilliant career. The portrait of Barbentane in Chapter 3 presents a smart – if not opportunistic – character who profits both during the War and after. The two of them became friends when Aurélien decides to contact his comrade from the War. However, in the first lines of Chapter 4 we get a closer look at Aurélien himself:

“Le fait est qu’Aurélien aimait peu qu’on lui parlât de la guerre et qu’il craignait la façon de ceux qui l’avaient faite comme la curiosité malsaine des autres. Il n’aurait pas su expliquer la conséquence logique de ces choses, mais la politique d’après-guerre l’ennuyait à peu près de la même façon. Il n’avait pas répondu aux invites des sociétés d’anciens de ses régiments. Sollicité par plusieurs associations, il n’était entré dans aucune” (1944: 35).

Aurélien reflects on his own “irresolution”, and thinks he is the only one to suffer from this consequence of the war. The omniscient narrator, however, lets the reader know that a lot of men felt the same way. We also hear that his inactivity is a lot like his experience from the trenches in wartime: “cette attente sans objet, cette absence de perspective” (1944: 73). In the following passage, three consecutive sentences begin with the word “L’étrange”, and the narrator lets us understand that the reality of the War fades in his memory like dreams of the past. On this background of the war experience, the potential romance between Aurélien and Bérénice – who is already married – seems to be the only perspective. Still, as suggested by the mere surname Bérénice (which we also find in Apollinaire’s poetry) reminding us of Racine’s tragedy, the mortal ending comes where Bérénice is found dead comes as no surprise at the end of the book.

Both in Céline’s and Aragon’s novels, World War 1 and the war experience as such become an essential part of literary character. Both male protagonists have a hard time adapting to society. Structurally, both plots evoke the War in the opening and are marked by death in the ending. Céline’s protagonist is incapable of moving beyond the war experience, and the ending implies a fatal and cynical view of life. In *Aurélien*, the melancholy stems from the protagonist’s irresolution and the claustrophobic war experience prolonged in the Parisian bourgeois lifestyle. Insisting on the complicated alienated lifestyle of their protagonists, these two writers do not make the war experience the central theme of the novel. However, the impact of
the War on writing the relationship between the individual and society has changed, with a fatal-tragic dimension which finds very different stylistic expressions in the writing of two ideologically opposed writers. World War 1 appears as a radical rupture and opposes the identity of the ancient combatant to society, as such in an almost ontological way.\textsuperscript{25}

If a certain void in the writing on World War 1 can be detected in the period of 1945-1980\textsuperscript{26}, one wonders if this is due to World War 2, and the proximity of traumatic experiences taken a step further with Nazism and the Holocaust. This is probably also the reason why Claude Simon’s \textit{L’Acacia} – published in 1989 – is at the same time a novel on World War 1 and World War 2 with its alternating plotlines. In spite of the aesthetics of fragmentation, which predominates Simon’s complex novels, he constantly insists on the reality of the war experience and how things really were. In other words, making a formal literary attempt to establish an equivalent between the two wars, Claude Simon, who was born in 1913, is trying to be the contemporary of earlier generations, in the same way that he wants his own contemporaries – and later readers – to become the contemporaries of his experience. In this way, the real persists thanks to indirect or oblique literary expression founded in the author’s specific experience.\textsuperscript{27}

**Narrative models, remediation, and serial effects**

But how do things work when we look at literature written by authors who did not themselves experience the trenches or warfare altogether? In many ways, the literary strategies and topoi change. Memory is no longer an individual question of literary expression. On the contrary, the individual writer must necessarily rely on historical documents, whether they be official historiography, letters of documents (like photographs) found in the attic, or literary sources. Making an impact becomes a question of the way to valorize a specific memory, more or less in opposition with the official national memory.

Thus, in contemporary writing, one tendency which is specifically French or Francophone, is related to the status formula literature, like crime fiction and graphic novels (or comic books) and their quest for truth and justice with its emotional effects.\textsuperscript{28} Regarding the impact of the War and the question of literary form, the codes and conventions of these genres both work with its stereotypes (narration and characters). This also implies a unique kind of attention to the everyday life that it depicts and celebrates. This is
probably one of the reasons why the traces of the war experience touch the reader of these forms all the more efficiently, making us understand that ancient combatants do, in fact, carry the traces of the War, and that these traces are very often neglected during the official (national) commemorations. Thus, crime fiction is, with its critical potential, a special kind of “littérature populaire” – in the strongest and noblest sense of the expression “the people’s literature” – dealing with social injustice and provoking humanist indignation.

One of the first authors of crime fiction to take his work in this direction is Jean Amila / Jean Meckert. His novel *Le Boucher des Hurlus* (1982), which left traces in literary history, was rewritten by Didier Daeninckx whose book *Le Der des ders* would even be adapted to the medium of the comic by Jacques Tardi. From this perspective, the writing and rewriting of history becomes a question of criticizing official narratives and storytelling, and reminding us of “alternative stories” rooted in the experience of ordinary people and everyday life. Let us take a closer look at *Le Boucher des Hurlus* (1982) and the way in which the writer uses formula literature to create a literary effect and a symbolic impact on World War 1 literature.

In this book, we are not exactly confronted with the destiny of the “the small soldiers” (as one critic calls the ones who fought in the trenches), but with the son of an ancient combatant who has been executed for his attempt at desertion. In this way, the impact of the War is related to the theme of generations, memory, and the mind, represented in the narrative perspective of the boy imagining more or less the destiny of his father. This destiny is also very much related to his mother’s situation. In the opening of the book, she is constantly harassed by the neighbors because of her husband’s supposed lack of commitment and loyalty – he is suspected to be a mutineer – which illustrates the division between the men’s experience in the warzone and the women’s at home.

The taste for revenge becomes the driving force of the narrative, and the narrator finds accomplices in the orphanage that he is sent to after his mother’s committal to a psychiatric institution. The boy Michou, who is eight years old, convinces his orphan comrades that they have to kill the General des Gringues, the “Boucher des Hurlus” – in their mind responsible for their fathers’ deaths – very much contrast with the adventurous spirit of some of the boys hoping to go abroad, to Canada for instance. The boys’ very simple, but still strong and coherent, reasoning contrasts very much with the chaos and absurdity of the adult world. What could be seen
as an absurd, infantile plan turns out to be a movingly absurd story, with its quality of anti-romantic *Bildungsreise*. One very material example of this is the pistol that the boys find and eventually use – more or less by accident – in taking another person’s life. They find a kind of relief in taking action, and some of them still want to hit the original target, but – absurdly – it turns out that the ancient officer that they are searching for has, in the meantime, died from natural causes. They even learn from the front page of a newspaper that he is going to have an official national funeral. The very impossibility of the boys’ project is symbolic of the injustice and the tone of the whole story equally related to despair and potential madness, when it is actually society that seems to have lost its senses.

Paradoxically, in adopting the children’s perspective, the critical and ethical aspects of the book become all the more persuasive. The heroic way of taking action is based on emotion, intuition, and guts more than actual documentation. The fictional universe makes the reader feel the indignation and perhaps, more intellectually, adopt the critical and ethical point of view. This is probably also what inspires *Le Der des ders* (1984) by Didier Daeninckx, whose approach to World War 1, according to the “rules of the detective genre”, seems a lot more based on research and documents. One is even tempted to read the pun of the title as a signal of the fictional manipulations of historical facts: the Great War that has been referred to as “*la dernière des dernières*” in the French context. Still, the use of the grammatical *singularis* refers to the private investigator René Griffon, whose death perhaps also signifies the disappearance of idealism as such.

At least Daeninckx’ *Le Der des ders* does not inspire much more hope than Amila’s novel. The powerful ones, who are guilty, avoid punishment, and instead more socially fragile figures are the ones who end as the victims of history. This may be the reason why the traditional figure of the private investigator becomes the couple of a woman and a man. At least the narrative develops two parallel stories of couples: the investigation being based on a story of adultery, the retired colonel by involving the investigator that he wants to document the whereabouts of his wife, who actually hangs out with pilots of the War. Nevertheless, neither jealousy nor money is the colonel’s concern. It turns out that he wants to frame the detective in a plot on documents from the War – a soldier’s “témoignage” – testifying to the colonel’s role in the War. Just as was the case in Amila’s novel, the final page of the book reveals a newspaper announcement of the inauguration of a new memorial monument. Quite significantly, the plot leads this main character to go undercover in the anarchist movement of the postwar period.
In this way, he discovers the existence of the “soldier’s journal” revealing the colonel’s guilt in a murderous act during the War. In Chapter 15, out of the book’s 16 chapters, the text of this document is reproduced, and thus the reader’s emotions become central when he reads the actual words of the soldier. The feel of authenticity is essential to this kind of representation related to the ethical flaw of the officers ready to do anything to defend themselves, not at all engaging in combat to defend the nation. At the fictional level, the document remains unpublished and the truth unknown to the public. The intervention of the private investigator paradoxically prevented the anarchists from revealing the content of the central document and injustice prevails. It is far from surprising that Jacques Tardi, as an author of comics and graphic novels, finds inspiration for his work in Daeninckx’s novel.

Jacques Tardi’s work on World War 1 has found its most clearly documented form in the monumental It Was the War of the trenches, his masterpiece (of three volumes) which was translated into English in 2010. Here, the traumatic nature of the War is traced in minute detail, and the reading experience is quite overwhelming. If the pictures are likely to haunt the reader, this is probably because Tardi himself has been haunted by these. Tardi keeps depicting World War 1, and his friends have asked him if he ever gets out of his trenches. Still, this obsession with the topic does not mean that he just repeats himself, and this is probably one of the reasons why texts like Daeninckx’s become valuable sources of inspiration. The similarities between the two lie in their critical attitude and a strong sense of integrity, and both of them are motivated by a personal history and their grandfather’s war experience.

Tardi’s black and white comic version of Le Der des ders makes one feel an almost the melancholic atmosphere with its “baudelairian humidity”. The cold and the darkness of Daeninckx’s novel becomes quite tangible. However, one also finds a particular pleasure in the plot making, the economy of the pictures and the text being very well balanced. In this album, the careful Tardi-reader can also find one tiny image from the trenches, a nightmare scene provoking the awakening of the hero (1999: 46). This kind of intertextual strategy refers to Soldat Varlot which is an adaptation, an early version of “Le Monument” (1998), a Daeninckx text directly related to the trenches and the horrors and the absurdity of war as such. In Soldat Varlot, this story is developed into a horrible plot line depicting the pure chaos and absurdity of the War. Tardi succeeds in creating his own unique universe. Living soldiers look more and more like the skulls and skeletons of the dead, very much in contrast to the fleshy girls sleeping with the en-
emy (as prostitutes), when Varlot is handing over a letter from his fallen comrade to his fiancée in the local village. The last image of this album, simply repeating the first, underlines the claustrophobic atmosphere of an absurd, inhuman universe.

These three authors all depict the violence and injustice after the War, as well as during the life in the trenches and the attacks with grenades and, what is more, their motivation for writing on the War is very similar. Just like the case of many French people, their relatives of earlier generations had been in war and had tried to escape from its horrors. But what also becomes evident is the importance of a textual and intertextual logic. Contemporary writers must necessarily look for (literary and historical) sources, and Daeninckx’s short story integrates the narrative form of the “journal” to bring the reader closer to the actual experience of the “poilu”, leaving traces of his own readings of the texts from the immediate postwar period at the same time. The fragmentation of the comic, presenting one image after the other, makes the reader feel all the more strongly that time seems to have stopped. This kind of suspension, through the representation of “text”, implies that no goal can be attained and no development is possible.

If one can detect a serial logic in the intertextual repetition of conflicts between the system and the individual, this is one of the major impacts of French “writing of the War”. All three authors point to the gap between the national mythology and the traces in the individuals’ minds. On the one hand, France as a nation celebrates the armistice and raises memorial monuments in honor of the fallen (the unknown poilu at the Arc de Triomphe). On the other hand, the image of the trenches, the mutilated that have returned from the War, and the taste of revenge or acknowledgement is quite a different story. In France, the commitment of the intellectual plays an important role. As a critic, one cannot help thinking that this is a very typically French phenomenon and a symptomatic expression of the literary awareness in its relation to history and ethical questions, such as injustice and disguising the truth on humiliation, suffering, and execution of the simple poilu on the orders of military superiors that appear to be cowards themselves. The real crimes are the ones perpetrated by the powerful representatives of the nation such as policemen and officers, and with Daeninckx’s crime fiction, “plot making” becomes a basic literary component for the archeological investigation of the present and the past.

Minuit writers against the *littérature impassible*?

If we move from formula literature to the very sophisticated “Minuit-literature”, a quite different formal tendency can be found. After the beginning of Minuit with the New Novel, critics presented the novels of this publishing house using the term *littérature impassible*, which means a literature more or less untouched by reality. In many ways, its very aesthetic criteria can be seen as the opposite of crime fiction (and its genre conventions) with its strong focus on stylistic aspects of the novel. Claude Simon, who was published by Minuit, was very much in opposition to his fellow writers who deliberately neglected socio-historical aspects of literature.

Significantly, Jean Rouaud wrote an article on Claude Simon, creating a kind of prototypical author of this tendency with his very personal style as a basis for apprehending collective matters and traumas defending a new form of realism. In most of his own novels, Rouaud proves to be a writer very much aware of the possibility of the importance of literature in the apprehension of past experiences, i.e. creating the necessary conditions for our individual experience. Significant is Jean Rouaud’s *Les Champs d’honneur*, the first volume of a trilogy on three generations depicting the grandfather as the figure carrying a war experience which remains untold.

*Les Champs d’honneur* remains a masterpiece regarding the novel’s capacity to give form to the individual’s experience. The family intimacy that we find in the opening of the book, with its portrait of the grandfather as a smoker and chauffeur of a 2CV, is a good example of this intertwining of everyday life in the present bearing witness to the experience of older generations in the past. The grandson being the narrator, he observes micro-events, which appear as essential elements of the human experience. Going for a trip with granddad was a whole adventure, partly because of the man’s smoking habits and his way of lighting one cigarette after the other when he should be keeping his eyes on the road. On the one hand, the children felt secure because of the comforting family atmosphere; on the other, they were joking about the life-threatening trip with their grandfather.

The climatic circumstances are an important part of the narrative’s opening. It is the most banal part of the atmosphere, in the Normandy region when you have to stop and wait for the rain to stop in a café, for instance. Still, it also becomes a quite strong symbolic sign of the essential moments of childhood and life, when the children experience the rain coming through the roof of the car. The words of the text on pretty banal situations still
take on a quite particular importance in relation to the silent, almost mute, grandfather whose pun “nez coulé” – meaning literally ‘running nose’ – in the primitive car gains intensity and attracts the reader’s attention to the detail of the text, with its existential texture parallel to the experience of climatically defined situations. It seems as if the weather and atmospheres of everyday life are there to prepare the effect of the inhuman and exceptional situations during World War 1.

In this book though, one of the interesting questions is related to the structure and the war scenes with their horrors at the end of the narrative. As readers, we rediscover the trenches and the soldiers’ feelings at being captured. The gas attack of the enemy I described is just another form of climatic change; the clouds carried by the wind have a funny color and the soldiers react to the unusual sight by firing their arms somewhat desperately, only to discover the deadly effect of the gas that attacks their organs, a consequence of inhalation. The foreign atmosphere by the end of the narrative contrasts with the opening scene and its very intimate atmosphere. The young boys have no idea what their grandfather had experienced as a young man, and to what extent he had experienced insecurity and grief.

Explaining why he chose to write this story, Rouaud points out that one piece of material and symbolic trace of the war experience related to the religious history of France played a decisive role. One day, Rouaud discovered the religious imagery related to the War and, at the same time, discovered a collective memory related to the Christian French fighting against the barbarians. The War was considered by many from this perspective, and the emotion of the young writer inspired his work on the novel that was meant to rehabilitate other young men of his grandfather’s generation having gone into war without the slightest idea of what warfare implied on a material or symbolic level.

With Jean Echenoz’ novel 14, also published by Minuit, we discover a quite different logic that has apparently very little to do with the writer’s personal life. In fact, Echenoz shocked the French literary establishment by the simple fact that he had chosen a historical topic for his book. Covering the years of the War from its mobilization to its end, the very undramatic opening takes the form of a portrait, Anthime going for a ride on his bike after lunch. Readers follow the experiences of everyday life in a very peaceful environment and, as a very positive critic of Le Monde who nevertheless ponders the meaning of the title as an announcement of the war points out, one wonders if it could indicate that this was the fourteenth book of the
writer. Academic critics have been more skeptical concerning the choice of the historical subject to which Echenoz, in their view, simply adapts his playful narrative strategies.\footnote{43}

One of the relevant questions to ask would be if one could see a kind of “formal intention” implying that contemporary readers should only see the characters as mere “creations of ink and paper” or – in a way – as ghosts. In this way, the important part would rather be the present time and the (a) historical premises of our existential situation. The rather distanced narration using the personal pronoun “nous” / “we” suggests a kind of common fate, still leaving us with an individual judgment, if not a solipsistic position. Only this reading would imply that the reader is in fact aware of the fiction’s intricate relation to reality, and that the claustrophobic feel of life (and almost certain death) in the trenches, leaves us as amputated beings.

Thus, the reader is well aware that the first peaceful images of Anthime’s life – and the vacation feeling often connected with the war experience – only lead into the trenches and confinement, both physically and mentally, but probably also in a more general existential way. Most European readers – perhaps the French more than any other population – will be aware of the high cost of the central European war, when the characters all too well fit into the collective idea of a swift and certain victory.

No euphoria of combat among other men; on the contrary, Arcenel loses his closest personal allies and finds himself isolated and disorientated. In this way, his execution for mutiny is the consequence of a mere strolling out of the camp following the road for just a little while, only to be discovered by the gendarmes who have no mercy. The sentence and the execution is simply “business as usual”. There is no escaping the confinement of the trenches, and the ones who survive are not able to find a normal life. These men appear as wounded and incapable of taking an active part in everyday life. The pain from lost limbs tells us about something that is no longer there, but still affects all of your life. Individual alliances and solidarity in such circumstances had nothing durable about them. Significantly, two former soldiers – one mutilated (after losing an arm) and the other blind – meet each other, but they only experience distance and difficulties in communication. They simply do not have anything in common. The \textit{mise en scène} of non-communication between ancient combatants appears as a symbolic use of the grotesque, concerning our own period just as much.

Similarly, the apparently promising closure related to the birth of a baby is the result of a quite ironic and comic act of lovemaking. In this perspec-
tive, one is tempted to see the title “14” as a kind of non-conclusive way of representing the War. Paradoxically, Echenoz’s style seems to imply that the impact of the War is a historical fact with its disillusion and amputation of mankind. We do necessarily live with the historical impact of war on our lives. Still, on the other hand, his version is very pessimistic and the choice of the topic may well be some kind of ultimately ironic comment on spectacular commemoration and probably also on the representation of historical reality. With 14, Echenoz is ultimately pointing to the limits of “historical realism” as such.

The story of the War... nothing more to tell?

One could say that, in the Echenoz version of the war, exhaustion haunts the individual, human civilization, and the novel genre as such. Still, though the last living combatants have disappeared, writers seem to continue telling the story of World War I.44 It seems that the War, as any other subject, can be re-told and find new force. One of the latest examples is Pierre Lemaître’s very popular Au Revoir là-haut / The Great Swindle, which is a very constructed narrative as documented in the closing text entitled “Et pour finir...”45 where he, in a very pragmatic way, indicates borrowings from historical and fictional representations of the War. In spite such “metafictional use of para-texts”, the plot dimension is essential. Like Echenoz’s novel, Lemaitre’s ends with the pregnancy of the female figure, and nevertheless, the situation is quite different. For Henri and Madeleine, being a married couple, this result could, in fact, seem very logical. Still, Henry sees different women and has never been accepted by his powerful father-in-law. His own business related to the handling of buried corpses is pure speculation on the account of victims of the War. The plot making is efficient and awakens the reader’s indignation (towards speculation and power as such), but another parallel story about two former soldiers selling non-existent memorial monuments just takes the grotesque to heights that paradoxically intensify the reader’s narrative desire.

The construction of this novel with its narrative strategies evidently aims at a very broad reception, with the aesthetic flaws this implies, superfluous commentaries and such.46 Still, the portrait of the ancient combatant couple Edouard and Albert is somewhat touching in its violent love-hate aspects, and one feels the existential meaning of this rewriting of Jean qui pleure, Jean qui rit47 (Barbusse, 1928). Edouard seemingly loses everything: his family, his face, his capacity of speaking, and still he laughs in his own an-
imal way. Albert, on the other hand, finds conflict in any decision making, and yet he succeeds in escaping with his loved one, carefully preserving the representation of a horse’s head as a symbolic trace of his war experience. In this way, the book works as a grotesque drama, and makes one ponder about how human beings can go on living together, even after an experience like the humiliating nonsensical warfare. On the one hand, we discover a strongly mutilated society, but still the writer suggests that fraud and evil exist everywhere at any time, and that humans will always tend to negotiate their own fate. There is even a place for pity and mercy, when the powerful father figure Monsieur Péricourt is confronted with his lost son appearing with a sort of burial mask looking like his real face (before the war), when his father, stunned and seemingly paralyzed, runs him over in his car. In this way, the war of the trenches and warfare is not only limited to the actual champs de bataille. Warfare seems to be part of the human condition.

Any (literary) perspectives?

In French literature on World War 1, it is necessary to distinguish between the early writings and the variety of genres implying different points of view and different tonalities. The letters and different kinds of testimonies of ancient combatants clearly are at the center of attention. However, journals and novelistic forms become a way – even for women – to express their experience of the War far from the battlefield. The cases of Céline and Aragon have shown that the impact of World War 1 changed the perception of reality on the individual level, but also on the collective level, just like Apollinaire felt it would very early on. Later, the individual’s difficulty in communicating the War experience would lead writers to use indirect fictional forms. This is also the reason why a whole series of novels, logically motivated by the hundred years that have passed and contributing to literature’s status as lieu de mémoire, have been published in recent time. One can wonder if World War 1 is going to persist as an object or a phenomenon bearing material for French writers. It seems that the early directly representational writings on the War are mainly going to be read by people doing different kinds of research, and that more recent, stylistic-formal approaches – either of a popular kind or of an artistic kind – are going to be the most culturally profound traces of the war experience. War will probably always be a literary topic. Still, in the French context, it may well, in the future, be difficult to find new and original approaches to La Grande Guerre, a theme that may well be exhausted.
Reference list


Endnotes


2 Understood as an inaugural rupture. This is why it is inscribed into contemporary memory, as well as in the stories of transmission and filiation which form a major tendency in the contemporary novel (such as Jean Rouaud’s *Fields of Glory*).


4 Like Schoentjes also suggests in his critical work on World War 1 in French literature.

5 As an attempt to avoid ideological commonplace interpretations of the war, we have had very precious publications like *La Grande Guerre des écrivains*, edited by Antoine Compagnon.

6 All writing on the war, even the editing of an anthology, implies a descent into hell and forces on you an expiatory test – making you meet your ghosts – and you are not unharmed by such an expiatory experience.

7 The first, an intense period running from the beginning of the war in 1914 until 1920; the second, a more tempered period, followed in the twenties. Finally, the third and most important phase was the thirties, with major works published by Giono, Drieu La Rochelle, and Céline, among others.

8 A question much discussed by Antoine Compagnon, among others, is the matter of realism. The war experience as such cannot, no more than any other experience, be fully rendered in literature.

9 A historical theme like the War implies particularly complex questions related to genre. Significantly, poems, letters (like Dorgelès’, *Lettres de guerre*), and journals are the result of the direct war experience.
Logically, fictional narration becomes the most adequate literary form for later generations.

10 “The 31st of August 1914”.

11 “We said farewell to a whole era”.

12 “unimaginable heights”.

13 “Oh my sky, my beautiful sky spotted with cannonades / The sky unfolded its tail like a burning phoenix/ Lunar peacock in his pride. Amen”.

14 Not least, thanks to Céline’s praise of this novel.

15 See Compagnon (2014) and Schoentjes (2009).

16 Were the bayonets really used for killing? This question, and others, has been raised.


18 Here is how it started. The passages (notes 19-22) are from Journey to the End of the Night, London: John Calder, 1988 (translator: Ralph Manheim).

19 “We were caught like rats”.

20 “Travel is very useful and it exercises the imagination”.

21 So, they’re putting Journey on the rails again.

22 “The fact is that Aurélien did not care for talk about the war; and he was just as much afraid of the chatter of those who had been through it as of the others’ unhealthy curiosity. He could not have accounted for it logically, but post-war politics got on his nerves in much the same way. Although he had been approached by several ex-service organizations, he had not joined any, nor even replied to their invitations.” (pp. 20-21)
23 “This waiting without purpose, this lack of perspective”.

24 “The strange thing”.

25 This radical effect of the War can remind us of Balzac’s novel Le Colonel Chabert from 1832 on the figure of the living dead. In the context of the Napoleonic wars, where everybody believes Chabert is dead, the protagonist is finally resigned when he finds out that no one really recognizes his existence and his beliefs or values.


27 Quite recently, the novel Des Hommes by Laurent Mauvignier has confronted the taboo of the Algerian War to reveal the collective trauma marking French society, much the same way as has been the case with World War 1.

28 Although a famous publishing house like Gallimard and a famous writer and editor like Raymond Queneau (who created the Série Noire and published Histoire des littératures) have considered these genres as actual literature, these are often seen as a more or less anarchist forms of writing. When it comes to the theme of World War 1, these forms are important, and writers are aware of the necessity of “collective rethinking” related to socio-historical and national-mythological issues they may find in each other’s works.

29 On the one hand, it implies violence and murder, but on the other, it also very often emphasizes more positive values such as solidarity when “official injustice” seems to be the social norm.

30 Daeninckx has very often been considered to do a historian’s work and critics talk about the “méthode Daeninckx” that was founded when he wrote Meurtres pour mémoire on the Papon affair, connecting the earlier Nazi-friendly Bordeaux-based official to the Préfet of Paris responsible for the slaughtering of Algerians at the Métro Charonne in 1961.

31 One can see the similarities with a historian’s approach in Daeninckx’s writing. Documents and the research of investigators and journalists play an important role. In the same way, he very recently (2013) pub-
lished a book on French postwar advertisements with their imagery related to the evil “Boches” and the heroic attitude of the French soldier.

32 Literally meaning “the last of the last ones”.

33 On a more personal level, Daeninckx explains very explicitly how his father’s legal battle against the army marked his childhood and made him aware of “the family tradition” of anti-militarism: “Table ronde à la villa Marguerite Yourcenar”. In Schoentjes (2008).

34 Thus, one is hardly surprised to find the Daeninckx fictions and universes in the black and white versions of Tardi, nor is one surprised to find the Daeninckx figure represented in Le Der des ders as a sympathetic journalist. See also Hein, Michael, (2001), “What haunts a soldier’s mind: Monsters, demons and the lost Trenches of Memory”. “Representations of Combat Trauma in the Works of Jacques Tardi”, in Jan Baetens (ed.), The Graphic Novel, Leuven: Leuven University Press

35 His grandmother told him about his grandfather’s experience during the war.

36 For further clarification, one can read Urs Hangartner’s article on the vocabulary related to this kind of media reflection.

37 Probably thanks to Sartre’s idea of “littérature engagée”, but also thanks to Queneau’s publishing – as an editor at Gallimard’s – Histoire des littératures – A History of literatures.

38 Griet Theetens underlines the social and political commitment of the neo-polar that can be considered as a didactic genre working against historical “errors” and forgetting, Voir “Une remontée dans les traces. La representation de la Première Guerre mondiale dans le roman policier français contemporain”, in Schoentjes (2008)

39 As a co-editor of the much discussed Littérature-Monde volume published in 2007, Jean Rouaud (who had left Minuit) participated in the critique of what can be considered a “Robbe-Grillet formalism”.

40 This is what Jean Rouaud himself reveals during a round table debate that the reader finds published in Schoentjes (2008).
41 The relatively puzzling title could also be seen as a playful way of indicating the number of books he has published, as suggested in *Le Monde*.

42 Like the academic critic – notably Schoentjes who sees, among other aspects (inscription of the centenaire), a direct reference to Victor Hugo’s *Quatre-vingt reize* – this is an important part of Echenoz’s intertextual games. Schoentjes, “*Un dernier compte à régler avec la Grande Guerre*”, in *Critique* no. 786, 2012/11

43 Thus, Wolfgang Asholt follows Schoentjes in suggesting that Echenoz *voudrait en finir avec l’histoire* “régler ses comptes avec l’histoire”.

44 Hedi Kaddour is one of these, and with his big novel *Waltenberg*, he more or less covers the history of the twentieth century.

45 Meaning literally “And to finish”.

46 The form of narration tends to guide the reader excessively in his understanding of the stereotypical characters and human relations.

47 “Jean who cries, Jean who laughs”.

48 His ‘platonic love story’ with the ‘beast’ Edouard taking an end when he leaves with the female ‘beauty’.
Chapter 9

The impact of World War 1 on Danish literature: War in the trenches and media

Anker Gemzøe

World War 1 and Denmark

During and after World War 1 Denmark – because of its marked neutrality – was often identified with the poet Jeppe Aakjær’s characteristic in *The Song of History*, written to a historical congregation in 1917:

“You infant-land that secretly cuddles together,
While the whole world is burning around your cradle”

An experience of being reduced to the role of spectator and standing outside of decisive historical events was, in fact, quite common among Danes during the war years. But, nevertheless, World War 1 was, also for Denmark, a time of dramatic change and – for the majority – hardly a good time.

The sequence of the following chapter is roughly chronological. After a brief historical survey, I focus on the Danish debate during the War and then go into some early war movies and novels. I follow the important effects on various kinds of modernism and the avant-garde by the end of the War. Last but not least, I go into the profound and long-lasting traces of the War to be found in retrospective novels and autobiographical works. One main thesis is that, in addition to the direct experience of the War shared by a considerable number of young Danish men, the rapid and fundamental changes in the media, created or at least accelerated through the
War, are especially important and visible as effects of the War on Danish literature.

In 1864, in the Second Schleswig War, Denmark had lost the duchies of Lauenburg, Holstein, and Schleswig to Germany (an alliance of Prussia and Austria that was dissolved by the Prussian War against Austria in 1866). North Schleswig (the south of Jutland) – where Danish was the main language and the majority of people identified themselves as Danish – remained under German rule until 1920. Almost 30,000 young Danish men from North Schleswig were forced into the German army during the War, and more than 5,000 were killed. An equal number, 30,000, Danish-Americans are estimated to have fought in the American army during the War. Other Danes, also motivated by the historical opposition between Denmark and Germany, enlisted individually and fought on the Allied side.

The majority of the Danish population was, in spite of widespread, traditional anti-German sentiments, inclined to neutrality because of the experience of useless sacrifices in the traumatic defeat of 1864 to the rising German superpower. The country was, moreover, led by an anti-militaristic Social-Liberal government that would go far to ensure Danish neutrality and thus, at the start of the War, acquiesced to German demands to lay out mines in the Great Belt.

After the War, the reunion of North Schleswig and Denmark – through one of the first and still one of the finest examples of border delimitation through a process of democratic vote – triggered a bitter political polarization between nationalists and moderate tendencies, represented by the Social-Liberal government and its support in the rapidly growing Social-Democratic party.

In many other ways, life and politics in Denmark were heavily influenced by the War. During the summer of 1914, a considerable security force of conscripts was convened, and a high degree of military mobilization was maintained through all the war years. One main effect of the War, was a sharp increase in social polarization. Many suffered from unemployment, malnutrition, and a shortage of housing. The poor supply situation was aggravated after the German declaration of the Unlimited U-boat War in 1917, which moreover caused a considerable loss of Danish sailors and ships. While a majority suffered from the War, others, mainly those inside agriculture and food production, profited from it, selling food supplies (often less
decent quality tinned food, etc.) to the Germans as well as to the Allies. This so-called Goulash Capitalism had an energizing effect on the wartime cultural situation, as some of the profits were directed into the cultural sphere.

The problems of the War led, however, to new socio-political measures from the Social-Liberal government – supported by the Social Democrats – which in many respects anticipated the future Danish welfare state. These measures were decided not least by Ove Rode, the powerful interior minister. Likewise, the wartime situation probably helped to pave the way for a political compromise leading to a most important renewal of the Danish democratic constitution, which dated back to 1849. In the constitution of 1915, women’s suffrage was introduced. At the same time, Iceland was recognized as a sovereign state. A further phasing out of Danish colonialism, likewise accelerated by the War, was the sale of the Danish West-Indian Isles to the US in 1916.

The tumultuous wake of the War had many and complex effects on the situation in Denmark. On the positive list, the before-mentioned reunion of North Schleswig with Denmark in 1920 may be counted, as can the introduction of the eight-hour-workday in 1919 – a considerable victory for the labor movement, and the implementation of a number of important laws in the beginning of the 1920s – radically improving gender equality. On the negative balance counts the death toll from the Spanish Flu, a further growing social and political polarization, and an unstable economy. As the European map was redrawn, Goulash Capitalism ended its fragile and unwholesome life in a serious financial crisis in 1922.

**The Danish Debate on the War**

From its outbreak in August 1914, the War was much debated in Denmark. All parties, regardless of their position in the debate, sensed it was a decisive historical and cultural threshold. But because of the country’s neutrality, very different attitudes could manifest themselves. Johannes Jørgensen – known as the author of the biographies of saints – and Martin Nyrop – the famous architect of the town hall in Copenhagen – defended the cause of the Entente Powers in internationally successful books. Karl Larsen, a satirical prose writer, was outspokenly pro-German. In a number of articles during and after the War, he claimed that accusing Germany of militarism and aggressive imperialism was “one of the many proofs of the breakdown of all historical memory and common sense during the first canon shots in 1914” (Larsen
2016: 69%). He pointed instead at a carefully planned French revanchism as the main cause of the War: “The thorough preparation and the clear French plans for the desired war are most obviously seen by Lieutenant Colonel A. Grouard’s France and Germany. The War to Come (La guerre eventuelle) that was published in 1913” (ibid.).<sup>4</sup> Johannes Vilhelm Jensen, later a Nobel Prize winner, admitted to some sympathy with the German cause in an article in 1914<sup>5</sup>, but added, “The present article is not meant to ‘support’ any of the parties, a terrible thought during peacetime and ridiculous during a war, where blood and iron settle the equilibrium of power between nations”<sup>6</sup>

The most important Danish debater of the War was the internationally well-known critic Georg Brandes, whose comments on the War did in fact arouse much international attention.<sup>7</sup> He had foreseen a World War as early as in 1881, and he commented on the War from its outbreak and on to the consequences of the Versailles Treaty in a number of articles, some of them very long and thorough. Moreover, they were compiled and published in the books Verdenskrigen (The World War, 1916/17) and Tragediens anden Del, Fredsslutningen (The Second Part of the Tragedy, The Peace Settlement, 1919).

In Verdenskrigens Forudsætninger (The Preconditions for the World War), first published in August 1914 he notes:

At this moment, five European superpowers release the desire for murder and rage of annihilation, primitive desires equipped with the most refined means of destruction, upon Europe, each of them claiming the love of peace, by which it has been animated, and each of them pleading the justice of the cause for which it is forced to fight. (Brandes 1987: 51).

Brandes did not take sides with any of the warring parties, but turned critically against them all. The article ends with this prophecy: “We are going to experience horrors and upheavals without measure and number that will result in a recoloring of the map of Europe and a complete revamping of the world map.” (Ibid: 67).

In 1915, public correspondence between Georg Brandes and Georges Clemenceau, the leading French politician followed.<sup>8</sup> They had become friends during a stay in Karlsbad. In 1904, Clemenceau printed an appeal by Brandes against the severe Russian repression in Finland, accompanied by a conclusion that presented Brandes as
“one of the most imminent men in Europe. By his profound and universal culture, by his completely disinterested thought, by his constant pursuit of the highest ideal of humanity, Georg Brandes is even more than the first citizen of his country. He is a ‘European’ in the greatest and noblest sense of the word.” (Brandes 1952: 101).

Now, in 1915, Clemenceau harshly criticizes Brandes as a representative of a neutral Denmark that did not have the courage to join the War against Germany and fight for its lost duchies in an article, L’Ennemi du Genre humain (Enemy of the Human Race). In his Aabent Brev til Georges Clemenceau (Open Letter to Georges Clemenceau (February 28, 1915), Brandes protests against the vehement, hardly well-founded attack on himself and Clemenceau's characterization of the Danes as cowards, saying, “Your words about the Danes that they are a Nation without Pride” (Ibid: 68). He also clarifies that Denmark has no interest in regaining its lost duchies with a German-speaking majority through a humiliating peace for Germany, but only for the right to self-determination for the Danish-minded population of North Schleswig. In a subsequent Svar til Georges Clemenceau (Answer to Georges Clemenceau, March 1915) he stresses that truth is the first victim of war: “One of the appalling things of a war like this is that it kills the love of truth. … I for my part consider the snorting national hatred that now divides Europe as an immeasurable disaster and as symptom of an immense decline” (1915: 74). On the vocation of the writer, he writes: “He ought to be silent, where silence is gold. And when he speaks, he ought to stick to the simple truth that is outshouted by the nonsense at peace, by the thunder of the guns at war.” (Ibid: 77). Clemenceau concludes the argument with the public statement, “Adieu, Brandès”, unmistakably marking the end of a friendship. “I admit that it is my fault that I have been able to mistake myself so gravely about your character, your spirit” (Brandes 1952: 120). Another attack by a French intellectual on Brandes’ neutral position was Paul Loyson’s open letter St. George Tamed by the Dragon (March 1915).

One of Brandes’ reactions was a sharpening of his analysis of the mechanisms accompanying and furthering war. Lovprisningen af Krig (The Praise of War, September 1915) contains this central point: “Nobody who knows something about the history of mankind can, in the present war enthusiasm, see anything but the most unambiguous atavism.” (Ibid: 78). After an acid depiction of atrocities committed in the name of religion, he concludes, “For upon religious madness has, as we all know, followed national madness” (Ibid: 81). Indirectly, he thus reminds his (former) liberal/radical friends of
their common front against the power of fanatical religion and implies their ‘un-radical’ capitulation to extreme nationalism.

In July 1916, Brandes – in connection with a number of other international peace initiatives, one of them by Henry Ford – tried the more activist approach of an *Appeal* to the warring parties. The appeal stirred up some international attention and was (as were quite a few of Brandes’ other utterances about the War) translated into several languages. Neither at home nor abroad, however, were most of the reactions favorable. The *Appeal* provoked another public polemic. William Archer, the Scottish intellectual, playwright, and translator, had translated half of Brandes’ Shakespeare book and become a friend and intellectual comrade of arms. Now he launched a counter-appeal, followed by a number of articles which were compiled in the booklet *Colour-Blind Neutrality*.¹⁰ In this quite-widespread publication, he characterizes Georg Brandes as a “Mr. Facing-Both-Ways” whose utterances are doing much harm. Archer was, at the time, attached to the office of War Intelligence. His successful intervention may justly, as was presumed by Brandes too, be seen as part of the efficient British propaganda machinery, the media war.

Strangely enough, their friendship survived the harsh polemic. But, once again, it seems to have animated Brandes to explore yet other points of view on the War. *Kampen om Kunder* (*The Battle for Customers*) (1916) accentuates the economic interests behind the War and thus has affinities with a socialist approach. As a conclusion to the long and detailed article, he states: “And thus we are now faced with the business war, the trade war in favor of the countries’ bank directors and large industrialists … And the trade war is dressed up as a fight for the homeland” (Ibid: 90). Finally, in *Finale* (December 1917), he synthesizes one of his main points: “In England, as in France and Germany, it is not the war, but the enemy that is hated. The war, however, is that which deserves hatred” (Ibid: 94).

In the articles compiled in his second book about the War and its consequences, he comments on the peace settlement. In *Nytaar 1919* (*New Year 1919*) he declares – without appearing very triumphant to have correctly prophesized from the start of the War, “Three empires have been dissolved and dismembered. Inside the superpowers, the larger and smaller nationalities have claimed their right to an independent national life. Princely glory has been replaced by republicanism” (Ibid: 98). At the same time, he points out how a mixed population in many places makes it impossible to divide people according to ethnic criteria. “A system of statelets is not happiness”,

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he pinpoints – and warns strongly against Danish chauvinism in the case of Schleswig. In subsequent articles such as Den hellige Alliance (The Holy Alliance, 1919) and Europa nu (Europe Now, 1925) he draws up a cool and clinical picture of the final situation, foreseeing a thirst for revenge in the losing nation(s), unduly humiliated by the peace treaty.

Georg Brandes’ war articles provoked many vehement reactions. In all of the warring nations, his neutral stand was extremely harmful to his reputation. In the domestic context, he was treated with much hostility by the predominantly nationalist, conservative press. At the end of the War, he even experienced a break with ‘his own’ newspaper Politiken. The editor of this main organ for the Social-Liberal government, where Georg’s brother Edvard Brandes was an influential minister of finance, refused to publish a controversial article of his. Secretly the article had been presented to Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius, who – considering Georg Brandes’ reputation as a ‘first citizen of his country’ – demanded it be stopped as dangerous for Denmark’s relationship with the victorious Allies, who had Georges Clemenceau as one of their most influential leaders.

Besides, Brandes’ articles on the War inspired an old literary opponent, Helge Rode – major symbolist poet – to yet another general attack upon the realist, secular, and scientific tendency that Brandes represented and that had dominated most of the time from the Modern Breakthrough in 1871 up until the War.

During the autumn of 1914, Rode proclaimed a Breakthrough of the Soul (as opposed to the Modern Breakthrough) in a number of articles in the magazine Illustreret Tidende. In the same months, he also published an article about the War that – with the title of Notes from the First Days of the War – became the introductory chapter of his book Krig og Aand (War and Spirit), issued in 1917. Herein he defends the value of the War, in spite of its horrors: “The unity, the densification, the common spirit and will make the war into something sublime, in spite of all. An immense greatness is created.” (Helge Rode 1917: 18).

The first part of the book contains a critical retrospection of the cultural life up to the War, and a major concern is a polemic against Georg Brandes’ The World War. In the chapter The Man of Our Times as Peacemaker, Rode reasons the following: since Brandes is critical of religion, he has lost any right to criticize the War. Instead of a love of humanity, his lack of faith has lead him to misanthropy – atheism does that per definition – so we must
understand the implied presupposition of the argument. “Misanthropy is, however, not a good basis for a peacemaker!”, Rode writes, concluding: “Our times rose to protest against the war; but it lacked pathos, for it protested against itself!” (Ibid: 110). Although Rode is mostly highlighting the positive aspects of the War, the critical and secular prewar spirit is stigmatized as a main cause of the War.

In the second part of the book, *The Problem of the War*, Helge Rode unfolds his alternative to Brandes. It is a re-instalment of an – undogmatic, free – mystical Christian spirituality. The message ends up in this vision: “From every corner of the world I now heard the great song of life. It gushed and irrigated, it thundered and whispered the highest name, our faith and our comfort, our mighty knowledge: I am!” (Ibid: 217).

Helge Rode’s point of view was not only contrary to that of Georg Brandes, but in stark contrast to that of his older brother, Ove Rode, the before-mentioned powerful interior minister. While Helge Rode had high hopes for the spirituality supposedly induced by the War, Ove Rode’s approach was deeply concerned and strongly critical. In a speech in 1916, *The War and Its Lesson*, he considers the war situation as a “magnifying glass”, glaringly revealing the already prevailing social conditions: “Poverty for the many with poverty’s tendency to stability and endurance – wealth for the few with the tendency of wealth to movement and growth” (Ove Rode 1921: 17). Instead of the ongoing senseless slaughter of young men, accompanied by “reckless greed, money hunt and fraud, driven into an enormous size and driven into the absurd” – characteristic of the war time situation as a magnifier of the prewar conditions – he hopes and works for a postwar society of solidarity, freedom, and peace, leaving capitalism, clericalism, and militarism behind.

**Early Danish anti-war-oeuvres: The media war**

By coincidence, a Danish film became the first pacifist film in World War 1. The film *Ned med Vaabnene!* (Lay Down Your Arms! / Down with Weapons!) was produced by the internationally well-known Danish Nordisk Films Kompagni in 1914. It was based on Bertha von Suttner’s novel *Die Waffen nieder! Eine Lebensgeschichte* (1889) that, before 1914, was translated into 16 languages. Bertha von Suttner’s novel, together with her active engagement in the pacifist movement, was rewarded with the Nobel Peace Prize in 1905. The film was directed by Holger-Madsen and the manuscript
was written by Carl Theodor Dreyer. It was shown in US in September 1914, where it was favorably received by critics as a contribution against war, “the hard, terrible, overwhelming reality of battles and mangled bodies of horses and men” (Motion Picture News d. 22.8.1914). The premiere in Europe was – because of the war! – postponed until 1915.

*Ned med Vaabnene!* has been credited for its innovative camera work, for a suggestive depiction of death and destruction, anticipating the horrible realities of the World War, and also for its focus on the point of view of a woman losing two husbands.

The Danish novel *Den tavse Dansker. En Bog om dem, der gjorde deres Pligt* (*The Silent Dane. A Book about Those who did Their Duty*) came out in 1916. It was written by Erich Erichsen, the lawyer and journalist (1871-1941) who was attached to the newspaper *København*. In Denmark, it became a bestseller, but was soon forgotten. It was translated into seven languages. The English translation *Forced to Fight. The Tale of a Schleswig Dane* was published in 1917 in England by William Heinemann, London, and in the US by Robert McBride, New York. In the Anglo-American version, a small propaganda twist was added: “Forced to Fight for the Huns” is the title of the first chapter. The pejorative “the Huns” is alien to the book in which the treatment of the Germans is generally sober and respectful.

*Forced to Fight* has divided Danish critics from its first reception right up to its rediscovery in recent years. It was no doubt based on a thorough knowledge of the soldiers’ letters that were printed in the Danish newspapers in Schleswig and a collection of war letters that was published already in 1915. Erichsen gave this documentary material a kind of fictional finish that cannot just be dismissed as “blood fantasies” (as was done by a contemporary critic), but rather adds some fictional supplements. The documentary basis of the book is personified as a first-person narration to the author of the book in 1916 by a young Schleswig Dane who went to war in 1914 at 24 years old, and has now returned, badly wounded, deprived of his right arm.

Though far from a literary masterpiece, the book does in fact present the situation of the Schleswig Danish soldiers in a convincing way. When mobilized, the young man goes to his barracks in Berlin, where he feels utterly alienated by the overwhelming nationalist enthusiasm that is everywhere in the capital:
“I felt very forsaken and lonely as I walked back to the barracks – so inconsolably deprived of everything.

All the others possessed the hopes and longings of a great period in history – something great to suffer for, something great to die for, with a bright and happy smile on their lips, and a glad light in their dying eyes. […]

I had only one thing as my goal to guide me – duty. Cold, hard, unalterable duty, demanding everything of me, without giving me anything whatever in return, except the pale consciousness that I had done what I ought because I had to; and only because of that.” (Erichsen 1917: 34).

Feelings like these are quite commonly expressed in the actually available documentary material. As before mentioned, quite a few letters came out during the War; many more by the end of the War and in the immediately following years; from then on, more and more letters, diaries, and memoirs have continued to become available.

Later in the book, it is well depicted how a deep disillusionment – grief over the fatigue, misery, hunger, and the hundreds of thousands of casualties – spreads through the German population instead of the initial enthusiasm.

The battle descriptions are rather early attempts to catch the new World War experience of senseless attacks against machine guns, of trenches and barbed wire. They are violent and suggestive, but seem in general trustworthy. The participation in the storming of Liege is rendered in great detail, in the rhythm of the commands to move on. A small fragment:

“Onwards and still on:
Until we reached the barbed wire.
The sight was appalling – later on. At the time my mind only grasped the picture as it took shape hastily during the moment of our onward rush.

It was not a barbed wire defense any longer. It was a steaming rampart of human bodies, torn asunder and trampled to pieces. Stumps of arms and legs, torn throats from which the blood ran in a clotted stream. Faces torn in cheeks and jaws and eyes. And a shrieking and death-rattling, a wailing and moaning that filled my ears and min-
gled with our own shrieks and shouts till I sounded as if the world were coming to an end in fear and terror.

But still we went on.

We had to leap over the barbed wire, while the lead screamed about us and man after man fell. We did not see where we jumped or where we trod.” (Erichsen 1917: 47f).

The book recreates the apocalyptic atmosphere of long drawn out bombardments and gas attacks; of the deadly monotony, the indifference towards life and death after years in the trenches; of hunger, cold and snow blindness at the Russian Front; and, worst of all, of the nightmares filled with anguish and horror when sleeping, or trying to.

Such descriptions you will hardly ever find in soldiers’ letters home, generally filled with trivialities and small cheerful moments. The narrator (and the implied author) are acutely conscious about this:

“A constant stream of pious lies has flowed homewards from the front during this year of war, and that, too, not merely on account of the censor. How could it be otherwise? Who would have the heart to make those at home more sad and anxious than they were already?” (Erichsen 1917: 97).

This metafictional reflection points revealingly to a major deviance between documentary material such as soldiers’ letters and the special power of fiction in rendering the war experience. In many respects, there is, however, as already indicated, concordance between fiction and the documentary material. That goes clearly for the immediate solidarity between the comrades in the trenches in spite of all national and ideological differences. The Schleswig Danish soldiers fought with the others and could even commit acts of bravery in spite of their lack of belief in the German cause. And, on their side, they were – although they were of course known to be outsiders representing a national minority – treated with respect by their German comrades in arms.

The book ends with the sad home-coming of the mutilated, forcefully aged young man. His parents and his fiancée can hardly recognize him. Moreover, he has come home to a “grief-laden country and a grief-laden people. I am certain there was not one home in which there was not weeping over a life
that had been taken, or a body that had been maltreated” (Erichsen 1917: 178f.). The long-term effects are foreseeable: “It will be a generation with sad hearts and many diseased thoughts … An impoverished generation – a joy-forsaken generation” (184).

It was no accident that this documentary novel was written by a journalist attached to København. The newspaper was passionately engaged in the cause of the Schleswig-Danes. But it was also an expression of the profound changes in the media world brought about by the War. On the documentary side, a flow of telegrams and of photos gave the War hitherto unknown coverage. On the ideological side, the warring nations built up enormous, well-organized propaganda apparatuses. The World War was crucial for Denmark, as its outcome would obviously decide the fate of North Schleswig. At the same time, the country was neutral and relatively fewer young men than in the warring countries came home directly from the trenches. Because of both factors, the media became especially important for the Danish picture of the War in a certain way, being the main sources for the war experience, and vehicles for the attendant changes in perception and mentality.

From the start the War, coverage was massive in the Danish newspapers, mostly in the form of a steady stream of war telegrams in the beginning, but soon with an extended use of photos, not least in the weeklies.18 At the start of 1915, one whole page of one of the main weeklies, Hjemmet (The Home), is covered with four captioned photos: one by an American war photographer showing dead bodies after a battle on the Serbian-Austrian Front; another a mass grave in the English part of the Western Front being filled with about 900 dead horses; English logistics carrying a supply of plum puddings into the trenches; and a lightly wounded English soldier sitting smiling by a gramophone – with the caption “It’s a Long Way to Tipperary”.

Just as an overflow of telegrams in the Russian-Japanese War had been the occasion to start a new form of popular newspaper, EkstraBladet, in 1904, a ‘competing’ newspaper, B.T., was started in 1916. It was one of the first Danish newspapers to brand itself with the well-prepared use of illustrations and visual layout of the pages.19 The War was present everywhere in the media, also in both the weeklies and in the cinema. Through the cause of the war, pictures of death and mass destruction were forced upon the public with an insistence never before seen. With telegrams and photo reports as dominant forms, the news mainly appeared as fragmented glimpses, as a juxtaposition of heterogeneous announcements and images. This was to become crucial for the impact of the War on literature.
War, art, and literature: The many faces of Expressionism

In the pioneering work about the impact of World War 1 on Danish literature, *Aargangen, der måtte snuble i starten (The Generation that Had to Stumble at Start)*, written during the World War 2 shortly after the German occupation of Denmark, Ernst Frandsen states that one main effects of the War was a shaking of the beliefs in evolutionary progress in the rational mind and in the masterful individual:

> The beautiful hope of the evolution of rational man to still higher cultural stages was like a mirage that dissolved under the shadow of the War. What might the clear thought mean vis-à-vis the national psychosis? And which weight might lie on the single individual in the trench? (Frandsen 1943/60: 105).

Frandsen has taken the title of his book from the last phase in Jacob Paludan’s great *Bildungsroman, Jørgen Stein*. As a generational characteristic, *The Generation that Had to Stumble at Start* is a Danish equivalent – though not quite as hopeless – to *The Lost Generation*. Some of Frandsen’s assumptions about the impact of the War are correct and nicely put. The War was a cultural shock and a catalyst for an epochal change in mentality. On the other hand, his account appears today to be blatantly insufficient and uneven, and he obviously overemphasizes the traditionalist and spiritualist side of the reactions. Actually, a broad contemporary rupture with the realist and naturalist tradition in art and literature took place. In some respects, it converged with Helge Rode’s aspirations. It was, however, much less inspired by religious mysticism than by the development of the press – and by a number of new artistic and intellectual impulses, among them international modernism (French cubism, Italian futurism, and German expressionism) – together with psychoanalysis, neo-Kantianism, pragmatism, and historical materialism.

In the inter-artistic and inter-Nordic magazine *Klingen (The Blade, 1917-20)*, impulses like these co-existed and resulted in rather different kinds of modernism and the avant-garde. On the initiative of Axel Salto, the painter, a group of young artists, architects, and poets contributed. In the second volume, Otto Gelsted, the poet and critic, and Poul Henningsen, the architect – two of the figures that were to be central to the renewal of heritage after Brandes – came onto the editorial staff: *Klingen* was, as before mentioned, inter-artistic in its orientation. However, visual art, at the time considered
the most advanced art form, had a prominent place. As the arts benefited from an unusual financial generosity because of the goulash capitalist boom during the war years, *Klingen* – bringing a wealth of original lithographs, woodcuts, and engravings – became one of the most exuberant and beautiful art magazines to ever appear in Denmark. The young experimental Copenhagen artists and intellectuals were seriously affected by the War, but could hardly be seen as representatives of a “joy-forsaken generation.”

The special *War Issue* of *Klingen*, Vol. 1, no 8, May 1918, is symptomatic of mixed attitudes towards the War. Sympathy is clearly with the Entente Powers and the mood most of the way remarkably enthusiastic at this point of the War. The soldier in the trench in the front page drawing wears an English helmet. There are two cheerful reports from life in Paris during the War. The poem *Mon sabre* by the fallen Frenchman Jacques de Chouens, which has a pathetic-heroic tone, centers on the image of a female mouth kissing the steel of the sabre, consecrating it to liberate the home country.

On the other hand, several of the drawings and lithographs, as well as some of the literary contributions, try to transfer the experience of the shocking war reality to *form*. They are examples of the modernist aspiration towards structural mimesis. The Norwegian painter Per Krohg had participated in the War a volunteer for a Norwegian ski ambulance. His one act play over two pages *Nervousness* or *A Quiet Night at the Front*, a front going right across a church shot to pieces, most of the ‘characters’ are the guns and the ‘words’ their sound. They rise from the “Pling!” of the rifles to the “Oouiiiiii baoom!!” of the long-range cannons and then culminate in a mixed choir:

Guns of all calibers, rifles, hand grenades, machineguns:

Oiieee plang! Baoum! Takketakketakketakkeouiiiiii pling, pling! **Baoum!**

**Baoum! Baoum!**

After that, Jesus asks Mary where God is. God, (“a painted plaster figure”) has been captured by the Germans. He is finally blown to pieces by a French air torpedo. The de-humanized onomatopoetic mimesis of the sound of war continues futurist and Dadaist experiments with pure sound words. And the implication of the *War Theatre* from 1916 is a conception of the War as an end play for all metaphysics and religion received by tradition. Emil
Bønnelycke’s poem *Hymne* sets a vitalistic-futuristic potentiation of youthful vitality as a counterbalance to the destructive War.

While this poem could be accused of suffering from an excess of pathos, later issues of *Klingen* show some of his most daring experiments with visual poetry. *Berlin* in no 9-10, June-July 1918, is a wordless graphic poem, consisting of partly parallel, partly crossing lines, reminiscent of metropolitan phenomena like railroad tracks, roads, cables or electric wires.

*New York* in no 9, 1919 is another graphic poem, filling the back cover page in a rather large format (30 x 40 cm.). A green, stylized skyline of Manhattan with skyscrapers and the Brooklyn Bridge is made up solely of words in the author’s handwriting, with varying sizes of the letters, sometimes large and easily readable, sometimes small and more enigmatic. The top of the left skyscraper reads like this in translation: “O about your houses New York and about your bridges I dream wild dreams.” And the bottom: “Let me be as the child of the century of bustle happy in your homeless middle of New York.” The right skyscraper consists of the names of famous Americans: politicians, inventors like Robert Fulton and Thomas A. Edison, the famous Danish photographer Jacob A. Riis, and movie stars like Douglas Fairbanks and Charlie Chaplin. In the middle, constituting one side of a central building, the eye is drawn to enlarged names of authors such as Frank Norris, Walt Whitman, Jack London, Edgar Allan Poe, and Upton Sinclair. The two poems are the first Scandinavian graphic poems in the spirit of Apollinaire’s *Calligrammes* and display the iconographic importance of the metropolises of Berlin and especially New York in the postwar years.

In addition to his contributions to *Klingen*, Emil Bønnelycke had already explored the expressionist way of interpreting the War in his debut collection *Ild og Ungdom* (*Fire and Youth*, 1917). In the city poem *Gaden* (*The Street*), the War is inescapably present on the newspaper front pages and in the street cries:

Cries of newspaper sellers: “The War! Lloyd George wants peace!”
“Gorky has served under Germany in secrecy”.
Crippled news-salesmen, rags, but cheerful dispositions.
Fatigue and poverty in the voice, when you’re really listening …
The man selling newspapers is life in wreck –.
“Latest news from today! “Hey!” A newspaper to the cyclist –.
“Kerensky speaks out skeptically in “The Anarchist”.
This is a fine example of the war experience through the optics of the media, a juxtaposition of fragmented announcements and images.

The war motif is also prominent in *Aarhundredet (The Century)*, from *Asfaltens Sange (The Songs of the Asphalt, 1918)*, one of Bønneleycke’s most famous poems, starting with this declaration of love:

> “I love you, you mysterious time, you century of centuries, who are rich in never guessed changes, rich in chaos, in the beauty of confusion, the splendor of speed, rich in risky business, rich in terror, in a swelling, murderous overture, the war, whose trumpets, the canons, and drums, the machine guns, proclaim the world revolution.”

The form of the poem is a *paean*, an ode, an invocation. The listing of the modern, paradoxical beauties of technical civilization makes it a *catalogue* in the tradition of Walt Whitman and Johannes V. Jensen, but also connects the poem with its most obvious source of inspiration: Marinetti’s *The Futurist Manifesto* (1908) that was succeeded by several others. While carrying on a controversy against traditional art and literature, negativity is integrated into an overriding positivity. The paradoxicality of modernity, its blatant contingency, is seen as an expression of dynamics and potentials.

With the voluminous novel *Spartanerne (The Spartans, 1919)*, Bønneleycke tried to render the war experience in expressionist prose. It is composed in three co-ordinate plotlines, similar to the principle of simultaneity in cubism. We are apparently presented with three first-person narrators: a Spartan, a soldier from the World War, and a Danish recruit in Viborg, the barrack town. The two contemporary lines are gradually revealed as being narrowly connected. The fighting soldier is the very same as the recruit, presupposing a fiction of Denmark as a full-scale participant of the World War. The plotlines illuminate youth and arms throughout history. The passages about the Danish recruit are obviously based on personal experience. The love letters of the Spartan warrior contain the prettiest lyrical prose in the book. But the most interesting parts of the book are finally the reports from the World War. Firstly, there are expressionist battle scenes, sparkling with energy, but often on the verge of overshooting the mark in pathos:

> “My soul sees all this: The fire, the green bundles of stars, such magnesium explosions, falling, conic ghostly lights, skeleton parasols of a pale, unnatural glow of mercury, smoking, sweating a milky, smoldering smoke.”
Secondly, and more daringly experimental, Bønneleycke seeks to illustrate the monstrous quantity of death and destruction through a kind of concrete poetry. This is the case in Chapter XIV, where the words “cross” and “graves” are mixed with names from many different nations. It begins like this: “I read a song of names, a requiem of cold data.” (“Jeg læser en Sang af Navne, en Dødsmesse af kolde Data.” (109)). There follows a long promenade among crosses and names:

“Americans. National Army. 2den Foot Garde Division.[in English in the original] Fallen at Somme June 21 1917. 411. 3 Comp. 59 Batt. 116. 2 Comp. 57 Batt. 301. 1 Comp. 59 Batt. 21. 4 Comp. 57 Batt. 79. 2 Comp. 59 Batt. 824. 4 Comp 57 Batt. 823. 4 Comp. 59 Batt. …


The ending is:


The book is not a perfect work of art. But, as an experiment, it contains some of the most interesting traces of World War 1 in Danish literature.

Traces of the War likewise impose themselves in the imagery of Tom Kristensen’s famous program poem: *Landet Atlantis. Et Symbol (The Land Atlantis. A Symbol)* in *Fribytterdrømme (Freebooter Dreams*, 1920), his debut – and the most important contemporary Danish collection of poems. But these traces are coated with several layers of myth, already from the title. Atlantis is a mythic country that has even sunk into the sea. A symbol prescribes an indirect, symbolic reading of eventual elements of reality. It is also unclear, consciously indeterminate, who speaks in the poem. If the agitator has the floor after the two first strophes, who then is the speaker before that?

In any case, the professed symbolic picture of a chaotic world is solidly rooted in the new pictures from the Great War and the subsequent revolutions:
“Superb like a war-shattered station are
our youth and our strength and our wild ideas [...]”

The land called Atlantis towards which we long,
has bright stacks of rifles adorning the streets.
Bonfires all flicker for the alleyway’s soldiers
hungrily leaning against the walls
and rapaciously grabbing at each scrap of food
they can extract from tin cans.

The streets are deserted, the wind harshly howls
making flutes of the keyholes and spectrally
whining the skeletal waltzes
so festively danced on the ruins of houses,
while shattered panes from their windows
all grin like ironical skulls.”

The link between reality and symbol is that a chaotic world requires a new intonation, hoarse and impetuous sounds. However there is – as everywhere in the poem collection – a contradiction between the garish and violent character of the images and tonality on one hand, and the classical, regular strophic form on the other.

Even adhering to this tradition, the poem contains a vehement rejection of the canonized concept of beauty – in favor of a beauty born in the chaotic now: the beauty of destruction, killing, war, and revolution. Objects with their original function converted (plush, postman’s jackets), mixed with phenomena of vulgar culture (tin gramophones) are stirred into one heterogeneous collage or montage. Forms and colors explode. But, at the same time, central elements in these stanzas are directly mimetic: veritable ekphrases of photos in Danish newspapers and weeklies from the World War and from the Russian and German revolutions.

The activist gesture at the end – “In chaos I raise up my gun/ towards beauty’s bright star and aim” (“I Chaos jeg løfter min Bøsse/ mod Skønhedens Stjerne og sigter”) – alludes to a famous sentence in Friedrich Nietzsche’s: Also sprach Zarathustra: “Ich sage euch: Man muss noch Chaos in sich haben, um einen tanzenden Stern zu gebären.” It also reminds one of the dramatic revolver shots by which Emil Bønnellycke ended a famous contemporary recitation of his poem about the killings of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.
A politically and formally even more radical expressionism, an instance of the Danish avant-garde closer to Dadaism than to futurism, was represented by Rudolf Broby-Johansen with the poem collection Blod (Blood, 1922). All the poems of this provocative collection, for which the author was brought to trial for pornography, contain shocking, bloody incidents such as sexual murder, necrophilia, induced abortion, and birth. A stylistic specialty is that all the words, written in capitals, acquire a thing-like or noun-like character. According to the author himself, these poems are troubled reactions to the million murders of the World War. The most direct example is the violent and decadent poem “STRIDSMÆND FOR DET VI ELSKER/ BELGIEN 11-6-1917” (“Warriors for what We Love/ Belgium June 11 1917”), in which a young girl is raped, killed and her body mutilated by six soldiers:

“RAPE […] THEN THEY FIGHT/ THEN ALL FIGHT/ WOMAN/ BODY/ CORPS/ BUTT/ HANDS/ BAYONET/ SQUASH/ CRACK/ TEAR // THEY FLEE FROM EACH OTHER // IN HALF-DARK EACH CORNER/ SYPHILITIC CRAWLS OVER PIECE OF THIGH/ BONE JOINT/ RUNNING CHROME OVER BLUE BLOOD PHALLUS (MUSHROOM !)/ SENIOR-SCHOOL PUPIL PUTS GENITALS INTO SHOE/ FEVERISH/ DOUBLE-NECK MASTURBATES CHEWING SANITARY TOWEL/ BALDHEAD DRAWS LABIA OVER FLUX PENIS AS A COLLAR”

The poem and the collection as a whole reveal a familiarity with the desperate poetry of August Stramm, Gottfried Benn (e.g. Morgue, 1912), and Georg Trakl. But it is also the verbal equivalent of the terrifying war etchings by J. F. Willumsen, the great Danish painter (1863-1958), who primarily focused on German war crimes such as Miss Edith Cavell’s Martyrdom (1916), The Invasion (1917), Two Dead Soldiers (1917), and The Belgian Prisoner (1918).

Otto Gelsted was co-editor of Klingen and the author of Ekspressionisme (1919), an excellent introduction to the flourishing modernism in Danish painting, competently viewed on an international background. He was sceptical, however, towards the literary branches of expressionism represented by Bønnellycke and Tom Kristensen, as well as Broby-Johansen. With Reklameskibet (The Show Boat, 1923) he made a striking parody of futurist style, mixing it with the emergent language of advertisement – and presented his own activist-radicalist alternative. But also in this poem there are ‘expressionist’ traces of the World War:
“And now the ship is
One single sparkling illumination,
The airplanes shell it with Bengali bombs”

Similar to before-mentioned poems by Bønnellycke and Kristensen, it ends with an activist gesture: the show boat is blown up, yet another indication of a militant attitude on the background of the War and the revolutions. The parodic, multi-voiced tonality of this poem became an important source of inspiration for the Danish lyrical modernism of the 1960s.

**Prosaic retrospections**

Years after the end of the War, its long-terms effects were registered and interpreted in different kinds of realist prose, in novelistic fiction, and autobiographical works. One of the first instances is Jacob Paludan’s *Søgelys* (*Searchlight*, 1923). The novel’s main character is Hugo Fahlen, a Danish-American now returning to Copenhagen. As one of maybe 30,000 Danish-Americans, he had enlisted in the American army and taken part in the war. Back in US, with scars on his body and wounds in his soul, no other work was available than that as a driver in a dynamite factory, not especially helpful for getting over the heavy case of post-traumatic stress he had acquired in the trenches. In peaceful Denmark, he is from time to time still hit with terrible fits of remembrance and anxiety:

> “Two claps of thunder behind him. He threw himself forwards in the chair, his nervous net became as ice, and the heart hammered loudly and swiftly, dookdookdookdook! The mouth gaped in terror, he grew deathly pale, crept over in the divan and started to shake intensely. He saw a piece of blue sky, a canon swung into position, the muzzle opened soot dark and then – ! A whistling lightning leaped out, everything became dark night, green and white sparks striped over the sky. He was in the trench again”

As were most of the returning soldiers, he is also deeply frustrated by the cynical commercial after-war atmosphere, without traces of brotherly understanding or tolerance. Hoping to find a little of the “unpaid goodness” left in his old home country, he registers with an alien, critical eye the rapidly growing Americanization of Denmark. He finds the effacement of the traditional gender roles especially appalling – “the more of equality, the more of unhappiness”, he thinks. The joyless competition of the sexes for
jobs and the feminine man are for him – as well as the traditionalist implicit author – the very worst signs of decadence. Unable to overcome his war traumas, he ends up in jail for a minor, casual case of fraud. He cannot bear the future, can barely find “a bridge back to the real world”.

Some years later, Jacob Paludan again approached the long-term effects of the World War in a very different kind of novel. *Jørgen Stein* (1932-33) is a historical Bildungsroman in two large volumes: *Torden i Syd* (*Thunder in the South*) and *Under Regnbuen* (*Under the Rainbow*). Jørgen, the younger son of a higher civil servant, a prefect in the small town of Thisted, Northern Jutland, is to begin his education in the somewhat larger city of Aalborg. The novel starts with a dinner party at the prefect’s house, where the sensational news of the murder on the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne and his wife is brought on a handbill from the local newspaper. Later, the start of the War is reported in a long series of still more ominous newspaper headlines.

During the rest of the first part of the novel, located in Aalborg, the course of the War is constantly present as a background, a kind of subplot. Jørgen is growing up, enjoying his formative years in Aalborg, interesting relations to attractive girls, a close friend, and the stimulating city life in the self-confident, rapidly growing industrial town of Aalborg. But, while enjoying himself on a Saturday night at a popular dancing place, Jørgen suddenly remembers a newspaper telegram he noticed in passing:

“Horrifying Battles in the Belgian Barbed Wire Fences.  
‘After all it is strange,’ he said.  
‘What is strange, you moron?’  
‘The War at one place – and fun at the other.’”

As the War drags on, this leitmotif is taken up again, but now with an added consciousness about the partiality of the media, the media war:

“Music, song, indoor life; outside in the frost you could read war telegrams, but who cared to. One had discovered long ago that the press services worked in a partial manner. Both armies seemed to be victorious in their fight against one another, and if anyone gave up a few positions it was for tactical reasons … One had become callous towards the immense number of casualties long ago. In front of the long posters of misery, women screamed with pleasure at a daring joke and gentlemen bid each other on Aalborg’s special thé-russe against the cold.”
The War changes its face in the winter of 1916-17. The Unlimited U-boat War is declared, ships are painted with camouflage, a comprehensive system of rationing is introduced, electricity and the opening hours of cafés cut down. Moreover, the winter is unusually harsh, many are starving, and civic kitchens are opened. Shady businessmen are imprisoned. “The movie theatres played Pax æter-na,25 while the Russian Tsar was put in prison and America decided to enter into the War … Circle upon circle of waves spread out from the already so far away incident in Sarajevo.”

The second part of the novel, Under the Rainbow, describes the long-term effects of the War on Jørgen and his generation. With Jørgen’s brother Otto as a leading character, there is a satirical portrait of the “Modern Mentality” of Goulash Capitalism, financial speculation and Americanization – in the vein of Searchlight. The armistice is dryly noted: “This autumn finally brought the Armistice. No dazzling victory for anybody; a difference in degree of loss of blood and hunger was decisive.” Jørgen’s reactions are uncertain, far from jubilant. In the movie theatre, showing the march of the victorious troops into Paris, he regards Lloyd George, Marshal Foch and

“The endless rows of soldiers. The music played incitingly, and the public was carried away – exactly the same psychosis as at the start of a war … He breathed heavily outside on the street, ashamed by the thought of these endless, khaki-grey masses, being silent about what they had seen. What did his courage concern those who had lived through the greatest; had not a half-hearted neutral lost all right to put in a word?

For Jørgen – the hesitant heir of a prewar bourgeois culture, more or less generalized as representative of his generation – the War has meant an unbridgeable rift in his development as it swept away a well-established, traditional order, now yesterday’s world, without revealing any easy access to a new one. The novel ends with the gnomic sentence: “After all, he belonged to a generation that had to stumble at start.”

In 1929, Thomas Dinesen presented a radically different Danish experience of World War 1 in his autobiographical work No Man’s Land. En Dansker med Canadierne ved Vestfronten. It was published in English one year later under the (rather arbitrarily) altered title of Merry Hell! A Dane with the Canadians. The translator is anonymous. The translation is generally rea-
sonable, but there are serious flaws: it contains, as in the before-mentioned translation of Erichsen’s *Forced to Fight*, more pejorative expressions about the Germans than the original; almost all of the (very few) erotic hints have been censored away; there are quite a number of other deletions, e.g. of the poem Thomas composes to his mother in a conquered trench near the end of the book.  

Dinesen was the third generation of a family of military engagement and distinction. At the outbreak of the War, he joined the Danish Academic Rifle Corps as his first step to real participation in a war against German militarism. After having graduated as an engineer in 1916, he tried to enlist in the French army. Though he could explain and prove that both his father and his grandfather had won the *Croix de la Légion d’honneur* as officers in the French army, it was of no use. He then tried England, was again met with refusal, but unofficially referred to the possibility of joining the Canadians. The book consists of extracts of letters to family during the war, diaries, notes, and memoirs. They are limited and self-centered, he admits, but claims truthfulness as their only merit.

In the spring of 1917, he has come to New York. After an attempt to join the American army, again in vain, he is finally enlisted in the Canadian army. Following chapters on his time as a recruit in Montreal and his camp life in England, the remaining two thirds of the book are reports of his active service at the front from March 1918 to the end of the War.

As a documentary report, it does not possess the full coherence and stylistic finish of a fictional work, but has the advantage of the freshness of impressions and the comprehensiveness of the account of life on front in the last year of the War. We are confronted with dirt, cold, hunger and thirst, the boredom of long waiting hours, close-ups on panic during drum fire or gas attacks, the adrenalin rush in raids – and the many, many ugly faces of death.

One of the first impressions of gunfire at the front is rendered through onomatopoetic words like an expressionist poem – “boom … boom … boom … boom-boom … BOOM!” “dah-dah-dah … dah-dah-dah … dah-dah-dah!”, “SWU-UPP!” (113) – but it is characteristic that, as a trained sportsman, he also notes a migration of birds on that night – “Gyw! gyw! gyW!” (114)—Duck, wild goose, woodcock, obviously indifferent to the guns.

In the breaks between the battles, there is time to reflect on the final, deci-
sive questions of life. As an agnostic, Dinesen has a keen and critical eye on strict religions, especially authoritarian Catholicism. He also wonders about the cynicism and meanness in the matters of sex and love of his comrades, good and loyal in other matters. He also is most critical of the stereotypes of the enemy in the war propaganda. In general, he thinks, the soldiers themselves are less prejudiced. He reports, however, a few grim instances of cruelties committed against German prisoners by Allied forces.

The end of *No Man’s Land* contains a long description of “The Offensive”, including attempts to render the adrenalin rush at mad attacks:

“A couple of survivors dash off from the post, and we rush after them, tear our hands and kilts on the wire, jumping across the over-turned machine-gun and the dead or dying gunners, running panting and perspiring along the dry, hard trench, corner by corner … and then we reach the next machine-gun post and throw ourselves against it, yelling and roaring, with bombs and bayonets, battle-mad – regardless of everything in the world, our whole being intent on one thing alone: to force our way ahead and kill!” (239).

In one of the conquered trenches, he admires the starry sky, remembers beautiful nights in his home at the Sound, and reflects upon his innermost impetus to go to war: “I have always wished that I might once be tried to my very utmost. When it comes to the crucial test, when each nerve and fibre in your bodies for days and weeks has been strained to bursting-point, – what are we worth then? what strength have we got in us? ” (249).

At New Year’s Eve 1918, he can look back upon the War and look forwards to working for peace and understanding. He has passed the test. In Bexhill, he has been awarded with the French *Croix de Guerre*, and in Buckingham Palace he has received the *Victoria Cross* from King George. Thomas Dinesen was the only foreigner to win the Victoria Cross during World War 1.

Karen Blixen was Thomas Dinesen’s sister. They were close and corresponded eagerly during the war. Her *Letters from Africa* show her deep involvement in the course of the War and his fate in it. In her more ‘artistic’ autobiographical work *Out of Africa* (1937), especially in the fourth part, *From an Immigrant’s Notebook*, there are some glimpses of her sporadic contact with the World War in Africa. Like other Swedish immigrants in Kenya, her husband Bror enlisted at the start of the War. She herself risked being sent to a concentration camp for women, but tried to avoid it by volun-
teering in a kind of “war safari”, transmitting information about the movements of the German army. During her journey to the farm, six months before the War, she had become acquainted with the head-commander of the German forces in East Africa, General von Lettow-Vorbeck – soon to become a legend as an invincible opponent: defeated, but never caught.

A special instance of the long-term effects of World War 1 on Danish literature is to be found in the autobiography from 1943 of the dramatist and clergyman Kaj Munk: Foraaret saa sagt kommer (Spring Comes so Gently). In two intertwined plotlines, he recalls his literary and religious formation. The effects of the World War are firstly direct and political. In the wake of the War, he strongly felt the turbulent turn of history at the fall of the princes and breakdown of empires:

“The thrones were overthrown, and the princes ran for their life, throwing their crowns behind them to hold up the pursuers … away were all the crowned heads in Germany. But the democracies triumphed … I had no belief in the princes anymore. And still less in the peoples that acted with rebellion against their princes. My mind began to look out for the dictator.”

For most of his life, Kaj Munk sympathized with the idea of dictatorship, and through most of the 1930s he expressed sympathy for Hitler, and above all Mussolini. By 1938, however, he took a public stand against the persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany. Immediately after the German occupation of Denmark, he intensely advocated resistance at any cost. He was, of course, put under censorship, but continued to preach openly against the occupiers. In January 1944, he was killed as the first prominent Dane in a wave of terror murders.

He used his autobiography as a chance to circumvent censorship. The double time perspective in it – narrator’s time and narrated time – also implies a subtle duplicity in his eye on World War 1 and World War 2. Even more interesting than the direct effects is the indirect influence on mind and mentality. It shows itself in images that connect the personal development to history at large and two world wars.

The experience of being chosen to his vocation as a poet by sudden inspiration, is formulated like this: “It was as if an index finger lifted out of the parenthesis of the book and stretched against me with a: You are the man.” The feeling of vocation as a clergyman is formed in the same image: “And
suddenly the index finger once again grew up between the letters and pointed at me with a: You are the man.” And when he finally decides to accept a vicarage in a remote parish in Western Jutland, his inner clarification is rendered in this way: “After all the finger had appeared from the cloud and had pointed for me on Vedersø. Then things are of course settled. ... I had to take this job upon me. I had to go out into the trench. / Speak, o Lord, thy servant heareth.”

The Biblical image at the end (1 Samuel, 3.10) – as well as the implicit reference to the *Ecce homo motif* – link the vocation as a prophet to the Christian tradition in which the author grew up. But the repeated image of the finger is taken from the British War Minister Lord Kitchener’s famous and vastly influential poster of recruitment from World War 1 – with its appealing index finger and the sentence: ‘YOU ARE THE MAN I WANT’. In this way, there is the juxtaposition of the acceptance of a benefice and “going out into the trenches”. And thus, the narrator demonstrates that the young main character’s personal feeling of holy vocation is profoundly shaped by his age: by the World War with its obligation to risk one’s life in the trenches, but not least with its modern media, aggressive agitation, and efficient language of advertisement.

This leitmotif – the obligation to take a stand and fight like a good soldier – also connects back to the time of narration during World War 2 and to the indirect mobilization to resistance that is present even in the most ‘innocent’ national idylls throughout the book.

**Conclusion**

Undoubtedly, Danish literature was profoundly influenced by World War 1. So were the other main art forms. Some instances in Danish art have been briefly mentioned. In music, the sound of war is frighteningly audible in some of the principal works by Carl Nielsen, the great Danish composer, a close friend of the painter J. F. Willumsen. The vitalist Fourth Symphony *Det uudslukkelige* (*The Inextinguishable*, 1916) has in its climax a vehement duel between two sets of timpani that threatens to break the musical life flow of the orchestra. In the first movement of his *Fifth Symphony* (1922), a similar war drama is enacted as the music is progressively interrupted by an aggressive snare drum at an accelerated tempo; at its climax the snare drummer should, according to the instruction by the composer, improvise “as if at all costs he wants to stop the progress of the orchestra”.28
In literature, the traces of the War are visible and profound from early in the War until many years later, in many different genres and literary currents from modernism to realism. Direct experiences of the War in the trenches are represented in documentary, semi-documentary, and fictive forms. At the same time, this chapter has demonstrated that one of the most important, long-lasting sources of influence was that of the War as it appeared in the rapidly developing media. Basic phenomena of modernity – discontinuity, fragmentation, simultaneous co-existence of heterogeneous elements – were shockingly accentuated by the War. Corresponding modes of presentation, reflecting new ways of perception and a new mentality, were first and most broadly introduced in the modern media. They were then taken up and further developed in literature and other art forms.

Denmark’s neutral position, partly limited to a spectator’s role, partly involved in a number of ways, has probably favored the importance of the media in the perception of the War and made the media angle especially visible. The variety of possible approaches may also – at least during the War and anything else equal – have opened a broader spectrum of attitudes to the War than in the warring countries, where the efficiency of the propaganda machinery and the public restraints upon opinion were necessarily much stronger.
Reference list


Frandsen, Ernst (1943/1960) *Aargangen, der måtte snuble i starten*. København: Gyldendal.


Endnotes

1 “Du Pusling-Land, som hygger dig i Smug, mens hele Verden brænder om din Vugge” All through the chapter, all translations of Danish titles and quotations to English are my responsibility, unless otherwise indicated.

2 Cf. Adriansen, 2014

3 Collected and reprinted as late as in 2016 in the book Ørnens flugt over Rhinen og over Ækvator. Essays (The Eagle’s Flight over the Rhine and over Equator, Larsen 2016).

4 An extreme example of the pro-German point of view is Emil Rasmussen’s satirical novel Barbarkvinder (Barbarian Women, The Revelations of a French Eyewitness of the Terrifying German Conditions, 1917). Published under the pseudonym of Jean Poincanard [‘No lie’], it is a grotesque parody of the supposed image of Germany in the French war propaganda. Its rather daring erotic episodes were considered pornographic, and the author was condemned to 14 days of prison.

5 Reprinted in his book Introduktion til vor Tidsalder (Introduction to our Age, 1915).


7 Brandes wrote the first serious study of Hans Christian Andersen’s tales and the first important book on Søren Kierkegaard. In a series of lectures, later on published in the main European languages (English translation Main Currents in Nineteenth-Century Literature 1903-05), he inspired the Modern Breakthrough in Scandinavian literature and became one of the founders of Comparative Literature. He was an untiring European advocate of Ibsen – “the main architect of Ibsen’s international fame”, according to René Wellek – and of Strindberg. In 1887 Brandes ‘discovered’ Friedrich Nietzsche. His published lectures (especially Aristocratic Radicalism, 1889) were decisive in preparing

8 Leader of the Radical Party, prime minister of France from 1906 to 1909 and again from 1917 to 1920, one of the main architects of the Versailles Treaty.

9 The controversy is extensively treated in Knudsen 2004, summarized as an article in English in Knudsen 2010.


11 Hereby, he also anticipated the heated cultural struggle in Denmark after the War that has been labelled *Livsanskuelsesdebatten* (the View of Life Debate).

12 His wartime speeches were also complied in a book: *I Krigen Vendetegn. Udvalg af Taler holdt I 1913-1920* (*In the Turning Sign of the War. Selection of Speeches Held in 1913-1920* (Ove Rode 1921).

13 Quoted from Kelly 1997.

14 A profound skepticism toward the book’s value both as literature and as a historical source is represented by Bendtsen 2014, whereas Lehrmann 2014 and especially Aabenhus 2014 defend it by comparing it to the picture drawn in the contemporary letters from the Schleswig-Danish soldiers.


17 Cf. *Krestens breve og dagbøger. En dansker ved vestfronten i Første Verdenskrig (Kresten’s Letters and Diaries: A Dane at the West Front*

18 An excellent account of the War as a “media event” is given by Ulrich Lehrmann (Lehrmann 2014), solidly based on his contribution to the story of Danish newspapers in Dansk mediehistorie 2 (Lehrmann 1997). Regrettably it is, in the first mentioned article, combined with an underestimation of the impact of the War on Danish literature, not least because of an insufficient understanding of the relationship between precisely the media and the literature in question.


20 To be treated in the next part of the chapter.

21 A definition of this concept can be found in Gemzøe 2003.


25 Theatrical release on February 16 1917. Like Down with Weapons Pax æterna was a Danish war drama film directed by Holger-Madsen.

26 No Man’s Land was re-published in 2014 with a preface by the Danish author and Afghanistan veteran Anne-Catherine Riebnitzsky. Merry Hell! has been reprinted by The Naval & Military Press, England.

27 Tom Buk-Swienty, in his ‘double biography’ Tommy og Tanne. Det store i livet, adds many important historical and personal nuances to Thomas Dinesen’s published self-portrait. As to No Man’s Land, he compares it to Ernst Jünger’s Im Stahlgewittern, and he rightfully characterizes the protagonists as “unusual types of soldiers” (Buk-Swienty 2016: 432). Though he might be right that Thomas Dinesen’s attitude to war is (even) more complex than revealed in No Man’s Land/Merry Hell! his evaluation of the book appears one-sided and reductive.
Perhaps a biographer is both a well informed and a biased literary judge of an auto-biography that his own work is intended to supplement and correct.

Chapter 10

The impact of the War: Some economic aspects

Finn Olesen

Introduction

Up to the outbreak of World War I, expectations on economic matters were in general rather positive. Now at last, the vision of Adam Smith – a macroeconomic outcome of harmony and optimality with economic growth and a significant high level of wealth for the first time in modern history – seemed to be within reach for many of the European countries and the US. Trade between countries looked like a game from which all countries could benefit. However, the outbreak of the War along with its consequences dramatically changed this scenario for decades to come, as we know from history. Far from being an economic environment of economic growth, the future became one of troublesome economic as well as political turbulence.

Through the years many economic historians have tried to depict what happened economically during the War and afterwards. Often with an emphasis on the huge negative impact the War had on international affairs. Before 1914, international trade patterns, capital flows and the exchange of scientific knowledge seems all to have contributed to gaining more prosperous times for all countries involved. After the War, the international economic system broke more or less down given room for depressing economic conditions which finally gave way to the Great Depression of the 1930s.

As this story has been told many times, the focus of the present chapter is somewhat different from the many contributions written seen from the perspective of an economic historian. Rather, the present chapter is written primarily seen from the perspective of a macroeconomist with an emphasis on the history of macroeconomic thought. As such, it becomes important
to the present author to try to illustrate how the war triggered out some early seeds to what later became known as the Keynesian Revolution in macroeconomics. The father to this revolution was the English economist John Maynard Keynes as he after many years of intellectual struggle finally published his *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* in 1936. The road to this new understanding in economics began as early as 1919 where he published the book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. From now on Keynes had established himself internationally as a well-known and respected economist who was capable of analysing and explaining complex economic matters thoroughly. Therefore, his book from 1919 is a very important contribution in both the writings of Keynes and in the history of macroeconomic thought.

With a focus on economic matters especially important concerning the potential danger of an economic crisis, Keynes made in his book an early prognosis on what could and should be expected to be the economic reality for the years to come not only for Germany but also for the victorious countries of the War. As history has shown, Keynes, unfortunately, was rather spot on with his prognosis. Somehow, the Versailles Treaty signalled the coming of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Likewise, from now on, Great Britain was no longer the world’s most powerful Empire economically as well as politically. Her position was overtaken by the US, which to a large degree had financed the expenditures of the war effort of both Great Britain and France.

The aim of this chapter is primarily to give a thorough examination of the book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. In this book, Keynes focused not only on economic consequences of the War he also took political considerations into account. Secondly, more economic history-like, it is to present some empirical evidence concerning various macroeconomic variables in order to depict some important economic consequences of the war.

**Keynes-1919: Troublesome times ahead?**

As known from the history of economic thought, the writings of John Maynard Keynes are rather extensive. During all of his life, he made several important contributions. The main characteristic of many of these was that they were not written only with a narrow focus on pure economic principles. In general, Keynes’s perspective was a much broader one. He understood very well indeed that society develops and changes as time goes by.
and the process of such a transformation could be rather complex to analyse. Therefore, you have to have an eye on economic, political, cultural and other relevant aspects when you study such processes.

**The scene is set**

In 1919, Keynes wrote the book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* after the Peace Treaty of Versailles had been agreed upon. As stated by (Skidelsky 1992), this book is seen by many as one of the best contributions that Keynes ever made in so far as he focused not only on an economic understanding of the Treaty, he also presented a political discussion of the dangers of a possible future European conflict.

In the spring of 1919, Keynes participated in the peace negotiations as a representative of the British Treasury. As it became clear to Keynes that the negotiations would end with a Peace Treaty that could only be explained by a thirst for revenge especially towards Germany, he finally resigned from the British delegation in June 1919. As explained by (Skidelsky 1992), this was not a sudden reaction from Keynes’s side. He had for a long time been very unhappy with the negotiations. Already as soon as by the end of October 1918, he had argued in a memorandum that it should be of essence that the winning side of the war should only put reparations on especially Germany of a size that she was able to pay. And the capacity to pay reparations was hinged upon Germany’s capacity to acquire a surplus on its trade balance. No one nation would gain by forcing reparations on Germany that were unrealistic. That would harm not only Germany but also both Europe and America as well.

At the Peace negotiations Keynes had tried to persuade the allied countries of this conviction. Nevertheless, he did far from succeed. In the beginning of May 1919, it was clear to him that the Allies would put forward reparations of such a magnitude that Germany had no chance of fulfilling. As Keynes wrote in a letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer Austen Chamberlain:

“We have presented a Draft Treaty to the Germans which contains in it much that is unjust and much more that is inexpedient … It is now right and necessary to discuss it with the Germans and to be ready to make substantial concessions. If this policy is not pursued, the consequences will be disastrous in the extreme … The Prime Minister is leading us all into a morass of destruction. The settle-
ment which he is proposing for Europe disrupts it economically and must depopulate it by millions of persons. The New States we are setting up cannot survive in such surroundings. Nor can the peace be kept or the League of Nations live”; (Harrod 1972: 294).³

On 28 June 1919, the Versailles Peace Treaty was signed by the Allies as well as by Germany.

**The need to explain the wrongdoings**

Back home, Keynes felt that he had to set the record straight.⁴ He felt he had to address the public about the harm that had been done at the conference. Because of this, he decided to write a book. At 12 December 1919, it was published. It immediately took on as sales rapidly went up. In August the next year, it had been translated into 11 languages and it had already sold more than 100,000 copies.

The intentions behind the need to write such a book were clearly expressed by Keynes himself in his Preface to the French edition. He stated that he had a need to demonstrate that:

“our representatives at the Paris conference committed two grand errors against our interests. By demanding the impossible, they forsook the substance for the shadow and will in the event lose everything. By excessive concentration on political objects and on the attainment of an illusory security, they overlooked the economic unity of Europe – illusory because security is to be found least of all in the occupation of extended frontiers, and also because the political contrivances of the moment will be largely irrelevant to the problems of a later decade”; (Keynes 1919: xix).

**The economic aspects**

In his book, Keynes seems in some important aspects to challenge the mainstream economic thinking of his time, especially concerning its view on economic stability. Actually, he was not sure that an overall optimal macroeconomic outcome would be brought about automatically by the market mechanism itself. Rather, the outcome could be one of disequilibrium and it was possible that economically unstable conditions could develop into
a serious economic crisis. Moreover, more importantly, seen from a 1919 perspective, such a situation might be the result of the terms put forward in the Peace Treaty. Not only Germany was in for troublesome economic times; that was the case for all of the European countries as they were now more than hitherto interrelated with one and other through trade. Therefore, it should be expected that an international economic crisis could develop in the years ahead, because as Keynes warned us with his opening words of Chapter 1:

“Very few of us realise with conviction the intensely unusual, unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature of the economic organization by which Western Europe has lived for the last half century”; (Keynes 1919:1).

That is, you cannot take macroeconomic stability for granted. Economies can be hit by recessions as well as more boom-like situations. The macroeconomic outcome is, in general, probably not one of full employment. Furthermore, you also have to acknowledge the fact that macroeconomic stability is partly dependent on political stability. Political turbulence can make economic decision-making processes very problematic to conduct the proper way. Therefore, potential political turbulence could be transformed into potential economic turbulence, just as troublesome economic times could question the stability of political institutions. The two systems – the economic and the political system – interact with each other nationally as well as internationally. It is due to this understanding that Keynes was worried about the peace terms that has been presented to Germany. These terms would not only with certainty harm Germany; they are at the same time also harmful to the international society as well.

Although Keynes, challenged the mainstream economic view on stability, he nevertheless acknowledged that Europe should be characterized as ”so organised socially and economically as to secure the maximum accumulation of capital”; (Keynes 1919: 11). Not surprisingly therefore, accumulation of capital had been an important feature of Western economic development up to 1914. However, the War had torn apart that process of accumulation, Keynes points out. And there is nothing in the peace terms that tries to re-address this fact. In sum, he finds that:

“I cannot leave this subject as though its just treatment wholly depended either on our own pledges or on economic facts. The policy of reducing Germany to servitude for a generation, of degrading the
lives of millions of human beings, and of depriving a whole nation of happiness should be abhorrent and detestable – abhorrent and detestable, even if it were possible, even if it enriched ourselves, even if it did not sow the decay of the whole civilized life of Europe”;
(Keynes 1919: 142).

How Europe might develop economically after the War is analyzed in Chapter 6 of the book. Generally speaking, this is sadly “one of pessimism” as Keynes points out. Firstly, he questions if the population of Europe is capable of feeding itself in the years to come. Surely, many of the European countries and perhaps especially Germany and Russia might have serious problems in this regard. Secondly, many of the European countries lack the right infrastructure, which is damaging to the process of economic growth. To trade efficiently with each other, countries need a well-functioning infrastructure. And trade is essential in stimulating the processes of economic growth, Keynes points out. Thirdly and most importantly, there is the threat of inflation. Prices are already going up in Europe and probably that process would be enhanced in the years to come, Keynes tells us. If this happens, Europe has to foresee tremendous economic troubles. It will not only harm trade and thereby economic growth, it also induces to “the waste and inefficiency of barter” (Keynes 1919: 152). And then of course, the nightmare of hyperinflation might have very severe damaging effects indeed to the working of the macroeconomic system:

“By a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens. By this method they not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily … As the inflation proceeds and the real value of the currency fluctuates wildly from month to month, all permanent relations between debtors and creditors, which form the ultimate foundation of capitalism, become so utterly disordered as to be almost meaningless … The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose”; (Keynes 1919: 148, 149).5

If this scenario is going to become reality, the consequences are catastrophic, as Keynes points out very pessimistically. If this happens:

“An inefficient, unemployed, disorganised Europe faces us, torn by internal strife and international hate, fighting, starving, pillaging,
and lying. What warrant is there for a picture of less sombre colours?"; (Keynes 1919: 157).

**Political considerations**

According to Keynes, Germany should be treated differently than stated in the Peace Treaty. This was not due to economic arguments alone. Peace terms had to be not only economically acceptable they should also be political fair and just. That is, you have to focus on international relationships between countries due to trade patterns and other economic relations between countries as well as political arrangements. Therefore, as Keynes pointed out at the very beginning of his book:

“If the European civil war is to end with France and Italy abusing their momentary victorious power to destroy Germany and Austria-Hungary now prostate, they invite their own destruction also, being so deeply and inextricably intertwined with the victims by hidden psychic and economic bonds”; (Keynes 1919: 2).

Because of this view, Keynes argued that the Treaty had to be revised. Rather visionary, Keynes states that one should hope that a Trade Union could be established in the near future including not only the European countries but also Turkey, Egypt and India. Such a Union "might do as much for the peace and prosperity of the world as the League of Nations itself"; (Keynes 1919: 169). If such a free trade area is established one would expect Germany to be the core country of union, Keynes goes on arguing that such an institution “might go some way in effect towards realizing the former German dream of Mittel-Europa”.

Furthermore, you have to take into consideration that:

“A debtor nation does not love its creditor … If, on the other hand, these great debts are forgiven, a stimulus will be given to the solidarity and true friendliness of the nation’s lately associated”; (Keynes 1919: 177).

A way out, is to propose, Keynes goes on arguing, to set up an international loan scheme. The task of such an institution would be to finance Europe’s – including Germany’s – net import. And the financier of such an arrangement has to be the US.
Finally, it is important not to put Russia aside, Keynes argues. Instead, the European countries should try to integrate Russia economically with Europe. That would be to the benefit of both. In trying to achieve this, Germany has an essential role to play, as Keynes sees it. In this respect, the Allies should ”encourage and assist Germany to take up again her place in Europe as a creator and organiser of wealth for her eastern and southern neighbours”; (Keynes 1919: 187).

To sum up

*The Economic Consequences of the Peace* had a very clear and decisive message to deliver to its reader. The scheme of reparations stipulated in the Peace Treaty of Versailles, especially those concerning Germany, was not only not fair and just; the terms of the Treaty were also indeed very harmful to the future economic environment in Germany as well as in Europe. You had to expect that not only Germany, but also the allied countries themselves, would run into very severe economic as well as probably also politically troublesome times. Moreover, perhaps an economic depression could even be so deep that the forces of destruction — economic and political — would become victorious in the end. Seen from Keynes’s point of view, the harmonious, optimistic and prosperous economic times of prewar Europe were forever gone.

As we all know, Keynes was certainly right in his prophecy in many ways. Unfortunately, it took some time before the politicians got around to ‘revise’ the Treaty of Versailles and ease the terms for Germany. Therefore, the 1920s and 1930s became indeed a damaging period in history, with worldwide tremendous negative consequences economically as well as politically. These events came to pave the road to the regime of Hitler and to the outbreak of World War 2.

Some empirical evidence

Of course, warfare has serious consequences. It affects human life immensely in many ways. So did of course World War 1. It was, as stated by (Singleton 2007: 42):

“an economic disaster of the highest order, especially in Europe. Its greatest impact was felt at the level of the individual – millions were
killed or wounded and others lost relatives, wealth and incomes. It is impossible to put a dollar figure on the ‘cost’ of the war. What level of compensation would have been adequate to satisfy those who suffered, whether materially or psychologically, as the result of the war?”.

In what follows, some economic aspects of World War 1 are presented.

Seen from the perspective of an economist, powers of war are basically depended partly on manpower – the size of population – and partly on the economic strength of the country in question as recognized by (Broadberry & Harrison 2009: 16):

“The richer countries were not only able to mobilise more men. Regardless of distance, they also supplied them better. Capital-abundant economies were able to support capital-intensive warfare”.

That is, the supply of armament in World War 1 was determined by the wealth of the individual country. The better off economically, the bigger the supply of weapons. Obviously, as indicated in Table 1, both the UK and the US were better off than France and Germany.

### Table 1: The wartime change in real GDP, 1913-1918

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<td>1917</td>
<td>105.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>114.3</td>
<td>113.2</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>81.8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Broadberry & Harrison 2009: 12).

Furthermore, as a consequence of wartime activities the share of government spending as a percentage of GDP had to grow. Once again, France and Germany were hit the hardest as shown in Table 2. And of course, govern-
ment spending must be financed either by taxes or by cuts in non-wartime activities or by borrowing.

Table 2: The share of government spending (percentage of GDP), 1913-1918

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<td>1914</td>
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<td>46.4</td>
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<td>1916</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>47.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>59.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>50.1</td>
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</table>

Source: (Broadberry & Harrison 2009: 15).

As an example, the UK budget deficit rose from 334 (£m) in 1914/15 to 1,690 (£m) in 1918/19. Because of this, the debt/GDP ratio rose from 26.2% in 1913/14 to 127.5% in 1918/19 (around 80% of the national debt was domestically held). In general, debt problems restricted the economic development in Europe after the War. The US had provided Britain and France with war loans, that made Britain and France to extend their own credits to Italy and Russia keeping them both in the coalition fighting much longer than they otherwise would had been able to.

Likewise, due to warfare activities, the economy is stressed as total aggregate demand has to match that of a maximum of supply, or stated differently, economies at war experiences both a demand pull as well as a cost-push kind of inflation. As such, the GDP deflator of the UK rose from an index of 100 in 1913 to an index of 225 in 1919 (as a percentage of 1913); (Broadberry & Howlett 2009: 218, 219). Hurt the most was of course Germany who experienced a period of hyperinflation in the beginning of the 1920s, which brought its financial system to break down. In general, most European countries suffered from inflationary tendencies.

Not surprisingly, in general, World War 1 combatants had a lower annual growth in real GDP than World War 1 neutral countries. That is the case concerning the war years as well as the interwar period. As pointed out by (Ritschl & Straumann 2010: 159-160), most of the European countries experienced growth rates that were below their historical growth paths. Seen
from their perspective, full recovery in this regard had to await the golden age of the 1960s: “In the three decades after 1914, Europe’s economy was in recession relative to trend during fourteen years, and cumulatively lost forty percent of its potential output”.

As such, the UK, Germany, the US, and to a lesser extent, France all experienced problems with unemployment from 1921 and onwards. Especially during the Great Recession in the 1930s unemployment rates grew to very high levels as indicated by Figure 1.

![Figure 1: Unemployment rates in industry, 1921-39 (%)](image)

Source: (Garside 2007:52).

In the period 1913-1929, the UK had an average growth rate of only 0.7%, Germany one of 1.2% and France – probably the country most stressed economically during the war years⁹ – had the highest growth rate of 1.9%, whereas for instance Denmark had one of 2.7%; (Broadberry & Harrison 2009: 33). That Germany has a rather low growth rate comes as no surprise due to the burden of reparations. That was to be expected because, as stated by (Ritschl 2009:68): “The harsh clauses of the Treaty of Versailles can be interpreted as a desperate attempt to achieve an ersatz victory by economic means”."¹⁰
More surprisingly, the UK had an even lower growth rate in the above-men-
tioned period. However, this might be explained, as stated by (Greasley &
Oxley 1996), by a poor competitiveness which stressed the British industry
tremendously in the 1920s, making the macroeconomic outcome, in gene-
ral, to be one of unemployment. The interesting question is then, which – if
any – role did World War 1 play in this story? Based on their statistical
analyses the answer seems quite clear: the impact of the War had indeed
an important role to play – likewise, (Broadberry & Howlett 2009: 229)
also argue that World War 1 had a significant negative long run impact
on Britain’s wealth (a setback of 11.0% to 14.9% of pre-war wealth). Or as
(Greasley & Oxley 1996:94) conclude:

“there were statistically significant breaks in British industrial pro-
duction during the period 1879 to 1938 ... [their statistical analyses]
... emphasize that the First World War marked the major structural
discontinuity in Britain’s industrial growth ... The macroeconomic
shock of the First World War had enduring consequences for British
industry ... [therefore] ... the origins of the depressed interwar indus-
trial economy appear to lie in the macroeconomic shock of the First
World War, since neither the return to gold in 1925 nor the 1929 US
crash had more than a transitory effect on British industrial produc-
tion”.

Likewise, as international relations after World War 1 did far from function
as well as had been the case before the war years might of course also have
contributed to the low growth rates of Britain.

Furthermore, by use of supply side economic arguments, (Broadberry 1990)
tries to explain why the UK developed serious problems with its level of
competitiveness due to a rise in the real wage which resulted in the emer-
gence of mass unemployment in the UK. From 1921 to 1938 with an excep-
tion of the year 1927, the unemployment rate was above 10% – in the range
of 10.3% to 22.1%; (see Figure 1 and Chick & Pettifor (2010)). At the same
time, due to the regulation during World War 1 there was a built up of un-
satisfied demand. Because of this, Broadberry argues that workers in gen-
eral desired more leisure rather than more income as the supply of goods
was rather limited. However, the reduction in hours worked – “the major
supply shock of the interwar period”; (Broadberry 1990: 276) – was not
accompanied by a similar reduction in the money wage and with a fall in
the general price level, we have an increasing real wage. Therefore: “it was
the unfortunate combination of the scale of the hours reduction, the mainte-
nance of the weekly wage, and the appreciation of the exchange rate which was so devastating for British industry in the aftermath of World War I” (Broadberry 1990: 282).

That France performs as well as illustrated may also seem surprising. As stated by (Hautceour 2009), France adapted growth-wise, apparently, quite astoundingly well to the war in comparison with its neighbors, although France had an ongoing severe budgetary crisis until 1926. Perhaps this fact, to some degree, could be explained by the huge state intervention in the economy as the state took a massive part in macroeconomic management (an enormous rise in government expenditure, the state’s demand for resources e.g. in the labor market as well as financially). However, according to (Hautceour 2009: 201), France was hit hard by the fact that it lost its old position in the world, economically as well as politically. Similar to the UK, France’s position in the ‘new’ world order was less superior than it had been before the outbreak of World War 1.

Although the US became an active war partner rather late, the War had influenced the US economy from the very beginning as the European purchases of goods turned the recession around and created a rather long period of boom like times. In general, World War 1 highlighted the magnificent economic strength that she had; economically as well as financially. From now on, the US took the first rank among countries as the industrial nation. Moreover, the US was not affected negatively to the same degree by wartime activities as was the case with the European combatants. As a result of this process of transformation – Britain’s economic weakness and the increasing strength of the US – it meant, for instance, that the War “undoubtedly contributed to the emergence of New York as a centre of capital export”. From now on, “entrepreneurs and governments would look to the one industrial nation that had remained largely unscathed by the war”; (Rockoff 2009: 335). However, seen from the perspective of (Rockoff 2009: 338), the most important long run impact of the War might have been political rather than purely economic, as the War had an impact “on the ideology of the nation’s economic and political leaders”. That is, the lessons of World War 1 gave way to a new understanding of the “reforming liberalism of the 1930s that inspired future generations of would-be reformers”.

That World War 1 had an impact on economic and political matters in the 1920s and 1930s for many countries is a fact. In addition, of course, to some extent, economic and political matters were interrelated with each other.
When the War ended, all kinds of economic organizations were challenged, as economic conditions were in general very fragile indeed.\textsuperscript{17}

To some countries, the War had an even more devastating impact.

In Germany, it gave birth to a new kind of democracy with serious economic problems, which later on broke down as Germany transformed itself into the Nazi regime and gained economic recovery.\textsuperscript{18} In Russia, it meant the building up of the communist state of Lenin and Stalin and depressive economic living conditions for most of the population. In the UK, it gave her an inferior position than hitherto, politically as well as economically – for many years, the UK suffered economic hard times with huge unemployment. In the US, it gave birth to her as a modern superpower; although hit hard by the Great Depression, the Roosevelt administration gave its citizens not only hope of a better future but also a macroeconomic plan that early on in the 1930s began stimulating the level of effective demand in the US and made the economic recession less severe.

**Concluding remarks**

With the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to see why a World War was not avoided in time. Why give away prosperous times for nothing? What were the motives for war?

As pointed out by (Broadberry & Harrison 2009), the liberalism that followed the classical economic period of Adam Smith and David Ricardo was challenged in the late nineteenth century by imperialistic political views. Now, more priority, politically, was directed towards being able to control more territory at the cost of trade benefits. As such, these politicians reasoned that “it was worth Germany’s while to break up world trade for a while in order to grab territory from the older powers”; (Broadberry & Harrison 2009: 3).\textsuperscript{19} Perhaps more territory could be a way to more wealth.\textsuperscript{20}

As we all know, that was not the outcome of the War. Instead, World War 1 produced a fragmented Europe with countries that were “ensnared in reparations and debts, and incapable of returning to political and economic stability”; (Eloranta & Harrison 2010: 134).

That is, as Keynes had prophesized in 1919, the decades to come were indeed dramatic. For some, there were times of enormous economic prosperity; for others it was years of heartbreaking depressive economic realities.\textsuperscript{21}
On the ruins of World War 1, the foundations of the coming Nazi regime were laid down brick by brick.\textsuperscript{22} Once again, the quest for \textit{Lebensraum} became the keyword for Germany. However, at the end, they did not achieve this goal. Once again, Europe was torn apart.

Furthermore, Britain lost its superior position in the world, economically as well as politically. From now on, the international scene was dominated by the US as the one and only superpower.\textsuperscript{23} And this is a position that she more or less has held ever since.

On the ruins of World War 2, the foundations of the coming process of European integration were built. Also in this respect, Keynes had foreseen what probably would be the best solution for peace in Europe. This time, Germany succeeded in so far as she became one of the two founding partners – the other one being France – of the European project\textsuperscript{24} that, until the recent crisis, paved the road to economic prosperity for most European countries. In this respect, as the most economically important member of the European Union – and the EMU – Germany finally ‘conquered’ Europe the third time.

Finally, World War 1 also, at least to some extent, triggered a rather long period of massive unemployment in the UK and elsewhere. It was due to these empirical facts of depressive economic times that Keynes undertook the role, being the most internationally known economist of his time, to try to get economic theory to be in better accordance with real life phenomena. His long life struggle succeeded at last with his publication of his \textit{General Theory} on 4 February 1936. As we all know, it was based on the content of this book that the Keynesian Revolution emerged, which for decades to come, set the scene for macroeconomic thought. Based on this economic understanding and its economic policy recommendations, prosperity was brought to many Western countries as argued, among others, by (Skidelsky 2009).\textsuperscript{25}
Reference list


Endnotes

1 Thanks to Søren Dosenrode, Wolfgang Zank, Mikael Randrup Byrialsen and Robert Smith for comments on an earlier draft of the present chapter. The content of this chapter is a revised version of WP 2016-3 ‘World War I – some economic aspects and considerations’, Working Paper Series, MaMTEP, Department of Business & Management, AAU.

2 As pointed out by (Broadberry & Harrison 2009: 3): “Globalisation has been under way for centuries. The modern wave of globalisation that dates from the early nineteenth century gave a significant boost to world trade, world capital flows, and worldwide migration, with great powers competing for colonial empires on a global scale. The Great War of 1914 to 1918 then interrupted and, for a time, set into reverse the process of globalisation”.

3 Finally, at 5 June 1919, Keynes addresses the Prime Minister Lloyd George: “I ought to let you know that on Saturday I am slipping away from the scene of nightmare. I can do no more good here. I’ve gone on hoping even through these last dreadful weeks that you’d find some way to make of the Treaty a just and expedient document. But now it’s apparently too late. The battle is lost. I leave the twins [Lord Cuncliffe and Lord Sumner, two members of the British delegation who both advocated a hard line towards Germany] to gloat over the devastation of Europe, and to assess to taste what remains for the British taxpayer”; (Skidelsky 1992: 375).

4 With (Harrod 1972: 303): “The book was not written as a definitive history of the Peace Conference. It was quite intentionally designed as a polemic; it was composed in two months at a white heat of passion, immediately after the events. It sought to influence public opinion at once. Europe was disintegrating and must be saved”.

5 As Moggridge has interpreted Keynes’s general views on inflation: “Thus, as well as producing the currency fluctuations that impaired international trade and recovery, inflation was destroying the basis for capitalist accumulation itself”; (Moggridge 1992: 333).

6 As we know presently from the case of Greece; probably most Greek would agree with Keynes on this matter!
7 Alternatively, stated more precisely: “The evidence of the chapters that follow suggests that the comparative success of the various economies in mobilising their resources depended on three factors that varied independently: their level of economic development, their proximity to the front line, and the duration of their engagement”; (Broadberry & Harrison 2009: 14).

8 It must be remembered, of course, that the war was fought in France as part of its territory was occupied. Therefore: “the economic impact on the war effort was high, since all the ten departments (out of a total of 87) that were occupied stopped producing for (and paying taxes to) France”; (Hautcoeur 2009: 172).

9 As pointed out by (Hautcoeur 2009: 170): “If the war did not come as a surprise, its development and duration were unanticipated … the war represented an enormous shock to the economy”.

10 “Germany’s debt burden was clearly less outrageous than it would appear. As long as a full return to the gold parity was expected for Britain and France, it seemed reasonable to burden Germany with a debt total not far below those borne by the victorious powers … However, an additional constraint was the fact that, for the most part, German debt was foreign-owned rather than domestic”; (Ritschl, 2009: 70). And of course, payment was based on a surplus of Germany’s trade balance, which puts a limit to the amount of goods that could be imported.

11 That is Word War 1 “interrupted the long-established growth pattern by adversely affecting British industry’s competitiveness”; (Greasley & Oxley 1996: 98).

12 In general, the utility function is a positive function in both consumer goods and leisure time, U(C,L). However, if there is a kind of constraint on the number of consumer goods supplied at the market it could optimal for the individual to substitute towards consuming more leisure time thereby reducing his number of hours supplied as labor.

13 Data on per capita hours covering the period 1913-1938 is reported in (Nason & Vahey 2009: 23). Their findings fully support those of (Broadberry 1990). Furthermore, this paper delivers other data series on relevant macroeconomic variables on business cycles for the UK during World War 1 and the interwar period.
However, this explanation is questioned by (Glynn & Booth, 1992: 731) as they find his “effort to explain the slump of the early 1920s entirely in these terms is mistaken”. This point of view is, however, totally rejected by Broadberry’s reply; (Broadberry 1992).

“Before 1914, France had a central financial and political position in continental Europe and the Mediterranean, which balanced the industrial position of Germany and complemented the mostly intercontinental position of Britain”; (Hautcoeur 2009: 201).

Not only concerning the level of GDP growth and fluctuations in the level of employment but also financially. As pointed out by (Oliver 2007: 195): “the list of countries that experienced banking and currency crises by the end of the interwar years reads like an atlas of the world”.

Therefore: “Politicians, bankers, economists, businessmen, union leaders and workers had to make important decisions on the basis of incomplete or misleading information … Instead of working for the common good, many preferred to act in their own perceived best interests. Politicians sought re-election, bondholders campaigned for deflation, workers demanded higher wages and so on. Suffice is to say that the problems were immense and the actors poorly informed, confused and selfish”; (Singleton 2007: 29).

As seen from Figure 1, the unemployment rate drops down from 1933 and onwards. Perhaps not surprisingly, election results in Germany confirm that the support to the political extremes (the Nazi party and the Communists) could be seen as a ‘function’ of the economic situation – the deeper the recession the greater the support.

As argued in Chapter 2 of the present book, ‘The reasons for the war’ written by Knud Knudsen, this traditional old view of Germany as the aggressor is challenged somewhat by modern research as some studies argue, that Germany was far from being the sole responsible for the outbreak of the war. For details, please consult the chapter written by Knudsen.

That is “in continuity with the period before 1914 was the rivalry for colonies”; (Eloranta & Harrison 2010: 140). According to (Broadberry & Harrison 2009: 7, 10), 1913-GDP per capita data gave the US and the
UK first positions with 5,301 $ and 4,921 $ compared with Germany’s level of only 3,648 $ (almost the same as that of France: 3,485 $).

21 “The First World War cast a long shadow over interwar economic development that international institutions failed to disperse. Unresolved tensions eroded the possibilities of returning to a normal world, and Europe became fatally polarized between wealthy and poor, democracies and dictatorships”; (Eloranta & Harrison 2010: 149).

22 With (Ritschl 2009: 72) on the Versailles Treaty: “It sought economic safeguards in the absence of a credible security arrangement. It prolonged the agony of Germany’s economy for several more years. It strengthened the elements aimed at revenge instead of promoting change and modernisation. And when its feeble controls ultimately collapsed, nothing was left to prevent Germany from rearming for World War II”.

23 As pointed out by (Aldcroft 1987: 33), Europe in general experienced a decline in economic importance as the European “economic machine became impoverished and run-down during the course of hostilities, while she became increasingly dependent on external sources of supply and finance. The United States became the great provider, and as Europe lost overseas investments and contacts so America increased her influence and emerged from the war as a strong net creditor”.

24 The first step in the European process of integration was the implementation of the ‘European Coal and Steel Community’ in 1951 with six members: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

25 As stated by (Carabelli & Cédrine 2010), it seems as if Keynes with the Economic Consequences of the Peace got his understanding on the complexities of international economic relations in place early on. With this understanding, Keynes tried to pave the way to “a sounder political economy between nations”, (Carabelli & Cédrine, 2010: 1026), with his plan for an International Clearing Union. The result of the negotiations at the end of World War 2 became known as the Bretton Woods system. Also in this respect, it seems, might World War 1 have had a lasting impact.
Chapter 11

The impact of World War 1 on everyday technologies: With an emphasis on transport and communication

Louise Karlskov Skyggebjerg

Poison gas and the sound of machine gun fire in the trenches in France. Submarines as a fatal weapon at sea and the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare. The first bombing of London carried out by German airships. Aircraft used for reconnaissance and developed as bombers and fighters as well. Tanks, flamethrowers, battleships etc. Many accounts of World War 1 and technology focus on the development of weapons and other technologies for military use.¹ No doubt, there was a huge effort to perfect old weapons and develop new ones in the decades before and during the War, not least the aircraft. However, the aircraft did not have a decisive impact on the War (Wilson and Prior 2001), but was the opposite true? Did the War have a decisive impact on the aircraft itself or on other technologies which could be used for civilian purposes?

Some technologies used by the military are only useful as weapons, while other technologies are fit for civil use as well. In popular history writing, World War 1 is said to have boosted the development and diffusion of a whole bunch of such technologies like zips, stainless steel, radio, aircraft, tea bags, and wristwatches.² The thesis in this chapter is that the connection between World War 1 and the development and diffusion of new technologies is much more blurred than this mainly positive and quite popular story about war as a booster of new technologies, common in popular history writing, at museums, and the like. We need empirically based analysis of how exactly war and technological change are connected, not just an
endless repetition of the same myth-based and unambiguous stories. In this chapter, I therefore look into certain aspects of communication and transport in order to reconsider the relationship between war and technological change on the basis of empirical analysis. The analysis has an emphasis on the development in Continental Europe, especially Denmark, and on technologies for civil use. I focus on everyday technologies, understood as technologies which – not necessarily at the time of World War 1, but sometime later in history – became widely used for civilian purposes; technologies which became an unquestioned part of the quotidian, something we came to take for granted as an unquestioned part of our daily lives in Continental Europe.

Purposely, I do not distinguish between the development of new technologies in a narrow technical sense and the transfer and diffusion of knowledge, skills, and usage of technologies, as I see them as closely interrelated parts of any innovation process. In the Schumpeterian tradition, the processes of invention, innovation, and diffusion are commonly seen as more or less clearly separable phases. However, inspired by the English historian of technology, David Edgerton with his plea for a more user-centric history of technology and focus on the transformation and use of old technologies (Edgerton 2006), I find it much more fruitful to treat invention, innovation, and diffusion as closely interrelated aspects of a messy and constantly ongoing process of technological change.

**War and technology**

In both belligerent and neutral countries, a war changes normal procedures in many ways. Denmark was not an active part of World War 1, and Danish industry was neither destroyed nor largely turned into armaments production. However, even in neutral Denmark, industry in general was highly influenced by limitations in import and export during the War, not least after the submarine blockade came about in 1917. The experience of shortages in raw materials and fuel was a common experience, and some markets were turned upside down. The market for some commodities like silverware and canned meat flourished, while other industries tried to get through by using substitute materials and developing new products. The business anniversary literature often describes both World Wars as a kind of break from normal operation, a break which lasted longer than the wars because of the rationing of materials and currency restrictions in the following years (Knudsen 1921; Møller 1960; Villadsen 1995; Hansen and Serin 1997). To be sure,
even for a neutral country, World War 1 meant something, but was this something positive or negative regarding technological change?

The idea that war has a positive influence on the development and diffusion of technology is, as mentioned, common in popular science literature, but also quite usual in the academic discourse. The positive correlation is often stated as a simple fact, an undisputable truth. A conventional argument is that large amounts of resources are invested in military research and development in wartime, which leads to the development of sciences and technologies for civilian and military use (Edgerton 2011, 21).

Lewis Mumford, a well-known historian of technology, argued in *Technics and Civilization* (1934) that war has been the chief propagator of the machine. While World War 1 was characterized as a large-scale industrial operation, he found the opposite true as well: that modern industrialism could be termed a large-scale military operation. Key factors of modern industry, like interchangeable parts, standardization, mass production, and the massive manufacture of iron he ascribed to the pressure of military demands. In his view, “the most important fact about modern warfare is the steady increase of mechanization from the fourteenth century onward: here militarism forced the pace and cleared a straight path to the development of modern large-scale standardized industry” (Mumford 1934: 87). In Mumford’s opinion, war stimulates invention, although he found it a paradox that the army often had resisted invention, in his mind because of what he termed third-rate minds (Mumford 1934).

Historian of economy John Nef is a proponent of the opposite view. In 1950, in his study of the influences of war on material progress, Nef strongly criticized the notion that war is a constructive economic force. Instead, he argued that remarkable technical progress was made possible by a relatively peaceful period from 1815 to 1914, where peaceful requirements were of greater importance for inventors than military ones. In the period between World War 1 and 2, he found that the United States, compared to the European countries, had had favorable conditions for mechanical progress because the former had benefitted from the constructive advantages of military preparations without experiencing the directly destructive consequences of warfare at home. In short, Nef argued that warfare had been less a cause for industrialism than its shadow (Nef 1950).

Since Mumford and Nef, there have been numerous studies on the relationships between economy, technological change, and military imperatives,
often in the form of studies of the so-called military-industrial complex (Hacker 1994). Much of the discussion has been about the consequences of war for economic development and the development of social institutions, rather than technological change.\(^3\) When it comes to technological change, a key thesis is – as mentioned – that the military plays an important role as a stimulator of technological development, especially in wartime. As the story often goes, military-born technologies like radar, nuclear energy, and computers “spill over” into civilian use. However, this thesis is, among others, criticized by historian of technology David Noble because it suggests that military influence is something external and temporary. In general, Noble finds that the military has played a central role in industrial development and has shaped our technologies and social institutions, which he does not see as an unambiguously positive thing (Noble 1985).

David Edgerton, another historian of technology and an expert on World War 2, finds that the development of key civil technologies probably was retarded by the War. However, the significance of the military and military-related institutions for innovation should, in his view, not be neglected, and he finds no simple answer to the question: does war accelerate or decelerate the progress of science and technology? (Edgerton 2011). In his view, conventional stories of the relations between war and technology are, in general, innovation-centered stories focusing too much on new technologies. As examples, he points out that the relatively novel machine gun and poison gas did not kill nearly as many on the Western Front in World War 1 as artillery fire and small arms. The great battleships were hardly used, and the airplane did not have the devastating and decisive effect predicted, their significance was rather found in the threat of use, than in the actual use (Edgerton 2006).

In the following, I look into three specific cases regarding communication and transport – radio, motor trucks, and airplanes – where World War 1 is often thought of as a booster of technological innovation and diffusion. I do so in order to nuance this picture through empirical examples of the connection between World War 1 and technological development in Continental Europe, especially in Denmark. In the conclusion, I discuss the relationship between war and technological change on the basis of these empirical examples.
Radio: Military involvement in point-to-point communication

It was in 1922 when radio as we primarily think of it today – used for transmitting news and information, entertainment, and advertising to a general public – started booming. In Denmark, two radio amateur clubs were formed; they started publishing magazines and experimental radio programs were broadcasted. The situation was quite peculiar: while listening to the radio was forbidden until a new law was passed in 1923, the minority of amateurs who actually asked for permission to use a radio receiver got ‘no’ as an answer. In 1925, the Danish State Radio started broadcasting (Den traadløse 1922; Gerald, 1926; Bramslev 1982).

These and similar events in other European countries marked a shift from a period where radio was mainly seen as a means of point-to-point communication – a competitor for telegraphy by cable – to a supplementary perception of radio as a broadcasting technology useful for educational and cultural objectives, a mass communication technology. To a large degree, the same technical components were the backbone in two quite distinctive communication systems, radio as wireless telegraphy and radio as broadcasting.

The rise of radio broadcasting in the early 1920s was in fact an unanticipated consequence of a then quite old radio technology (Aitken 1985), a technology in which the military had taken great interest from the very beginning. The navies, especially, were involved in the development of radio as a point-to-point communication technology long before World War I, and during the War, radio and the military remained closely connected (Edgerton 2006).

In the words of the historian Daniel R. Headrick, radio “was born into a world of jittery jingoism and started life as a weapon in the commercial and military rivalries of the great powers” (Headrick 1991: 116). In Germany, the development of Telefunken (Gesellschaft für drahtlose Telegraphie) and the planning and hosting of the two first international radio telegraph conferences in 1903 and 1906 illustrate this point. These incidents were a result of a political and military interest in preventing a Marconi monopoly in wireless telegraphy (Friedewald 2000).

The development in Denmark can also illuminate the high degree of military involvement in the new point-to-point communication technology.
The Danish navy began experimenting with what was firstly known as wireless telegraphy only a few years after the Italian inventor Marconi had demonstrated radio technology for the first time. And in 1906, representatives from both the navy and the army were in the Danish delegation at the international telegraphy conference in Berlin, where the term radio was adopted as the official word for wireless telegraphy (Gerald 1963; Bramslev 1982).

In the early years, radio technology was primarily seen as a maritime matter, imagined to be useful for rescue operations at sea and correspondence with ships, both private and naval vessels. In 1907, the first Danish passenger ships began to use radio, and the first Danish radio act was passed – which gave the state exclusive rights to construct and operate wireless telegraphy. Without special permission, nobody else was allowed to experiment with and use radio. The navy was so involved in radio at that time that they actually suggested that they should control all future coast radio stations in the country. However, they were opposed by the State Telegraph, who argued that the handling of telegrams was their task (Gerald 1963; Bramslev 1982).

The military frame that dominated radio technology before and during World War 1 had consequences for the radio discourse as well, and thereby for the visions of inventors and developers. In the public imagination, radio technology had a close entanglement with security from early on, and this discursive context put constraints on the development of radio as a broadcasting technology (Satia 2010).

Civil experiments with broadcasting

The technical prerequisite for the possibility of the expansion of radio from point-to-point communication in Morse code to including the broadcasting of music and the human voice was the development of a way of generating undamped continuous radio waves. This was impossible in Marconi’s system. In 1902, the Danish inventor Valdemar Poulsen patented the Poulsen arc transmitter, one way to generate continuous waves. Another way, the radio frequency alternator, was developed in the US by Reginald Fessenden. He is often said to be the first to transmit music in 1906 (Buhl 1995). However, the main reason for finding new ways of generating radio waves was actually not a wish to transmit talking and music, it was to solve interference problems in the old point-to-point communication system.
The new ways for generating undamped continuous radio waves were used for some years, not least for military purposes and with armies and navies as important customers. However, in the years after World War 1, they were outperformed by the use of vacuum tubes as a third technology to generate undamped continuous radio waves. During World War 1, all three systems were in use together with Marconi’s old spark system. However, the vacuum tube system was quite new and only just out of the laboratory in 1914 (Aitken 1985).

The qualitative shift in what radio was used for, not only point-to-point communication but broadcasting as well, followed few years after World War 1 and the shift has often been interpreted in connection with the development of radio technology during the War. I will therefore look into what World War 1 concretely meant for the development of radio.

First of all, the War generally stopped the experiments of radio amateurs, including early experiments with broadcasting. In Denmark, an assistant of Poulsen, Peter Jensen, had transmitted the human voice without wires as early as 1907 from Lyngby Radio, the Poulsen’s experimental station (Jensen 1948). Two years later, radio sent from Lyngby Radio was demonstrated in public at an exhibition in Copenhagen. The first Danish radio amateurs, two teenagers experimenting with radio transmitting and listening, listened to the music experiments on their homemade radio. Unfortunately, because of the radio act of 1907, both their listening and their experiments with sending were in fact illegal, and when their activities were reported to the authorities, they were stopped. However, after a short break, they received official permission as experimenting radio amateurs. This went well until the outbreak of World War 1 stopped their experiments again. The authorities simply demanded their equipment dismantled.

This is just one example showing that with war going on, the authorities in many countries would not allow civil radio experiments, neither listening nor sending. In Britain, constables actually confiscated and sealed thousands of private wireless sets (Headrick 1991). In Belgium, where concerts were broadcasted regularly before the War, the War put an end to this, and in the US, a ban on amateur radio – among other things – stopped transmissions of wireless phonograph concerts and other broadcasting experiments carried out by inventors, amateurs, and universities (Gerald 1963; Ahm 1972; Breidahl & Rée 1940; Slotten 2006). Seen in this light, the few experiments with broadcasting for soldiers during the War (White 1996/2015)
were nothing that really mattered. In general, the War put a spoke in the wheel regarding experiments with radio as a broadcasting technology.

The problem with amateur radio from a military point of view was twofold. Firstly, the radio amateurs sending radio could cause serious interference problems, and secondly, all radio amateurs could be listening in on secret communication. Contrary to wired communication, radio waves can be listened to by everybody with a receiver.

The military interests were in the possibility of transmitting secret encoded messages, not in radio broadcasting as a mass medium (Friedewald 2000). That meant that the uncontrollable spreading of radio waves in all directions was seen as a negative thing preventing secrecy, not as a positive thing enabling many listeners (Aitken 1985; Headrick 1991).

**Information flow, international cooperation, and business opportunities**

The outbreak of the War did not only stop some amusements for radio amateurs. The War in general meant that the military took over the existing radio systems. In Germany, as an example, all private and public radio stations were taken over by the military (Friedewald 2000), and in Denmark, the civil experimental station, Lyngby Radio, was – from the moment the War broke out – guarded by the military and soon taken over by the Danish state (Bramslev 1982).

The War also made it harder to maintain an international flow of information about technological developments. When a Danish engineer in 1918 did a lecture about the development of radio, he complained that it had been difficult to get information about progress in the previous years because the belligerent countries had treated information with confidentiality (Poulsen 1918). This was not the only example of such complaints, and concretely, the War stopped the work of an “International Commission on Scientific Wireless Telegraphy” (Bramslev 1982) founded in Belgium in 1913. The limited international information flow was bad news for the development of the radio because, contrary to many myths about the lonely and only inventor, the development of new technologies usually involves international inspiration and exchange of knowledge. As an example, the vacuum tube has been called “an international accomplishment” (Tyne 1977: 5).
If radio was going to be a useful technology, other kinds of international cooperation were necessary as well, namely the coordination of the use of the wavelengths in the radio spectrum. This was a huge issue in the International Radio Convention, agreed upon in London in 1912. However, the War stopped this kind of international collaboration and no new conference was called in Washington in 1917 as planned. In fact, no new international radio conference was held before 1927. Among other things, this meant that the section in the Treaty of Versailles that bound Germany to obey any international radiotelegraph convention that might come into force within five years was never in use (Headrick 1991).

As mentioned, the military was an important radio customer from the very beginning, and the War created business opportunities for the professional radio corporations in the form of military orders. The number of Danish civil ships equipped with radio also increased during the War (Gerald 1963), among other things to enhance safety in the unsafe wartimes with the risk of attack at sea. However, at the same time, the War destroyed other civil business opportunities. After the War, Poulsen’s arc transmitter patent was extended, with reference to the problems induced by the War on the possibilities for commercial use. Historian of science Hans Buhl, who has studied the story of the arc transmitter in detail, concludes that the War had both inhibitory and stimulating effects on the development and diffusion of the arc transmitter technology used, among others, by the German navy (Buhl 1995).

Radio tubes

One effect of the outbreak of the War in 1914 with direct consequences for the development of the Poulsen system was that the construction of a transatlantic radio station with arc transmitter in Canada was stopped immediately. This forced two Danes, M.P. Pedersen and Otto Skovmand, working on the construction, to leave Canada. Before they left, they contacted Lee de Forest, who in 1906 had patented his audion, an early type of radio tube (Gerald 1963; Bramslev 1982). It was then arranged that Pedersen and Skovmand should be the representatives of de Forest’s company in Scandinavia, and they had an audion transmitter sent to Denmark. However, the War soon made the import of radio tubes impossible. Instead, they started their own production, in spite of troubles with a shortage of the mercury needed in the production process. This brought the manufacturing of a new technology, radio tubes, to Denmark.
When historians often perceive World War 1 as an important period in the development of radio, they normally think of the technological development of radio tubes during the War, the radio technology that became dominant in the 1920s. In fact, all important vacuum tube inventions had been done before World War 1 but, in 1914, most of the available tubes were still at an early stage of practical application. Only few radio tubes were on the market, and they were not at all suited for war, being difficult to manufacture, unreliable, and not very robust. During the War, more reliable tubes were developed first in France (available from 1916) and in the US before the country entered the War in 1917. Also in Germany, tubes were developed. Telefunken was involved in the development of a tube invented by Robert von Lieben in 1912, and the company started manufacturing tubes two years later. In 1917, the first vacuum tube transmitters were employed on German warships and used by the German troops at the Western Front (Friedewald 2000; Thrower 2014).

Radio innovation focused on military purposes

In general, the War speeded up developmental work and production on the background of military demands and highlighted the need for reliable and uniform interchangeable tubes (Tyne 1977; Anonymous 1919). In this way, the War had a positive influence on the development of radio in boosting the development of the technology that became dominant in the 1920s when broadcasting boomed. However, during the War, broadcasting was not at all in focus, not even as a technology useful for propaganda. Instead, the focus was on developing radio as a technology with a direct military output such as radio systems usable in the trenches or for communication with aircraft. The use of Morse code in airplanes had been demonstrated before the War, but the weight and size of the radio equipment, together with noise, vibration, and electrical interference caused problems. Radio communication with airplanes made a leap forward during the War. However, the equipment continued to be large and rather unreliable, and as late as 1927, Charles Lindbergh did not carry radio on his transatlantic flight, to save weight (Schroer 2003).

A Major, J.E. Cochrane, described the status quo of wireless telegraphy for military purposes in 1913, and listed four advantages of wireless compared to older methods of communication: it cannot be cut by the enemy, it can be quickly moved (no wires must be taken up and re-layed), communication can be established between two points without the necessity of traversing the
country between them, and communication can be established with ships at sea (Cochrane 1913). Radio technology was indeed used by the military in World War 1, but cable communication was still far more common. After the War, it was estimated, that the US Signal Corps had laid out around 100,000 miles of wire in France alone (Mroz 2009). However, the War also showed the vulnerability of this kind of point-to-point communication and, during the War, the submarine cables were often overloaded with wartime traffic or simply cut by the enemy. Though the military and political importance of communication networks in the form of both cables and radio stations became obvious during the War – if it had not been even before – it was still primarily the submarine cables and the question of what to do with the German cables which drew attention in the peace negotiations in Versailles, not the new radio technology (Aitken 1985; Headrick 1991; Winkler 2009).

To sum up, both before and during World War 1, military interests in radio had a stimulating effect on the development, production, and diffusion of radio in some ways, but with a focus on using the technology for point-to-point communication. For the development of radio as a broadcasting technology, the War probably had a negative effect in stopping experimentation and banning radio amateurs. This use, so familiar today, was delayed rather than promoted by the War.

After the War, radio soon changed from a mainly military technology where civil use was predominately bound to maritime use and officers were important stakeholders, to a civil technology which still would be taken over by the military in case of war, but where the daily control in Denmark was left to the State Telegraph (Archival material: Danmarks Radio). When the use of radio for point-to-point communication, still crucial for safety at sea, was supplemented with radio broadcasting in the early 1920s, the influence of the military diminished and a new state institution, the Danish Broadcasting Corporation, was formed.

I now turn to the next empirical example, how World War 1 influenced the development of the truck. Does it show the same blurred connection between technological innovation and war as the radio history told above?

**Noticed and unnoticed transport technologies in war**

At the Danish Museum of Science and Technology, an American Mack AC truck is on display. This type of truck was widely used on the battlefields
in France in World War 1. In total, around 2,500 Mack AC trucks, with the nickname “Bulldogs”, were shipped to the Continent during the War (Mroz 2009; Montville 1979). In 1919, the truck at the museum was purchased by a Danish company when the truck market became flooded with both used and newly produced motor trucks the armies didn’t need after the Armistice. It is, then, an example of technological cross-border transfer caused by World War 1.

Already at the beginning of the War, contemporaries called World War 1 the war of technique, and one of the technologies used were internal combustion engines in motor vehicles and airplanes. The visibility of this new technology was large, and among motor enthusiasts, it became common to ascribe a crucial role to the internal combustion engine for the war effort (Motor 1919; Hildesheim 1915; Rye 1938). Not least, one incident early in the War caught attention and has been retold many times ever since: when Parisian taxis and buses were used to move troops quickly under a German attack at Marne (Mroz 2009; Scheck 1997; Rye 1938; Norup 1938).

Historian of technology David Edgerton reminds us not to exaggerate the use of new technologies and forget the importance of old technologies, and the academic discourse in general often points to the importance of horses for warfare. Before World War 1, motorized vehicles had seldom been part of military equipment. Railways, horses, and mules were the normal means of transportation. In fact, the use of horses for transportation peaked in the beginning of the twentieth century and they were involved in huge numbers in both World Wars (Edgerton 2006). When the British entered World War 1, they shipped 60,000 horses, compared to 1,200 trucks, to France (Mroz 2009), and in late 1917, 450,000 British horses and mules worked on the Western Front, the majority transporting material, particularly from the railheads to the front (Edgerton 2006). In other words, horses may not have caught the same contemporary attention as the new motor vehicles, but they were essential. To quote John Singleton, a historian of business and economy, the horses were “as indispensable to the war effort as machine guns, dreadnoughts, railways and heavy artillery, yet because of our fascination with the history of technology we never give them a second thought” (Singleton 1993: 178).

**The truck and the military**

The Danish army got its first truck in 1908 (Rye, 1938), and even the much
bigger US army owned only 12 trucks in 1911. However, they began to experiment with vehicles from a number of manufacturers, and despite problems with off-road performance, prewar American tests showed the usefulness of improved trucks for military transport. In 1916, trucks were used with success by the US army in Mexico, and when the US entered World War 1 in 1917, the numbers of army trucks of all types had increased to 2,400. Several came to Europe with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), and their commanding Major General estimated that he needed no less than 50,000 trucks in Europe. The production of new trucks was geared up and, in the end, American manufacturers produced 227,000 trucks in 1918 alone (Scheck 1997).

The British military had tested steam-powered and petrol-driven trucks already in 1901. They owned 507 vehicles of different kinds in 1914, but requisitioned and purchased many more when the War broke out (Singleton 1993). In the German army, passenger cars had become an indispensable element of the work of higher officers by 1914, and motor trucks were also seen as useful for moving material. In 1914, they had approximately 500 passenger cars, compared to around 20,000 in 1918. They used a substantial number of trucks during the War as well, not least a special army truck designed in 1907 and bought by hundreds of private users who, in return for a subvention, should make their truck available to the military in case of war. This principle of subvention was also used in countries like France and England (Showalter 2002; Schwarte 1920).

However, Albert Mroz, an expert on American vehicles in World War 1, finds six reasons for why motor transport was not widely used by the military at the beginning of World War 1. The motor truck was considered unproven and unreliable, and nobody was certain of the best fuel to choose. Roads were primitive or non-existent, and hundreds of manufacturers offered an array of machines and parts which were not interchangeable. Reliable railroads were already available on the European continent, and people were not familiar with motors requiring hand-crank starting, constant maintenance, repair work, and driver training, in addition to transporting fuel and oil in huge quantities (Mroz 2009).

In short, before the War, motor vehicles were only beginning to be essential parts of military equipment, their reliability was relatively untested under battle conditions, and a huge problem was the lack of standardization. When the AEF entered France, they used 294 different types of trucks, with the result that mechanics had to cope with tens of thousands of non-
interchangeable parts (Mroz 2009). By the end of the War, thousands of motor vehicles were integrated in every army on the battlefield, but were still far outnumbered by the number of horses and were less decisive than the railways (Singleton 1993; Wolmar 2009; Schwarte 1920).

Reliability test and surplus of a wartime technology

The War was a test of reliability, but no huge technical development of trucks and motor vehicles in general came during the War. Actually, the War sometimes meant that older technological solutions better suited for war conditions were used, for example chain drives instead of shaft drives on some trucks (Norup 1938; Schwarte 1920). Many military vehicles were built for special uses, not least tanks, but they could not easily be changed to civilian use after the War. It was a curiosity when the Danish journal Motor in 1919 could write that dreadful tanks in France were rebuilt as tourist buses meant for touring in the mountains (Motor 11/10 1919).

The War certainly meant a shortage of and restrictions on the civilian use of gasoline in many European countries. However, what World War 1 changed most was the production capacity and the number of vehicles. In the US, the number of motor vehicles produced annually rose from 356,000 in 1912 to 1,526,000 in 1916. Most of them were used in the US but, in the first year of the War, approximately 16,000 trucks were exported to Europe. This corresponded to one-tenth of the estimated total number of motor vehicles in Germany and France at the outbreak of the War (Mroz 2009).

The increased production to meet military orders resulted in a huge surplus of former army motor vehicles in Europe after the War. In January 1919, Motor brought out an article about the French army as the biggest – and perhaps the only – automobile dealer in France. The army had a year before it decided to sell cars, trucks, and parts no longer useful for the military. They had put them on display near the Eiffel tower, and had already sold 7,500 motor vehicles of all kinds. The selection of vehicles was odd and their condition poor, according to Motor, which could tell that the vehicles for sale were cleaned and sometimes painted, but most of them could not be driven in their current condition (Motor 18/1 1919).

A couple of months later, Motor brought another article about the demobilization of the German army and the sale of former military vehicles from an office in Munich. Because no petrol was available, interested buyers
could not test these vehicles. The journal feared that neutral countries like Denmark would be “blessed” with a flood of old fashioned, worn-out wagons, and warned their Danish readers from buying old war equipment from the belligerent countries (Motor 15/3 1919). The warning was repeated later the same year (Motor 1919), probably not least because of the magazine’s close connections to the Danish automobile industry. The surplus of used motor vehicles was not good news for the industry and, in fact, the Danish automobile factory Triangel had a large inventory of unsold trucks in 1919, and had to put production to sleep in 1920 (Jessen 2005). In October 1919, Motor could write that the French government had bought 150,000 vehicles from the US army, according to Motor a very unpopular decision in a French motor industry afraid of a flooded market (Motor 25/10 1919).

The War did not only mean a huge surplus of used military equipment. The increased capacity of the manufacturing industry also meant that many newly produced vehicles were looking for new owners, not least when the European automobile plants used for armament production went back to normal after the War, first in France and later in Germany.

The War altered the balance between the American and the European automobile industry as well, and led to tough competition. Before the War, European cars were exported to the US. After the War, the European countries were flooded with American vehicles coming from a country spared from the direct ravages of war, and a country where the industry had not been turned into armament production. Instead, it had prospered from the massive export to the belligerent European countries (Schmitto 1938).

The surplus of trucks in Europe after the War was visible in Motor, where the number of advertisements for trucks increased in 1919 and far outnumbered prewar times. According to Motor, there were approximately 3,000 trucks in Denmark in the summer of 1920, compared to the 930 vans and trucks in the official statistics from 1917. In between, there had been some years with little motoring because of import restrictions and lack of fuel (Motor 1920).

Looking back in 1938, it was claimed that the rising number of motor trucks in the first postwar years had been an unhealthy development based on the uncritical use of old military vehicles. However, what was called a much better development had begun in the middle of the 1920s, when lighter and cheaper trucks on pneumatic tires came on to the market. No matter what, the 1920s were a take-off time for the truck in Denmark (Mortensen 1938).
To sum up, contrary to the development of radio, the military was not closely involved in the development of trucks before the War. However, it became an important customer of trucks during the War, which led to increased production capacity and a huge surplus of trucks immediately after the War. The military interests in motor vehicles during the War led to the development of advanced tanks, but no big leap forward in the technical development of trucks in general (Schwarte 1920). On the contrary, during the War, a shortage of fuel and rubber put serious constraints on the development and use of trucks for civil purposes. And after the War, a market flooded with old vehicles made it difficult to produce and sell new ones, which probably delayed innovation.

I now turn to the third and last empirical example, how World War 1 influenced the development of airplanes. Contrary to the truck, the airplane changed a lot during the War.

**From stuff of dreams to reliable means of transportation**

When World War 1 broke out, radio and motor trucks were both relatively old technologies developed as practical, usable technologies. The airplane was, to a much higher degree, still the stuff of dreams. During the War, it changed and two years after the Armistice, the first Danish airline, Det Danske Luftfartselskab (DDL), started scheduled flights. The plane was a rebuilt German seaplane, the Friedrichshafen FF 49 C, originally designed for reconnaissance and equipped with two machine guns. Instead, it now had room for two passengers sitting in the open air and entering the plane by climbing a ladder. Just like the Mack AC truck, the plane was a case of the technology transfer of surplus military equipment from the belligerent countries to Denmark.

In 1909, the same year the American army had the very first military airplane in the world delivered from the Wright brothers themselves (Hallion 2014), the French aviator Léon Delagrange visited Denmark to demonstrate a brand new technology: flying in machines heavier than air. He, one of the greatest aviation heroes of his time, was interviewed to a Danish newspaper. He frankly told them that he did not expect the airplane to become a practical means of transportation like the railway or the car. However, he saw a future for the new technology in cases of war. This was due to the fact that airplanes can fly directly over the enemy and kill them easily. In his view,
the airplane would give war so many and such great opportunities, that war itself would become impossible (Lauridsen 2009).

New technologies of transportation and communication, from the telegraph to the Internet, have often been followed by this kind of hope of an everlasting peace (Edgerton 2006). However, as with many other technologies, the airplane was turned into an instrument of war. In August 1914, the belligerent countries had approximately 1.000 military airplanes of different kinds. At the time of the Armistice, the number had risen to around ten times as many combat aircraft alone (Hallion 2014).

However, regardless of the rising numbers, the airplane did not play a decisive role in World War I. But, as a new and spectacular technology, it was extremely visible and full of symbolic meanings. Among contemporary aviators and other enthusiasts, it soon became common to call the War a triumph for the airplane, pilots became heroes, and every incident in aerial warfare was noted (Hildesheim 1915). Today, there is no consensus among experts on how exactly the War affected the development of aviation. It is commonly said that World War I speeded up technological progress. However, this has also been called a myth by, for example, people arguing that no new official records of altitude, speed, or endurance were made during the War (Harvey 2006).

**Military and civil aviation**

World War I certainly ground the fledgling passenger traffic in machines lighter than air to a halt, namely the flights under the auspices of Deutsche Luftschiffahrt AG (DELAG). DELAG was founded in 1909 and flew with thousands of passengers in Zeppelins before the War. They began flying again in 1919, and the interwar period was the heyday for them in terms of passenger traffic in airships (Davies 1967; Strohmaier 2004).

According to R. E. G. Davies, chronicler of the world’s first airlines, World War I on the one hand encouraged the development of military airplanes so that long-distance bombing flights were possible by 1918. On the other hand, it retarded and impeded civil development because all nations concerned in aviation progress were preoccupied with war. He finds that the War halted the development of civil air transport, among other things because the ingenuity of the constructors was turned towards fighters, bombers, and planes for reconnaissance instead of planes for the transportation of mail.
and passengers. However, he also finds that World War 1 turned the airplane from something strange into something familiar. Pilots gained new skills, knowledge of aerodynamic and other technical problems of airplane construction was enhanced and, not least, many refinements were introduced through wartime experience. This made the planes more efficient and reliable enough to permit the serious contemplation of air services for the public after the War. The first airlines using heavier than air machines began flying in 1919 and, by the end of the year, more than a dozen civil airlines were in business (Davies 1967).

In Denmark, civil aviation before World War 1 was limited to spectacular air shows, and for the dawning of military aviation, the outbreak of the War had a negative effect. It became practically impossible to import airplanes. In 1914, the Danish army had three aircraft, of which one was considered not to be suitable for either warfare or training. The navy had four. New Danish airplanes were produced during the War, but the production was handicapped by the difficulty of information exchange and scarce news of development in other countries, and because it was almost impossible to get hold of reliable engines (Førslev 1936; Nøring 1936).

After the War, the Treaty of Versailles – which was ratified on 10 January 1920 – included harsh air clauses not only forbidding Germany to have an air force and demanding German military aircraft destroyed, it also forbade all manufacture and importation of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and other parts. The restrictions on civil production should have been in effect for a period of only six months, but they were prolonged by the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control (IAACC) until 1922 (Treaty of Versailles: article 198-210; Mulder 2006; Mulder et al. 2012).

A huge problem in the formulation and discussions following the Treaty of Versailles was how to distinguish between civil and military aviation. After lengthy discussions where aviation experts long claimed it to be impossible, a list of nine rules were agreed upon, distinguishing types through technical criteria such as engine size, speed, load capacity etc. However, many pointed to the fact that the distinction was problematic and that nothing could prevent civil aircraft from being converted into military ones and vice versa. The discussion was ongoing for years. However, at the latest after World War 2, the attempt to separate the military and civil uses of air power after World War 1 seemed artificial and unrealistic. Clearly, it had completely failed (United States Department of State 1919; ICAO 1994; Cooper 1946; Milde 2008; Treaty of Versailles 1968; Groves 1930).
The problems with distinguishing the types is not surprising. There were close links between the development of airplanes and the military from early on, and the aircraft industry was highly dependent on the patronage of the military. Some historians have stated that, in practice, no clear line can be drawn between the civil and the military development of aviation (Roland 1979), and mainstream historical accounts – which see the history of aviation as a mainly civil history – have been criticized (Edgerton 2006).

Another case of wartime surplus

While the exact influence of World War 1 on aviation can be discussed, there is no doubt the War brought the development of the new aviation technology in specific directions, reflecting the military requirements and uses for reconnaissance, air combat, bombings, etc. It also meant that production was increased and professionalized, and more reliable airplanes became available in huge numbers. In fact, as with motor trucks, the end of the War was immediately followed by a huge surplus of used military equipment and production plants desperately looking for new customers to replace the military when the market for military equipment suddenly disappeared with the Armistice.

In Britain, the Aircraft Disposal Company Ltd, created in 1920 with the purpose of converting and selling the many surplus military planes, sent thousands of cheap surplus planes and motors on the market (Barnes 1976). In Germany, the problem with the surplus war airplanes which made new-built aircraft seem too expensive in comparison was reduced, because of the deliberate destruction of old aircraft on IAACC orders (Mulder et al. 2012).

The surplus not only included hardware, but men with aviation skills as well. Many aviators no longer employed by the military visited Denmark in 1919 and showed their skills and/or tried to sell equipment (Foltmann 1936). The first pilot flying for DDL did also have a military background. He had been a pilot in the German navy (Kaas 1943).

One of the airplane factories looking for new customers in 1918 was the German Junkers. They had produced military airplanes but, in November 1918, the factory directed their attention to transport aircraft, expecting that military production would soon be a dead end. They therefore developed the first aircraft designed for the carriage of passengers, the Junkers J 13 (Type
F, later known as F.13). It flew from the summer of 1919. In contrast to the first Danish airliner, it had an enclosed cabin and was an all-metal aircraft. However, Junkers did not only produce this new plane designed for civilian use, they worked on the conversion of their military types into passenger transport machines too.

The Junkers factory was inspected by the IAACC in 1920, and the commission accepted the J 13 produced from 1919 as a civil airplane. However, in the end, Junkers was not allowed to put the aircraft into service inside Germany. All available engines were seized by the IAACC, and effective from January 1920, a total ban on the production of civil aircraft came into effect. Despite this, Junkers continued to build airplanes. However, the factory also had to survive by producing furniture, radiators, and other non-aviation related items in the early 1920s (Mulder et al. 2012).

Davies claims that, seen in retrospect, the wish to cease the production of large German aircraft as part of the peace conditions seems to have been a mistake, at least if the goal for the Allies was to have had an advantage in the civil field. As it turned out, the peace conditions compelled German designers to begin afresh. They eliminated many German manufacturing companies, but at the same time allowed the remaining ones to concentrate on a limited number of projects. In his view, the British and French factories continued to work on the development of military planes and conversion of military types for civil use for too long, instead of directing their focus to machines designed from scratch as civil aircraft (Davies 1967).

One telling example of a converted English warplane was the twin-engined bomber Handley Page O/400, which was used for many years by European airlines after the War (Mulder 2006). When a Handley Page O/400 visited Denmark in 1919, the rebuilding seemed quite primitive. The military equipment inside was replaced with 12 wicker chairs for passengers, but the flight was perceived as quite boring because the fuselage was without windows (Foltmann 1936). As this example shows, there was still a long way from converted military equipment to airplanes that could match the comfort and reliability of travelling by train. Also, the speed of these old military aircraft was still not too impressive (Davies 1967).

If aviation is going to be a practical and effective system of transportation, much more than available and reliable airplanes are necessary. International cooperation is also on the list of necessities. As with radio, World War 1 caused secrecy and delayed the international cooperation for a while but, as
part of the peace negotiations, an international convention – among other things settling the question of sovereignty in the air – was signed as The Paris Convention of 13 October 1919 (Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation). Denmark hesitated to sign the Paris Convention because of Article 5, which stated that “No contracting State shall, except by a special and temporary authorization, permit the flight above its territory of an aircraft which does not possess the nationality of a contracting State”. With Germany excluded from the convention, this in practice would mean that Denmark was forced to exclude German air traffic from Danish air space, and could expect in return to be excluded from German air space (Archival materials: Trafikministeriet; Statens Luftfartsvæsen 1918-1924). When the Danish geographical location just north of Germany is taken into consideration, this was unacceptable. The Allies had, in the Treaty of Versailles, ensured their own access to the Germany’s air space but, as a neutral country, Denmark was not included (Treaty of Versailles 1919: article 313-320).

The restrictions in the Treaty of Versailles had other consequences for aviation in countries like Denmark as well. The restrictions forced the German air industry into close cooperation with partners in the surrounding countries. The first Danish airline in 1920 was in fact a cooperation between Deutsche Luft-Reederei (DLR, German Air Shipping) and DDL (the Danish Airline). DLR was founded in 1917 by AEG, looking for new uses for their military aircraft. They carried their first passenger in 1919, and were the prime partner in the airline, owning most of the fleet and all surplus military aircraft (Kofoed 2000).

The cooperation between DLR, DDL, and four other European airlines resulted in the founding of the International Air Traffic Association, the forerunner of IATA (International Air Transport Association), in The Hague in 1919. For DLR, this was a way to be able to operate internationally, despite the clauses in the Treaty of Versailles (Hallion 2014).

**Military expertise and facilities used for civil purposes**

Not only are airplanes and international agreements necessary prerequisites for the development of aviation as a civil transport system, but so also are expertise and facilities on the ground. In Denmark, in the aftermath of World War 1, it was the military that had most experience with aircraft, and they were also the only ones with the necessary ground facilities. They had, in fact, taken over the only civil airfield in Copenhagen in 1915 (Kaas 1943).
Therefore, in 1920, the first Danish airliner took off from the naval airbase. The festive speeches that day included thanks to the Danish aviators from the navy and the army, because their expertise and experience had been so valuable for the preparations (Weihe 1993).

It was also the Danish navy who, on behalf of the Ministry of Public Works, conducted the first Danish trials with air mail services in 1919 (Kofoed 2000). They were later criticized for buying planes better suited for military use than for civilian purposes for the trials (Archival materials: Statens Luftfartsvæsen 1918-1926), and the planes did, in fact, not have a future as civil equipment. They ended up as navy material. However, it was this kind of plane which dominated the market at the time and was available for relatively cheap purchase.

The close mingling of civil and military air institutions was not without problems, but hard to avoid in a situation where the experts and facilities were predominantly military. An aviation commission in 1920 suggested to the Danish Ministry of Public Works – working on the practical regulations and implications following the first Aviation Act passed on 4 October 1919 – that the military should, as a temporary solution, take on civil supervision functions instead of establishing civilian institutions. In fact, the aviation branch of the Danish navy strongly opposed the creation of a civil air administration, probably eager to secure an important role for themselves in a period with disarmament. As it came about, the ministry paid the aviation branch of the army and the navy for their supervision of civil aviation for some years before a civil air administration was established. Also, the military ground facilities were used for civil aviation until a new airport opened in 1925 (Gregersen 1936; Archival materials: Trafikministeriet).

This close mingling of civil and military aviation on the practical level, and the lengthy discussions of the differences in the aftermath of World War 1 underscores the point of Noble, that the influence of the military on aviation cannot be seen as something external and temporary, only lasting as long as the War. The military played a crucial role in the development of aviation on many levels before, during, and after World War 1.

To sum up, no doubt the technical development of the airplane made a leap forward during the War, which meant that the planes of 1918 were much more reliable than the ones of 1914. At the same time, there were a lot more of them after the War, and surplus military equipment became the backbone
of the many new airlines popping up like mushrooms from 1919. This new branch was also dependent on the expertise of (former) military personnel. On the other hand, the War stopped the possibilities for civil experiments with airmail and passenger transport for a while, directed the attention of developers in specific directions, and put a spoke in the wheel of the possibilities of international cooperation and knowledge exchange.

**Booster or brake?**

When World War 1 was coming to an end, a German biologist wrote: “If a war lasts as long as this one … and absorbs all the intellectual and material forces of the nations, it is not surprising that there should be a few inventions while it is going on. There can be not the slightest doubt, however, that future statistics will prove that the annual number of inventions in Europe during the war was smaller – much smaller in comparison – than in any correspondingly long period we may select in the last few decades” (cited in Nef 1950: 376).

I have not counted the number of patents, but tried through three cases to look into the question: was World War 1 a technological booster, or did the War slow down technological change? Or as it was more specifically asked in the introduction: did World War 1 have a decisive impact on the aircraft or on other technologies, which can be used for civilian purposes? Did the War mean something positive or negative for technological change in a neutral country like Denmark?

The stories about motor trucks, airplanes, and radio show that there is no simple answer to these questions. The War meant, among other things, shortages of fuel and materials, restrictions to the civil use of cars and radios, problems with international cooperation, regulation, and flow of information, a focus on military needs to the detriment of civil purposes, the speeding up innovation in some fields, the upscaling of production, and a surplus of certain technologies like trucks and airplanes immediately after the War. It also changed the balance between countries and created different opportunities for further technological development and production.

In other words, the War disturbed normal procedures, sometimes with a positive outcome, sometimes with a negative one for the civil development and use of new technologies. It seems that – except for the faster technical development of aircraft – the War itself mainly had a negative influence,
while the interest of military institutions in peacetime had a positive influence on innovation, not least as important customers buying much more of the new equipment than any civil users. This makes it important to distinguish between war and the influence of military institutions in peacetime (Hacker 1994). When it comes to radio and aviation, the military interests strongly shaped development before the outbreak of World War 1, but when it comes to motor trucks, no evidence shows a particularly military interest in the development or any importance of the military as an institution before the War. The truck is also an interesting example of how the technological change a war causes is not always unidirectional, but can include the (re)use of older technological solutions.

The War functioned as a huge reliability test of technologies like radio, trucks, and airplanes. However, the War did not “give” us the airplane, the radio, or the truck, and there is no sign that these technologies would have been different today without the War. The War was a disruption and it affected development for some time, but it was by no means a cause for these technologies. All in all, a look into these empirical examples of communication and transport technologies shows that the importance of war for technological change is generally exaggerated compared to the importance of military institutions in peacetime and that, for some technologies like aviation, it makes no sense to try to separate civil and military development. They are constantly interrelated.

To return to the discussion in the introduction, neither the unambiguously positive view of Lewis Mumford, nor the negative of John Nef tells the whole story about war and technology. The general effect of war on the development and diffusion of new technologies is definitely not just stimulation, but neither is it only negative. To conclude, reality is messy, and to say that war in general accelerates technological progress is far too simple. As the empirical examples in this article have shown, there is no straightforward connection between war and technological change. In each case, we have to ask the question anew.
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Endnotes

1 This is a huge research field and a common subject in popular history as well. Just take a short look at popular websites like Wikipedia. They have several extensive descriptions of the development of weapons during World War I and the number of books published on the subject is legio. For an early example, see Schwarte, 1920.

2 Such stories are common on the Internet (see as examples Evans 2014 and Wall Street Journal, 2014).

3 Often mentioned is Werner Sombart’s “Krieg und Kapitalismus” (Sombart 1913), wherein he looks into the question of “ist und inwieweit und weshalb ist der Kapitalimus eine Wirkung des Krieges” (Sombart 1913: 3). In short, he finds that war has promoted capitalism and made it possible. For a rather old bibliography about technology and war, see Roland 1985.

4 Michael Friedwald has studied the history of Telefunken from 1905 to 1914 and he concludes that the German radio technology in that period was primarily shaped by military needs (to a higher degree than their British and American competitors), and that this have influenced the technology ever since (Friedwald 1999: 161).

5 For an analysis of the ban on amateur radio in the US and the role of the amateurs, see Arceneaux 2012.

6 DLR was in fact involved in negotiations about buying the more comfortable Junkers J 13 for passenger transport than their own converted military planes, some with open cabin. However, this never happened, because the support of their mother company, AEG, was dependent on the use of their planes (Mulder et al. 2012: 28). All the planes DDL owned before 1925 were rebuilt military equipment. Only the F.F.49c was unused and had been rebuilt at the factory in 1919. The other aircraft were purchased as used military surplus material in Britain (Lybye 1936: 280-281).
Chapter 12

World War 1 and the Chinese Revolution

Li Xing

World War 1 and the forces for Chinese Revolution

World War 1 had brought about unprecedented strains on the economic, social, and political constellations of all countries involved. The end of the War witnessed the dissolution of the “European Empire”: On the one hand, it smashed old empires, created new republics and nation-states, revived independence movements in the colonial world, and provided the opportunity for the United States to become a world power. On the other hand, the political extremism that emerged in the wake of World War 1 fundamentally transformed the European political landscape, which had a great impact on the historical trajectory of other regions as well. The rise of political ideologies was transformed into various forms of radicalism, from fascism to communism, with two concrete results in the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the triumph of extremist nationalism in Germany, characterized by Hitler and the Nazi Party. As one scholar described the effect and impact of World War 1 on the various movements towards social, national, and political revolution:

“The Russian revolutions of 1917 serve as the first case study, followed by the mutinies in France, and the collapse of monarchies in Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. Events in Italy and Greece show the danger of revolution even among the victors. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of modern Turkey, alongside French and British mandates, helped create the basis for the contemporary conflicts in the Middle East.” (Fulwider 2016)

Europe’s century-long Westphalian balance of power system of interna-
tional relations was damaged. It was after World War 2, and with the supremacy of the United States, that interstate relations under a new world order were reinstalled.

When examining the global consequences and impact of World War 1, many questions that historians attempt to find answers for are: why did some countries vigorously subject themselves to a socialist or communist revolution, while others did not? What factors led to the forces of political radicalism of communist revolution in Europe and their worldwide expansion? Why did the revolutionary forces generated by the War give rise to a communist regime in Russia, which inspired and encouraged a full-scale communist revolution in China?

The central question addressed and explored in this chapter is: what is the connection between World War 1 and the Chinese Communist Revolution? As mentioned previously, the impact of World War 1 was not only limited to the European continent. Rather, it brought about dramatic political, cultural, and social change across other regions such as Asia and Africa. Unfortunately, for most Europeans and for most Chinese population today including scholars, the memory of World War 1 is rather vague. Most Chinese people only know that the War took place in Europe and it had little to do with the historical contingency in China’s development trajectory. Much Chinese literature refers to World War 1 as “Ou Zhan” (which in Chinese means “the European War”) (Fan 2016). Hence, according to a Chinese scholar, the nexus between World War 1 and Chinese modern revolutionary history has been a curiously neglected topic (Xu 2011).

After decades of silence, the impact of the War on the Chinese historical trajectory has finally won the recognition of academic research both in China and in Europe. As one scholar points out,

“[His writing] discusses China’s role in the First World War with a focus on the country’s contribution to the war and the role of the war in shaping Chinese development and its place in the world. Contrary to common knowledge, China was not only involved in various aspects of the war, but the war also had a significant impact on China. The war period, therefore, marks a turning point for the country: the crises challenged China to define where it stood in the world and how to embark on a political and cultural revival.” (Mühlhahn 2014)

The chapter does not intend to focus on what kind of role China played in
the War. Rather, the chapter intends to anticipate that World War I was an important turning point in China’s contemporary history. The War, from which the Chinese communist movement evolved, marked the end of China’s self-isolation period of unrest and turmoil after the Opium Wars and the Boxer Rebellion in the nineteenth century, and the beginning of its long march towards the course of “internationalization” in the twentieth century. Chinese history underwent a dramatic transformation characterized by proactive engagement in the international system, ideas, forces, and trends which represent a clear leap forward in China’s rise as a modern “nation state” (Xu 2005, 2011).

**World War 1 and the Chinese (Communist) Revolution**

The concept of “the Chinese Revolution”, in a broad sense, covers many Chinese contemporary historical events, including the Chinese Communist Revolution. The historical legacies which underline this notion include:

1) The Xinhai Revolution in 1911, led by Sun Yatsan, a revolution that overthrew the Qing Dynasty and established the Republic of China;
2) The Second Republic Revolution in the 1913, a rebellion against Yuan Shikai, who attempted to restore the imperial system;
3) The Northern Expedition during 1926–28, a military campaign against the conservative Beiyang Government led by Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist forces in cooperation with communist support;
4) The Anti-Japanese War (part of the Second War World) 1937-1945; an eight-year protracted war during which the nationalists and the communists formed a coalition to defeat Japanese aggression;
5) The Chinese Civil War of 1946-1949, a war between the nationalist government and the Communist Party-led forces led by Mao and the Communist Party.

The final victory of the Chinese Communist Revolution also marks the final victory of the entire history of the Chinese Revolution. Therefore, very often the notion of “the Chinese Revolution” literally refers to “the Chinese Communist Revolution”, and these two terms are often used interchangeably.

Notwithstanding the historical richness of this notion of the Chinese
Revolution, the Chinese Communist Revolution mainly refers to the Chinese Communist Party’s uninterrupted struggle and drive to dominant power since its founding in 1921. The history of the Chinese Communist Revolution can be divided into two main phases: the first phase was a proletarian insurrection on the Russian model, and the failure of this insurrection in 1927 caused the breakdown of the Nationalist-Communist alliance and reshaped the whole subsequent history of China. The second phase, triggered by the anti-Japanese War, ended with the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.

The Chinese Communist Revolution has been researched, studied, and written about by numerous sinologists and historians. It is, without doubt, one of the most important events in Chinese history, and brought about dramatic socio-cultural and socio-political transformations, as well as fundamental changes in ideas, thoughts, value systems, and scholarship, including all spheres of life. The decline of Chinese civilization from a “Middle Kingdom” into an underdeveloped periphery country has been a subject of interest in social science, and especially in the field of development studies. A number of contending theoretical explanations or “schools of thought” have been advanced to explain the causes of underdevelopment in China, embracing both internal and external factors (Li 2012), such as:

1) The Asiatic Mode of Production (a Marxist interpretation of the oriental pre-capitalist economic formations and the primitive societal forms and class structures);
2) The preindustrial stage theory (internal equilibrium combined with external pressure causing “a century-long process of disintegration, transformation and slow gestation within the traditional Chinese order” (Eckstein as quoted in Lippit 1980:19);
3) The state and social structure theory (the social structure symbolized by the Chinese family system, a conservative bureaucracy and ruling ideology, a parasitic elite, fatalistic attitude, etc.);
4) The colonialism and imperialism thesis, (underdevelopment is a historical process caused by Western colonial-imperialist expansion;
5) The culturalist interpretation (the Weberian thesis on the incompatibility between modernization/modernity and cultural values, attitudes and practices).

The introduction of these competing theoretical explanations on the devel-
opment of China’s underdevelopment does not aim to stimulate a new round of debate on the above explanations and interpretations. Rather, they are mentioned in order to highlight the historical background of the Chinese Revolution in which it was to find the solutions to these internal, as well as external, constraints, whether cultural, social, or politico-economic, that the Chinese Revolution, both before and after the People’s Republic, carried out a unique attempt to transform China’s society and specifically the consciousness of its people in line with collectively accepted political and ideological norms.

Therefore, it is absolutely meaningful to understand the role and impact of World War 1 on China’s modern history and the historical trajectory that China embarked on in such a political and cultural revival. While World War 1 forced the old European imperialists to concentrate on peace and security in Europe, the new emerging powers – Japan and the United States – speedily increased their influence in different parts of the world, particularly in Asia. Japan was able to position itself as an equal power, along with the existing Western hegemons, as a result of the War, while its ambition to control the whole of Asia was foreseeable. The United States also increased its trade with China, including political and cultural linkages. Meanwhile, China was convinced by the harsh lessons from the Versailles Conference that it could not trust and rely on the imperialist powers, and it had to look for new partners who shared similar experiences and aspirations. The October Revolution of 1917 and the birth of a great Soviet Union was a source of inspiration for revolutionary transformations and for freeing itself from the hold of the Western colonial powers.

The objective and methodological consideration

The chapter intends to reveal the nexus between China’s internal trajectories and the external influences since the nineteenth century, with a focus on the role of World War 1 and its impact on China’s revolutionary trajectories. Methodologically, the nexus is conceptualized by examining the internal and external interactions from a relational-historical approach. Such an approach is seen as a good way to study the interactive relationships in the process of transformation, with a special focus on the mutually-related internal and external factors. It implies that the “challenge-response” dynamism has been always expressed in the internal-external nexus and is embedded in the multiple causalities in China’s modern history (Li 2010). The “relational” aspect emphasizes the relation and interaction among internal
and external factors in the process, whereas the “historical” aspect underlines the transformative and dynamic nature of the process.

The objective of the chapter aims to emphasize the historical importance of World War 1 in bringing about a fundamental transformation in China’s contemporary history – the victory of Chinese communism – which has shaped China’s development trajectory since the beginning of the twentieth century. In other words, it aims to explore China’s century-long “challenge-response” dynamism, i.e., how external challenges helped to shape China’s internal transformations, and how generations of Chinese people had been struggling to respond to the external challenges and constraints. Likewise, it is equally important to understand how China’s inner transformation contributed to reshaping the regional and world order. Each time, be it China’s hegemony or decline, the capitalist world system has to adjust and readjust itself to the opportunities and constraints brought about by the “China factors”.

The historicity of the Chinese (Communist) Revolution

“In the 1930s a commentator for the Washington Weekly wrote: no matter whether you are a congressman, financier or general, or even the President of the United States, once you visited the countryside in China’s western regions and came to know the peasants there, you would immediately be a supporter and follower of the Chinese Communist Party.” (Wang 1994: 26)

The historical role and significance of the Chinese Communist Revolution has been written/rewritten and interpreted/reinterpreted over different periods of time. Was the Chinese Communist Revolution really necessary? Was it historically imperative? There are people inside and outside China who suspect the historical necessity for such a revolution under the assumption that if China had not adopted Marxist theory, had not gone through the armed revolutions, and had not taken the socialist road, China would have developed more rapidly and “normally”, and it could also be possible that China might have developed into an advanced nation possessing some of the characteristics of Western democracy. Unfortunately, history does not always follow one’s expectations, and nor did it grant the time and opportunity which China needed. World War 1, World War 2, and the Chinese Civil War totally altered the course of Chinese development.
Facing the critical questions at the present time – why did China have to go through a communist revolution? Why did it have to look to Marxism at the time when there might have been other social theories and alternatives? Many people have tried to study the history of the Chinese Communist Revolution in a non-Marxist approach, but they all ended up with a dilemma. As Dirlik describes, “students of Chinese Communism in the West, the majority of whom do not share a similar conviction in Marxism’s truths, have nevertheless found in China’s circumstances variegated reasons for radicals’ attraction to Marxism and consequently turning to Communist politics, as the only means to resolve the problems of Chinese society” (Dirlik 1989: 255). Therefore, to understand the transformation of China, one has to understand the historical context of the Chinese Communist Revolution and its entire discourse.

The historical background of the Chinese (Communist) Revolution

When Marco Polo brought back to Europe his image of China: the most powerful, stable, and efficiently ruled country in the world, the West began to pay great interest to the East. Actually, his China-wonder was not unique because, since Roman times, the flow of trade and commodities were overwhelmingly from East to West. Although the West now takes special pride in its technological achievements, the transmission of major new techniques was, until the recent past of the industrial revolution, no less overwhelmingly from East to West (Segal 1966: 318; Hobson 2004). The Western image of China was indeed infinitely mysterious and promising.

China’s real interest in the outside world was relatively recent in its history of several thousand years. In ancient times, if one was asked to travel lands outside China, the answer would be that one who knew the Chinese classics had nothing left to learn. Until the arrival of European colonialists in the nineteenth century, China was still an autonomous, self-satisfied, and self-contained civilization. Its geographical compositions were also unique: barren steppes and desert in the north, high mountains and arid plateaus in the west, the endless sea in the east, and inaccessible jungles in the south made it possible for China to establish a highly developed preindustrial civilization (Kapur 1987: 1). Chinese people used to think that their civilization was the highest in world history and their position was the center of the world (the English word “China” is “Middle Kingdom” in Chinese), surrounded by barbarians. Based on this worldview, the Chinese devoted many
of their energies to the development of the humanities, civil, and cultural activities, rather than to capital accumulation and military buildup.

Contrary to the Yuan Dynasty (the Mongol Empire) which was an outwardly expansionist empire, since the Ming Dynasty, China began to isolate itself from the external world, like the “Forbidden City”. The emperor in the late Ming Dynasty in 1521 ordered all ocean-going junks destroyed, and trade outside Chinese territorial waters was forbidden because the merchants, with their wealth based upon worldwide trade, were becoming a challenge to the imperial power based on tribute from the land (Brown 1993: 16). Therefore, China’s perception and view of the outside world was closely linked with its long-term isolation and was rarely influenced and challenged by external factors. This is perceived by the West as an example typical of China: self-satisfaction and a lack of curiosity about the outside world. Such an attitude is believed to have placed China in a disadvantageous position and caused her much suffering since the nineteenth century. Chinese did not foresee the necessity to provide for proper protection against possible external aggression, because the empire had been a hegemonic power and was free from any serious external threat prior to 1800.

In the early nineteenth century, China faced several crises. On the one hand, two powerful neighbors posed potential threats to China’s security. Russia slowly expanded up to China’s northern frontiers, and Japan gradually crossed the narrow sea. On the other hand, the forced entry into China of Western nations was even more dangerous, not only to its security, but also to its entire civilization. The forcible opening up of China to Western industrial products and civilization ideas, the establishment of industries on its shores, compounded with the inevitable problems involved in the acculturation process, destroyed the delicate balance the Chinese system had created after centuries of intellectual and economic efforts (Kapur 1987: 2).

While China had no interest in dealing with outsiders and it wanted nothing form the West, the West wanted a great deal from China. The ambition of European powers was not only to urge their governments to protect their trade, but also to force a passage for other products. The enforced opening of China’s market and sovereignty after its defeat in the Anglo-Chinese Opium War (1939-1842) has been described as the start of a “century of humiliation.”

The consequences of the Opium War were very damaging: traditional tributaries were taken away; concessions to foreign privileges were made; the
authority of the emperor, upon which Chinese order based, was ended; the hand-labor-based industries on which Chinese economy depended were destroyed; and the favorable balance of trade which existed until 1830 and which had brought an uninterrupted flow of silver from the outside, became lopsided (Kapur, ibid.: 2). China indeed became an international colony. The traditional social structure was finally broken down. China’s customs offices and post offices were largely controlled by Westerners; Western ships were permitted to navigate freely in its waters and even to demolish some of its coastal defenses; many Western troops were stationed at a number of points on a permanent basis; pieces of territory in various parts of the country were taken over as concessions. China was, thus, divided by Western powers as “spheres of interest” and was “carved up like a melon.”

This situation was really an unprecedented challenge to the Chinese “Middle Kingdom” identity as a whole. The loss of power was a great humiliation, and it marked the decline of Chinese prestige and power. Since the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, Chinese academics and elites were deeply divided in how they should adapt to the new situation and deal with the new challenges. There were four main schools of attitude. The first school favored the restoration of the traditional social structure, recovering ancient power, and expelling outsiders. The second school preferred a limited change, but was not interested in modern science and industry, nor was it interested in learning about the Western political philosophy and economic system. Its only interest was Western weaponry technology and military training. The third school went to the opposite extreme: it favored total Westernization, and was convinced that science and technology did affect values. This school believed that it was impossible to borrow Western technology while maintaining Chinese ways of thinking and its outdated institutional structure. The most influential one was the fourth school – revolutionary Marxism and Leninism. The final victory of Marxism and Leninism in China was an outcome of a long process of internal turbulence and struggle. Thus, it is important to review this process so as to understand why China became communist.

From the first large-scale domestic uprisings, the Taiping Uprising (late 1850’s-early 1860’s), to the establishment of a republican government after Sun Yat-sen’s Xin Hai Revolution (1911-1912) which marked the end of imperial rule, Confucianism as a national guiding philosophy had been facing fundamental challenges from both inside and outside. The struggle, searching for new inspirations and new solutions to stimulate a re-emergence of the “Middle Kingdom”, continued as the world entered the twentieth century.
The Versailles Treaty and the May Fourth Movement

On 14 August 1917, as World War 1 entered its fourth year, China abandoned its neutrality and declared war against Germany. China’s involvement in World War 1 in Europe was mainly in the form of deploying workers to battlegrounds in Western Europe and Russia. This contribution was already historically unprecedented in Chinese history, since both the Ming and the Qing Dynasties had restrictive policies in trying to keep the Chinese people from going abroad (Mühlhahn 2016). China sent more than 100,000 laborers to France and Belgium in the Western Front and 2,000 of them were buried in France (MacMillan 2014). In addition, another 40,000 of them were scattered across France, working in factories, digging trenches, carrying ammunition, toiling in docks and railway yards, together with a few hundred Chinese students recruited as interpreters (The Economist April 26, 2010).

Despite the huge Chinese contribution and immense sacrifice, and despite the fact that China belonged to the winning side of the War, the whole Chinese nation was completely shocked by the fact that the Treaty of Versailles granted Japan the right to take over from Germany the resource-rich province, Shandong, which was also the birthplace of Confucius. The humiliation that the Versailles Treaty imposed on China was immensely unbearable:

“For China, the Treaty of Versailles was a similar debacle. None of China’s demands were taken seriously by representatives of the allied powers, including U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, the great idealist, who arrived in Paris with his Fourteen Points in tow. China demanded an end to extraterritoriality for foreign powers on its soil, a cancellation of Japan’s exploitative ‘Twenty-One Demands,’ and the return of Shandong from the Germans.” (Panda 2015)

Dismayed by the failure of the 1911 Xin Hai Revolution\(^2\) to establish a republican government, and triggered by the “Western imperialism” revealed at Versailles, where the secret agreement of transferring German rights in Shandong to Japan had been previously signed between the Allied Powers and Japan to lure Japan to enter World War 1,\(^3\) a nationwide movement broke out on 4 May 1919, when thousands of students rallied in Beijing to protest against China’s treatment in the Treaty of Versailles and against the Chinese government’s perceived humiliation and capitulation to the whims of Western imperial powers.
Their protest was supported by striking workers across China. A new force joined in the fray, as workers in factories went on strike in support of student demands. The growth of industry had brought a modern working class onto the stage. At the end of 1916, there were nearly one million industrial workers, and this number doubled by 1922. The effect and consequence of the May Fourth Movement radicalized political movements in China and contributed to the rise of powerful political and intellectual groups such as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was formed two years later.

The May Fourth Movement and the rise of the Chinese communist socio-political forces

After the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty, and between 1911 and 1949, China was stagnated by a protracted and complex process of civil wars and revolutions. During this period, the event of the May Fourth Movement was a historical milestone. It was not only a political protest against Western imperialism and a patriotic movement for the restoration of Chinese independence and sovereignty, but also an intellectual turning point in Chinese modern history. The May Fourth Movement was also a “New Culture Movement”, a nationwide movement calling for a cultural reform of Confucian values, for a socio-political reform based on “democracy, equality, science”, as well as for creating viable values for a new and modern China.

There are two important impacts of World War 1 to contemporary Chinese history. The first is that the Versailles Treaty paved the foundation for the subsequent Japanese aggression against China. As one Chinese scholar sharply points out,

“At the Paris peace talks, the United States approved Japan’s seizures in Shandong. After the war, Japan accelerated its invasion and expansion into China, occupying our country’s three northeastern provinces. The powers … including the United States, Great Britain, and France … did not even apply any sanctions against Japan, refused … to call Japan an invading state, and even demanded that China recognize Japan’s ‘special rights and interests’ in China’s Northeast, thus in actuality supporting Japan’s invasion.” (Qian Wenrong, cf. Goldstein 2015)

The second is that the War fundamentally changed China’s worldview. Previously, the Chinese perception of outside world had been based on ide-
as and concepts that had not been tested, and the Chinese rejection of the foreign world was not based on any real knowledge or any real experience and rested upon a lack of knowledge and indifference (Kapur 1987: 2). Now, people like the translator Yan Fu held the Western civilization in contempt as he wrote with outright and hostility following the end of World War 1, “It seems to me that in three centuries of progress the peoples of the West have achieved four principles: to be selfish, to kill others, to have little integrity, and to feel little shame. How different are the principles of Confucius and Mencius, as broad and deep as Heaven and Earth, designed to benefit man everywhere” (Yan cf Woetzel 1989: 1-2). It was at this time that China had to consider a new geopolitical phenomenon in which the new situation needed a new perception, and the new experience required a new response. How to respond and act in the face of this massive acculturation was both imperative and urgent.

In retrospect, the May Fourth Movement was part of a series of worldwide revolts as an outcome of the effects of World War 1, and was enthusiastically inspired by the Russian October Revolution of 1917-1923. The Russian Revolution took place in 1917 during the final phase of World War 1. The Revolution transformed Russia from being a traditional monarchy into becoming the world’s first communist state. The Russian victory presented an alternative model to China, where the new communist leaders promised to build a new, fairer, and more efficient society. Two years after the May Fourth Movement, the Communist Party of China was founded. Mao Zedong later cited the May Fourth Movement as a “new stage in China’s bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism” (Mao 1939). The May Fourth Movement also marked a turning point in which China’s intellectuals began to turn to supporting the CCP.

**Intellectual debate and the victory of communist radicalism**

From the 1840s, the questions of national wealth and power, national survival and cultural identity have become pivotal concerns for all Chinese. What transformations did China have to undertake in order to create a new viable culture, capable of combining the best of the traditional with the modern, the indigenous and the foreign, thus ensuring China’s existence as a political entity? At every stage of domestic turmoil, whether facing Western imperialist invasion or civil wars, the question was intensely debated among Chinese intellectuals in different classes. Facing the increasing disintegra-
tion of the imperial regime, Chinese began to ponder the necessity of a social transformation which would overthrow imperial feudalism and develop a new society. Many great intellectuals and thinkers engaged in this endeavor.

Kang Youwei (1858-1927) was regarded as China’s first modern thinker since the late nineteenth century. He advocated radical changes in China’s imperial system. His ideal Chinese society – variously translated as “great harmony” or “great unity” – consisted of a much more radical vision than that of a communist society. He advocated not only for the abolition of private property and of national government, but also the complete dissolution of families and even the elimination of personal names (Chi 1986: 5). However, Kang admitted that this ideal vision was to be realized in the distant future. For the China of his own time, he advocated a constitutional monarchy resembling that of some European countries.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), who established the first republic, advocated a revolution in order to replace the Manchu imperial rule with a republic. While Kang had advocated for a peaceful change with the support of the imperial government, the 1911 Revolution led by Dr. Sun was an armed rebellion aimed at overthrowing the Manchu Dynasty. By 1924, Sun had elaborated his revolutionary theory and formulated his Three Principles of the People into a system – nationalism, democracy and people’s livelihood. The principle of nationalism was seen as promoting equality among all Chinese people, as well as China’s equality with foreign powers; his principle of democracy sought to establish a democratic form of government based on the model of the United States with certain modifications; and his principle of people’s livelihood was a kind of socialism with a certain degree of regulation of capital and the relative equalization of land ownership (ibid.: 5).

Chen Duxiu (1879-1942) was another influential intellectual during China’s New Cultural Movement, and he was one of the earliest founders of the Chinese communist movement. He and Li Dazhao, another influential communist advocator, were among the first May Fourth intellectuals to write on the October Revolution, and played a significant role in the early attempts to adapt Marxism to the Chinese situation. He once dreamed of making a combined model of capitalism and democracy for China. He converted to Marxism in 1920 and favored the dictatorship of the proletariat. He was one of the founders and early leaders of the CCP. His effort in making China a prototype of the Soviet model failed after two decades of bitter experiences.
Among the most influential of early thinkers, was Mao Zedong (1893-1976). Like Sun Yet-sen, but unlike the others, Mao was both a thinker and a revolutionary who devoted his whole life to the course of an envisioned just society. Mao has been regarded as the only person who successfully combined Marxism with China’s real situation, and adopted a strategy of organizing a peasant army to gradually seize political power from the Kuomintang. After Mao succeeded in the civil war and established the new republic, he led a continuous revolution towards the building of socialism and an independent force against the international isolation and Western imperialism.

The challenges facing the nation were dual: China not only had to build a modern economy, but also create a new culture and value system in order to shape the direction of national development. In other words, the requirement for forming a new cultural identity became a yardstick for generations of Chinese reformers and revolutionaries, because a new value system and attitude were preconditions for the transformation of individuals, as well as the material base of society, and economic development and culture were intricately interconnected (Kung, 1975: 219). For a long period, debates on the necessary cultural transformations were centered on four areas: (a) the reform of Confucian value systems; (b) the sinification of Western values; (c) the establishment of a consciousness of class struggles; and (d) social revolution versus evolution.

Since the Opium War, the repeated failure of the Confucian state to defend Chinese society from foreign invasion and social disintegration brought the inherent confrontation between state and society to a breaking point. Despite its 450 million people, rich resources, long history, and centuries of civilization, China had nevertheless been unable to resist the Japanese invasion as a consequence of its feudal and semi-colonial stagnation. In other words, China had lost its vestiges of independence and nationhood.

From the first large-scale domestic uprisings, the Taiping Uprising (late 1850s-early 1860s) to the establishment of a republican government after Sun Yat-sen’s revolution (1911-1912) which marked the end of the Confucian state, Confucianism as a national guiding philosophy faced a fundamental challenge both from inside and outside. The desire to search new inspirations for an emergence of China’s new national culture continued as the world entered the twentieth century. The final coming out of a new cultural consensus was a product not only of historical development, but also intellectual debates through a few phases: the May Fourth Movement (1916-21);
the first civil war (1921-27) and the second civil war (1927-37); the Sino-Japanese war (1937-45); and the third civil war (1947-49).

The May Fourth Movement was a milestone in Chinese modern history during which different schools of thoughts bloomed, including many foreign-inspired schools, namely Marxism, Leninism, socialism, liberalism, Darwinism, etc. It was during this period that Marxist proletarian culture and class theory began to influence and inspire the way of thinking of Chinese people, and especially Chinese intellectuals.

After numerous failures in resisting Western imperialist challenges, Confucian ideology as an analytical framework was finally discarded even by most conservative intellectuals. This was because Confucian ethical and political traditions obviously proved to have lost their viability during a time when China urgently needed a new analytical framework to examine the new social structure after the overthrowing of the imperial system. Being without Confucianism as a state ideology, together with the abolishing of the feudal system, left China two options: moving towards capitalism through gradual reforms as Darwinian evolutionism suggested, or advancing directly to socialism with a mass political and social revolution.

The debate in Chinese intellectual circles on whether China should take a capitalist or a socialist road divided them into two major groups. One group believed that China was far from able to develop a socialist system even though it seemed to be superior to the capitalist system, and in order to resolve its poverty and backwardness, China only had the alternative of developing capitalism. People of this group maintained that the success of socialism depended on a viable proletarian working class, but at the present stage, “Chinese factory workers are too few and too weak to take over political and economic responsibilities;” and in order to create the conditions for socialism, the immediate task of Chinese society was to develop capitalism under a strong central government, rather than eliminate it (Chow in Kung 1975: 258).

The other group thought it impossible for China to develop capitalism independently, due to the international and domestic conditions, and the only option for it was to develop socialism as Russia did. This is because, “in the first place, the imperialist powers would not allow China to carry out any transformation aimed at autonomous capitalist development if they could possibly help it,” and every time people stood up against traditional rule, the imperial powers intervened and suppressed the effort by force (Hinton 1990: 164).
Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Chinese nationalist revolution which overthrew the Qing Dynasty, felt perplexed. “Why don’t the teachers ever allow the pupils to learn?” he asked. Mao observed that China had been determined to learn from the progressive model of Western capitalist countries since the 1840s, and China had also wanted to obtain salvation and achieve modernization. But, as he noted, the aggressions of the imperialists had shattered those dreams of the Chinese people, “How strange! Why do teachers always carry out aggression against the students?” He finally concluded that to take the road of the Russians was the most effective option. In addition, the group of progressive intellectuals perceived capitalism as a system in which the bourgeoisie and businessmen dominated society. It was a system which they found it hard to accept. Thus, to develop capitalism as an alternative to resolving China’s social problems was not generally considered to be a workable alternative.

However, the opposite view is that China could possibly have achieved modernization in a stage-by-stage process by independently embarking on a capitalist road, and this view might not be incorrect, seen from today’s perspective of economic marketization. But, history does not always follow one’s will. The historical circumstances, including both external and internal conditions, have determined the unlikeliness and impracticality of China trying independently to develop capitalism (Hu 1997: 6). This is due to a number of reasons: Firstly, there was the lack of a strong presence of bourgeois forces capable of creating the preconditions for the development of capitalism, and the national bourgeoisie was too weak to mobilize the necessary social transformations. Secondly, the fact that China lost its sovereignty and independence, suffering aggression and oppression at the hands of almost all Western imperialist powers offered China little ground to speak of in developing national capitalism. Thirdly, considering China’s internal chaotic situation of national disintegration such as socio-political disorder and contradictions and civil wars, the realization of national unity must be achieved prior to the development of any new socio-political system. The importance of achieving national unity can be seen from the fact that, in building the preconditions for developing capitalism, the Nationalist Party, led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, had to cooperate with the newly emerging Communist Party. Lastly, China’s miserable peasant class, which comprised of 80% of its population, could not provide any basis for developing capitalism. Most of the industries centered along the coast cities and big cities along the Yangtze River. Workers made up a small segment of the population, and they did not even possess a unifying class consciousness. This was a problem for the revolutionary movement.
The short life of Sun Yat-sen’s Republic Revolution and the humiliation in the Versailles Treaty of World War 1, together with Japanese imperialist intentions tore up the Chinese admiration for learning from the West and Japan. So, if both Western constitutional monarchy and republicanism, as well as Japanese militarist culture could not be imitated as alternatives to save China, then what else could be an option? Early Chinese Marxists Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu argued that, with or without a strong state, the establishment of Chinese capitalism would eventually become the agent of Western capitalism and would not solve China’s poverty and backwardness. The most forceful and comprehensive argument was put forward by Li:

“Although China itself has not yet undergone a process of capitalist economic development such as occurred in Europe, America, and Japan, the common people (of China) still indirectly suffer from capitalist economic oppression in a way that is even more bitter than the direct capitalist oppression suffered by the working class of the various (capitalist) nations...

If we look again at the international position of China today, (we see) that other nations have already passed from free competition to the necessary socialist-cooperative position, while we are still juveniles; others have walked a thousand li, while we are still taking the first step... I fear that we will be unable to succeed unless we take double steps and unite into a socially cooperative organization. Therefore, if we want to develop industry in China, we must organize a government made up purely of producers in order to eliminate the exploiting classes within the country, to resist world capitalism, and to follow (the path of) industrialization organized upon a socialist basis.” (Li cf Kung, 1975: 259)

Li’s argument identified China as a “proletarian nation”, although it lacked a strong proletarian working class. He associated the potential of a Chinese proletarian revolution to the worldwide proletarian movement against international capitalism. His far-reaching and insightful analytical worldview paved the way for the establishment of a populist tradition within the CCP, which was further developed by his disciple, Mao Zedong. It was Mao who was able to combine the Marxist-Leninist theory with China’s unique socio-economic and socio-political reality, which led the Chinese Revolution into the final victory.
The role of Marxism, Leninism and the Russian Revolution

Since the May Fourth Movement and especially since the victory of the 1917 Russian Bolshevik Revolution, Marxism and Leninism began to play an active role in influencing the direction in which China was moving. The origin of the Chinese Communist Revolution did not come directly from the mass peasants, but firstly from the intellectuals. Not all of China’s intellectuals became communist, of course. Nevertheless, a large number of students and professors turned to favor communist ideas. A vast number of Chinese students and intellectuals were eager to find a way out of China’s long-suffered desperate position, and they were ready to devote themselves to any movement that gave them hope for the restoration of national self-respect, economic sufficiency, and individual dignity. Many of them looked forward to Western democracy as a favorable choice, but they had little opportunity to see the advantage of free enterprise and economic competition. It was far from clear that Western democracy could be made to work in China. It was even difficult to find a Chinese definition of democracy upon which it could neatly fit Chinese society and cultural tradition. At that moment, Western democracy had no program for a country like China; and indeed, it had never given much real thought to China’s problem (Creel 1954: 261). Western civilization was imaged in Chinese minds by science and democracy which the Chinese admired and wanted to learn from. But the problem was that Western political culture and its economic advances were often associated with memories of Western aggression. The West tried to help China, but in a rather different way. Missionaries had been sent to Christianize the Chinese, teachers to educate them, and money to alleviate their distress and sorrow. But none of these addressed the real social problems. After all, it was the Western nations which had long contemplated China with contempt and had repeatedly used military force against it. At this moment, Marxism—as a theory of Western origin and yet one critical of contemporary capitalism—found receptive followers among Chinese intellectuals who were intellectually drawn to Western enlightenment.

This frustration and anger towards the Versailles Treaty exploded with the May Fourth Movement of 1919, during which the appeal of Marxism expanded, and many intellectuals claimed to discover a solution to China’s social problems from the important teachings of Marxist revolutionary ideas. Marxism, and especially Lenin’s theory of capitalist imperialism, provided Chinese intellectuals with a partial theoretical framework, as well
as a psychological answer to their difficulties in finding the proper explanations and theories for the failures of traditional Chinese culture and for the humiliation suffered at the hands of the West (Peck 1975: 73). It was this school that they finally turned to. Therefore, it is important to know why the Chinese communist movement could prevail in a society where the cultural heritage had been dominated by Confucianism. The attraction of Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese was that, as Kapur observed:

“It was an effective ploy to criticize the West from a Western point of view; b) it gave the Chinese a new methodological framework to understand their own past and foresee the contours of their future; c) it offered a conceptualized view of international reality. Lastly, it amply proved its anti-imperialist credentials—an important source of attraction—after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution when the Soviet leaders denounced imperialism, unilaterally abolishing unequal treaties and relinquishing many privileges of tsarist Russia including extraterritoriality as well as their share of Boxer indemnities.” (Kapur op.cit.: 3)

Marxism-Leninism made the Chinese intellectuals more open-minded and internationalized. It offered them a great source of inspiration to take positions and to analyze the world from different perspectives. China, as they saw it, was no longer an isolated “Middle Kingdom”, the center of globe surrounded by barbarians, but a part of the world full of different forces and ideas. Since the establishment of CCP in 1921, the Chinese contribution to both transforming and strengthening Marxism-Leninism was equally important. The Chinese view on its role in the international affairs had changed from regarding itself as the center of the world and a universal authority, to seeing that China’s problem was part of the world’s problems and the Chinese Revolution was relevant for the outside world.

It was the Russian Revolution that finally dramatized for Chinese intellectuals the significance of Marxism as a global ideology of revolution and encouraged them to excite their revolutionary imagination. Mao said,

“For a hundred years, the finest sons and daughters of the disaster-ridden Chinese nation fought and sacrificed their lives ... in quest of the truth that would save the country and the people ... But it was only after World War I and the October Revolution in Russia that we found Marxism-Leninism that best of truths, the best of weapons for liberating our nation. And the Communist Party of China has
been the initiator, propagandist and organizer in the wielding of this weapon.” (Mao cf Chi 1986: 271)

Although the Russian political system was perceived as non-democratic, there were of course explanations and justifications for the Russian political system. European democracy was identified and criticized as being a kind of bourgeois democracy in essence, not a democracy for the common people. In Western capitalist countries, political democracy was promoted at the expense of economic democracy, while in Russia, there was economic democracy but at the expense of certain political rights in relation to state authority. However, this did not contradict the Chinese traditional patriotism of sacrificing personal rights for the interests of the state. After 1917, the Russians called the Chinese to join with them and other people in the cause that they claimed to be a new international order of economic, social, and political justice which was to be founded on the premise of complete equality among all nations and races. Such a position conformed to the spirit not only of China’s on-going struggle, but also to the ancient humanitarian and cosmopolitan doctrines of Confucianism.

In his late years, China’s revolutionary pioneer Dr. Sun Yat-sen was deeply impressed by the fact that, among all the Western powers, only Soviet Russia represented itself as being willing to cooperate with China on an equal basis. Sun showed a great admiration of the Russian Revolution in his popular essay *Three Principles of the People*:

“Another great change was brought about by the Revolution of 1917: it was the complete turnover of a great military autocracy into a new socialistic state. During the last six years internal reforms have been instituted in Russia and a new policy of peace has replaced the old militarism. The Russians have set out as pioneers in the movement for helping the oppressed by curbing the strong.

Now again the big Powers are alarmed by Russia; they are more afraid of her than ever, and with good reason; for the new policy of Russia will destroy not only Russian imperialism, but world imperialism; it will destroy not only world imperialism, but also the entire capitalistic system of the nations … The new policy of Russia, I believe, will breakdown this monopoly; and so all capitalists of the world are much alarmed. The world is facing a serious crisis; and as a result of this crisis, great changes will take place.” (Sun 1923)
As a result of his appreciation of the Russian revolutionary achievement, “to unite with Russia, to unite with Chinese Communists and to rely on workers and peasants” became the core idea underlined Sun Yat-sen’s key national policy in his later years.

Furthermore, numerous Russians were educated in the Chinese language, history, and culture, and prepared to operate in China with effectiveness. Many Chinese people were invited to Russia and trained in communist doctrine and tactics at the expense of the Soviet government. It is well-known that the majority of the Chinese Communist Politburo members had studied in Russia. With regard to China’s social reality, it was obvious that Western political democracy appeared to address less urgent social problems, while the Soviet economic democracy seemed to be more relevant. The later split between the Soviet Union and China should not alter the influence and contribution which the Russian Revolution made on the course of development of China.

For almost a whole century, many Chinese people felt China to be at a disadvantage, and some of them even were ready to admit that its culture was inferior to that of the West. But, with the rise of communism, this view was changed. Many indeed believed that the Communist Party represented the progressive side of contemporary human society. Although it was a fact that not all Chinese people supported the Communist Party – some were even strongly anti-communist – they could not avoid being gratified by the achievements the CCP had made, and that China once again started to wield an unignorable influence in world affairs which it had not enjoyed for many, many years. Some Chinese people might wish that such a result had not come about under communist leadership, but whatever they might prefer they could not but admire the result.

Nevertheless, whatever political discourse might be more suitable to China, it was Mao who was able to combine both learning and statesmanship and combine Marxism-Leninism with China’s reality. No matter how significant Marxism and Leninism are, without the combination of them with China’s reality by Mao Zedong, a peasant intellectual, Marxism-Leninism would probably have aroused only a few rebels. Mao once stated that everything else had been tried and all failed. Scholars nowadays may argue about whether every possible means had really been tried. But, in a sense, Mao was right in indicating that all the democratic and literal ideals of different scholars had failed, except the communist way of addressing and solving the deep-rooted social problems. Although communist historians maintain
that it is the people who create history and reject the great-man theory of history, there is no doubt that without Mao’s contribution, Chinese history would have run a different course (Chi 1986: 296).

Concluding Remarks

The chapter explains that the victory of Chinese Communist Revolution was organically connected with the effect and result of World War 1, and it was a landmark in modern Chinese history. China was one of the primary victims of World War 1, despite the fact it was on the winner’s side, while Japan was one of the leading beneficiaries and began to extend its military power in Asia. Many Europeans might not know of the Chinese 1919 May Fourth Movement, and therefore might now realize that this movement, as a direct consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, became a major foundation for Chinese nationalism and communism in the twentieth century. The lesson that China learned from World War 1 was that achieving a strong nation state status was essential for its place in the international system. As a result, China shifted its position from internationalism (joining the War) to self-determining nationalism (He 2016), and furthermore, to international communism.

The chapter also analyses how China’s socio-political and socio-cultural transformations coincided with the course of World War 1, leading the country towards a century-long revolution. As one scholar highlights the impact of World War 1 on China’s history as “the end of an age and beginning of the new one” (James Joll cf Xu 2011), nevertheless, the historical role and significance of the Chinese Communist Revolution is being rewritten and reinterpreted. After the Cold War, many politically-motivated opinion-makers, as well as academics, attempted to challenge the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Revolution and dismissed the history of which it was an outcome and in which it had played such an important role. There are people inside and outside China who suspect the historical necessity for the Chinese Communist Revolution and who claim that, if China had not adopted the Marxist theory, had not gone through revolutions, and had not taken the socialist road, China would have developed more rapidly into a “normal” power, and it could also be possible that China might have developed into an advanced nation possessing some of the characteristics of Western democracy. Unfortunately, history did not grant the time and opportunity which China needed. World War 1, World War 2, and the Chinese Civil War totally altered the course of Chinese development.
Therefore, to understand the contemporary transformations taking place in China, one has to understand the historical background and foundation of the Chinese Communist Revolution and its entire discourse. If national identity is agreed to be a useful tool to understand the transformation of a country’s development trajectory, then World War 1 can be argued to provide China the momentum and opportunity to rethink the identity questions and to redefine its international relations (Xu 2011).
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http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/making_sense_of_the_war_china


Sun Yat-Sen (1923) The Three Principles of the People.


Endnotes

1 The notion of “century of humiliation” refers to the period between the first Sino-British Opium War (1839) and the end of the Chinese Civil War (1949), during which the political incursion, economic exploitation, and military aggression by Western imperialist countries are regarded as the key external factors that undermined the historical glory of the Chinese civilization and humiliated the Chinese nation.

2 The “Xin Hai Revolution” refers to the “Republican Revolution of 1911” led by Sun Yat-sen, which overthrew China’s last Qing Dynasty and turned China into a republic. It is also called Xinhai Revolution in Chinese, because the year 1911 was a Xinhai Year in the sexagenary cycle of the Chinese calendar.

3 It was also disclosed that China had also agreed to this arrangement, whereas Wellington Kuo (顧維鈞), China’s ambassador to France, refused to sign his name to it.
Chapter 13

The First World War: Tracing its impacts

Søren Dosenrode

Introduction

Admittedly, there is a certain ‘what if’ connotation to embarking on this part of the book. Certain developments were present before the war but were accelerated by it, like modernism in literature or aviation in technology; with others it is hard to establish a causality, like aspects of scientific inventions. And, in cases where it is possible – like the borders drawn up in the Middle East – the next question arises: for how long a time is it right to consider a development to be an implication of World War 1 rather than that of other developments and inventions and so forth. Bearing this in mind, the contributors to this volume have tried to identify impacts of the Great War, and they will be collected and extended in this chapter. It goes without saying that the impact in many cases was strongest in the interbellum, then lost strength and faded away like ripples caused by a stone thrown into the water of a quiet lake\footnote{1}.

The first part of this book was dedicated to the war itself and to the Peace of Versailles. Then followed a series of in-depth analyses of central fields of interest. On the basis of the previous chapters, but also much extended, this chapter aims at giving a condensed but broad overview and analysis of the impact of World War 1. Concretely, it will look at World War 1’s impact on culture, politics (domestic and foreign relations), economy, and lastly on science, technology, and medicine.
Culture and literature

James Winders formulates the impact of World War 1 on culture like this (2001: 99):

“It is difficult not to conclude that the Great War of 1914 to 1918 set in motion many of the violent forces and much of the cultural despair that bedevilled the remainder of the twentieth century. The war shattered the confident ideals of an entire generation, many of whom in their disillusioned state would succumb to the lure of the apocalyptic politics of fascism.”

Yet there was another, perhaps more surprising, aspect to the war experience too. In his article, Mosse (1986: 494) refers to an analysis made by Bill Gammage, who concludes,

“Veterans tried to forget the tragic years of the war as quickly as possible, and yet, as they resumed civilian life, they remembered the security, purposefulness and companionship of the war. Many veterans considered the war years in retrospect as the happiest years of their lives.” [My emphasis, SD].

Thus, there was an ambivalence to be found, and it spilled over into culture, into its prism: literature.

This section will begin with general thoughts on the war’s impact on culture, before we look into its impact on literature in Germany, the Anglo-Saxon countries, France, and Denmark. The focus on literature is because of its ability to absorb and amplify less tangible feelings and emotions and, if it succeeds in ‘hitting a nerve’, it will reach a big audience and thus contribute to ‘framing’ a period.

General remarks
Looking at the cultural scene, a number of developments have roots in the war or before it, others were new. According to Winders (2001) one of the attitudes of the cultural response to the Great War among writers and painters was escapism, physically (for example, the Americans going to Paris like Ernest Hemingway and F. Scott Fitzgerald) or intellectually. Other responses were cultural pessimism and despair (e.g. Sigmund Freud and Oswald Spengler). This pessimism and despair in pre-war ideals was expressed by
Ernest Hemingway in his *A Farewell to Arms* (1929: 196):

“There were many words that you could not stand to hear and finally only the names of places had dignity. Certain numbers were the same way and certain dates and these with the names of the places were all you could say and have them mean anything. Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates.”

Of course, there were more positive approaches, too: those who saw the war and its atrocities as some kind of purification – an apocalypse – after which one might find hope, for example Hermann Hesse’s *Demian* or T.S. Eliot’s poem *The Waste Land* from 1922.

The realisation that shellshock could be more than cowardice (Jones et. al 2006), (Thomas and Ironside 2006) helped pave the way for psychology as Sigmund Freud would recognise it as a diagnosis. Freud himself further developed his psychoanalysis and dream studies, and Carl Jung’s idea of archetypes both left traces in the literature (for examples see August Strindberg and George Bernard Shaw). Winders (2001) argues that the authors of modernism had to undertake a journey within as a result of the ‘ruins of the postwar world around them.’ The experiences of the war were immanent, and some lamented the lost world of pre-war Europe, for example Marcel Proust *A la recherche du temps perdu* (*In Search of Lost Time*). Hermann Hesse, among others expresses, the disillusion of the (German) youth in the post-war era; and Erich Maria Remarque, in his iconic *Im Westen nicht Neues* (*All Quiet on the Western Front*, 1928) went a step further, not being able to extort anything positive from war’s rage. Of course, the war also affected art (for examples, see Max Beckmann and William Orpen) and music (see Vaughan Williams and Paul Hindemith). The experiences of the war were carried on until and through the next one, which began only twenty-two years after the first one had ended, thus making it possible for a woman first to lose the father of her son in the First World War and then the child, now a grownup soldier, in the next – in other words, the personally felt, direct impact of war.

In the next part, we will reflect on the impact the war made on literature in the main antagonist states: Germany, the Anglo-Saxon countries, and France, and in a neutral state, Denmark.
Impact on German literature
According to Schlosser (Chapter 6), the majority of German and Austrian intellectuals looked positively on World War 1 in 1914. The war was seen as a potential purification, as a possibility to revitalise culture. Ernst Jünger’s war diary *In Stahlgewittern (Storm of Steel)* was one such a glorification of war, and a radical violation of humanistic ideals. The book was re-printed both during the 1920s and 1930s, where it aimed at ‘setting things right’ after Versailles, and it was a useful tool for the growing militarism of German society. After the war, the book has been re-published again (most recently in 2007), but Schlosser notes the change in the newer editions towards a less war-glorifying style, suiting the *Bundesrepublik*. Contrary to Jünger, Hermann Hesse looks inwards, towards the inner universe of each individual. This escapism, looking a lot like pacifism (cf. Schlosser Chapter 6), was not popular with the Nazi-regime, and from 1942 Hesse was not allowed to publish his works. After World War 2, Hesse has remained an inspiration to very diverse groups, ranging from hippies and environmentalists, to young Chinese and Japanese people today. In general, World War 1 still fills the literary landscape in Germany, be it in the form of new books like Florian Illies’ book *1913 Der Sommer des Jahrhunderts (1913 The Summer of the Century)* from 2012, or the re-publishing of Erich Maria Remarque’s classic *Im Westen nicht Neues*.

World War 1 was reflected on from different points of view in German literature in the years between World War 1 and World War 2. World War 1 was the manifestation of the modernisation and industrialisation of life. Nationalists, especially, (see Spengler and Jünger) reflected the relation between man and machine. The killing of millions in World War 1 destroyed the value of individual life. But, the individual also felt threatened (Alfred Döblin) and alienated (Franz Kafka) in the modern metropolis after World War 1. Hermann Broch presented a review of the era 1888-1918 in the novel *Die Schlafwandler (The Sleepwalkers)* (1931-1932). The modernist Broch analysed the degeneration of moral and all values in favor of functionality. Joseph Roth, on the other hand, looked back at the period before World War 1 with nostalgia in his novel *Radetzkmarsch (Radetzky March)* (1932). For him, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the only possible bulwark against the growing Nazism.

Impact on Anglo-Saxon literature
Chapter 7 focuses on ‘the impact of World War I on Anglophone literature’. Bent Sørensen argues that World War 1 gave rise to a number of phenom-
ena of lasting interest to historians and scholars of literature and culture in the Anglophone world. English literature already had a long tradition of reflecting on wars and their impact on soldiers in the frontline, as well as the civilians on the home front, but with the brutal witness-based poetry of the trenches of World War 1, the awareness of the psychological effects of war and of trauma discourses and behaviours became foregrounded in new ways. The term the ‘Lost Generation’ was coined as a way of discoursing the national and personal trauma of losing upwards of one million British citizens to military or civilian deaths directly attributable to the Great War. The generational metaphor is of particular interest as a reservoir of cultural memory of the losses connected with the war. While the USA lost relatively few soldiers in combat (approximately 117,000), the aftermath of the Great War was of great cultural significance as the Lost Generation identity position became widely disseminated to apply to many groups that had not directly been involved in the war. In fact, the Lost Generation became only the first of a number of American literary generations whose auto-image incorporated absence and negation in its label. It is, in other words, possible to trace the effect of World War 1 through the cultural and literary generational constructs of the entire twentieth century in the American context.

**Impact on French literature**

Concerning France, Bille Jørgensen (Chapter 8) refers to Pierre Nora who speaks of *Lieux de mémoire*, remarks that it is not surprising that an abundant literature on different aspects of World War 1 has marked the literary history of the twentieth century, and approvingly quotes Laurence Campa as saying: “*La Grande guerre a nourri la littérature durant un siècle*”.

The impact of World War 1 as very important in the French *entre-deux-guerres*. With his essay *Témoin*, published in 1929, Jean-Norton Cru presents a critical analysis of testimony writings from the period 1915-1929. Thus, it becomes clear that the psychological and social consequences of the war took on various generic forms (letters, novels, and essays, among others). This témoignage tendency implies very important personal and existential concerns, but also reflections on language and style between popular patois expressions and more radical modernist tendencies (like Louis Aragon and Céline). Though patriotism is present, it is worth noting the explicitly critical view of the war that can be seen in journals like the satirical *Le Canard enchaîné*, founded in 1916 and which still exists, but also the pacifist *Le Populaire* founded in 1918 with Henri Barbusse as its Editor-in-Chief.
Perhaps nowhere has World War 1 left as deep an impact as in France, and Jørgensen remind us that, not only culturally and politically but also geographically, the war has left clearly visible imprints in the form of devastated battlefields, graveyards, and monuments. World War 1 has certainly left its mark on the French culture.

**Impact on Danish literature**

In Denmark, the direct impact of the war on Danish literature was clear, according to Gemzæ, although Denmark was neutral (Chapter 9). One important author, Georg Brandes, was critical towards the war and the bloodshed, and he continued to foresee revanchism from Germany due to the hard terms for peace after the war. In general, one finds the same two tendencies in Danish literature during and after the war as in other European nations; that is a pacifist and a more supportive one, the latter often believing in or hoping for a moral purification (for example, Helge Rode). Gemzæ demonstrates that the literary scene in Denmark was inspired by what happened in Europe (modernism, cubism, futurism, and expressionism), and in that way was influenced by the war. After for example Emil Bønneleycke’s *Spartanerne (The Spartans)* (1919) and Rudolf Broby-Johansen’s and Tom Kristensen’s poetry from the last years of the war and the years immediately afterwards, the war as a central topic fades out. Still, there are important contributions every now and then where the War is important like Thomas Dienesen’s *No Man’s Land* from 1929, describing his war experiences at the Western Front, and also – but less prominently – in the autobiography of the dramatist and priest Kaj Munk from 1943, where he explains how the war and the fall of empires influenced his worldview.

When explaining why World War 1 does not have a prominent place in Danish culture and literature today, two reasons spring to mind: first, Denmark was neutral and profited greatly from the war. And second, Denmark and the Danes did not suffer much from the war. There were Danes participating in the war – as German conscripts from Southern Slesvig – but as the majority of Danes sided with the Entente Powers, their history has largely been neglected. The war which impacted most on Danish literature and culture is World War 2, where Denmark was occupied by Germany.

**Summing up**

It seems clear, and by no means surprising, that left World War 1 a direct impact on culture, including literature. Of the states we have looked at, the
impact was strongest in the European states which fought in the war and it was strongest in the *interbellum* period. This is not surprising, as the war destroyed the value of individual life, and the moral standards and ideals the world had been built upon. For some, perhaps more surprising, is the lasting impact the war has had up until today, as is manifested in the sheer number of books, articles, broadcasts, parades, exhibitions, and ceremonies being launched around the centenary of the outbreak of World War I, and continuing with the centenaries of the battles of Verdun, Somme, Passchendaele (also known as the Third Battle of Ypres), and onwards. These events clearly show the importance of the memory, as well as the interest in the war more than a hundred years after its outbreak. A tendency not to be forgotten is that of the two strands in literature and culture, 1) the dissociation from the war’s terror and cruelty and 2) seeing the war as something good, purification, and so on; the former prevails today.

**Political impact**

A situation where a generation of young men are mobilised, drawn away from family and indeed from civil society, of which many are killed (eight to eleven million soldiers) or wounded (twenty-one million soldiers), is bound to create holes in societies’ fabrics, and result in a press for changes. Millions of families lost a husband, a father, a brother. Adding to the military losses, the civilian losses were tremendous, too: seven million killed. On top of this suffering, there was the physical damage: a belt of devastation along the Western Front, landscapes rendered barren rundown factories and infrastructure, and so on. In the international realm empires and kingdoms had fallen, and fallen apart. The impact was clear and easy to see. In this section, we will look first at some of the domestic impacts, and then the international ones, although the borders between the two are often blurred.

**Domestic impacts: Revolutions, bloody and less so**

The war was bound to have an impact domestically. Democracy was one of the reasons why the US went to war, as was clear from Wilson’s Fourteen Points (Wilson 1918), and it worked in the beginning. Related to democracy was the question of universal suffrage: taking millions of men away and leaving their tasks to women fuelled the demand for more equal rights, for democratic rights. After the war, the traditional family structure and gender specific roles were questioned. The states themselves, their organisation, had been changed due to the war effort, and this, too, had consequences in
the form of growing bureaucratisation. Thus, the following section will be focused on the following three impacts: the spread of democracy, women’s rights and family structures, and the bureaucratisation of the state.

**Spread and fall of democracy**
The end of the war meant the fall of a number of autocratic regimes, where a monarch had had a decisive influence on politics and minorities were often discriminated against (for example, Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia). The peace treaties, leaning on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, insisted on full democracy in the new states of Europe. But democracy did not last long as the right way to govern in Europe. During the 1920s and 1930s, the following countries turned either into dictatorships or became autocratic: Russia in 1918; Hungary in 1920; Italy in 1922, Bulgaria in 1923; Spain in 1923 (and again in 1936); Turkey in 1923; Albania in 1925; Poland in 1926; Portugal in 1926; Lithuania in 1926; Yugoslavia in 1929; Rumania in 1930; Germany in 1933; Austria in 1933; Estonia in 1934; Latvia in 1934; and Greece in 1934. Thus, at the end of the 1930s, only a minority of European states remained democratic, notably France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland. A story goes that the wife of the Danish foreign minister, Emma Scavenius, attended a dinner and was seated next to an American ambassador. Being polite, he asked about her country, Denmark. She explained that it was a democracy, that it had had a majority government for years, and was stable. The ambassador, smiled at her and said, “Oh, I see. Denmark is a dictatorship!” Denmark was in fact a democracy but, as the majority of European countries were not, one cannot blame him. How did this happen?

There is a variety of reasons for the decline in democracy: several of the states were not prepared for a new political system, and were vulnerable to small groups of communist revolutionaries (like the short revolutions in Germany and Hungary); some states did not have any tradition for democracy, or only a weak and short one (for example, Bulgaria and Poland); in some states large parts of the populations felt cheated (Italy) or badly treated by the peace treaty (for example, Germany and Hungary), thus creating anger against the establishment; some had a bad economy in periods (Germany) and all were hit by the Depression; and importantly, the Soviet Russian internationalism – aiming at exporting revolution and dissolving capitalist states – unleashed counter-revolutionary forces.
Of the countries with autocratic or dictatorial leaders listed above, the worst – and seen from an international relations perspective, the most fateful – was Nazism’s rise in Germany. When Hitler and the Nazi-party gained power in 1933 by promising jobs, a good economy, and revenge for the ‘humiliations of Versailles’, a new war became more likely. Part of the ‘Nazi-parcel’ was also discrimination against German Jews: first anti-Semitism, then discrimination, and later mass-murder (the Holocaust). How did it happen, that one of the world’s most civilized countries did this to its citizens?

The rise of Nazism has been explained in a number of ways: by some as a unique historical phenomenon (Fischer 1995), or the old German striving for supremacy in Europe (Taylor 1944) and so on. Davidson (1977) names a number of factors: the German army had not been defeated in Germany and thus seemed unbeaten; the peace terms were harsh; Soviet-inspired internationalism was set against German nationalism, and lost; and then there was Germany’s bad economy which included huge unemployment (inflation followed by the Great Depression); behind all of this, loomed the spectre of World War 1. According to Davidson (1977) by the beginning of the 1930s a majority of those in society had been radicalised out of their tradition, and wanted change. This change is what Kershaw (2004) describes convincingly as ‘project of national salvation’ personified in Hitler, combined with the (2004: 241): “new, modern power-élite[’s]” acceptance and support of Nazism’s ideological goals (2004: 254): “operating alongside weakened old élites through the bureaucratic sophistication of a modern state.”

Democracy was restored in Western Europe after the end of World War 2, but not in Eastern Europe until after the implosion of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War meant hopes for a peaceful and democratic world. This hope has not come true, as the annual reports from Freedom House states year after year (Freedom House 2017):

“Key Findings

• With populist and nationalist forces making significant gains in democratic states, 2016 marked the 11th consecutive year of decline in global freedom.
• There were setbacks in political rights, civil liberties, or both, in a number of countries rated “Free” by the report, including Brazil, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Tunisia, and the United States.
• Of the 195 countries assessed, 87 (45 percent) were rated Free, 59 (30 percent) Partly Free, and 49 (25 percent) Not Free.
• The Middle East and North Africa region had the worst ratings in the world in 2016, followed closely by Eurasia.”

**Women’s rights**

The place most radically questioning the traditional family and gender specific roles was Soviet Russia after the revolution.

Within a month after seizing power, a new family law was passed in the Soviet Union (Goldman 2004: 1): “The code captured in law a revolutionary vision of social relations based on women’s equality and the ‘withering away of the ‘family’.” The progressive gender policy of the Soviet Union was to last less than ten years, when substantial parts were rolled back by Joseph Stalin.

However, gender equality was ‘in the air’ in most of Europe and North America, and had been already before the war; the undisputed role of the male as head of family, *pater familias*, was about to fall. During the war, woman had replaced men in factories, taken over many of the men’s roles in the home, and so on. They had contributed to the war effort and had proven that they could fulfil the same tasks as the men (Taylor 1966). The political result was that, during the first ten years after World War 1, universal suffrage was introduced in twenty European states and, in the 1930s, in five more states, to cover most of Europe. Outside Europe, women got voting rights in for example, Canada and the USA (New Zealand and Australia already had universal suffrage before the war) (see Sondhaus 2011; Ray 1918). As mentioned, there was already a press for universal suffrage before the war, but the war accelerated the development. However, it is important to remember that this development left most of Asia and Africa untouched, and only developed very slowly in Latin America, where women in Ecuador first got a right to vote in 1961.

Although universal suffrage became the ‘norm’ during the interbellum, it did not lead to, for example, equal pay, but it did strengthen the development towards women’s empowerment which had begun very modestly before the war. Belonging to this development was a loosening up of the sexual morals which prevailed before the war. Going into war, with the possibility of dying, did not encourage young lovers to restrain themselves as before the war. When coming home from war, the more relaxed morals remained
in place, although peace had broken out (for example, the Roaring Twenties in the US).

Bureaucratisation of the state
A third important trend was that of centralisation in state government\textsuperscript{14}. To win the war, the belligerent states needed to control and maximise the resources in their country, be that people, raw materials, or means of production. The economy was directed to support the production. Food was rationed, and imports and exports were controlled. Added to this, normal police and secret police watched over internal security, and telephone operators listened in on your phone calls. Rationing, control, and so on also took place in the neutral countries, and nowhere did the state apparatus shrink to its pre-war size after the war had ended.

Blum, Eloranta and Osinsky (2014) sum it up:

“The European nations, the primary belligerents in the conflict, underwent massive transformations involving extensive state regulation, the substitution of market mechanisms by an administration of state officials, and growth of the technocracy. These changes anticipated the emergence of the state-directed economies of the communist and fascist types, as well as plenty of new democracies, in the interwar period. When the war ended in 1918, the institutional design of the most European economies was drastically different in comparison to what had existed before the war.”

James Wilson looks specifically at the US, but his findings fit what happened in Europe as well (1975: 78):

“The number of administrative agencies and employees grew slowly but steadily during the 19th and early 20th centuries and then increased explosively on the occasion of World War I, the Depression, and World War II. It is difficult to say at what point in this process the administrative system became a distinct locus of power or an independent source of political initiatives and problems.”

Seemingly, this growth will continue (Meyer 1987: 215): “The facts of bureaucratic growth are indisputable. By any measure, the size and influence of government have increased almost continuously to the present time.”
Summing up
Looking at the domestic developments and impacts of World War 1, three developments were emphasised: the spread of democracy, only for it to be limited again until the fall of the Soviet Empire around 1990 and again a decline in recent years; the change in gender roles, as exemplified by women’s rights to vote (in some parts of the world); and the spread and growth of state-control and bureaucracy.

The *interbellum* clearly demonstrated that democracy was a fragile flower. The mixture of untamed nationalism, economic crises (partly due to the harsh demands of reparations), a feeling of having been ‘unjustly’ treated – in some cases combined with regions with a fairly low level of education – and a lack of genuine democratic experience prepared the soil for fascism, communism, and old-fashioned autocratic rule. Just before the outbreak of World War 2, less than half of European states were democratic, and after the end of World War 2, countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Russia would continue as dictatorships, and three states would be absorbed by the Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). The large expectations for a Wilsonian ‘New World Order’ after the end of the Cold War has only come true to a limited degree.

“The rapid extension of the suffrage to women, not only in the United States but also in many foreign countries, may confidently be predicted as one of the important consequences of the great world war”, Ormay Ray wrote already in 1918 (p. 469), and he was right, insofar as the war clearly demonstrated that women had taken their share in making the ‘home front’ work, replacing the men at war. The patriarchal worldview and order was broken, and democracy spread. World War 2 contributed to the development of women’s empowerment, which got its final breakthrough at the end of the 1960s.

The need for control and organisation brought a hitherto unseen growth of the state, of its bureaucracy. It expanded, and never returned to its pre-war size, thus laying a fundament for at least the Western bureaucratic states of today.

**Foreign Political implications of World War 1**

In this section, the impact of the war on international relations will be analysed, beginning with Europe – the cradle of the conflict – proceeding to the
Middle East, Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and the Americas, ending with a general summary of its impact on international relations.

**Europe**
The foreign political situation right after World War 1 was abnormal in Europe: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia were ‘on standby’; actually, Austria-Hungary had fallen apart and never was to return as a great power. As the US-Congress had refused to ratify the peace treaties and the people had elected an isolationist, Warren G. Harding, as Woodrow Wilson’s successor, the US had returned to its usual isolationism, leaving the playing field to France and the United Kingdom. However, although the US withdrew from treaty execution, her economic and financial interest in Europe remained strong and so did a certain political interest in brokering a revised peace. France and the United Kingdom were both worn out by the war, but did not realise this; they had emerged victorious and with their respective empires intact – even enlarged – by Germany’s colonies, now under ‘mandate’ from the League of Nations. Thus, the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s were relatively peaceful, a kind of Indian summer for the two imperial powers.

As indicated in the list of autocracies and dictatorships above, the majority of Europe’s – and indeed the world’s – states were not democratic before the outbreak of World War 2. Two major powers, Germany and the Soviet Union, were totalitarian, driven by totalitarian ideologies and both strived for world dominance. The uprising of communism and fascism as ruling ideologies in two great powers had domestically caused millions of dreadful acts, disrupted lives, and suppression – ‘Holocaust’ and ‘Gulag’ says it all. The aggressive ideologies of Germany and Soviet Russia also caused the next European civil war, World War 2, again with horrible human losses (National WWII Museum): fifteen million dead soldiers, twenty-five million wounded soldiers, and forty-five million dead civilians (a bit more than today’s population of Germany or of Iran). Added to this was the invention of nuclear weapons, the introduction of the ‘balance of terror’, letting the populations of the Eastern- and Western-Blocs live in anxiety for decades (annihilation by nuclear war was close at least during the Cuba missile crisis in 1962, the ‘Soviet nuclear false alarm incident’ in September 1983, and the NATO exercise ‘Abel Archer’ in November of the same year).

In the aftermath of the World War 2, one saw a world divided into a free world under US leadership, a communist world under Soviet dictate, a small group of neutral states, and large areas which were still colonies. The rise
of Nazism in Germany and Communism in Russia, and the resulting World War, must be seen as one of World War 1’s most massive impacts.

Back in 1921, Aristid Briand had argued that Europe had to unite, because soon it would find itself between a hammer (Soviet Russia) and an anvil (the USA). After World War 2, that situation came true; until World War 1, Europe had dominated the world; now, other powers were deciding its fate.

In the subsections the following topics will be analysed: The Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union; The Cold War; and the Uniting for Europe.

The Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union
The war impacted on all societies in Europe and on a number outside – directly or indirectly. In few places was the direct consequence as tremendous as in Russia. The regime change in Russia was to impact on the world ‘ever after’, directly until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and indirectly until today. During the Soviet period, the communist ideas, weapons, and training of revolutionaries was exported to the ‘Third World’, where the ruling class still today profits from the support they got then like, for example, in Angola, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), or Laos. Basically, Soviet Russia became a country which had declared war on the capitalist world, adding a much stronger ideological flavour to international relations than Woodrow Wilson’s idealism.

In February 1917, Russia’s autocratic Tsar was forced to abdicate, and a Western style Provisory Government took over power, but it was challenged by Bolshevik forces launching the October Revolution, throwing the country into a civil war lasting until 1921. The immediate background for the revolution were irregularities in food supplies, lockouts, strikes, and demonstrations (Fitzpatrick 1994). One especially important cause of the revolution was the war (Kennan 1967: 1): “It [the old system] fell because the strains of conducting a prolonged major war, superimposed on more basic weaknesses and problems of adjustment, were simply too much for it.”

The overall aim of the communists was to make the Marxist-Leninist vision come true. It was by no means obvious that the Bolsheviks would win, but they did (Kennan 1967: 7): “The Bolsheviki came out ahead very largely because they were, in this maelstrom of poorly organized political forces, the only political force that had hardness, sharpness, disciplined drive and clearly defined purpose.”
Read (2014) summarises:

“The Russian Revolution was one of the most influential events to emerge from the furnace of the First World War. It transformed Russia and its Empire and firmly planted the flag of world revolution at the centre of 20th century world history. The revolution was the outcome of a vast array of interacting forces, internal and external, long term and short-term, structural and accidental. The Great War did not create the forces of revolution, but it did set them in motion and fuel them.”

It is not an exaggeration to say that Soviet Russia challenged all capitalist states, in the sense that it wanted to destroy them through revolutions in their respective countries until a universal dictatorship of the proletariat was reached. With such an approach to international relations, and a belief in the inevitable breakdown of the capitalist system, normal international relations are hard, if not impossible to conduct (Morgenthau 1967). Soviet Russia was internationally isolated in the 1920s and 1930s, while on the other hand it supported revolutionary movements all over the world. Indeed (Kennan 1967: 10), “It was in its exemplary effect beyond Russia’s borders that the Bolsheviks themselves saw the greatest importance of the Revolution.”

The communist dream of internationalism, under Soviet Russian leadership, prompted nationalism and counterrevolutions which, outside Soviet Russia, proved the stronger power (Kennan 1967).

The polarisation between communists on the one side, and nationalists and fascists on the other side, brought about crisis in many European countries, as discussed above. The lack of success in exporting the revolution to Europe was countered by successful exports to Africa and Asia, thus accelerating the decline of the European colonial empires (Kennan 1967), as will be discussed further below.

As a sign of the dictatorships’ ruthlessness and lack of principles, Nazi-Germany and Soviet Russia concluded a non-aggression treaty (The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact) in 1939. In a secret annex, the two states divided Eastern Europe between them, including a division of Poland. Poland was attacked by both states soon afterwards, thus igniting World War 2; two years later Germany attacked Soviet Russia, which then changed sides and became an ally of the United States, the United Kingdom and France.
Cold War
At the end of World War 2, Soviet Russia stood as one of the victorious powers alongside the USA, Great Britain and France; in reality, only Soviet Russia and the US mattered.

Seen from Soviet Russia’s point of view, nothing good came from the West; Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812, in 1918 Russia was forced to cede large parts of her European lands to newly established states (the Brest-Litovsk Agreement), and in 1941, Hitler had broken his treaty with Stalin, and invaded Soviet Russia. To avoid this again, Stalin insisted on, and got Eastern Europe recognised as Soviet Russia’s sphere of influence at the Yalta-conference in February 1945, a kind of cordon sanitaire mark II. After its liberation from German occupation, Soviet Russia had kept her troops in Eastern Europe and within a few years had demolished any kind of democracy there, introducing one-party systems in all the countries there. As trust between the Western Allies (the US, United Kingdom, and France) and Soviet Russia deteriorated in the years after 1945, what Winston Churchill described as an ‘iron curtain’ divided Europe into a Western, democratic part, and an Eastern dictatorship. This led to tensions between the two blocs, and to increased rearmament. In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded as a Western defence-league, and in 1955 the Eastern bloc did the same under the name the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance – or the Warsaw Pact for short (Calvocoressi 2001).

Until the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, the two blocs competed for supremacy, exporting the European conflict to the rest of the world. Ideologically, the one bloc fought for freedom, democracy, and capitalism, whereas the other promoted Marxism-Leninism, one-party rule, and command economy. The competition took place all over the globe, where Soviet Russia and her alley China (their relations deteriorated from the end of the 1960s) promoted and supported anti-colonial and anti-imperialist groupings in, for example, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Thus, they contributed to casting off the colonial yoke, but often just replaced it with another exploitive elite now just called ‘progressive’ or ‘revolutionary’ (Dunbabin 1994 (a)). For Europe, the end of World War 2 clearly demonstrated her new role as domineered, not dominating.

Sharp (2010: 4) mentions the impact of the Cold War: “The Cold War did freeze some of the persistent post-Versailles problems of the 1920s and the 1930s but when first the Soviet Empire, and then the Soviet Union itself col-
lapsed, many of these issues re-emerged.” Several of these problems were solved by the European Union, due to its policy of demanding that border disputes and minority problems be solved before a country could join the Union (see the discussion below).

After the end of the Cold War, Eastern Europe was set free and oriented itself towards the West, joining both NATO and the European Union. This situation has left Russia much in the same situation as before World War 2, that is without a protective belt against ‘the West’. In general, Russia today has sunk from the status of one of the two superpowers to that of a great power, together with Brazil, China, the European Union, and India.

When the Cold War ended, and a number of dictatorships in Europe, Africa, and Asia fell, it looked as if the ideas and values of the West (democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and capitalism) had won a decisive victory and a new ‘era’ of peace and cooperation had dawned, as was expressed by Francis Fukuyama in his famous article from 1989, referred to above. Developments in the 2010s clearly show that this is not the case; one only has to look at, for example the number of not free states still existing (Freedom House Index, 2017) or at Russia’s increasing aggressive behaviour (the occupation of Crimea, destabilisation of Ukraine, interference in Syria, and so on) to see this. It is clear that Fukuyama’s liberal prophecy, The End of History, has not yet materialised.

The uniting of Europe

To prevent a new war in Europe, and to end the century-old rivalry between Germany and France, the French foreign minister Robert Schuman suggested the founding of a European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, only five years after the end of World War 2, inviting especially Germany, but all European states, to join. Key to this project was placing coal and steel production under a supra-national authority. Coal and steel were then the key components of arms production. The plan was to extend the cooperation to other sectors, and over time create a European federation. Five states accepted the invitation, namely Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The cooperation of ‘the Six’ was extended to include a common market (1957), and from 1987 an internal market and a European Political Cooperation (Dosenrode 2012).

In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union was signed, and included the treaty establishing the Economic and Monetary Union.
By then, the EU had twelve member states. After various extensions and revisions, especially after the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, the European Union mostly resembles a (weak) state of federal design (the EU had twenty-eight members in 2018) (Dosenrode 2012). The weakness of the Union’s construction was demonstrated by the economic crisis which hit the world in 2008-2014; by its difficulties in managing the migrants trying to get to Europe (from approximately 2008 onwards);²⁰ by the Syrian refugees (from 2015 onwards); and by Britain leaving the EU (BREXIT). As regional integration is manmade and not automatic, one cannot say whether the uniting of Europe, as it looks at present, will be a serious attempt to bring Europe back to being a leading power but, according to Andrew Morawcsik (2010), Europe already is the second superpower. U.S President Donald Trump’s isolationistic foreign policy may force the Member States of the EU to move even closer together, as indicated by German chancellor Angela Merkel in spring 2017 (Handelsblatt 2017).

Not surprisingly, the impact of World War 1 on international relations was felt very strongly in Europe, as it created the possibility of World War 2. World War 2 divided the continent in two hostile camps preparing for war, then after the collapse of the Soviet Empire the enhanced process of European unification, strengthening the process already begun by the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951.

The Middle East²¹
The impact of World War 1 has left its imprint clearly on the Middle East. The Middle East was part of the Ottoman Empire which was on the losing side of the war. It was home to Arab tribes wanting to cast off the Ottoman yoke and have their own state (Pan-Arabism). This gave rise to a disgraceful example of the old-fashioned European power politics so hated by Woodrow Wilson. On the one hand, the United Kingdom made an agreement with the Arab leaders that they would gain independence if they ignited an uprising, which they did. On the other hand the United Kingdom, France, and Russia agreed on how to share the Middle East among them in 1915 and 1916, not granting the Arabs a united Arab state (the Sykes–Picot Agreement). In addition, in 1917 the British foreign secretary Balfour wrote Walter Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community, that the government supported the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine (Dosenrode & Stubkjær 2002). After further negotiations, a border between Syria and Iraq was drawn; France received a mandate over the Northern part (today’s Syria, Lebanon, and parts of Southern Turkey) and the United Kingdom over the Southern
part (today’s Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and parts of Saudi-Arabia). Wright wrote (2016), “The new borders ultimately bore little resemblance to the original Sykes-Picot map, but their map is still viewed as the root cause of much that has happened ever since.” Until after World War 2, the region was fairly quiet due to the presence of the mandate powers. The reason for the unrest and instability which followed is, among other things, that the final borders were ‘made with a ruler’, not taking much note of the culture and history of the people inhibiting the area. For example, the Kurdish nation was spread over Iran, Iraq, and Turkey (and a bit of Armenia and Syria); and Iraq was ‘born’ with Kurds in the north, Sunni Muslims in the middle, and Shia Muslims in the South of Iraq, thus laying the foundation for today’s unrest in Iraq.

After World War 1 Balfour’s promise of a homeland to the Jews was implemented (although not in the way and form it was intended) and the state of Israel came into being; with it came seemingly unending conflicts with her Arab neighbours. During the Cold War, the Middle East conflicts were fuelled by the rivalry of Soviet Russia and the USA, itself an offspring of World War 1 and, after a break, this rivalry has been resurrected since President Putin took up leadership in Russia.

**Africa**

Africa’s role in World War 1 tends to be ignored; perhaps because Africa was not itself an ‘important’ battlefield during World War 1 compared to, for example, the Western Front in Europe, but the war caused hundreds of thousands of deads in Africa. During the war, at least three developments are of interest: first, African soldiers fought for their colonial powers, especially France. Second, the war was used by the Entente Powers to attack and occupy the German colonies in Africa – taking them over by mandate after the war. And third, local people used the ‘distraction’ of the war to attack their colonial masters to gain freedom or better circumstances.

According to Lunn (2015) 502,600 Africans were soldiers in Europe, and 252,000 were war workers, thus contributing substantially to the war effort. Added to this, were 268,000 descendants of European settlers fighting with the Entente Powers (Koller 2014). Most of these came from France using indigenous soldiers in Europe. Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom used them in Africa. According to Koller, it is clear that the French army used the indigenous soldiers for difficult tasks, and that their death rate was two and a half times that of Frenchmen. Added to
this, France introduced (Koller 2014) “forced conscription between 1914 and 1917 that traumatised West African populations”.25 It was a French hope that the colonial soldiers would absorb the French civilization, and bring it back home with them. And, in many cases, this was done. Upon returning home, these soldiers acted as ‘go betweens’ between the colonial administration and the local population, and they tended to settle in the cities (Koller 2014) but, although they were ready to ‘modernise’, their support was seldom honoured. These persons, the modernisers, were to be important in the struggle for independence, decades later (Rathbone 1978).

As also happened in Asia, the Entente Powers used the outbreak of the war as an excuse to seize German possessions, and to get rid of German competition in trade (Rathbone 1978). In some cases, the fights were short – like the Togoland Expedition lasting less than three weeks, where as in others they lasted longer, and one throughout the whole war (in Eastern Africa, where the German commander, major-general Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was able to use a ‘hit and run’ tactic, manoeuvring in the vast area of East Africa). These campaigns often left much of the country devastated and the people starving.26 After the war, Germany was ‘Out of Africa’, and the Entente Powers shared the spoils – the German colonies – in the form of League of Nations mandates.27

In a number of cases, the war encouraged rebellions against the colonial powers (see examples in Balesi 1990). In North Africa there was, for example, the Zaian War in Morocco, where the Zaian confederation of Berber tribes rebelled against the French between 1914 and 1921, and the Senussi Rebellion where the Senussis in Egypt, Libya, and Sudan rebelled against the Italians and British from 1915 to 1917. In South Africa, a number of Boers rebelled against the South African Union in the Maritz Rebellion, 1914–1915, but they were quickly overrun. Basically, of these rebellions, none had success worth mentioning. Authaler and Michels (2014) argue that, “while the new international system provided different norms and rationalizations, as well as alternative opportunities for African actors in the colonies, continuity was nonetheless more commonly experienced and dominated societal currents more so than the shifts”.

In his famous Fourteen Points, President Wilson had demanded that (Wilson 1918):
“A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.”

Well, their participation in World War 1 did not bring the indigenous African soldiers new political rights, as was the case in India. The long-term consequences of World War 1 were to be seen after World War 2, where various armed groupings fought against colonialism for the freedom of their countries, very often under the banner of ‘Marxism-Leninism’ and supported by Soviet Russia and China, a direct offspring of World War 1. This placed many of the ‘new’ African states in the ‘Eastern camp’ during the Cold War. As Marxism-Leninism is not prone to democracy, this was a factor which contributed to the delayed democratisation of Africa.

**Asia**

Although comparatively little fighting took place in Asia and the Pacific during World War 1 (the Australians and the Japanese attacked and annexed German colonies there, and parts of the German fleet were operating in the Pacific), the war left its imprint on the region, too. Not only did Australia, French Indochina, India, and New Zealand send troops to fight in Europe and elsewhere (implying soldiers dying, coming back wounded, or ‘just’ with the experience), at least three important developments were directly or indirectly consequences of the war: Japan took up its international role and also diversified its industry; Soviet Russia exported its revolutionary ideology to China and Indochina; and Indian participation in the war – as well as in World War 2 – delivered her an important argument in her quest for democracy and independence.

Japan had gained the rank of a great power, at the latest when she won the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, proving effectively how her strategy of opening and modernisation, which begun in 1868 (see the Meiji Restoration), had succeeded.

During World War 1, Japan sided with United Kingdom, and got a free hand in the Pacific. It declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary and occupied a number of German territories – including Shandong in China – and remained there, unilaterally announcing its claim to hegemony in China (Tooze and Fertik 2014). Although China later sided with the Entente
Powers, Japan’s claim to Shandong was confirmed in the Versailles Treaty of 1919 and caused strong popular dissatisfaction in China, leading to the May Fourth movement.

Li Xing (Chapter 12 in this book, p. 269) explains Japan’s rise like this:

“While the First World War forced the old European imperialists to concentrate on peace and security in Europe, the new emerging powers – Japan and the United States – speedily increased their influence in different parts of the world, particularly in Asia. Japan was able to position itself as an equal power along with the existing western hegemons as a result of the war while its ambition to control the whole Asia was foreseeable.”

As Japan was not involved in serious war operations, she was able to develop and diversify her industry, and supply her allies with materials needed, thus increasing her exports and transforming the country from a debtor to a creditor nation (Tooze and Fertik 2014).

Based on its World War 1 claims of hegemony over China, Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, and in 1937 it tried an all-out invasion of China – in both cases the Japanese forces committing atrocities to the civilian population, thus isolating Japan internationally. Additionally, Japan had trade disputes with Great Britain and the United States, thus pushing her further towards Germany. In September 1940, Japan invaded French Indochina, which belonged to Vichy-France and which was a vassal state to Germany, and in the same month, Japan joined Germany and Italy in extending their ‘Axis-alliance’. In December 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, thus pressing the US into World War 2. After the attack, Japan began a war of conquest, with the aim of making a Pacific empire. Japan finally capitulated on 15 August 1945 after two nuclear bombs were detonated over two Japanese cities.

Following the capitulation, Japan was occupied, demilitarised, and democratised. Japan experienced a large economic growth from the 1950s until the end of Cold War.

As explained by Li Xing (Chapter 12 in this book, p. 269), the inspiration and success of Mao Zedong in China was much due to the support and inspiration of Soviet Russia. “The October Revolution of 1917 and the birth of a great Soviet Union was a source of inspiration for radical and revolu-
tionary transformations and for freeing itself from the hold of the Western colonial powers.” And later, “the Russian victory presented an alternative model to China, where the new communist leaders promised to build a new, fairer and more efficient society.”

Li Xing also argues (Chapter 12 in this book, p. 275) that “there are two important impacts of the First World War to the contemporary Chinese history. The first is that the Versailles Treaty paved the foundation for the subsequent Japanese aggression [against China]’ and [...] ‘that the war fundamentally changed China’s worldview.”

The success of the Soviet Russian and Chinese revolutions was an incentive to promote and export Marxism-Leninism and thus put the West under pressure. As the Cold War developed, both Soviet Russia and China supported and encouraged revolutionary movements in Asia (and many other places, too). One example is Ho Chi Min, who was sent from Moscow to Canton in 1924 to form a resistance movement against French colonialism in Indochina. He was the co-founder of the Communist Party of Indochina, which was to develop into the Communist Party of Vietnam. One of its main purposes was to gain the country’s freedom from its colonial rulers and establish a socialist, one-party state. As is well known, this aim was accomplished in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and so on, but not without considerable bloodshed. The export of revolutions did not succeed everywhere, for example, not in Malaysia, Singapore, or South Korea (Dunbabin 1994 (a)).

India, contributed substantially to the British war effort, and got its first ‘reward’ in the form of a 1917 promise from Edward Montagu, Secretary of State for India to introduce the principle of a dual mode of administration, where elected Indian legislators and appointed British officials would share power. This resulted in the Government of India Act of 1919 (Encyclopaedia Britannica (1)). The implementation was done reluctantly and did not gratify the National Congress and the Muslim League, leading to civil disobedience over the next decade. The Government of India Act of 1935 led to provincial self-governance, but was not enough to satisfy the National Congress’ wishes either (Encyclopaedia Britannica (2)). When World War 2 broke out, the Muslim League supported the British war effort, while the Indian National Congress demanded independence before it would help Britain, this leading to the imprisonment of the National Congress leaders. No solution was found until 1947, when India and Pakistan were declared independent states. Obviously, the Indian war effort in both world wars was
an important contribution to Indian and Pakistani independence (see, for example, Calvocoressi 2001).

So, even though World War 1 is often referred to as ‘the European War’ in China, it is quite clear that it has left its imprint in Asia, too.

The Americas
When war broke out, the United States remained neutral, and did so until April 1917 when the country declared war on Germany and began to mobilise itself in its war effort. By mid-1918, the US had approximately one million soldiers in France, building this force much faster than had been expected by Germany. The US intervention was a decisive victory for the Entente Powers, worn out after the German ‘Spring Offensive’ (March-July 1918), and US-troops played an important role in the ‘Hundred Days Offensive’ (August- November 1918), resulting in Germany’s defeat (see further discussions in Zank in Chapter 4 in this book; Dosenrode in Chapter 5 in this book).

While it is possible to argue for a number of impacts of World War 1, in the following section, three will be looked into: Domestically, the war promoted women’s rights and created an awareness of racial problems; the US entered the world stage as a decisive power; and the war gave the US a leading economic role.

Domestically, World War 1, according to Keene (2014), gave women’s rights groups good arguments for demanding voting rights, and for Woodrow Wilson to be a true liberal. The right came with the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.

The mobilisation of the African American labour force, and the ‘Great Migration’, where about half a million African Americans from the South moved to the industrial centres of the North to fill gaps made by the conscripts, created an awareness that racism was not only a problem confined to the South, but had to be tackled nationwide, thus (Keene 2014) “the war was a transformative moment for the civil rights movement, a time when the black community acquired not just the motivation but also the means for launching assaults on Jim Crow.”

According to the Monroe Doctrine, there were separate spheres of influence for the Americas and for Europe. This implies not only that the US
would not tolerate outside interference in the Americas, but also that the US would not intervene outside them. This self-imposed isolationism was paused with US intervention in World War 1, but returned when Woodrow Wilson’s plans for a League of Nations was not endorsed by the Senate. After World War 2, the US has remained a global power (see above), and is today the world’s only superpower, although President Trump (inaugurated 2017) seems to be withdrawing the US from world politics, at least partly.

When the World War 1 broke out, Britain and France individually financed the war effort. After a while, Britain took over the financing of the Allies until 1916, when it ran out of money and had to borrow from the United States. The US took over the financing of the Allies in 1917, but did so with loans that she insisted should be repaid after the war (Tooze & Fertik 2014). When the question of Britain and France’s war debt was brought up, President Calvin Coolidge supposedly exclaimed, “They hired the money, didn’t they?” (Coolidge). This meant that the war changed the world’s economic system, shifting the financial centre of gravity from London to New York (see below).

Canada, as one of the Dominions, joined Great Britain in the war in 1914, just as militarily unprepared as, the US would be three years later. Canada lost more than a hundred thousand soldiers during the war. After initial enthusiasm among the English speakers of the country, the divide between the French and the English speaking populations became evident, especially about the question of conscription, when the government had to go back on its initial promise not to introduce it (Canada). The English speaking part accepted conscription, whereas the French speaking part did not. The French speaking community increasingly began to identify with Canada and North America, whereas the English speaking one in the beginning of the war was – in general – all in for the empire (MacKenzie 2015). During and after the war, the general trend – within both communities – towards being Canadian, in its own right, was to increase.

Morton, much in accordance with MacKenzie, sums up the impact of World War 1 on Canada like this:

“The great achievements of Canadian soldiers on battlefields such as Ypres, Vimy and Passchendaele, however, ignited a sense of national pride and a confidence that Canada could stand on its own, apart from the British Empire, on the world stage. The war also deepened the divide between French and English Canada, and
marked the beginning of widespread state intervention in society and the economy.”

In other words, it resulted in independence internationally, and a split domestically. MacKenzie (2015) added to this that “Canada emerged from the First World War an economically stronger and more autonomous nation with a greatly enhanced international reputation.”

The Dominions, loyally supporting Great Britain in its fight, insisted on – and got – their reward in the form of increased influence in the imperial foreign policy. One important achievement in this respect was Resolution IX of the Imperial Conference of 1917, which promised to recognise the Dominions as autonomous nations and give them a voice in the empire’s foreign policy, when the war was over (this was a prerogative until then jealously guarded by the government in London). The Dominions were granted seats at the Peace Conference, much to France’s annoyance (see Nicolson 1964: 240). It is a general trend that World War 1 increased the Dominions’ and colonies’ influence according to racial or colour terms: most for the Dominions (‘White’), then India (‘Brown’), and then, hardly any the rest (‘Black’).

A consequence of the Dominions’ increasing independence was the foundation of the British Commonwealth in 1926, with the Balfour Declaration. Great Britain and its Dominions agreed that they were ‘equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs’ (Imperial Conference 1929). This may be seen as the beginning of the winding up of the British Empire. Under the name Commonwealth of Nations, it still exists today as an intergovernmental organisation which has fifty-three members, of which sixteen are realms with the British Monarch as sovereign (Commonwealth).

The Latin American countries declared their neutrality at the outbreak of the war, and it lasted until 1917 when the US entered the war and a number of Latin American states followed, most notably Brazil. On the other hand, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico remained neutral (Encyclopaedia Britannica (3)), for example.

The war influenced the Latin American countries in two ways (cf. Rinke and Kriegesmann 2015): 1) as European investments dried out, US based business continued and expanded their investments in Latin America, thus increasing US dominance in the region, and 2) Europe and the European
civilization lost its role as an ‘ideal pattern’ for the elites in Latin America to copy.

**Summing up foreign political implications of World War 1**

One central implication of World War 1 on foreign politics is a series of changes in the international system. In 1914, the international system was multipolar, centred on Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia, followed by Italy. One might also consider the Ottoman Empire as some kind of ‘honorary power’, but she was already weak (however, still able to keep the Entente Powers away from the Dardanelles). Outside Europe, Japan had proven her power by beating Russia in the 1904-05 War. The United States was a power, but a dormant one. World War 1 left the system very much changed: Austria-Hungary, Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia were either dissolved or castrated, and the US had retired into isolation, thus leaving United Kingdom, France, and Japan (and to a lesser degree Italy), to tend to their empires. Until then, ideology had been fairly unimportant in foreign relations. But President Wilson had introduced ideology (see further discussions in Chapter 5 in this book). His vision for a New World Order included the promotion of democracy, free trade, and collective security. He pushed for the League of Nations, an organisation of collective security, envisioned to be an organisation to prevent conflicts and stop them from evolving. Its Covenant was a part of the Treaty of Versailles. The US did not join it though, and its success rate was very moderate. The great powers continued to pursue power politics (read: national interests). However, the situation in the *interbellum* was unnatural and unstable; it was the swansong of the European empires and indeed of Europe. As already mentioned the interbellum passed, one witnessed the growth of Germany and the Soviet Union’s power: two ideological powers both striving for world hegemony, leading to World War 2. World War 2 changed the international system, and again the number of powers had diminished: Germany and Japan had lost and were occupied. Italy had lost, but managed to change sides just in time to come out with relatively small losses (her colonies, Dodecanese and Trieste). France and the United Kingdom were on the winning side again. Again, the international society tried to create an organisation for collective security, the United Nations, which was founded in 1945 (UN). In its charter, it has serious powers, but as the five permanent members of its Security Council (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the US) each have veto-power and rarely agree, it has not lived up to the hopes which followed its inauguration.

It became clear a few years after the end of the war that the world was now
ruled by two superpowers: the Soviet Union and the United States. These two states fought for supremacy both ideologically and politically, and the struggle lasted until the Soviet Union imploded and dissolved itself on 26 December 1991, thus ending a conflict which lasted from 1914 until 1991. After the Soviet Union’s implosion, the international system was left with one superpower. Potentially Brazil, China, the EU, India, and Russia could challenge US hegemony, but at the time of writing, 2018, that seems unlikely, as the US is – by far – the stronger power. Thus, World War 1 has left a clear and lasting impact on world politics, just as important as the Peace of Westphalia. 

**Economy**

The Great War had serious implications for global and national economies, too. Before the war, the world was ‘globalised’, with a network of trade, capital movements, and migration; that stopped. Free trade was hampered, as the belligerent powers tried to block each other, leading to the German submarine blockade of the British Isles, and of the Royal Navy blockading Germany.

War has to be financed, and this led to inflation during and after the war. But printing money and raising taxes does not work in the long run. Thus, states try to raise credit abroad, leading to deficits and dependence. In this section, we will look at: inflation during and after the war; the shift of economic power, and its long-term impact.

**Inflation**

According to Hardach (2015),

“The methods of financial mobilization were basically the same in all belligerent countries. The government borrowed the money from the central bank to meet the rapidly rising expenses of the war […]. At regular intervals, the short-term debt was funded by issuing long-term war loans. Only a small part of government expenditure was financed by taxes. The rapidly rising government deficit entailed in all countries wartime inflations of various dimensions, visible in rising prices and a deteriorating exchange rate of the currency.”

Thus, one legacy of World War 1 was inflation; others were the perils of
resizing industry and changing products for peacetime consumption, what one might call ‘from guns to pots and pans’.

As mentioned by Hardach (2015), inflation hit during the war. Tooze and Fertik (2014: 255) comment that

“From the point of view of the combatants, the inflation was a necessary evil in the process of mobilization they were driving … What wartime inflation revealed was the possibility of the entire world expecting the same shock at the same time, and that this shock could be the product of conscious decisions.”

Inflation was especially bad in Germany, resulting in hyperinflation 1921-1924 as feared by Keynes (see the discussion in Chapter 10 in this book). The German government financed the war through loans, expecting to win the war and thus to be able to claim reparations. The result was obviously the opposite: Germany lost, and was left with a high debt and also had to pay reparations. However, the reparations ‘only’ amounted to one-third of the German deficit, and the inflation would have come anyway Bresciani-Turroni 1931: 94-95, because (Bresciani-Turroni 1931: 98):

“The German Government bought foreign exchange with paper money which was not purchasing power collected from German citizens by taxes, but new purchasing power created by the discounting of Treasury bills at the Reichsbank, that is by the increase of note-issues.”

Still, the debt accumulated was due to the way the war had been financed, and the war did have economic consequences.

**Shift of economic power away from Europe**

After the war, the traditional economic order had changed (Tooze and Fertik 2014: 235):

“What emerged from the war, […], was not a shrunken global trading system, but one characterized by even larger bilateral imbalances, which were no longer offset by Britain’s robust balance of payments. It was not so much a deglobalization as a decentering of Europe.”
The US and Japan were the great winners.

Olesen agrees that the global consequences of the war were bad (Chapter 10 in this book):

“Somehow, the Versailles Treaty signalled the coming of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Likewise, from now on, Great Britain was no longer the world’s most powerful Empire economically as well as politically. Her position was overtaken by the USA, which to a large degree had financed the expenditures of the war effort of both Great Britain and France. 37”

This transfer of the financial power from Europe to the US is central to the power structure of international relations, and it signalled how hollow the ‘power’ of France and the United Kingdom in reality was after the war. Also important was that the ‘globalisation’ which existed before the war was not restored afterwards. Devastation as consequence of the war, rising debts, and inflation all contributed to prevent a working international economic system.

**Long-term consequences**

Olesen (in Chapter 10 in this book) isolates a number of long-term effects of World War 1:

1) Unemployment from the beginning of the 1920s followed by recession in the 1930s (leading to social unrest, nationalism and eventually World War 2);
2) For most European states they first fully recovered economically in the 1960s;
3) And, as mentioned above, both Britain and France lost their economic, financial and political power and the US emerged as an economic and financial power, outshining all others.

The economic consequences of World War 1 were huge and long-felt, leaving their imprint clearly on today’s economic and political system.

**Science, technology, and medicine**

World War 1 was a technological war, and although for example, the British military felt it was ‘moral and the human quality’, which secured the vic-
tory, science and technology had become crucial to warfare (Palazzo 2002: 4). World War 1 accelerated and refined innovations already made before the war for example, aeroplanes were refined, x-ray machines made mobile and so on, and it did lead to new innovations (such as tanks, flame throwers, poison gas, and two-way radio transmitters). The use of existing technology – in form of, for example, machine guns – made traditional frontal assaults suicidal (although this did not stop them, with hundred thousands of deaths and people wounded as a result). Machine guns gave the defender the upper hand, and promoted thoughts on how to break this, resulting, for example, in tanks and poison gas. U-boats sinking ships with reinforcements trying to cross the Atlantic led to depth charges and hydrophones, and so on. In this section we will first look at its impact on science and technology, and then the impact of the war on medicine.

Impact on science and technology
It is commonly contended that the war lead to a huge leap forward concerning science and technology, but that equation is not quite so simple, as Roland explains (1985/262):

“First, it was a war of industrial production. Germans were never really defeated in that field […] Second, the machinegun and the submarine were critical technologies. […] Third, some new technologies proved less efficient on the battlefield than they might have because their potential was never fully exploited.”

When it comes to, for example, the use of aircraft and tanks, these were developed during the 1930s, building on experiences from the Great War. In this sense, science and technology not only gave some ‘here and now’ advantages, but also made an impact on future wars. The German development of tanks and aeroplanes and their use contributed to the quick German victories over Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and France in World War 2, with severe political consequences.

Returning to the question of the war’s implications on technology and science, Louise Karlskov Skyggebjerg (Chapter 11 in this book), analyses the commonly-held assumption that the war sped up the invention and diffusion of technology. Trying to assess the impact of the war on everyday technology (looking at transport and communication), she focuses especially on radio, trucks, and aeroplanes. The conclusion is that there is no clear-cut answer to the question. If one looks at radio, the war advanced ‘point-to-point’
technology, but not broadcasting in a wider sense. On the contrary, civilian experiments were normally prohibited during the war. Trucks had been invented before the war, but Skyggebjerg (Chapter 11 in this book) notes that the reliability of motor vehicles was untested under battle conditions and, in general, their use was hampered by a lack of standardisation which made repairs difficult. There were no great innovations in that field, but production capacity was increased dramatically. Aeroplanes are a marked difference. At the beginning of the war, they were still very much in their infancy. During the war, they were developed and refined (recognition planes, fighter planes, and bomber planes). But Skyggebjerg (Chapter 11, p. 249 in this book) maintains that they did not play a decisive role in the war, but were “a new and spectacular technology … very visible and full of symbolic meaning.”

Skyggebjerg made an interesting observation concerning radio and trucks: yes, they did contribute to the war effort, but cable communication was far more common than radio, and trains, horses, and mules much more important than trucks.

Regarding the trucks and aeroplanes Skyggebjerg mentions, the armistice meant that hundreds if not thousands of each category were no longer needed and were sold for civilian purposes, thus helping to mechanise transportation – one example is that all but one aeroplane of the newly-founded Danish Aviation Company were old planes from the war.

**The impact on medicine**

Machine guns and hitherto unseen amounts of artillery inflicted not only deaths but also wounds, wounded soldiers who had to be treated. Dolev (2007: 5) quotes T. H. Goodwin’s statement from 1917 on the objectives of military surgery: “The whole object of medical service in war is to provide men for the fighting line, to keep them fit, and if sick or wounded, to make them fit and ready for further fighting as soon as possible.” New types of wounds made by fragments of shrapnel, poison gas, and burns from flamethrowers challenged military surgery and new techniques and cures had to be invented, new organisations of military field hospitals and transportation had to be made, rehabilitation and – for some – artificial limbs had to be made, and were made.

Dr Lars P. Nielsen has provided the following four paragraphs on the relationship between medicine and war:
The medical field was in a transition state in the beginning of World War 1 (WW1). During the war the medical profession expanded and developed many novel methods, which later were used in the daily clinic. The war was later called “an efficient schoolmaster” as many trials using novel procedures and modalities were performed as the war resulted in urgent need for fighting war related diseases and consequences.

Louis Pasteur died in 1895 and his ideas was slowly changing the view on infectious diseases as being caused by microorganism. During the World War 1 vaccination for typhoid fever reduced the fatality rate of this severe infection. Furthermore, the treatment for tetanus in the form of vaccines, anti-toxins and not at least improved surgical skills reduced the number of tetanus cases during the years of war. The invention and use of Thomas’ splint was also important in reducing soft tissue injury and immobilizing fractures- a concept still in use today. The many injuries highlighted the need for rehabilitation and special hospitals for such purposes was introduced and due to its success a need for bringing the preventive and curative medicine together was envisioned.

Bomb shelling resulted in severe psychological problems (shell shock) and the diagnostic capabilities were indeed developed as a consequence of the many victims of bombs. This new symptom complex was a consequence of more efficient weapons and war machinery.

Despite the rapid improvement in many medical areas, the Spanish pandemic influenza hit both the military personnel and young civilians hard. The global infection caused an estimated 50-100 million human fatalities in just 9 months.

However, with World War I a new era of relations between technical war and disease had begun.”

Summing up
Trying to sum up, it is obvious that World War 1 did have an impact on science, technology, and medicine, and World War 1 was a technological war but, as Skyggebjerg noted in this volume (p. 247), some of the new inventions did not win the war – like aeroplanes, poison gas, and tanks.
Much military equipment developed during the war was further developed (for example, tanks and aeroplanes). Poison gas is still a threat to people, soldiers and civilians alike. Soldiers in modern armies all have gasmasks as part of their equipment, giving them a kind of protection, a protection that the civilians in Iraq and Syria did not enjoy when poison gas was used on them by dictators Saddam Hussein and Bashar Hafez al-Assad respectively, and poison gas in the hands of terrorist groups belong to today’s nightmares – one just has to think of the Tokyo subway sarin attack in March 1995.

Much of the knowledge gained treating the wounded has helped medicine progress, as is the case with, for example, orthopaedic surgery (Schoenfeld 2011: 691) or the experiences of the Spanish Flu do for the prevention of pandemics (Clarke 2016: 941-942).

The war was indeed a rough schoolmaster.

Concluding remarks

What if Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary had not changed the route of his cortège that fateful day in August 1914 in Sarajevo, and had not passed by the assassin Gavrilo Princip? Perhaps World War 1 would not have happened, and thus no Russian Revolution, no Fascism or Nazism, no Holocaust, no World War 2, no Pearl Harbor, no nuclear bombs, no Cold War, no Chinese Revolution, no...? This is an interesting but unanswerable ‘what if’ in history. The fact is that World War 1 did happen, the Urkatastrofe of the twentieth century, and that it has influenced and shaped our present day world culturally, politically, socially, economically, scientifically, and technologically. World War 1 changed Europe, from the continent projecting power to the rest of the world, to being a chess piece in the game of larger powers (first the US and Russia, today only the US).

In this chapter, the results and conclusions of the previous chapters have been accumulated and analysed, and there were many impacts, which raises the question: which were the most important ones? Using the criterion of focusing on the stability of the international system, three important impacts will be emphasised:

- The Russian Revolution resulted in a different societal model. It also led to millions of people’s deaths and suffering. It aimed at fundamentally changing the world, and challenging the capitalist system. Its antagonism to capitalist states and its militant anti-colonialism laid the foundation for the Cold War (1947 – 1991).
Additionally the Soviet Union exported the revolution to China.

- In the decades before World War 1, the economic system had been stable and the centre of it was Europe. After the war, the system was not re-stabilised, the centre of gravity had moved to New York, and it lasted until the 1960s before most (West-) European states had recovered economically.
- The rise of fascism – especially in Germany – as a result of World War 1, led to industrialised genocide, as well as to the outbreak of World War 2.

In other words, the impact of World War 1 has been enormous, and the war has shaped the world we live in today.

In this book, we have tried to approach World War 1 in an interdisciplinary way. In the first part of the book, we analysed the motivation of young men to go to war, using a psychological approach; then we looked at the causes and the course of the war using a historical approach combined with international relations theory. In the second part, we searched for the impacts, traces of the war in literature, in politics, in economy, and in science and technology, and summed up the impacts in the concluding chapter using the respective disciplines’ histories often combined with insights from political science and international relations. By doing so, we have gained a more nuanced understanding of the Great War’s importance.

That the War left impacts in all the fields of society and human activities we looked into is not surprising. What is surprising, is that the impacts are still felt it today’s world – not ‘only’ in literature, but also in politics (for example, universal suffrage in some parts of the world, but not all), international relations (for example the United Nations, a descendent of the League of Nations), in conflicts (for example, Iraq) and in cooperation (the EU, for example), in psychology (for instance, psychoanalysis and the recognition of shell shock), in economy (such as the rise of the US as the greatest economic power), in technology and science (like poison gas, but also better aeroplanes and better radio transmission), and in medicine (for example, the prevention of pandemics). One finds the impacts of the war in many places. The war was a brutal schoolmaster, and it caused enormous suffering (among which are Hitler’s, Mao’s, and Stalin’s campaigns of persecution). Trying to understand today’s very complex world requires knowing and understanding World War 1 and its impacts.
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Endnotes

1 It goes without saying that we do not claim to capture all developments, but we do try to identify the most important ones.

2 A good overview of European culture, including the timespan from World War 1 until the year 2000, is found in James Winders’ book (2001).

3 Culture is a central concept, and in the words of David Landes, (2000: 2) it makes “almost all the difference”. Geert Hofstede makes a very simple but useful distinction concerning culture, when dividing it into ‘Culture one’ and ‘Culture two’ (1991). ‘Culture one’ is culture in the classical meaning of the word, that is education, refinement, art etc. ‘Culture two’ includes the activities in ‘Culture one’ but is broader – very much broader -, including everyday work and routines like greeting, eating etc. Culture in this book is concerned mainly with ‘Culture one’.

4 This ‘Myth of the War Experience’ was not revived after World War 2; it was unique to World War 1 (cf. Mosse 1986).

5 I previously referred to Donna Baker’s (1975) use of this method.

6 Of the latter, one could mention ‘Dadaism’, which originated in Zürich during the war.

7 A memorial monument was erected in Marselisborg, Århus, for the 4000+ Danes who fell in the war, but the war has, generally speaking, been forgotten. Claus Bundgård Christen tells the story of the Danes forced to fight for Germany on the Western Front. They belonged to a group of persons who defined themselves as Danish, but were living in Germany after Denmark had lost the war against Prussia, as well as Schleswig-Holstein in 1864

8 History demonstrates several examples of how long time it takes to create a full, stable democracy. For example, in Great Britain, it took from the Reform Act of 1832 until 1928 for universal suffrage to be achieved, in France, the period lasted from the Revolution in 1789 until the present constitution was created in 1958. In Denmark the period lasted from 1849 until universal suffrage was introduced in 1915.
9 Nazism is seen as a variation of fascism. See Kedshaw 2004: 241.

10 Kershaw (2004) gives an overview of the different approaches to understanding how Nazism rose in Germany.

11 For an analysis of the revolution, see further below. Among the hundreds of descriptions and analyses of the Russian Revolution and the history of the Soviet Union, Edward Acton (1995) is recommendable.

12 In Canada, the Wartime Elections Act from 1917 gave the right to vote to the wives, widows, mothers, and sisters of soldiers serving overseas, opening for universal suffrage in 1918, thus marking a direct link between the war and the beginning of the emancipation of women in that country.

13 This pattern was repeated when World War 2 broke out.

14 Blum, Eloranta, and Osinsky (2014) deliver an excellent analysis of the ‘Organization of War Economies’ in their article of the same name.

15 It is worth remembering that during the interbellum there were large proportions of the people, and also the elites, who were not interested in a new war. Mosse (1986: 494) wrote “The Myth of War Experience could disguise but never eliminate accurate memories of the past, as manifested in the reluctance of most men and women to wage war again.” And the same reluctance, this time in the British parliament specifically, has been described by Martin Gilbert (2012).

16 See for example. J. P. D. Dunbabin 1994 (a) for a detailed overview of international relations from World War 2 until the beginning of the 1990s.

17 See e.g. J. P. D. Dunbabin 1994 (b) for a detailed overview of international relations from World War 2 until the beginning of the 1990s. The first chapter gives a short overview.

18 This headline was also the title of Ernst Haas’ famous book from 1958 establishing the neo-functionalist school, within theory of regional integration.
See, for example, Dosenrode 2012, Chapter 2 for an introduction to Europe’s unification.

For a discussion of the EU’s answer to the economic crisis see, for example, Zank (2015a).

For an introduction to the Middle East, see Dosenrode & Stubkjær (2002: 35-51) for a short introduction, or Kamrava (2013) for a detailed analysis. Zank (2015b) analyses the Middle East with regard to regional integration, or the lack of it, and there also analyses the conflicts of the region.

A solid overview is found in Nasson (2014).

Perhaps a hint of another reason for ignoring Africa is found in Clemenceau’s speech delivered to the French Senate on 20 February 1918, in which he stated: “We are going to offer civilisation to the Blacks. They will have to pay for that [...] I would prefer that ten Blacks are killed rather than one Frenchman!” (quoted by Koller).

Koller (2014) estimates that around 708,000 indigenous Africans were either soldiers (440,000) or war workers (268,000), but his figures seem a bit inaccurate, as he writes a bit further on that France (alone) used 450,000 indigenous troops. The important thing being that the amount was large, implying that many African families, especially in French colonies, were affected by having a son, a brother, or a father in the war.

See also Balesi 1990: 186-187.

Lunn (2015) has estimated that around 708,000 civilians died in Africa due to the war.

The last large mandate of the League of Nations was Namibia, which gained independence in 1990 after years of resistance to the South African occupation.


Clements (2005) argues that the crucial decision leading to the USA entering the war was made already in 1914-1915 by a number of nei-
ther well-considered nor rational answers to a number of occurrences. He also points to the sinking of the *Lusitania* as a crucial factor. Frank Trommler (2009) analyses the effect of the sinking of the *Lusitania* not only on the American public, but also on the search for an American unity for the American nation, a cultural independence, and the hysteria against socialists.

30 Showalter (2002) has made a good overview of the literature on the US in World War 1.

31 David R. Mayhew has isolated eight domestic policy changes attributed to World War 1 (2005: 477-448): Progressive taxation; a record high protective tariff; a national budgeting system; prohibition; women’s suffrage; immigration restrictions; domestic intelligence; and the cartelization of the railroads under tight government management.

32 ‘Jim Crow’ was a nickname for the segregationist laws dividing whites and blacks, first finally abolished in 1965.

33 Declaration made by US President James Monroe 1823 on US’ foreign relations. For an analysis of the doctrine, see ‘Monroe Doctrine, 1823’.

34 Technically, the whole empire joined the war when Britain declared war on 4 August. One of the features of the War was that it increased national self-awareness in the constituent parts of the empire. In 1919, George V could have ratified the Treaty simply upon the advice of the Westminster Parliament, but instead the government chose to wait until all the Dominion parliaments had approved the treaty.

35 For further discussion of this, see McManus 1992: 2

36 The Peace of Westphalia formally ended the 30-Years War in 1648, and created a system of sovereign states in Europe.

37 Olesen’s word ‘somehow’ is important, as the Great Depression is normally not attributed to World War 1. Tooze and Fertik (2014: 237) write that “The economic confusion of the moment [the Depression] were as much due to the supersession of competitive markets by oligopolistic firms and the new significance of materials found only in far-flung parts of the world as they were to the war and nationalism.”
38 This also spilled over to human life in the form of the modernisation and industrialisation of life itself, destroying the value of individual life, as mentioned above.

39 The most important German tank-tactics developer was General Heinz Guderian. In France general Charles de Gaulle pleaded for the use of tanks, too, but in vain.

40 Dolev (2007:10-11) tells how British military surgeons used to operate on soldiers wounded in their abdomens at once, until they realized that those not undergoing surgery survived at a higher rate than those having immediate surgery; then the technique was reconsidered and changed.

41 It goes without saying that the author of these lines does not in any way try to justify the unnecessary bloodshed and suffering arising from the war.

42 Sharp, in his excellent monograph from 2010, emphasises the German question, the League of Nations, developments in minority rights and international public law, and the rise of the US as the important legacies.
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The Great War belongs to one of modern world history’s most important periods, rivaled only by the Thirty Years’ War and its peace agreement in Westphalia in 1648. The results of the Great War left their impact on the whole world, including:

- the move of economic power from Europe to the United States of America
- the construction of the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire
- the transferal of German colonies to the victorious powers via the League of Nations
- the Russian Revolution, and
- the developments in *inter alia* Germany smoothing the path for World War 2 and the Cold War.

The traces of the War can be followed well into the twenty-first century, too.

In this book, we will analyze the War itself and trace its impacts. This will be done using an interdisciplinary approach: the best way to get a broad understanding of the War as the book’s aim is to do a comprehensive ‘360 degree’ analysis of the impacts, finding them in culture, economy, politics, and technology.

This book gives a comprehensive introduction to World War 1, and it is an essential companion for students studying World War 1 or aspects of it.

*This wide-ranging and valuable interdisciplinary examination of World War 1 offers insights that reach beyond conventional military, economic, and diplomatic studies of the war and its impact, though these are addressed. It assesses the psychological, cultural, medical, and technological changes influenced or brought about by the conflict, both at the time and subsequently, and analyses the role played by that war in long-term developments in China. The information on the impact of the War on neutral Denmark gives it an interesting and rewarding perspective. Together, these essays add much to our knowledge and understanding of the wide-ranging legacy of what was, undoubtedly, the single most important event of the twentieth century – the Great War.*

Alan Sharp. Emeritus Professor of International History, University of Ulster

*Highly relevant and highly welcomed focus on the long shadow of the First World War.*

*This is a book reminding us about the fact that the Second World War was not the only motivating factor behind the process of creating the institutionalized European Cooperation in the second half of the twentieth century. It also gives us valuable insight into the problems of meeting the challenges and threats of the perception of the nation state as the sole actor in an already somewhat globalized world. The book is also valuable because it gives us such a multifaceted exposure of the period.*

Poul Nielson
Former Member of the European Commission
Former Danish Minister (S) of Energy and of Development Cooperation
Honorary Professor af the University of Aalborg